Operation Boxster
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.025612
I note you seek access to the following information:
1. How many individuals have been specifically recorded by Operation Boxster as being involved in sex work as either a sex worker or arrested for kerb crawling by the operation since its inception?
I understand MPS will only be able to provide this data into two periods of deployment in which Operation Boxster was permanently staffed which is between July 2020 until December 2020 and July 2021 to present day.
2. Yes or no – have any individuals specifically recorded by Operation Boxster as being involved in sex work as a sex worker been subsequently placed on a managed cohort database (eg Integrated Offender Management, Gangs Matrix)?
3. If yes, please provide the names of any and all managed cohort databases on which they have been recorded.
4. Please provide the number of sex workers referred to Immigration / Home Office Enforcement by the Operation Boxster unit between July 2021 to the present day.
5. The total number of times sex workers have been arrested for sex working activities or received a prostitute street caution by Operation Boxster since its inception per year. Please break this down by:
A. Whether the individual was arrested or received a street caution
B. The ethnicity of the individual arrested/cautioned
I understand MPS will only be able to provide this data into two periods of deployment in which Operation Boxster was permanently staffed which is between July 2020 until December 2020 and July 2021 to present day.
6. Please provide copies of any and all reports completed by the Met Police in relation to Operation Boxster for the Enfield Crime Scrutiny Panels from the Operation’s inception to date.
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 21(1) - (Information reasonably accessible by other means)
Section 31(1)(a) – Law enforcement
Section 40(2)&(3A)(a) – Personal Information
Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(5A)(5B) – Personal Information
Reason for decision
In respect of Question One (1) and Five (5)(a), information has been disclosed today in full.
In respect of Question Five (5)(b) and Six (6) (Scrutiny Panel Report),we have today provided partial disclosure. Information not disclosed for these questions are exempt by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 31(1)(a) – Law enforcement
Section 40(2)&(3A)(a) – Personal Information
In respect of Question Two (2) and Four (4), having located and considered information pertinent to your request (whether the answer be zero or more), I am not required by statute to release the information requested by virtue of the following exemption;
Section 31(1)(a) – Law enforcement
In respect of Question Three (3), the Metropolitan Police Service neither confirms nor denies that it holds the information you have requested as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions;
Section 40(5A)(5B)
Section 31(3)
In respect of Question Six (6), as the information is already published via the Enfield Council website, the MPS is required to exempt it under the following exemption (in respect of information that is already reasonably accessible online);
Section 21(1) (Information reasonably accessible by other means)
The MPS conducts thousands of investigations each year. The MPS does not, as a matter of course, confirm or deny information such as that which you have requested in response to a Freedom of Information Act request or disclose details which may relate to operational and tactical matters relating to it, to ensure investigations are not undermined and to ensure public confidence in policing is maintained. To do so would allow a picture of the Met’s investigations to be established which can in certain instances be used to undermine law enforcement. This would reveal areas of police activity/interest and could reveal personal data relating to a small number of individuals. For this reason, the MPS does not confirm nor deny whether information is held in response to certain information you have requested regarding living individuals in a small localised area.
A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under Freedom of Information, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world and not just to one individual.
In most cases, Personal Data is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
To confirm or deny whether personal information exists in response to your request (particularly Question Three) could publicly reveal information about an individual or individuals, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the UK General Data Protection Regulation (UK GDPR).
Where an individual is requesting his or her own personal data the information is always exempt. Such information can be requested under other legislation (please see the advice and assistance section below).
Where an individual is requesting third party personal data the MPS must ensure that any action taken adheres to the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the UK GDPR. To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows disclosure of personal data if that disclosure would be compliant with the principles for processing personal data. These principles are outlined under section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5 of the UK GDPR.
ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE
If the information is your own personal information, for example, if you are seeking a crime report where you were a victim, witness or suspect, then you are able to request your information via a Right of Access Request (ROA) under the DPA. In order for us to progress your request as an ROA request, please provide us with the following information:
1. A proof of your residential address dated within the last six months, this can be a utility bill or bank statement.
2. A proof of ID to confirm your name, date of birth and signature, this can be a passport or a driving licence.
3. A dated sample of your signature to match that on your ID this can be on a blank piece of paper section 5 of the optional application form (see below).
Further guidance and an optional application form are available on our website: www.met.police.uk, click Request > Information: about the police, about yourself or someone else > myself > my own personal Interest. You can also request the ROA application form from any MPS Police Station. This process may take up to 30 calendar days from the date we receive the additional information.
If the requested information relates to a third party, for court purposes, or if you already obtained a Court Order for the information, please get back in touch and we will advise you how you may be able to request the information.
Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement - Operation Boxster is a Neighbourhood Policing Team operation dedicated to tackling the issues caused by an entrenched street sex working area which covers Fore Street and surrounding roads.
The aims and objectives of the operation includes increasing local public confidence by reducing ASB and ensuring the safeguarding of vulnerable women/persons involved in sex work is at the fore front of police strategies.
Your questions focus on a current police Operation concerning mitigating the risks associated with sex work with the objective of increasing the sense of safety with the local community and local residents.
Disclosure of the information you have requested would provide street level intelligence regarding localised relatively small areas to the criminal fraternity. Disclosure of information could be used to undermine vulnerable individuals or assess if individuals have gone detected or undetected and may or may not be on certain policing systems.
Disclosure of figures related to vulnerable individuals, including possible referrals of sex workers to the Home Office, who in many cases are victims themselves, may lead those involved in the criminal fraternity to try and ascertain what policing and personal information is or is not on certain systems, placing the public at risk of even more crime and victims at greater risk of further exploitation depending on what information is held
.
Victim safety, security and confidence in the police must always be the first priority of the MPS and any adverse disclosure effectively relating to the direct safety of victims would be detrimental and counterproductive for law enforcement and public safety.
Section 31(1)(a)(b) therefore applies to recorded information in all instances you refer to as disclosure would reveal information relating to vulnerable persons and their safeguarding. The exemption must be consistently applied to this request in full to safeguard information pertaining to victims.
It is not in the public interest to disclose information that would provide street level intelligence regarding localised relatively small areas to the criminal fraternity.
It is not in the public interest to disclose information that could be used to undermine vulnerable individuals or assess if individuals have gone detected or undetected and may or may not be on certain policing systems.
Disclosure of figures related to vulnerable individuals, including possible referrals of sex workers to the Home Office who in many cases are victims themselves, may lead those involved in the criminal fraternity to try and ascertain what personal and policing information is or is not on certain systems, placing the public at risk of crime and victims at greater risk of further exploitation and fear.
Victim safety, security and confidence in the police must always be the first priority of the MPS and any adverse disclosure effectively relating to the direct safety of victims would be detrimental to law enforcement and public safety and is not in the public interest.
An adverse disclosure of this kind may lead to a lack of reporting among the public and victims if FOIA disclosure makes it appear that we cannot handle sensitive crime related information in a sensitive and discrete manner. This in turn undermines the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime effectively where there is a loss of public trust and confidence.
Publicly disclosing information relevant to the request may require the MPS to increase resources if those with ill intent use answers as ‘intelligence’ against vulnerable victims, often women, in a small localised area to try and undermine their safety and those of others for criminal gain.
If these questions are lodged with the MPS and other Police Services over time, across London and the UK for the same type of Operations regarding vulnerable women, disclosures would lead to a mosaic effect of revealing and pinpointing where and how our intelligence is gathered on police systems. Over time this may allow an inference to be made by those with ill intent about how the public and victims may or may not be fully safeguarded, particular if certain areas have low numbers compared to others. This risks putting individuals at risk of further exploitation and crime, which is an outcome that is not in the public interest.
The strongest reason favouring disclosure is the furthering transparency and openness regarding the use of public funds.
The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is to ensure vulnerable individuals and victims are not put at risk of further crime, exploitation which would undermining the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime due to adverse FOIA disclosures.
Section 40(2)&(3) - Personal Information - The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.
40(2)(a)(b) of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied.
The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act.
There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (UK GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. The information held relates to a very small relatively recent number of living individuals in a given area.
Some individual members of the public may feel there is to some degree a legitimate interest in the disclosure of the personal information requested.
However, the rationale for exempting information is that disclosure is not necessary to satisfy the legitimate interest in disclosure and/or may cause unwarranted harm to one or more vulnerable data subjects to which the data refers to that may enable their identification on a local level.
Consequently, it would be disproportionate to disclose the exempt information.
Additionally there is not an overwhelming legitimate interest of full disclosure in consideration that the remaining information disclosed today, which discloses higher level figures that less risks identification of vulnerable individuals.
Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that the vulnerable individuals to which the data refers would reasonably not expect their information to be continually published in response to specific Freedom of Information Act request.
The disclosure provided today demonstrates accountability and transparency and is important to the MPS. The rationale for non-disclosure is based on the fact there is little necessity to disclose this personal information, risking personal identification, to meet a legitimate interest. Disclosure may cause unwarranted harm to the individuals to which the data refers and lead to damaging repercussions in an area where there is already a need for police action and protection. Consequently, it would be disproportionate to disclose the full requested information.
I have not therefore identified a strong legitimate interest that would be satisfied in disclosing the full personal data requested in response to this request for information.
The public release of the full ethnicity data would not satisfy any identifiable legitimate interest.
Consequently and as explained above, it would be disproportionate to disclose any more information that that disclosed at a safer level today.
Personal Criminal Offence Data
The ethnicity data requested can also be classed as criminal offence personal data relating to living persons that can be identified. Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that:
a. The Information Commissioner (the ombudsman for the Act) guidance on the release of personal criminal offence data under the Act states:
‘Due to its sensitivity, the conditions for processing criminal offence data are very restrictive and generally concern specific, stated purposes. Consequently, only two are relevant to allow you to lawfully disclose under FOIA or the EIR. They are similar to those identified above for special category data. These are:
• consent from the data subject; or
• the processing relates to personal data which has clearly been made public by the individual concerned.
If a relevant condition cannot be met, you must not disclose the information as disclosure would be unlawful and therefore in contravention of principle (a).’
The conditions required to release personal criminal offence data are not present in this case. The release of the requested personal data does not accordingly satisfy a legitimate interest and cannot be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.
Section 31(3) (Law Enforcement) Neither confirm nor deny (Investigations) - The MPS believe that any response other than a neither confirm nor deny would impact on police resources by hindering the prevention and detection of crime should an adverse FOIA response which references a member of the public in itself reduce public confidence in the ability of the MPS to sensitively maintain discretion in the community, particularly in regards to vulnerable individuals.
Irrespective of what information may or may not be held, to confirm or deny if we hold the names of any and all managed cohort databases on which indivuduals may have been recorded would undermine Personal Identification data protection principles and our ability to conduct a law enforcement role to the very best of our ability.
Disclosure of database names (should they be held in this instance) would simply undermine public confidence in the ability of the MPS to handle Operations diligently, sensitively and tactfully.
Confirming or denying whether the information is held would encourage public debate concerning the use of public funds and assist with improving accountability by allowing police action which may or may not have occurred to be scrutinised.
Confirmation or not of whether information is held furthers public debate in regards to possible incidents that may have occurred or possible police activity.
As with all investigations it is of paramount importance that the response to a FOIA request does not disrupt or have any negative impact on that investigation (whether information is held or not in this instance). Any such possible disruption to any investigation (whether related to the matter referred to in this request or not) due to an adverse FOIA disclosure would not be in the best interests of the public.
Irrespective of what information may or may not be held in this case, to confirm or deny whether information is held relating to living individual would undermine law enforcement and the abilities for the police to conduct its role in the community to the best of its ability.
The strongest reason favouring neither confirming nor denying whether the requested information is held is to ensure Operations and any possible investigation is not prejudiced due to an adverse FOIA disclosure which undermines the ability of the MPS to prevent or detect crime whether information is held in this case or not.
I consider that the benefit that would result from issuing a confirmation or denial does not outweigh the considerations favouring the neither confirm nor deny response.
Section 40(5A)&(5B)(a)(i) - NCND - (Personal Information) - Section 40(5) of the Act provides an exclusion from the duty to confirm whether personal data is held, if doing so would breach one of the Data Protection Principles.
There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (UK GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:
a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.
This request asks the MPS to confirm or deny whether it holds tactical policing information regarding possible police activity connected to a specific localised place, and Operation.
Whilst I accept that there is a legitimate interest in providing general information on the strength of Operation Boxster, I do not believe that the legitimate interest test has been met in the round for the breakdown of low level intelligence that you seek.
For this reason, this notice constitutes a refusal under Section 40(5) of the Act and does not confirm nor deny whether information does or does not exist.
In respect of Question Six (6) information requested has been identified as being accessible via other means as it is already published. Where information is already in the public domain we are not required to re-publish the data; instead public authorities are required to direct you to the information, which we have done in this instance. This action is in accordance with section 21 of the Freedom of Information Act.
Disclosure
Q1 - How many individuals have been specifically recorded by Operation Boxster as being involved in sex work as either a sex worker or arrested for kerb crawling by the operation since its inception?
I understand MPS will only be able to provide this data into two periods of deployment in which Operation Boxster was permanently staffed which is between July 2020 until December 2020 and July 2021 to present day.
Between November 2019 till March 2020 (Operation Boxster first deployment with permanent staff) 55 individuals were recorded as being involved in on street sex work in the Fore Street and High Road Area.
No individuals were arrested for kerb crawling during the period of June 2020 and December 2020.
Since July 2021 to the present time 69 individuals have been recorded as being involved in street sex work by Operation Boxster.
During the same period 114 males have been arrested for soliciting a woman for the purpose of prostitution.
Q5(a)&(b) - The total number of times sex workers have been arrested for sex working activities or received a prostitute street caution by Operation Boxster since its inception per year. Please break this down by:
a. Whether the individual was arrested or received a street caution
b. The ethnicity of the individual arrested/cautioned
I understand MPS will only be able to provide this data into two periods of deployment in which Operation Boxster was permanently staffed which is between July 2020 until December 2020 and July 2021 to present day.
Between June 2020 till December 2020 a total of 154 street cautions were issued to a total of 55 individuals identified as sex workers in Fore Street and High Road.
The ethnic breakdown of these street cautions are as follows:
• Identified as British – 22
• Identified as Bulgarian – 67
• Identified as Romanian -59
In addition to the above, the ethnic breakdown of 6 other individuals is exempt (by virtue of Section 40(2)&(3A)(a), due to the risk of identification as the figure for each of their ethnicities totalled either four (4) less.
The ethnic breakdown of those arrested are as follows:
• The 25 arrests relate to a total of 10 individuals
• 7 of the arrests made the individual identified as Bulgarian
• 18 of the arrests made individuals identified as Romanian
Between July 2021 till present day a total of 165 street cautions have been issued to a total of 69 individuals identified as involved in on street sex work in Fore Street and High Road.
Of those 69, 64 of these individuals received one or more street cautions.
The ethnic breakdown of these street cautions are as follows:
• Identified as British – 56
• Identified as Bulgarian – 87
• Identified as Romanian - 9
In addition to the above, the ethnic breakdown of 25 other individuals is exempt (by virtue of Section 40(2)&(3A)(a), due to the risk of identification as the figure for each of their ethnicities totalled either four (4) less.
Q6 - Please provide copies of any and all reports completed by the Met Police in relation to Operation Boxster for the Enfield Crime Scrutiny Panels from the Operation’s inception to date.
Please find the attached Scrutiny Report document captured by this request. Information redacted from this report is exempt by virtue of the following exemptions Section 31(1)(a) (Law enforcement) and Section 40(2)&(3A)(a) (Personal Information).
Additional information that could be considered pertinent to this part of your request has been located in the public domain. As this information is available on the Enfield Council website, the MPS is not required re-publish such data by virtue of the Section 21(1) exemption (Information readily accessible by other means).
Instead I am able to direct you to the information below;
Additional Assistance
The Metropolitan Police has launched an action plan to tackle violence against women and girls. This is available at the following link:
Violence against women & girls action plan.pdf
The plan sets out to:
- Increase the number of perpetrators brought to justice for violence against women and girls;
- Improve processes and victim care across the criminal justice system to improve outcomes;
- Reduce the likelihood of women and girls becoming repeat victims;
- Increase women’s confidence in the police and, in doing so, improve the reporting of crimes, which disproportionately affects women and girls in London;
- See an increase in reporting to police, but a decrease in prevalence;
- Intensify work to tackle sexual misconduct and domestic violence by officers and staff.