Equality Impact Assessments (EIAs) - For Operations Crosshair, Oregrande, Orochi, Pandilla and Wordwell

 

I note you seek access to the following information:

 

For ease of reference this FOIA request is a cost refusal follow up of closed case 22/27097 for which the MPS issues a cost refusal Section 12(1) exemption.

 

1. For Operations Wordwell, Orochi, Crosshair, Pandilla and Oregrande, please provide, for each operation, the relevant Equality Impact Assessments (EIAs) that apply to them. We understand that none of the operations have bespoke EIAs but are instead covered by EIAs the Met has for overarching areas of policing. If no EIAs at all apply, please clearly state that. 

 

2. For Operations Orochi, Crosshair, Pandilla and Oregrande, please provide any documents that can be located within 18 hours that lay out their focus/target. This could be a strategy document, a plan, a list of aims and objectives etc. Please also provide the location that each operation focused on, e.g. Barking and Dagenham.

 

3.  For Operations Orochi, Pandilla and Oregrande, please detail how many arrests were made.

I have today decided to disclose some information located information to you today.

 

In respect of Question One (1), the MPS is able to confirm information what information is or is not held/recorded. Please see the Disclosure section of this response letter for further information.

 

In respect of Question Two (2) the MPS is able to disclose some information held for this part of your request. Some information in a redacted briefing for Operation Crosshair and some information within two redacted documents relating to Operation Pandilla cannot be disclosed today as they are exempt by virtue of either one of the following exemptions;

 

- Section 40(2)(3A)(a) (Personal Information)

- Section 31(1)(a) (Law Enforcement)

 

In respect of Question Two (2) regarding Operation Orochi, the MPS has been able to locate the MPS County Lines Business Case which is pertinent to your request. On careful consideration, certain sections of this Business Case is exempt from disclosure by virtue of the following exemption;

 

- Section 31(1)(a) (Law Enforcement)

 

In regards to Question Two (2), I am also not required by statute to release additional information pertinent to your request which is exempt under Section 21 (Information readily accessible by other means). For ease of reference the MPS is happy to provide a link instead to the already publicly available information under the Disclosure section of this response letter below.

 

In respect of Question Three (3), the MPS is able to disclose information held in full.

 

Additionally, the MPS is required to engage the following exemption for this FOIA request;

 

- Section 23(5) Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies

 

As some information is exempt from disclosure, this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act).  

 

 

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under Freedom of Information, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world and not just to one individual. 

 

Section 23(5) - (information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies)

 

Section 21 - (Information accessible to applicant by other means)

 

Section 40(2)&(3A)(a) - Personal Information Section - The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information. 

 

40(2)(a)(b) of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. 

 

The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act. 

 

There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (UK GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. 

 

Under Article 6(1)(f)  of the UK GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:

 

a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.

b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.

c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.

 

Under Article 6(1)(f)  of the UK GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is not considered to be lawful as it contains:

 

• Personal information regarding living individuals

 

Some individual members of the public may feel there is to some degree a legitimate interest in the disclosure of the redacted personal information.

 

However, the rationale for redacting information is that disclosure is not necessary to satisfy the legitimate interest in disclosure and/or may cause unwarranted harm to one or more data subjects. Consequently, it would be disproportionate to disclose the redacted information.

 

Additionally there is not an overwhelming legitimate interest in full disclosure in consideration of the information that has been disclosed today which is less likely to identify individuals and undermine policing and confidence in our handling of personal information. 

 

Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that individuals would not reasonably expect their personal information to be published in response to this specific Freedom of Information Act request regarding recent working Operations that are in place to prevent and detect crime. 

 

The disclosure provided today demonstrates accountability and transparency and is important to the MPS. The rationale for non-disclosure is based on the fact there is little necessity to disclose this personal information to meet a legitimate interest and that disclosure may cause unwarranted harm in its disclosure to the individuals to which the data refers in their personal capacity. The MPS find it would be disproportionate to disclose the redacted information. 

 

Disclosure of the full information you have requested is likely to allow for the identification of a very small number of individuals.

 

Constant adverse FOIA disclosure of crime related as well as personal staff information erodes the trust and confidence the public has in the ability of the police to handle personal information, particularly that relating to crime facts in a sensitive and discreet manner. This in turn may lead to a chilling effect in terms of the erosion of trust in police resulting in an under-reporting of crime.

 

Section 31(1)(a)  (Law Enforcement) - Law enforcement measures (including those which relate to tackling County Lines) are put in place to protect the community that we serve. Other than the information that you have been given access to today, any further disclosure of information held is exempt to protect operational and policing tactics and intelligence regarding recent operations at a local as well as cross force level. 

 

Disclosure of the redacted information would enable criminals to assess police resources at a given point in time, methodology in regards to preventing and detecting crime, including but not limited to that in relation to County Lines. The redacted information can be used to ascertain if crime or criminal methods and activity may be likely to go unreported and undetected at a given point in time. Disclosure may give a false confidence on how criminals may be able to evade detection in future, by understanding policing methodology and resource details redacted today. The public interest is served by the disclosure today (and that already available online) without allowing for the undermining of policing operations, tactics, technique and resources.

 

Disclosure would undermine the public’s trust in the police to handling tactical information regarding operations to prevent and detect crime today and in the future. Full disclosure may then lead to a underreporting and a decrease in contact with the police. This is a risk should the public fear constant adverse disclosures under FOIA will identify them (in respect of local location information), their activities or allow others to identify individuals or tactics used to prevent and detect crime at a local or cross county level. 

 

Under-reporting of crime is a real concern to the MPS and disclosure regarding specific incidents (along with higher level County Lines operations that cross forces) may lead to that chilling effect amongst the community and erode trust in the police, which would not be in the public interest.

 

Full disclosure would involve releasing information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies and tactics available and used by the MPS and other police services across the country to evade police detection, especially if similar tactics and methodology is used in the future, particularly in regards to County Lines related crime.

 

Disclosure would undermine the public’s trust in police handling operations professionally, whether this be at a local level or cross force level (in terms of County Lines). Full disclosure is not in the public interest as disclosures that lead to a lack of confidence in policing due to adverse disclosures regarding methodology and tactics may be likely in turn to lead to under-reporting. Creating and maintaining public trust in the police is a vital priority to help cut and detect crime. Disclosure may also lead to a decrease in contact with the police, should the public fear constant adverse disclosures under FOIA about technical aspects of Operations which allow individuals to try and assess if actions have are or are likely to have gone unreported or evaded.

 

Under reporting of crime (particularly in regards to organised and serious crime) is a real concern to the MPS. Full disclosure regarding specific Operations undertaken to protect the public may lead to that chilling effect amongst the community and erode trust in the police, which would not be in the public interest. Disrupting high harm offenders is vital and adverse disclosures would undermine policing.

 

The full disclosure of information would not, in the view of the MPS, greatly further the public’s understanding and instead could only be used to hinder law enforcement and crime prevention.   

 

The strongest reason favouring full disclosure is the public interest in the public gaining the greatest possible understanding of policing Operations that take place at a local as well as cross force level.

 

The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is ensuring public safety is not compromised (by disclosing information held for a policing purpose), that will aid individuals evading detection or hinder the MPS preventing crime.

 

This decision is reached on the understanding that the public interest is not what interests the public, but is what would be of greater good to the public if disclosed to the public as a whole. As advised, the Public Interest has been met to a large extent by the information already disclosed into the public domain today. 

 

 

 

• Operation Wordwell - No recorded information is held. 

 

• Operation Orochi - The MPS held an internal review at Operation Orochi (the MPS County Lines Taskforce) of the requirement for an EIA by undertaking an Equality Impact Assessment screening exercise. The outcome of which established that Orochi does not fulfil the requirements of an EIA. This position has remained unchanged since Operation Orochi commenced in November 2019, and is subject to periodic review.

 

• Operation Crosshair - No recorded information is held

 

• Operation Pandilla - No recorded information is held

 

• Oregrande - No recorded information is held

 

 

• Operation Orochi – The MPS has been able to locate the MPS County Lines Business Case and disclose it in part. Redactions undertaken in the document are engaged by virtue of;

 

- Section 31(1)(a) (Law Enforcement)

 

Please also find the links to information requested which provides the information regarding this Operation and information which may be of interest to you;

 

 

 

MOPAC website - Home Office Grant Funding Operation Orochi Uplift 2021

 

 

• Operation Crosshair – The MPS is able to locate and disclose a redacted version of a located Operation Crosshair Briefing. Information exempt from disclosure within this briefing is by virtue of;

 

- Section 40(2)(3A)(a) (Personal Information)

- Section 31(1)(a) (Law Enforcement)

 

• Operation Pandilla - The MPS is able to disclose a redacted version of two located Operation Pandilla Tactical Plans. Information redacted from the Plans contains exemptions from disclosure by virtue of;

 

- Section 40(2)(3A)(a) (Personal Information)

- Section 31(1)(a) (Law Enforcement)

 

• Operation Oregrande – The MPS has been able to locate information held at the time of your request which confirms; “This relates to VSU patrols for Robbery, Knife Crime and Violence against women. This was in September 2021”. 

 

The MPS can confirm VSU refers to ‘Violence Suppression Unit’.

 

Q3 - For Operations Orochi, Pandilla and Oregrande, please detail how many arrests were made.

 

• Operation Orochi - From inception in November 2019 until December 2022, Op Orochi has arrested 1,484 persons, of which 88% (1,308 individuals) went on to be charged. 

 

• Operation Pandilla - As of 08/09/2022, arrest figures were as follows:

	Met arrests	County force arrests	Total arrests
Op PANDILLA 6	132	66	198
Op PANDILLA 7	85	57	142
Op PANDILLA 8	23	40	63

Operation Pandilla 9 took place between 4 to 6 October 2022. As at 28 October 2022, arrest figures were as follows:

	Met arrests	County force arrests	Total arrests
Op PANDILLA 9	22	34	56

 

• Operation Oregrande - One (1) individual is recorded to have been arrested.