Use of mobile fingerprinting by MPS

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.024613

I note you seek access to the following information:

I am writing to you because I wish to get information on the use of mobile fingerprinting by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). After trailing mobile fingerprinting technology in 2018 under the stop and scan scheme, it seems to have been rolled out across England.

I want to know if:

(1) Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) use mobile fingerprinting service? And has it ever employed it at any time since fingerprinting services were tested and rolled? If yes, for what period has it ran?

(2) If it has, how many times has it been employed? Please provide a breakup by year, starting from whenever it was first rolled to the present day?

(3) Could you also provide a breakup of people on which it was employed by nationality, gender and visa status?

(4) Of the people on which the service was used, how many were subsequently arrested, detained and/or deported? And on what counts? Again, a breakup by year.

(5) I also need access to the latest privacy impact assessment for holding of this information

CONTEXT -
We ran our own pilot of INK Biometrics (developed in house in 2018) after the previous contract for a mobile fingerprinting device ended - this type of technology has been in use since around 2011.
The Metropolitan Police (MPS) has not taken part in nor are we aware of any pilot scheme/tactic called stop and scan. Police can only use the devices under a power covered by S61 6(A) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

Section 61 6(A) PACE (6A) a constable may take a person's fingerprints if:
(a) The constable reasonably suspects the person is committing or attempting to commit an offence, or has committed or attempted to commit an offence and
(b) Either of the two conditions mentioned in subsection (6B) is met.
(6B) the conditions are:
(a) The name of the person is unknown to and cannot be readily ascertained by the constable or
(b) The constable has reasonable grounds for doubting whether a name furnished by the person as his name is his real name.

Fingerprints taken under the above power are submitted and searched against the police and immigration databases; they are deleted from the device once the search against the two systems has been completed.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)&(3) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

Before I explain the decisions that I have made in relation to your request, I thought that it would be helpful to outline the parameters set out by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act), within which a request for information can be answered. The Act creates a statutory right of access to information held by public authorities. A public authority in respect of a request must, if permitted, state under Section 1(a) of the Act, whether it holds the requested information and, if held, then communicate that information to the applicant under Section 1(b) of the Act.

The right of access to information is not without exception and is subject to a number of exemptions which are designed to enable public authorities to withhold information that is unsuitable for release. Importantly, the Act is designed to place information into the public domain, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received.

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement - Disclosure of any further information in regards to your request would cause operational harm to the MPS and affect our ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement. The release of such information would reveal tactical operational information which would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.

It is not in the public interest to disclose any further information as it would in effect, reveal law enforcement tactics and resources used to respond to such policing matters. Disclosure of the type of capabilities available to the police at a specific point in time would enable those individuals intent on committing criminal activity to circumvent methods used to prevent crime and apprehend offenders. This in turn hinders the ability of the MPS to carry out its core functions in law enforcement.

Section 40(2)&(3) Personal Information - I consider that Section 40(2) and 40(3A)(a) is applicable in this case, as disclosure of personal information, as would be contained within the document being requested, would breach the 1st data protection principle that requires personal data to be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to individuals.

There is no presumption of disclosure in relation to ‘personal data’ which is defined as: ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual’

“Identifiable living individual” means a living individual who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to—
(a) an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data or an online identifier, or
(b) one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of the individual.’

For such disclosure to be lawful, it would be necessary to satisfy a condition within Article 6 of the GDPR. Article 6 sets out the six lawful bases, applying to all processing; one of which must be in place in every case of disclosure of personal data under FOIA, in accordance with the First Data Protection Principle.

I am satisfied that the disclosure of personal data as would be contained within the requested information would be unwarranted in the circumstances of this request. This is because the disclosure of this personal data is not necessary to satisfy the legitimate public interest and in relation to personal data, there is no presumption of disclosure. Furthermore, none of the conditions specified within Article 6 of the GDPR would be met.

Disclosure

Q1- Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) use mobile fingerprinting service? And has it ever employed it at any time since fingerprinting services were tested and rolled? If yes, for what period has it ran?

The MPS uses an in house solution called INK. Mobile Fingerprinting was previously done using a device called MobileID which was third party and provided by the Home Office. All data for this request is from INK going back to 2018 when it went live.

Q2 - If it has, how many times has it been employed? Please provide a breakup by year, starting from whenever it was first rolled to the present day

Please see the attached data titled (searches by Month).

Q3 - Could you also provide a breakup of people on which it was employed by nationality, gender and visa status?

Please note that a request made under the Freedom of Information Act is for information held by a public authority at the time the request is made. When responding to such requests, there is no requirement for a public authority to create information or provide opinion unless previously recorded.

There is no statuary requirement to record the ethnicity, gender or visa status of an individual scanned in these circumstances, however due to a desire for transparency we are undertaking work that will allow us to record the ethnicity of those scanned.

Therefore this information is not held by the MPS.

Q4 - Of the people on which the service was used, how many were subsequently arrested, detained and/or deported? And on what counts? Again, a breakup by year.

This information is not held by the MPS as we do not record this information.

Q5 - I also need access to the latest privacy impact assessment for holding of this information

This information is exempted by virtue of section 31(1) – Law enforcement and section 40(2) – Personal information - reasons for which can be found in the Reasons for decision.