Amazon Ring internet-connected camera-enabled doorbells
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.19.012185
I note you seek access to the following information:
- Has your force partnered with Ring to provide Ring’s internet-connected camera-enabled doorbells to the public in your force area for free or at a discount between 1st January 2018 and 1st October 2019?
- If the answer to questions 1 is positive, can you please disclose how many cameras have been distributed by your force as a result, between 1st January 2018 and 1st October 2019.
To avoid any doubt, Ring is the brand name of Amazon's range of internet-connected camera-enabled doorbells. This the brand's website.
Decision
I have today decided to disclose the located information to you in full where the questions refer to held/recorded information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act).
In addition, and irrespective of what other information may or may not be held relating to any use of covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour, this request also requires the MPS to Neither Confirm Nor Deny whether it holds any further information. This is because the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions;
• Section 24(2) National Security
• Section 31(3) Law Enforcement
Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not the further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is held within this response for your questions.
Reasons for decision
Section 24(2) (National Security) and Section 31(3)(Law Enforcement) NCND -
Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives behind this specific request, confirming or denying that any information relating to the any possible covert practice of facial recognition would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct/undertake their criminal/terrorist activities.
Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the Police Service may or may not deploy the use of facial recognition would be likely to lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat has remained at the second highest level ‘severe’, except for two short periods during August 2006, June and July 2007, and more recently in May and June this year following the Manchester and London terrorist attacks, when it was raised to the highest threat, ‘critical’. The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists and the current threat level is set at
‘severe’.
It is well established that police services use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.
Confirming or denying whether any information is or isn’t held relating to covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorist would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities.
This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics may or may not be deployed. This can be useful information to those committing (or those intent on committing or planning) crime. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.
Please note this response should therefore not be taken to as an indication of whether or not the further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is held within this response for your questions.
The strongest reason favouring neither confirming nor denying whether additional information is held is to ensure law enforcement capabilities to protect national security are not undermined in any way whether additional information in this case is held or not.
The strongest reason favouring neither confirming nor denying whether additional information is held is to ensure law enforcement capabilities and methodology
(whether or not used in this instance) are not undermined by an adverse disclosure.
Confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation, for example to any possible covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour would potentially show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities.
Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not information in relation to the covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour is held or not.
Disclosure
Q1 - Has your force partnered with Ring to provide Ring’s internet-connected camera-enabled doorbells to the public in your force area for free or at a discount between 1st January 2018 and 1st October 2019?
The sponsorship agreement with Ring was for the supply of 64 Ring Video Doorbells, 64 chime units, 36 Ring spotlight cameras (wired/battery editions) and free cloud recording for 6 months, which was valued at £21,596 for a proactive burglary initiative in the London Borough of Barnet. These were received by the Metropolitan Police to be distributed directly to vulnerable or repeat victims of crime.
Q2 - If the answer to questions 1 is positive, can you please disclose how many cameras have been distributed by your force as a result, between 1st January 2018 and 1st October 2019.
We do not hold specific data for question 2 as we don’t know if the cameras were distributed, although the assumption is that they were.