Policing the Sarah Everard vigil at Clapham Common
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.022597
I note you seek access to the following information:
I write in response to your complaint to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in relation to our Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) notices recorded under reference numbers 01/FOI/21/018884 and 01/FOI/21/019463. Your initial request was received by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on the 30 March 2021 and stated:
I wish to see full copies the following information regarding the policing of the Sarah Everard vigil that took place on Clapham Common on 13 March 2021:
- Tactical plans
- Risk and threat assessments
- Community impact assessments
- Memos
- Briefing/debriefing materials
- Internal reviews
- Lessons learned reports
- Incident reports”
On the 14 May 2021, the MPS refused to provide the information held in connection with your request in its entirety, citing the following provisions of the Act:
• Section 17(1) - Refusal notice.
• Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law enforcement.
• Section 40(2) and 40(3A) (a) - Personal information.
In refusing your request, the MPS provided the following explanation:
It is not in the public interest to disclose the requested information, as it would in effect, reveal law enforcement tactics and methodology used to respond to policing matters. Disclosure of the type of capabilities available to the police at a specific point in time, would enable those individuals intent on committing unlawful activities, to circumvent methods used to prevent crime and apprehend offenders.
By providing such information, which is clearly related to policing capabilities, would in turn hinder the ability of the MPS to carry out its core functions in law enforcement.”
The MPS also explained that providing the personal data contained within the requested material would breach the 1st data protection principle in respect of the lawful, fair and transparent processing of personal data.
On the 19 May 2021, you asked the MPS to review its decision to refuse your request in its entirety. On the 2 June 2021, the MPS reconsidered its response to your initial request for information dated the 30 March 2021. In doing so, the MPS again relied on the aforementioned exemptions set out by Section 31 (law enforcement) and Section 40 (personal data) of the Act in refusing your request in its entirety.
On the 6 January 2022, the MPS received notification from the ICO of a complaint in relation to your request for information. Following receipt of your complaint to the ICO, I have reassessed your request for information and can confirm that the following records have been located in connection with your request for information:
INFORMATION LOCATED
1. MO6 Event Debrief - 13 March 2021
2. SX Tactical Plan - Version 2.1
3. Community Impact Assessment
4. National Post Event Learning Review
5. Overarching Strategic Intentions for the Metropolitan Police response to the Coronavirus Epidemic (Operation Pima) - Version 9
6. Covid Retrospective Enforcement Principles - 15 December 2020
7. Central London Public Order Reserves – 13 March 2021
8. Public Order Reserves – 13 March 2021
9. Hot Debrief – 13 March 2021 (21:10)
10. Intelligence held in respect of the vigil for Sarah Everard on the 13 March 2021
Decision
I have disclosed the following records in connection with your request for information.
1. MO6 Event Debrief – 13 March 2021
2. SX Tactical Plan - Version 2.1
3. Community Impact Assessment
4. National Post Event Learning Review
5. Overarching Strategic Intentions for the Metropolitan Police response to the Coronavirus Epidemic (Operation Pima) - Version 9
6. Covid Retrospective Enforcement Principles - 15 December 2020
7. Central London Public Order Reserves – 13 March 2021
8. Public Order Reserves – 13 March 2021
Documents 1-5 and 7-8 have been provided to you in redacted format, that is, I have removed information that is exempt under the Act. I have also removed information that is not relevant to your request for information. It is of note that a separate Community Impact Assessment was not produced for Sarah Everard’s vigil at Clapham Common on the 13 March 2021, rather the vigil is captured in the overarching Community Impact Assessment for the investigation into Sarah Everard’s murder. Large parts of the document are therefore not relevant to your request and have been removed for this reason. In addition, documents 7 and 8 provide details of the planning for a number of other events that are unconnected to Sarah Everard’s vigil at Clapham Common. These sections have also been removed as they are not relevant to your request.
Document 6 titled ‘COVID Retrospective Enforcement Principles’ has been provided to you in full. Documents 9-10 have been refused in their entirety under the Act.
The MPS continues to rely on the following provisions of the Act in respect of any exempt material:
• Section 17(1) - Refusal notice
• Sections 31(1)(a) and (b) - Law enforcement
• Sections 40(2) and 40(3A)(a) - Personal data
Additionally, the MPS relies on the following provisions of the Act in respect of other exempt material:
• Section 24(1) - National Security
Section 24(1) - National Security & Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement - Under Section 24(1) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information that is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. Section 31(1)(a) of the Act provides that any information is exempt if its disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention or detection of crime. Section 24 and 31 are qualified exemptions.
This request seeks access to the tactical plans, risk/threat assessments, briefing and debriefing materials, incidents reports and internal reviews held by the MPS in respect of the vigil for Sarah Everard which took place on Clapham Common on the 13 March 2021. The located records contain a range of information that would, if released, make it more difficult for the MPS to police future events.
The MPS considers that the following types of information and/or reports are operationally sensitive:
a. Intelligence - The MPS can confirm that it holds intelligence in respect of the vigil for Sarah Everard. The requested documents also contains a terrorist threat assessment that is based on police intelligence. The MPS considers that any information related to the intelligence it holds, inclusive of what intelligence was obtained, the nature of that intelligence, where and/or from whom it was obtained, when the intelligence was obtained and when it was disseminated and to whom, is operationally sensitive.
b. Hot Debrief - 13 March 2021 (21:10) - A hot debrief was held at 21:10 on the evening of the vigil for Sarah Everard. The aim of this debrief was to allow persons performing key roles in the police operation, to talk openly about any challenges or issues that they encountered immediately after an event. Hot debriefs are informal meetings where a free and frank exchange of views and experiences are communicated. There is no expectation that a record of a hot debrief would be disclosed publicly. To do so would be likely to have a chilling effect on future hot debriefs where officers would be constrained in expressing their views candidly.
c. Threat assessments, Command Protocols, Contingencies and Tactical Plans - Threat assessments, Command Protocols and Contingencies are key parts of any tactical plan, as they highlight the likely policing challenges and the action that will be taken and by whom, in response to the anticipated challenges. This information is considered to be operationally sensitive as its disclosure would inform those that are intent of committing offences at events, of the action that will be taken by police in response to particular scenarios.
d. Number and Composition of Units to Police the Vigil - The MPS considers the number and composition of the units deployed to police events to be operationally sensitive, as the public release of this information, over time, would enable those intent of committing crime, to predict the resources police will deploy to police particular events. This could assist the offender to counter police tactics and commit crime.
e. Contact Details and Links to Information of Police Departments - The contact details (i.e. email addresses and telephone numbers), links to forms and other data repositories of police departments that are not used by the general public, are considered to be operationally sensitive as persons intent on disrupting the work of the police, would use these details to frustrate the work of the police. This could occur as persons with this intent would send vast amounts of unsolicited correspondence to email addresses, make nuisance calls or conduct similar activities to frustrate policing.
f. Other Operational Material - The requested records contain a range of operational material that would, if released, provide little or no public benefit but would be of use to the offender in committing offences. Information such as radio channels or talk groups to be used whilst policing an event or the call signs used, would not further the debate with regard to the policing of the vigil for Sarah Everard but could, for example, be useful to an offender should they obtain inappropriate access to a police radio or communication system.
The MPS has a statutory role in both preventing and detecting crime and apprehending the perpetrators of criminal offences. Should the MPS release the information set out at points a-f above, it is likely that there would be two consequences. Firstly those that are intent on committing criminal offences would be better informed about police tactics. A better informed offender would be more confident in committing offences increasing the likelihood that they would commit crime. Secondly a better informed offender would be more difficult for police to detect which would make it more challenging for police to prevent and detect crime.
The public release of information that would lead to further crime being committed and would have an adverse effect on the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime and apprehend those that commit offences, would be contrary to the public interest.
When considering whether the release of information is in the public interest, I have to consider whether the public interest is in favour of releasing information into the public domain or whether there is sufficient reason to support withholding the requested information. Having considered your request, I accept that there is a public interest in transparency and public confidence when any request is made for police information. These factors are heightened when the request for information concerns an event such as the vigil for Sarah Everard on Clapham Common that has attracted considerable public debate. I have attached particular weight to these public interest factors for these reasons.
I have found that the release of some operationally sensitive material such as the intelligence held, threat assessments, command protocols, contingency plans and the number/nature of police units deployed to police the vigil would, if released, inform the offender of the likely action police will take when policing similar events in the future. This type of disclosure would harm the Met’s ability to both prevent and detect crime, in that this information could be used by offenders to frustrate operational policing. Having carefully considered this, I found that the public release of any information that would harm the Met’s ability to both prevent and detect and/or apprehend offenders, to be contrary to the public interest. I have accordingly refused to release the information described above in response to your request for information.
Section 40(2)&(3) - Personal Information - Section 40(2)(a)(b) of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act.
There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:
a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.
The requested records contain the names of members of staff and other persons not employed by the MPS. They also contain criminal offence data. Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that:
Names of Police Officers holding the rank of Chief Inspector and below
a. The police officers named in the requested records that hold the rank of Chief Inspector and below, do not hold the rank or role where they would reasonably expect their names to be published in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. Additionally, the function that they performed within these records was not one of a decision maker. I have not therefore identified a legitimate interest that would be satisfied in disclosing their personal data in response to this request for information.
Criminal Offence Data
b. The requested documents contain personal criminal offence data. The Information Commissioner (the ombudsman for the Act) guidance on the release of personal criminal offence data under the Act states:
“Due to its sensitivity, the conditions for processing criminal offence data are very restrictive and generally concern specific, stated purposes. Consequently, only two are relevant to allow you to lawfully disclose under FOIA or the EIR. They are similar to those identified above for special category data. These are:
• consent from the data subject; or
• the processing relates to personal data which has clearly been made public by the individual concerned.
If a relevant condition cannot be met, you must not disclose the information as disclosure would be unlawful and therefore in contravention of principle (a).”
The conditions required to release personal criminal offence data are not present in this case. The release of the requested personal data does not accordingly satisfy a legitimate interest and cannot be disclosed under the Act.
The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) has undertaken a bespoke thematic inspection into the MPS’s handling of the vigil for Sarah Everard held on Clapham Common on the 13th of March 2021. This review considered the operational decision-making, application of the law in the context of the COVID regulations and the Met’s engagement with those at the vigil and the wider public. HMICFRS final report has been published. Please find links to HMICFRS report and supporting information below.
HMICFRS announcement publishing the report
HMICFRS Report
The MPS has also published information under the Act that is relevant to your request for information. I have provided links to this information below:
https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/disclosure_2021/december_2021/correspondence-regarding-the-sarah-everard-vigil2
https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/disclosure_2021/december_2021/correspondence-regarding-the-sarah-everard-vigil3
https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/disclosure_2021/december_2021/correspondence-regarding-the-sarah-everard-vigil4
https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/disclosure_2021/december_2021/correspondence-regarding-the-sarah-everard-vigil5
https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/disclosure_2021/december_2021/correspondence-regarding-the-sarah-everard-vigil6
https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/disclosure_2021/december_2021/correspondence-regarding-the-sarah-everard-vigil7