Incidents at Russian London buildings & RT Diplomats
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.23.028298
I note you seek access to the following information:
During the past 12 months how many times have the Metropolitan Police attended the following addresses in response to calls for service or incidents:
Buildings at The Trade Delegation of Russia in the United Kingdom 32 – 33 Highgate West Hill, London N6 6N
The Russian Defence Office at 44 Millfield Lane, London N6 6JB
The Russian Embassy at Kensington Palace Gardens, London, W8 4QP
If so please could you provide a copy of the CAD messages in relation to each call and attendance or reasons for call and details of the incidents.
During the past 12 months does the MPS have details of the number of times and incidents where Russian accredited diplomats have claimed Diplomatic Immunity in relation to a Policing matter?
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal Information
Reason for decision
The disclosure of individual CAD records has been exempted as its disclosure would identify police methodologies, the focus of police activities and areas of interest and information relating to incidents that may be the subject of ongoing enquiries or investigation, all of which are exempt by virtue of Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act.
Section 31 - Law Enforcement - FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information.
To disclose further details of CAD records would be harmful to the MPS’ law enforcement role and current and future investigations, as it would allow members of the public to define the general steps taken in relation to law enforcement, in that they would be able to identify the type of tactics employed by the MPS in responding to reported incidents.
There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by releasing information relating to operational tactics. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of a police operation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how information is garnered and how police respond to incidents, which would provide criminals of today with an insight into how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.
This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.
Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics as disclosing the methods and resources employed in response to the reporting of incidents would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk.
Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies used by the MPS.
The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during its initial response and investigation of reported incidents and the public release of the modus operandi employed would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of similar incidents.
Additionally MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.
I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh not disclosing information relating to operational methods employed by the MPS. To disclose how the police respond to reported incidents and conducted their enquiries (i.e. gather information and record intelligence) would allow criminals an insight into police investigations and ultimately how to evade prosecution.
Section 40(2)(3) of the Act is engaged as to disclose personal information in relation to your request could publicly reveal details of names, telephone numbers and other personal information relating to victims, officers and others involved in the incidents reported, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
Section 40 - Personal information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would reveal personal information relating to any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that the details of certain current residential addresses would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.
The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of names, telephone numbers and other information relating to individuals that is recorded on CAD records constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the person(s) concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.
In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1) (a) and 6(1) (e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.
Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.
When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.
Please also note that the MPS do not provide statistical data for short periods (such as in-month timeframes) as this would allow a detailed picture of crime patterns to be built up through multiple requests and, particularly when related to individual locations, give an indication of whether information is held regarding specific incidents.
Disclosure
I can therefore provide the following data regarding CADs recorded during the calendar year 2022.
During this period there were no recorded CADs for Buildings at The Trade Delegation of Russia in the United Kingdom 32–33 Highgate West Hill, London N6 6NL or The Russian Defence Office at 44 Millfield Lane, London N6 6JB.
328 CADs were recorded linked to the address of The Russian Embassy at Kensington Palace Gardens, London, W8 4QP. These CADs were recorded as covering the following types of incidents:
• Assault
• Criminal Damage
• Drugs
• Road Traffic Collision (RTC) - Damage only
• Road Related offence
• Anti-social Behaviour (ASB)
• Abandoned Call
• Collapse/Illness
• Concern for Safety
• Suspicious Incident
• Protest/Demonstration
• Urgent Assistance
• Complaint Against Police
• Lost/Found Property
• Messages
• Police Generated Activity
• Pre-Planned Events
• Contact Record
Regarding the final part of your request I can confirm that, since the start of 2022, there has been one named diplomat who was the suspect in a speeding offence. A second speeding offence was recorded in 2022 for a diplomatic vehicle registered to the Russian Embassy however a driver was not nominated to the MPS and it was referred to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) to deal with.
Please note that whilst a diplomat enjoying immunity/inviolability under the Vienna Convention is technically “claiming immunity” with regards to a speeding matter, they are still liable for the equivalent sanction (in terms of monetary fine) as per a normal member of the public – this, however, is administered in a different way.
The relevant fine (typically £100) is imposed but is handled by the FCDO rather than the relevant Force’s Safety Camera Processing department. Furthermore, the equivalent points are recorded on the diplomat’s Diplomatic Driving Permit (rather than a UK-issued DVLA Licence). Repeat offending can jeopardise the diplomatic agent’s presence in the UK.