Cash for Honours investigation

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.026477

I note you seek access to the following information:

To answer your query, I would like the MPS to proceed with questions 1, 3, and 4.

Please confirm receipt at the earliest convenience.
I am writing in relation to the ongoing investigation into suspected offences under the 1925 Honours Abuse Act, commonly referred to as the royal “cash-for-honours” investigation.

1) How many MPS staff members have been placed on this investigation? Please list these by rank.

3) Have any members of the investigation team at any point worked for the Royalty and Specialist Protection Command or any other part of the MPS responsible for protecting members of the royal family?

4) What is the name of the investigation?

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)&(3) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

Before I explain the decisions that I have made in relation to your request, I thought that it would be helpful to outline the parameters set out by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act), within which a request for information can be answered. The Act creates a statutory right of access to information held by public authorities. A public authority in respect of a request must, if permitted, state under Section 1(a) of the Act, whether it holds the requested information and, if held, then communicate that information to the applicant under Section 1(b) of the Act. The right of access to information is not without exception and is subject to a number of exemptions which are designed to enable public authorities to withhold information that is unsuitable for release. Importantly, the Act is designed to place information into the public domain, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received.

Section 31 (1)(a)(b)(c) – Law Enforcement - In deliberating whether or not this information should be disclosed, I have considered the potential harm that could be caused by disclosure. If officer deployment data on specific operations/investigations were released into the public domain there could potentially be substantial harm to the Police Service, as it could inhibit its ability to fulfil its core functions. The release of operational tactics would furnish individuals or groups having the necessary intent to disrupt police activity with the necessary information to effectively do just that, thereby hindering future operational activity.

The aim of the Freedom of Information Act is to make government bodies more open and transparent. Releasing officer deployment data would make the MPS openly accountable for officer staffing levels, proving police deploy their resources in the most suitable manner with the numbers available. Additionally, providing the public with details of how we spend public funds and use our resources would show that the MPS has utilised their biggest resource, officers, efficiently. This would assist public debate.

Information regarding police deployment data is a valuable commodity to individuals (and/or organisations) wishing to commit crime, as it provides an insight into tactics and resources available to the MPS. Therefore, those seeking to commit criminality could counter any future policing tactics and elude justice. This will ultimately have a detrimental impact on innocent members of the public.

Furthermore, releasing data on the level of officers on an investigation, would allow individuals to gather information on other operations. Providing information in this piecemeal way would be harmful to present and future operations as it would put into the public domain the levels of resources we have and may likely allocate to such an operation. Criminals could utilise this information for malicious intent causing harm to the public. As crime prevention/detection is in the public's interest, any release of information which would be likely to prejudice our ability to prevent and/or detect crime could only be viewed as being harmful to the public interest.

After weighing up the competing interests I have determined that the disclosure of the above information would not be in the public interest. I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh disclosing information relating to the number of officers allocated to a specific operation. Therefore, this information is exempt.

Section 40(2)&(3) – Personal Information - Section 40(2)(a)(b) of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act.

There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:

a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.

Having considered the release of information relating to whether any members of the investigation team have worked for the Royalty and Specialist Protection Command or any other part of the MPS responsible for protecting members of the royal family, I have found, having considered the legitimate interest test, that:

a) The disclosure of this information would satisfy an identifiable legitimate interest, being to provide information that will show transparency.

b) This disclosure of the requested personal data is necessary to satisfy the legitimate interest identified at point a.

c) However, publication of this information would be likely to lead to unwanted and unsolicited intrusion, as due to the numbers associated to this question, if released, would lead to identification of officers. In this regard, I believe that disclosure of this personal data would be likely to cause unwarranted harm.

The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.

Q1 - How many MPS staff members have been placed on this investigation? Please list these by rank.

This information has been made exempt by virtue of s.31 of the Freedom of Information Act governing Law Enforcement.

Q3 - Have any members of the investigation team at any point worked for the Royalty and Specialist Protection Command or any other part of the MPS responsible for protecting members of the royal family?

This information has been made exempt by virtue of s.40 of the Freedom of Information Act governing Personal Information.

Disclosure

Q4 - What is the name of the investigation?

The operation name is Operation Napier