Internal facial recognition board meeting minutes
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.023158
I note you seek access to the following information:
I write to request information and records under the FOIA, regarding the Metropolitan Police's use of live facial recognition technology on 28 January 2022.
1. How many facial recognition alerts were there during the deployment in Westminster?
Of these alerts, how many were:
1a. True positive matches of members of the public?
1b. False positive matches of members of the public?
1c. Alerts related to police staff ('blue list')?
And
1e. How many true positive alerts led to interventions?
1f. How many false positive alerts led to interventions?
2. Please provide the Equality Impact Assessment and other related decision documents regarding this deployment.
3. How many police staff, uniformed and plainclothes, were deployed for the operation at Oxford Circus?
4. Please provide minutes from the Met's internal facial recognition board meetings over the past 24 months.
5. How many individuals were on the watchlist?
6. What thresholds were set for inclusion on the watchlist?
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 21(1) – Accessible via other means
Section 31(1)(a)&(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)&(3) – Personal Information
Section 42(1) – Legal professional privilege
Section 43(2) – Commercial sensitivity
Reason for decision
When a request for information is made under the Act, a public authority must inform you, when permitted, whether the information requested is held. It must then communicate that information to you. If a public authority decides that it cannot comply with all or part of a request, it must cite the appropriate section or exemption of the Act and provide you with an explanation.
Section 21(1) - Information which is reasonably accessible to by other means - of the Act provides public authorities with an exclusion from the duty to disclose information, under Section 1(1)(b) of the Act, when the information requested is reasonably accessible to the applicant. This exemption is accordingly claimed in respect of the information requested that is already published. Where information is already in the public domain we are not required to re-publish the data, instead, public authorities are required to direct you to the information, which we have done in this instance.
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement - of the Act provides that any information is exempt if its disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention or detection of crime or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.
When information is released under FOIA it is also published on the MPS website and considered to be a release to the world and the MPS then has no control over what use is made of that information. Whilst not questioning the motives of any applicant, providing information that we believe would prejudice law enforcement any information that would reveal policing tactics or would compromise law enforcement tactics. This would hinder the MPS’ ability to prevent and detect crimes and would allow criminals to gain knowledge about capabilities and investigative processes of police forces as a whole. Such criminals will be able to determine vulnerabilities and specifically target those force areas where they see a potential area to exploit. This would undermine the operational integrity of our activities, which would adversely affect law enforcement.
It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the MPS’ ability to accomplish its core functions of law enforcement.
The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during investigations and the public release of some of the information requested would prejudice its ability to conduct policing of investigations.
Section 40(2)&(3) - Personal Information - of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act.
There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:
a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.
The requested records contain names and contact details of members of staff and other individuals which the MPS considers is of a personal nature. Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that:
Names of MPS employees
The MPS employees named in the requested records would not reasonably expect
their details to be published in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. I
have not identified a legitimate interest that would be satisfied in disclosing their personal data in response to this request for information.
Email addresses, telephone numbers and locations of staff members
The public release of emails addresses, telephone numbers and locations of MPS employees that corresponded in connection with the Freedom of Information Act request recorded under the references above would not satisfy any identifiable legitimate interest.
The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.
Section 42(1) – Legal Professional Privilege - Information in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege or, in Scotland, to confidentiality of communications could be maintained in legal proceedings, is exempt information.
The MPS has a need to safeguard openness in all areas of communication between client and lawyer, to ensure access to full and frank advice. Disclosure of any legal advice provided concerning Live Facial Recognition would impede the relationship between the MPS and Legal Advisors, thereby hindering the law enforcement role of the MPS.
Having considered your request, I accept that there is a public interest in transparency when requests are made for police information. This is particularly the case, given that the release of the information requested would better inform the general public about the allocation of public resources.
However, the MPS will not release any information that would harm the relationship between the MPS and its Legal Advisors. The client’s ability to speak freely and frankly with its legal advisor in order to obtain appropriate legal advice is a fundamental requirement of the English legal system and the concept of legal professional privilege protects the confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and client. This helps to ensure complete fairness in legal proceedings.
I consider that the benefit that would result from the information being disclosed does not outweigh disclosing information relating to the legal advice provided to the MPS and information generated in confidence by individuals who contributed to this procedure.
Section 43(2) of the Commercial Interests - In order for the exemption provided under Section 43(2) to be engaged in this case, the MPS must demonstrate that disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person. In this case, we are relying on the lower threshold of 'would be likely to'. This exemption has been applied as disclosure of some details within the Minutes of Meetings are subject to commercial confidentiality and as such, revealing this level of information would be likely to have a prejudicial impact upon the commercial interest of the MPS.
Any information that can be used by competitors to inform future business decisions, could significantly impact the position of our contractors and will not be released.
Companies contracting with the MPS would have no reasonable expectation that specific information that is considered to be sensitive will be shared with the public or competing companies. Certain details could be of a competitive or strategic advantage during future tenders. It is predominantly our contractors who would be most directly prejudiced by the disclosure of the information, however, it could also prove detrimental to the relationship between the MPS and our contractors and suppliers and may, as a result, damage the bargaining position of the MPS.
Ultimately the disclosure of this information would have the potential to damage business confidence and cause harm to the commercial interests of the MPS which in turn, may impact upon the procurement of similar services in the future, as companies would be less willing to share details with the MPS through fear of disclosure under the Act.
The ICO guidance itself confirms that there is a public interest in allowing public authorities to withhold information which if disclosed, would reduce its ability to negotiate or compete in a commercial environment. Furthermore, disclosure of the information requested has the potential to cause damage to business confidence and cause harm to the commercial interests of the MPS.
Finally, it is not in the public interest for the relationship between the MPS and our contractors to be negatively affected. This is due to the fact that harm to, or termination of, these relationships may result in the MPS being unable to procure our preferred choice of contractors, which we require to facilitate effective policing. In the event that our current contractors were to terminate their relationship with the MPS, we would have to seek out new contractors and renegotiate terms. By narrowing the range of those that would work with us, we may be forced to use less preferable companies. This could subsequently lead to us having to procure less suitable services or utilise public funds in a less efficient manner.
Disclosure
Q1 - How many facial recognition alerts were there during the deployment in Westminster?
Of these alerts, how many were:
1a - True positive matches of members of the public?
1b - False positive matches of members of the public?
1e - How many true positive alerts led to interventions?
1f - How many false positive alerts led to interventions?
Q1 & 1a,b,e,f – Please note that Section 21 Exemption applies to these questions because the information requested is already available in the public domain and I have included the relevant link below:
LFR - Deployment Recordspdf
Q1c - Alerts related to police staff ('blue list')?
There were 15 blue list alerts.
Q2 - Please provide the Equality Impact Assessment and other related decision documents regarding this deployment.
In accordance with our duty under S.16, we have taken your reference to “…other related decision documents…” to mean other impact assessments relating to the use of LFR. The Data Protection Impact Assessment is already in the public domain and I have provided the relevant link below. The Section 21 Exemption therefore applies to this question.
Advice and information - LFR
Q3 - How many police staff, uniformed and plainclothes, were deployed for the operation at Oxford Circus?
Section 31 Exemption applies to this question. This is because Freedom of Information requests are not private transactions and any release of information under the Act is a disclosure to the world. The MPS will not reveal police strength for any operation as this would give criminals an enhanced knowledge of our operational capabilities and highlight policing tactics as well as reveal any deficiencies. This would be detrimental to law enforcement.
Q4 - Please provide minutes from the Met's internal facial recognition board meetings over the past 24 months.
Please find attached documents as requested. Please note that the information has been provided in a redacted format, that is, I have removed information that I consider to be exempt under the Act. A series of asterisks (*********) denote where exempt information has been removed. All of the above exemptions apply to this question.
Q5 - How many individuals were on the watchlist?
Section 21 Exemption applies to this question. This is because the information is included in the Deployment Records highlighted above via the internet link.
Q6 - What thresholds were set for inclusion on the watchlist?
In accordance with our duty under S.16, we have taken your reference to “…thresholds…” to mean the parameters set for addition to the Watchlist. Therefore both Section 21 & Section 31 Exemptions apply to this question. With reference to Section 21, some of the information is already in the public domain and I have provided a link below for your reference. In accordance with the information provided in the link below, Section 31 applies because individual Watchlists are bespoke for each deployment based on intelligence, so any information relating to their parameters and thresholds set, risks revealing sensitive police information. Please see the section below titled ‘Legal Annex’ for further information on the exemptions utilised.
College of Policing - LFR watchlist
With reference to the Minutes dated 05/02/2021, please note that it contains an error, in that it states that CC Andy Cook is the Biometrics Commissioner, which is incorrect. However, with reference to inaccurate information recorded, the ICO guidelines state the following:
“What if the information is inaccurate?
The Act covers recorded information, whether or not it is accurate. You cannot refuse a request for information simply because you know the information is out of date, incomplete or inaccurate. To avoid misleading the requester, you should normally be able to explain to them the nature of the information, or provide extra information to help put the information into context.
When considering complaints against a public authority, the ICO will normally reject arguments that inaccurate information should not be disclosed. However, in a few cases there may be strong and persuasive arguments for refusing a request on these grounds if these are specifically tied to an exemption in the Act. It will be up to you to identify such arguments”.
ICO - Guide to FOI requests