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Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.025902
I note you seek access to the following information:
Privacy International (PI) is aware that drones are being used by police forces across the UK for surveillance purposes.
In 2020, as part of research into the Police use of drones, Drone Wars sent Freedom of Information Access Requests to 48 police services across the UK. Of the 42 that responded, 40 UK police forces confirmed they were using drones - 95% of respondents, or 83% of those FOIAed. According to these FoI responses, as of 2020, there were at least 288 drones operated by police forces across the UK. In the first 6 months of 2020, there were more than 5,500 overt uses of drones by the police within the UK.
In 2021, it was reported by the Guardian that drones were used by police to monitor political protests in England. The Surrey, Cleveland, Staffordshire, Gloucestershire and West Midlands police forces said they had used drones at Black Lives Matter protests.
Further, on the 16th March 2021 the Mayor of London confirmed that "drones have been deployed by the Metropolitan Police Service] for coverage of crime scenes, providing aerial support for pre-planned operations, surveying premises and providing live footage of operational deployments to assist command decision making and therefore support a wider policing plan".
PI is also aware of drones being obtained by other public authorities such as Border Force
It is suspected that drones are being deployed to monitor migration at UK borders. In 2020, it was reported that drones sold by Portugese company Tekever were seen flying over the English Channel. PI would also highlight a recently published procurement exercise by the Home Office for the future use of drones by Clandestine Channel Threat Command.
In light of the above information, PI requests the following information by way of a Freedom of Information Act request. Please can you confirm the following:
1. If you are using drones for surveillance purposes, on which legal basis do you rely for the collection and storage of data collected by drones?
2. Please provide us with information regarding what payloads could be fitted onto the drones, such as the type of cameras, sensors or other tools that you have previously fitted onto the drones.
3. Please confirm if any of the drones have been or can be combined with facial recognition technology?
4. Please provide us with the following:
a) any guidance and/or policy you are relying on for the the deployment of drones
b) Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) in relation to the use of drones if one has been completed.
5. Please confirm which private companies you have used for the procurement of drones.
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 24(2) - National Security
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) – Personal Information
Section 43 – Commercial Interest
Reason for decision
To provide full details of the payloads that could be, or are, attached to drones operated by the MPS in response to the second part of your request could allow criminals to employ either tactical or technical counter measures to undermine their operational capability.
Details relating to operation protocols, methodologies and the specifications and capabilities of MPS drones detailed within policy or guidance documents requested in the fourth part of your request would also be of value to those who may seek to disrupt police operations and these have either been redacted or withheld. Disclosure of this information would be detrimental to the MPS’s ability to prevent and detect crime as well as the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. For these reasons Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act is engaged.
Full disclosure of the policy documents requested in the fourth part of your request would also identify individual officers, which would be a breach of data protection principles. As such, these details are exempt by virtue of Section 40(2)(3) of the Act.
With regards to your final question, to provide details of the companies used by the MPS to procure drones would be prejudicial to the commercial interests of manufacturers, as this would identify the types and capabilities of drones that the MPS procure. This would not only damage manufacturers’ relationships with the MPS, but also put the Service at a disadvantage, as it would adversely affect our ability to source other suppliers in a competitive environment. Any disclosure of information, which would likely be prejudicial to the commercial activities of the MPS or another company is not in the public interest and therefore attracts Section 43(2) of the Act.
In addition, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm nor deny whether any other information is or is not held relating to the covert use of drones as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act).
Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters - (5) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section 1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).
Confirming or denying whether any additional information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information, if held, that is supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.
Section 24(2) - National Security - As you will be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that any other information is held regarding the use of this specialist equipment for police operations, would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the force are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities. Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the police service may or may not deploy drones, would lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. The use of drones is a rapidly developing technique, which can be used by the police service as a whole in a variety of ways to combat crime.
Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, providing details relating to payloads used by MPS drones and operational protocols or equipment specifications would reveal the capabilities of these resources and give important information to criminals. The release of this information, combined with detailed information readily available on the internet, would allow criminals to identify the strengths and weakness of the aircraft, which they would then be able to use to their advantage when planning criminal acts. This would therefore both directly and indirectly impact on the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of criminals and increase the fear of crime in the community the police service seeks to serve.
Disclosure of the information requested would compromise law enforcement tactics. Terrorists could target areas of weakness knowing that their activities are less likely to be detected. It may be used by criminals/terrorists who are intent on pursuing their criminal activity, to identify and exploit the limitations of these resources. To disclose the strengths and any possible weaknesses of the equipment would lead to more crime being committed and individuals being placed at risk, thus hindering the prevention and detection of crime and increasing the risk to public safety and the safety of operational teams.
Law enforcement is of paramount importance and the Police service will not disclose information if to do so would undermine its purpose and place the safety of individual(s) at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of using public money in policing operations appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by criminals or terrorists, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both the security of the country and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of security and law enforcement, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The use of drones is a police tactic that is open to police forces for the purpose of law enforcement and can assist in the prevention and detection of crime. Any disclosure which hinders our capability and assists criminals cannot be in the public interest.
In addition the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm or deny whether it holds any other information relevant to this request as the duty in Section 1 (1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24 - National Security & Section 31 - Law Enforcement - The threat of terrorism cannot be ignored and it should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently categorised as ‘substantial’.
It is well established that police forces use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.
Confirming or denying that any other information is held in relation to the use of drones, or unmanned aerial devices, would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police forces’ methods and techniques, enabling them to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities. This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics and capabilities are, or are not, deployed. This can be useful information to those committing crimes as it would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.
By confirming or denying whether any other information is held would render Security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.
Confirming or denying that any other information is held regarding the use of drones would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics and would also hinder any future investigations. In addition, confirming or denying methods used to gather intelligence for an investigation would prejudice that investigation and any possible future proceedings.
It has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and terrorists and so to confirm or deny any other information is held concerning specialist covert tactics would lead to law enforcement being undermined. The Police Service is reliant upon all manner of techniques during operations and the public release of any modus operandi employed, if held, would prejudice the MPS’ ability to conduct similar investigations.
By confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation to the use of drones would hinder the prevention or detection of crime. The MPS and Police Service in general would not wish to reveal what tactics may or may not have been used to gain intelligence, as this would clearly undermine the law enforcement and investigative process. This would impact on police resources and more crime and terrorist incidents would be committed, placing individuals at risk. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing information, if held, in relation to any aspect of investigations or of any nation's security arrangements so confirming or denying that any other information is held, may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held regarding the use of drones if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk, undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement.
Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the Police Service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and all areas of operations carried out by police forces throughout the UK.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The use of drones in any covert capacity is a sensitive issue that would reveal police tactics and therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any other information is held regarding the use of drones, is not made out.
However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any additional information that would meet your request exists or does not exist
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal information - Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that revealing the names contained within the policy documents disclosed would identify these officers. Release of such data would therefore be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.
The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that providing information that identifies individuals constitutes personal data and the release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.
In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.
Section 43 – Commercial Interests - In this case the disclosure of the companies that the MPS use to procure drones, could be seen as an endorsement of particular products and provide a benefit to that company and detriment to other rival products, especially within the area of counter-measures within the market.
Potential purchasers of this equipment may seek procurement from other suppliers, through their knowledge that particular makes or types of drones are used by the MPS. Any disclosure, which prejudices the commercial interests of either the MPS, by affecting our ability to source suppliers in a competitive environment or a company, through likely loss of business and therefore revenue, cannot be in the public interest.
Disclosure of the requested information would weaken the position of the MPS in a competitive environment, due to a disclosure of market sensitive information. This would have a harmful effect on future partnerships when entering into commercial activities. To identify that the products of specific companies are used could prejudice their commercial interests if it results in potential purchasers reconsidering procuring their equipment, especially if through disclosure criminals identify a potential weakness. Any subsequent loss of business or income would prejudice their commercial interests
I have found that it is important that the MPS protects its own commercial interests, as maintaining effective commercial arrangements supports the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. In view of this, I have found that the public interest lies in favour of preserving the commercial interests of the MPS and our suppliers by withholding some of the requested information and this outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
Disclosure
I will address each part of your request where information can be disclosed in turn.
Q1 - If you are using drones for surveillance purposes, on which legal basis do you rely for the collection and storage of data collected by drones?
Regarding Question 1, any surveillance data would be governed by -
• the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA),
Government Site:RIPA codes
• the Police Act
Government Site:Legislation
• compliant with the Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA)
Government Site:Protection of Freedoms Act 2012
• compliant with the principles of the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice
Home Office - Surveillance Camera Code of Practice.pdf
• any subsequent storage of data is Management of Police information and Information Commissioner’s Office compliant.
https://www.college.police.uk/app/information-management/management-police-information
Information Commissioner's Office(ICO)
3. Please confirm if any of the drones have been or can be combined with facial recognition technology?
Regarding Question 3, the answer to the question posed is ‘no’.
Q4 - Please provide us with the following:
a) any guidance and/or policy you are relying on for the the deployment of drones
b) Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) in relation to the use of drones if one has been completed.
Regarding Question 4, please find attached redacted versions of the DPIA document and two MPS policy/guidance documents.