Quickly exit this site by pressing the Escape key Leave this site
We use some essential cookies to make our website work. We’d like to set additional cookies so we can remember your preferences and understand how you use our site.
You can manage your preferences and cookie settings at any time by clicking on “Customise Cookies” below. For more information on how we use cookies, please see our Cookies notice.
Your cookie preferences have been saved. You can update your cookie settings at any time on the cookies page.
Your cookie preferences have been saved. You can update your cookie settings at any time on the cookies page.
Sorry, there was a technical problem. Please try again.
This site is a beta, which means it's a work in progress and we'll be adding more to it over the next few weeks. Your feedback helps us make things better, so please let us know what you think.
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.025751
I note you seek access to the following information:
Please provide all complaints or conduct cases where body worn video is mentioned in the summary section or a flag has been added, as suggest by the PAU.
This is based on the understanding that there may complaints which are not included in this collated data. Please state the year of the incident and a description of the mis-use (e.g. the camera was turned off by an officer) and complaint outcome (upheld/misconduct verdict etc).
Please proceed with this amended request or process as a new request, whichever is preferable to you.
******
PREVIOUS REQUEST -
Under the Freedom of Information Act, please can you provide me with the following:
1/ All records of mis-use or incorrect use of body worn video over the last four years (from January 1st 2018 to the date this response is answered), providing the year of the incident and a description of the mis-use (e.g. the camera was turned off by an officer). If the force does not collect these records, please state why it does not scrutinise use of this policing tool.
2/ All records of any known complaints made about mis-use or incorrect use of body worn video over the last four years (from January 1st 2018 to the date this response is answered), providing the year of the incident, description and complaint (e.g. video turned off or video not turned on).
3/ All records of all misconduct cases against officers for mis-use or incorrect use of body worn video over the last four years (from January 1st 2018 to the date this response is answered), providing the year of the incident, description of the mis-use and reason for misconduct, and misconduct outcome and investigatory body (e.g. management advice by PSD).
These searches successfully located the information relevant to your request. I have disclosed the located information to you in the attached document. Please note, some data within the attached document is redacted. I have redacted details such as the names of the general public, Police officers and Police staff, so as not to contravene Data Protection principles. I have also redacted data that would identify policing tactics, as well as entries where the case is still ongoing and awaiting an outcome.
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 30(1)(a) - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities
Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)&(3A)(a) - Personal Data
Reason for decision
Section 30(1)(a)(i) - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities - Whilst there are some areas of overlap between section 30 and 31, section 30 provides an exemption in relation to a particular criminal investigation and is engaged when there is a link between the data and the investigation. Some of the requested data pertains to ongoing investigations which are still awaiting the final outcome. In some cases the summary box may simply outline whether the case relates to the misuse of BWV, for example ‘neither officer activated their BWV whilst attending this incident’. In other cases the summary field provides this data in addition to the complainants and officers names, as well as a detailed description specific to the offences. Due consideration has been given to this fact in the public interest test below.
Revealing policing interest - The requested data is held by the MPS for the purpose of each criminal investigation.
The ICO guidance states ‘52. In a democratic society it is important that offences can be effectively investigated and prosecuted. However, the public needs to have confidence in the ability of the responsible public authorities to uphold the law and the public interest will be served by disclosures which serve that purpose’.
You are seeking information about ‘all complaints or conduct cases where body worn video is mentioned in the summary section or a flag has been added’ over the last four years. Disclosing this data without redaction would show exactly where policing interest has or has not occurred in relation to specific allegations. It is not the policy of MPS to disclose who is or has been the subject of its investigations, whether that subject be a member of the public or a serving officer or member of Police staff. Providing such data could undermine the integrity of police investigations and operations, and could have far reaching consequences.
I have found that there is a inherent public interest in seeing that investigations are carried out properly by providing the specifics of public complaints and conduct matters, some of which are related to the misuse of BWV. It shows the extent to which these incidents are logged and investigated. It also provides reassurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively dealing with crime, even within our own ranks.
However, there is also a compelling argument that the release of all requested data could undermine our approach to investigations, in that there is an clear expectation that criminal investigations are dealt with confidentially and that the MPS does not disclose who may be subject of its investigations for the purposes of fulfilling a FOIA request. It is my assessment that this point outweighs the public interest in obtaining further information in some cases, especially in investigations that are currently ongoing. Accordingly, I have applied a Section 30 to this request.
Section 31(1)(a)(1)(g) by virtue of (2)(b) - Law Enforcement - Section 31(1)(a) allows public authorities to withhold information if it is likely to or would prejudice ‘The prevention or detection of crime’. It is a qualified exemption and as such makes it subject to a public interest test. In order to conduct this test I must consider the public interest considerations favouring disclosure and non-disclosure. Section 31 is also subject to a prejudice test, so I will consider what potential harm would result from disclosing the requested information.
Eroding public trust - There are a number of factors which effect the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime. One of which centres on public engagement and public trust. How comfortable are the public with reporting alleged offences and crime perpetrated by MPS staff? Can the MPS be trusted with information provided by the public? When a member of the public contacts the police to make a complaint, there is an expectation that the allegation will remain confidential. This consensus allows the public the confidence to report allegations and offences about MPS personnel, without the fear of being identified to the wider public. It could be argued that by providing you all of the summary entries without redaction could lead to the identification of the individual who made the complaint.
I have found that there is a clear public interest in providing alleged police wrong doing in relation to the ‘mis-use or incorrect use of body worn video’. The MPS want to be as open and transparent as possible and therefore it is imperative that the appropriate information is made available to the public. This should not however, hinder one of the core functions of the MPS, which is the prevention or detection of crime.
There is a no doubt that providing the public with a deeper insight into some of the public complaints and conduct matters that have been logged is a good thing. It shows the nature of some complaints which are received and that these complaints are subsequently investigated. This must however, be weighed up against the risk that the data released could erode public trust, which does not not encourage the public to highlight alleged wrong doing, which in turn negatively affects the MPS’s law enforcement function. It is my assessment that the release of the data without redaction would do this and therefore certain parts of the data have been redacted by virtue of Section 31(1)(a).
Section 40(2)&(3A)(a) - Personal data - is both an absolute and class based exemption which means there is no requirement on the MPS to consider whether there is a public interest in disclosure. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. Section 40(3A)(a) states that public authorities will not disclose information which constitutes personal data if the disclosure would contravene any of the Data Protection principles.
To disclose the document without redaction would publicly reveal information about individuals which would contravene Data Protection principles. The Data Protection Act 2018 defines personal data as any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual. There are six data protection principles set out in section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). The first principle requires personal data to be processed in a ‘lawful and fair’ manner. The basis for determining what constitutes lawful and fair is outlined under section 35 of the DPA. Under section 35(2) it states:
• the data subject has given consent to the processing for that purpose, or
• the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for that purpose by a competent authority.
It is important to note that we do not have the consent of the data subjects and the release of the data will not be used for a law enforcement process.
Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:
• There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
• The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
• The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.
Having considered your request, I have found that the attached document contains a range of personal data and criminal offence data, in relation to Police officers and staff and the public. By means of a legitimate interest test I have considered the release of the personal data, and I have found that:
The names of Staff members -
• Disclosing the names of MPS officers and staff would provide specific details regarding who is/was the subject of public complaints and conduct matters.
• The legitimate interest in transparency would be further satisfied through the release of this information.
• Officers and staff would not reasonably expect their names to be published in response to a Freedom of Information Act request for a non-law enforcement purpose. In this regard, the public release of their personal data would be unexpected, unfair and distressing to the data subject(s) and could lead to unwanted and unsolicited intrusion from the media and/or others interested in the specifics of their complaint and conduct matter.
The names of the public -
• Disclosing the names of the public would identify exactly who has made a complaint.
• I have not identified a legitimate interest that would be satisfied through the release of this information.
• Policing London relies on the trust and confidence. The MPS receive communication from the public routinely be it reporting a crime or making a complaint. In the course of such communications, their contact details will need to be logged. The public have a legitimate expectation that the MPS would not publicly release and publish their names in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. The MPS must consider how we process personal data and without their explicit consent, the sharing of their personal data would be harmful, and cause alarm and distress to the data subjects. I therefore find it justified to withhold the names of the public that are contained within the attached document.
Criminal Offence Data -
• The requested data contains personal criminal offence data. The Information Commissioner (the ombudsman for the Act) guidance on the release of personal criminal offence data under the Act states:
“Due to its sensitivity, the conditions for processing criminal offence data are very restrictive and generally concern specific, stated purposes. Consequently, only two are relevant to allow you to lawfully disclose under FOIA or the EIR. They are similar to those identified above for special category data. These are:
• consent from the data subject; or
• the processing relates to personal data which has clearly been made public by the individual concerned.
If a relevant condition cannot be met, you must not disclose the information as disclosure would be unlawful and therefore in contravention of principle (a).”
• The conditions required to release personal criminal offence data are not present in this case. The release of the requested personal data does not accordingly satisfy a legitimate interest and cannot be disclosed under the Act.
USE OF BODY WORN VIDEO - Between 2018 and 2022, Met officers activated body worn video (BWV) to record their actions and interactions with members of the public on 19,411,101 occasions. This should be taken into account when considering the 630 cases in which BWV is mentioned in the summary section of complaints or conduct matters.
DATA CAVEATS - The attached data shows complaints or conduct cases where BWV is mentioned in the summary section. DPS use a system called Centurion for the recording, management and process control of Police Professional Standards data. It provides the ability to monitor the investigation processes of a case by an investigating officer, including the investigation plan and investigation actions. There is no specific classification, or offence code on Centurion relating to mis-use or incorrect use of BWV. The specifics of any complaint or conduct case is contained within the details of the centurion report and therefore may not necessarily be contained in the summary box. This means the results obtained may have BWV contained within the summary section but the case may not actually relate to the mis-use or incorrect use of body worn video. I have included a column titled Does the case relate to misuse of BWV to clarify which cases relate to the alleged misuse of BWV and which do not.
Please note that one case can have multiple officers and multiple allegations attached to it. For example one case could have two allegations but only one is related to BWV. This has resulted in some entries appearing mutiple times.
Differences between a Conduct Matter & Public Complaint -
Conduct Matter - A Conduct Matter arises in any circumstances where there has not been a public complaint but the circumstances indicate that an officer or member of police staff may have either committed a criminal offence or behaved in a way that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings.
Public Complaint - Public Complaints refer to allegations received externally from individuals outside of the organisation.
Disclosure
Please find below redacted information pursuant to your request above.