Operation Pelican - The effort to remove Julian Assange from the Ecuadorian embassy in London
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.023868
I note you seek access to the following information:
The Home Office recently informed me that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) funded Operation Pelican, the effort to remove Julian Assange from the Ecuadorian embassy in London.
Please tell me, for the period 1 June 2018 - 1 May 2019:
- who was highest ranking MPS official involved in Operation Pelican;
- how many MPS officials worked on Operation Pelican in total;
- what was the MPS' total budget and expenses for Operation Pelican, broken down by year.
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 38(1)(a)(b) – Health & Safety
Section 27(1)(a)(c) – International Relations
Section 24(1) – National Security
Reason for decision
I note that at your questions 2 and 3 you have asked for the number of MPS officers [sic. Officials] that worked on Operation Pelican in total, and the MPS' total budget and expenses for Operation Pelican, broken down by year.
Unfortunately, please be advised that the MPS will not disclose information in relation to costs or resourcing specifically relating to Operation Pelican as to do so would provide individuals who have the intention to cause harm, with valuable intelligence on how the police operate. This would compromise our law enforcement functions by hindering our ability to detect crime and apprehend offenders. Disclosure could also result in a risk of physical harm to a range of individuals, including those within the Ecuadorian embassy, which would hinder our international relations and would have an adverse effect on national security.
It should be noted that there have been a number of previous FOIA requests in relation to the policing of the Ecuadorian Embassy, and information in relation to costs and resources since 2012 has recently been disclosed in response to a previous FOIA request in January 2022 which released costs for the financial years 2012/13 to 2015/16. The response is currently accessible on the MPS website having been published on the MPS Publication Scheme. To assist please find a link to the published information below:
Of note, within that response we (the MPS) stated:
“The MPS can neither confirm nor deny any costs following officers’ withdrawal from the Ecuadorian Embassy in 2015, as to do so would potentially identify operational tactics and capabilities.”
The policing operation at the Ecuadorian Embassy has also been subject to MPS press releases and Mayor’s Questions (please see the published response mentioned above for a link to relevant Mayor’s Questions).
A MPS Press statement issued on 11/10/2015 included the following:
“The operation to arrest Julian Assange does however continue and should he leave the Embassy the MPS will make every effort to arrest him. However it is no longer proportionate to commit officers to a permanent presence.
The MPS will not discuss what form its continuing operation will take or the resourcing implications surrounding it.
Whilst no tactics guarantee success in the event of Julian Assange leaving the embassy, the MPS will deploy a number of overt and covert tactics to arrest him.”
Additionally, a further MPS press statement released on 19/05/2017 included the following:
“Mr Assange remains wanted for a much less serious offence. The MPS will provide a level of resourcing which is proportionate to that offence.
The MPS will not comment further on the operational plan.”
Going back to your request specifically, it is apparent that disclosure of the information you are seeking at your questions 2 and 3, i.e., the number of officers working on the policing operation over the specified date range, and the budget, costs and expenses for the policing operation over the same date range, would by virtue of the mosaic effect, specifically if other requests were received and information disclosed for other date ranges, confirm or deny costs since the withdrawal of officers’ from the Ecuadorian Embassy in 2015. This would identify operational tactics and capabilities; and would also provide information in relation to the form of any continuing policing operation/plan and any resourcing implications.
Section 24(1) - National Security - By supplying any policing arrangements of this nature, such as additional costs and resourcing information, would render security measures less effective. In order to safeguard national security, there is a need for the MPS to protect information held as to release it would likely have a detrimental effect on policing resources, particularly in the sensitive area of national security.
Policing resources would be negatively affected should those with intent to map and obtain an operational advantage over MPS resources (allocated for national security purposes) manipulate the disclosed information.
Section 27(1)(a)(c) - International Relations - To disclose the costs and information in relation to resourcing relating to these further policing arrangements for the Ecuadorian Embassy after 12th October 2015 would be likely to prejudice or undermine international relations between the United Kingdom and Ecuador, should this negatively impact on their staff. Any disclosure of information, which could be considered by staff to cause a threat cannot be in the public interest.
To provide any further policing costs and information about resourcing may hinder and undermine the partnership approach between countries in respect of law enforcement and international cooperation.
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement - By providing the requested details would mean that there is a strong possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS will be compromised, which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension of an offender. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing this information, since they may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.
To disclose what costs have been incurred, other than that which has already been disclosed by the MPS, would allow one to infer the level of resources/capability being deployed on an operation. Should these costs be lower than envisaged, this could enable individuals to believe they have a higher chance of undertaking a criminal offence without being detected or evading capture.
Therefore, MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.
Section 38(1)(a)(b) - Health and Safety - There are significant risks associated with the provision of any further policing costs, and in disclosing resourcing, since this could reveal vulnerability. This in turn would place individuals in a position of danger, should the police service need to counter the threat posed following an inappropriate disclosure of information, which threatens their wellbeing. The health and safety of individuals is of paramount importance to the MPS. Any disclosure of further information, which endangers the safety of an individual, is likely to lead to a loss of confidence and disengagement by the public and this cannot be in the public interest.
In addition, disclosure of the requested information is likely to have a detrimental effect on policing procedures and compromise the safety and health of police officers. These procedures could be negatively affected should the information, be manipulated by those with criminal intent to obtain an advantage over police policing arrangements. To provide additional resources to counter any occurrence of harm following FOI disclosure also cannot be in the public interest.
In considering whether or not the MPS should release the information requested I have considered the potential harm that could be caused by such a disclosure.
FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information.
To disclose any further costs that may have been incurred as a result of this continued plan i.e. after 12th October 2015), or information about resourcing, i.e., the name of the highest ranking officer involved in Operation Pelican, and the number of officers that have worked on Operation Pelican in total, would cause operational harm to the MPS and affect our ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement.
Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain and allow those with a criminal intent, to improve their plans for causing disruption and would assist them in avoiding detection and apprehension, whilst placing individuals at greater risk. This would be highly likely to impact on police resources. The MPS would be likely to need to adapt their tactics and strategies for dealing with such incidents etc., if any further costings or resourcing information were to be disclosed, which could then be correlated with likely tactical resources deployed.
Disclosure of any further expenditure costs, and resourcing information, would highlight the concern level that the MPS places on this case and thus the effort being devoted. Therefore, MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information, could be manipulated by those with criminal/terrorist intent to operate in those areas.
The release of any further information may lead to an attack on this establishment, causing harm to embassy staff and possibly members of the public, as it may be deemed a vulnerable target. This could have a detrimental effect on the UK government’s relationship with Ecuador and therefore, other states or international organisations, would reconsider their affinity with the UK. Consequently, this could lead to a lack of trust and undermine law enforcement agreements in the future. It could also influence the sharing of information provided during the course of political and diplomatic exchanges.
It remains the case that the publication of any further information relating to additional policing costs and resourcing, could potentially lead to harm to individuals based within this Embassy, and particularly if that information related to security costs and resourcing.
Whilst the MPS has confirmed the disclosure of two press statements that are of some relevance to your request, and provided a link to a previous FOIA disclosure, it must be noted that a Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, as set by the security service (MI5) based upon current intelligence and that threat has only recently been reduced from the second highest level, ‘severe’ to ‘substantial’, which means that despite being reduced, an attack is likely.
In consideration of the ramifications of this threat level, it would not be wise to release details of any further operational costs or resourcing, which relate to any continued policing plan regarding the Ecuadorian Embassy since the withdrawal of officers in 2015, other than that which is already in the public domain. To do so could possibly compromise the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS. Modern-day policing is intelligence led and information of this nature, needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with the release of such information as this may provide those seeking to commit criminal acts with an advantage over the MPS and other forces, as the information can indeed be viewed as operational 'intelligence' and operationally sensitive. Disclosure could have a negative effect on the MPS’s ability to undertake similar types of operations.
To disclose the requested information would therefore provide them with an opportunity of disrupting police activity. In respect of this request, disclosure of any police activity that relates to Julian Assange and his presence in the Ecuadorian Embassy, and any subsequent operation, costing or resourcing information, would identify the extent of the procedures that were put in place.
Therefore, disclosure could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them thus increasing the cost to the public purse.
As stated the UK faces a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists and this threat is greater in scale and ambition than any of the terrorist threats in the past. Government reports suggest that at any one time the police and security agencies are contending with many terrorist plots, terrorist groups or networks and individuals who are judged to pose a threat to the well-being of the UK and or UK interests.
While the plots may not necessarily all be directed at specific individuals or locations, the MPS have a duty to promote the safety of all individuals. Therefore, to release information in relation to costs and resourcing about specific operations and within specific date ranges, would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security. National security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK and abroad. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose information. By providing details which breakdown any resourcing costs and any other operational expenditure could potentially be misused proving detrimental to national security.
In the current environment of an increased threat of terrorist activity, providing any details that could assist an extremist, terrorist faction or fixated individual who have the relevant time and know-how, would put people’s lives at risk.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the police service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of the public at risk, undermine national security or law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by criminal activity, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police operations in this highly sensitive area.
Any disclosure of information, which includes policing arrangements and resourcing costs, could be used to identify the deployment of resources and therefore prejudice our ability to conduct similar operations. It could allow those who seek to cause harm to members of the public within the vicinity of the Ecuadorian embassy or embassy staff themselves, to gain an understanding of our operational capabilities. This is therefore sensitive information of intelligence value to a criminal or terrorist. Consequently, it is our opinion that for this reason the balancing test favours non-disclosure of any additional information.
Please see the disclosure section below for information that has been located in response to your question 1 and assessed as suitable for disclosure.
Disclosure
Q1 - Please tell me, for the period 1 June 2018 - 1 May 2019: - who was highest ranking MPS official involved in Operation Pelican?
Commander Neil Jerome was the highest ranking officer [sic. official].