Correspondence and communications between the MPS & Shell (protests and protesters)

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.025133

I note you seek access to the following information:

From 1 January 2021 to the day this request is processed, I would like to request all correspondence and communications - including any ‘intelligence’ briefings - between the Metropolitan Police and the oil company Shell in relation to protests and protesters.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal data

Reason for decision

Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement - Protests will continue to take place within the MPS district. Knowledge of the operational plans and the tactics used by police to police protests could make it more difficult for the MPS to police future events. This disclosure highlights the likely policing challenges the MPS routinely contend with when policing protests and could inform those that are intent on committing offences at protests, of the actions that will be taken by police, to combat this. This would hinder both the prevention and detection of crime. If we consider this fact set in the context of the current threat level, both now and possible near future events of a geo-political nature, the release of the emails without redaction could be negatively used.

The redaction of MPS and Shell’s staff contact details does not reduce the value or quality of the rest of the data. You have requested ‘all correspondence and communications - including any ‘intelligence’ briefings - between the Metropolitan Police and the oil company Shell in relation to protests and protesters’.
You have been provided with parts of that communication that does not include the contact details of staff. FOIA disclosures effectively constitute a disclosure to the world at large, and with this in mind, I believe that the inclusion of contact details could cause harm. Person’s intent on disrupting the work of the police, would use these details to frustrate the work of the police and personnel from external organisations. This could occur as persons with this intent would send vast amounts of unsolicited correspondence to email addresses, make nuisance calls or conduct similar activities to frustrate policing.

The MPS want to be as open and transparent as possible and therefore it is imperative that the appropriate information is made available to the public. This should not however, hinder the core functions of the MPS, which is the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

If an individual arrives at a protest with the intention of causing harm to police operations, they would now be armed with all the information needed cause disruption. There is a no doubt that providing the public with a deeper understanding of policing is a good thing. It shows the challenges that the MPS face and how these complexities inform decision making. This must be weighed up against the risk that the data that you release could compromise future actions that police may take, which in turn would not prevent crime or help detect crime but rather encourage it, which negatively affects the MPS’s law enforcement function. It is my assessment that the release of the emails without redaction would do this and therefore would be detrimental to law enforcement.

Section 40(2)(3) - Personal data - When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. Section 40(3A)(a) states that public authorities will not disclose information which constitutes personal data and if the disclosure would contravene any of the Data Protection principles.

To disclose the emails without redaction would publicly reveal information about an individual or individuals which would contravene Data Protection principles. The Data Protection Act 2018 defines personal data as any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual. There are six data protection principles set out in section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). The first principle requires personal data to be processed in a ‘lawful and fair’ manner. The basis for determining what constitutes lawful and fair is outlined under section 35 of the DPA. Under section 35(2) it states:

• the data subject has given consent to the processing for that purpose, or
• the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for that purpose by a competent authority.

It is important to note that we do not have the consent of the data subjects and the release of the data will not be used for a law enforcement process.

Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:

• There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
• The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
• The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.

Having considered your request, I have found that the email trail contains a range of personal data, in relation to police staff and external organisations personnel. By means of a legitimate interest test I have considered the release of the personal data, and I have found that:

The names of Staff members

• Disclosing the requested information would provide greater detail into the communications between the MPS and Shell. The public may have a general interest in finding out who has been involved in such communications with a global organisation.

• The legitimate interest in transparency would be further satisfied through the release of this information.

• Some of the police officers who were part of the email trail hold the rank of Chief Inspector and below. Officers of that rank would not therefore, reasonably expect their names to be published in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. In this regard, the public release of their personal data would be unexpected, unfair and distressing to the data subject(s) and could lead to unwanted and unsolicited intrusion from the media and/or others interested in the specifics of their role in policing the protest.

The names of external personnel

• Disclosing the names of external personnel would identify exactly who the MPS has communicated with from Shell, in relation to protests and protesters from 1st January 2021 to the day this request was processed.

• The legitimate interest in transparency would be further satisfied through the release of this information.

• Policing London relies on the trust and confidence of the public. The MPS often work with external organisations. In the course of such communications, email can be generated. Now whilst high ranking MPS officers would expect to be named in relation to FOIA requests, external personnel have a legitimate expectation that the MPS would not publicly release and publish their names in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. The MPS must consider how we process personal data and without their explicit consent, the sharing of their personal data would be harmful, and cause alarm and distress to the data subject. I therefore find it justified to withhold the names of external staff that is contained within the email trail.

Disclosure

I have disclosed the located information to you in the document attachment. Please note, some data within the attached document is redacted. I have redacted the names of MPS officers and staff from external organisations, so as not to contravene Data Protection principles. I have also redacted data that would identify policing tactics and operational procedures pertaining to the management of protests.