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Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.026089
I note you seek access to the following information:
1) Please tell me how many reported incidents of
a) rape,
b) sexual assault and
c) miscellaneous sexual offences happened in the last five financial years
(2017/18, 2018/19, 2019/20, 2020/21 and 2021/22) at the following addresses:
• Tottenham Hotspur Stadium, 782 High Rd, London N17 0BX
• Stamford Bridge Stadium, Fulham Rd., London SW6 1HS
• London Stadium, London E20 2ST
• Selhurst Park Stadium, Selhurst London, SE25
• Emirates Stadium, Hornsey Rd, London N7 7AJ
• Brentford Community Stadium, 166 Lionel Rd N, Brentford TW8 9QT
• Craven Cottage, Stevenage Rd, London SW6 6HH
By ‘rape’, I’m referring exclusively to the following offence classifications:
• 19C Rape of a female aged 16 and over
• 19D Rape of a female child under 16
• 19E Rape of a female child under 13
• 19F Rape of a male aged 16 and over
• 19G Rape of a male child under 16
• 19H Rape of a male child under 13
• 19J Rape of a Female – Multiple Undefined Offenders
• 19K Rape of a Male - Multiple Undefined Offenders
By ‘sexual assault’ I’m referring exclusively to the following offence classifications:
• 17A Sexual assault on a male aged 13 and over
• 17B Sexual assault on a male child under 13
• 20A Sexual assault on a female aged 13 and over
• 20B Sexual assault on a female child under 13
• 21 Sexual activity involving a child under 13
• 22A Causing sexual activity without consent
• 22B Sexual activity involving child under 16
By ‘miscellaneous sexual offences’ I’m referring exclusively to the following offence classifications:
• 70 Sexual activity etc. with a person with a mental disorder
• 71 Abuse of children through Sexual Exploitation
• 73 Abuse of position of trust of a sexual nature
• 88A Sexual grooming
• 88C Other miscellaneous sexual offences
• 88D Unnatural sexual offences
• 88E Exposure and voyeurism
• 8Q Stalking
• 23 Incest or familial sexual offences
Please break down by
a) number of alleged incidents at the above-mentioned addresses
b) Broken down by ‘rape’ (as defined above), ‘sexual assault’ (as defined above) or ‘miscellaneous sexual offences’ (as defined above)
c) Further broken down by offence category (e.g. 20 counts of 'miscellaneous sexual offences', of which 5 incidents of 88A sexual grooming, 15 of 88E exposure and voyeurism)
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3)- Personal data
Reason for decision
Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement - There are a number of factors which effect the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime. One of which centres on public engagement and public trust. How comfortable are the public with reporting crime? Can the MPS be trusted with information provided by the public? When a member of the public contacts the police to report an offence, there is an expectation that the allegation will remain confidential. This consensus allows the public the confidence to report allegations and offences in the MPS district, without the fear of being identified to the wider public. It could be argued that by providing you with the exact stadium location and the year that the offence took place could lead to the identification of the individual who made the report.
You may ask how this is possible, and to demonstrate this, I will provide three examples:
Scenario 1
If the offence occurred in a toilet and there were members of the public entering the toilet once the offence had finished, they could have conceivably witnessed a victim and perhaps more noticeably, a child victim looking distressed. These persons may not have felt comfortable enough to ask the victim or more specifically a child about their welfare, right then and then. However, if we now confirm the offence has taken place at a particular stadium and the exact year that this has occurred, we could then be providing some members of the crowd who entered the toilets, with all the data to identify the distressed victim they saw in or around the toilets.
Scenario 2
If a victim was being supported by a member of staff on the concourse, awaiting removal to a staff office or an office where police could be called to, the victim would inevitable looked distressed. This would be noticeable to any passer-by who could identify that something was wrong, but not necessarily know the reason why. If we now confirm the specific stadium, the year and the sex of the victim this could identify to passers-by who that victim was. Or perhaps trigger them the think about someone they remember seeming distressed. Arguably, this would be more of a concern with offences that have taken place in recent years, as the victim may be more memorable.
Scenario 3
Increasingly the general public use high quality camera phones. Images and videos of football stadiums, the pitches, seating areas and the concourse are readily filmed and posted online. The video function on camera phones will record events in real time once selected, and then the subsequent footage can be stored. If a member of the public was filming the concourse and noticed a crowd around the victim and continued to film after approaching that crowd, somebody attending to a victim could simply say, whilst the camera is on, that an offence has occurred. This footage could include the specifics of what has occurred or perhaps not. However, what is notable is that the victim may have been filmed at a specific stadium, at a specific year innocuously. The disclosure of all of the requested data could then supply enough specifics to confirm that an offence had transpired against the filmed victim, and, what the offence may have been.
These three examples present the risks in releasing all the requested data. It is important to note that if there is a perceived risk that an individual could be identified, no matter how small the risk could be, this would undoubtedly erode the public’s trust. This is likely to make individuals less likely to report offences to the MPS in the future, if this may lead to the identification of the victim. It may also make individuals that have already reported allegations worry that these could be disclosed at some point.
I have found that if I were to disclose all of the requested data, this would make public all the recorded sexual offences that have occurred at a very specific location, in a particular year. This would reinforce the MPS’s commitment to transparency with the public. I accept that this has wider connatations. Openess is linked to trust, the very trust necessary to instill a sense of confidence in the MPS.
Conversely, I have also found that there is a compelling argument that if the MPS were to disclose all the requested data, this could identify the victims. The combination of the exact stadium location, offence class, offence expansion and the year that the offence took place could lead to individual’s being identified. There are far reaching issues that arise from this, in that there is an clear expectation that when the public reports allegations, this is done so confidentially. So, to release any data that could identify an individual may erode public trust, which in turn is likely to make individuals less likely to report allegations and offences to the MPS in the future. For an organisation that relies upon and requires public participation to help with law enforcement this would be detrimental. However, I believe that the absence of the stadium location and specific year completely removes the risk of identifying any individual. Accordingly, I have not included this data on the attached excel spreadsheet.
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal data - When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. Section 40(3A)(a) states that public authorities will not disclose information which constitutes personal data and if the disclosure would contravene any of the Data Protection principles.
To disclose all the requested data would publicly reveal information about individuals which would contravene Data Protection principles. The Data Protection Act 2018 defines personal data as any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual. There are six data protection principles set out in section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). The first principle requires personal data to be processed in a ‘lawful and fair’ manner. The basis for determining what constitutes lawful and fair is outlined under section 35 of the DPA. Under section 35(2) it states:
• the data subject has given consent to the processing for that purpose, or
• the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for that purpose by a competent authority.
It is important to note that we do not have the consent of any of the data subjects to release their personal data and the release of the data will not be used for a law enforcement process.
Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:
• There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
• The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
• The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.
You have requested that the MPS disclose information in relation to sexual offences at 7 staduims. By means of a legitimate interest test I have considered the release of the personal data, and I have found that:
• Disclosing the requested information would provide a factual answer to this request. The legitimate interest in transparency would be further satisfied through the release of this information.
• Disclosing all of the requested information could pose a legitimate risk to an individual who has confidentially contacted the MPS, as they could be identified.
Disclosure
I would like to inform you that I will supply a partial disclosure of the requested information. I will disclose the total number of sexual offences that took place in football stadiums between 01/04/2017 to 31/03/2022, as well as the offence class and offence expansion.