Callsigns used by the Violent Crime Taskforce & Violence Suppression Unit

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.024381

I note you seek access to the following information:

Request 1
Q1) Are you able to provide the callsign used by the Violent Crime Taskforce
Q2) Is Violence Suppression Unit under VCTF? or are they separate units.
Q2a) Are you able to provide the callsign used by the Violence Suppression Unit?
Q3) Are you able to provide how many units from VSU patrol Lambeth?
Q4) Are you able to provide the name of the Superintendent in charge of the Violence Suppression Unit?

Request 2
Q1) I passed a TSG carrier yesterday with the callsign "Oracle 41" can you possibly provide information on the callsign?
Q2) Can you provide the callsign used by ERPT in the Ealing Borough?
Q3) Can you provide the callsign used by ERPT in the Lambeth Borough?
Q4) Can you provide the callsign used by ERPT in the Camden Borough?

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

Request 1
Information relating to questions 1, 2a and 3 are exempt by virtue of Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act which governs Law Enforcement.

Request 2
All questions are exempt by virtue of Section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act which governs Law Enforcement.

Before I explain the decisions that I have made in relation to your request, I thought that it would be helpful to outline the parameters set out by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act), within which a request for information can be answered. The Act creates a statutory right of access to information held by public authorities. A public authority in respect of a request must, if permitted, state under Section 1(a) of the Act, whether it holds the requested information and, if held, then communicate that information to the applicant under Section 1(b) of the Act.

The right of access to information is not without exception and is subject to a number of exemptions which are designed to enable public authorities to withhold information that is unsuitable for release. Importantly, the Act is designed to place information into the public domain, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received.

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement - Call signs are assigned to specific units, vehicles or officers. Call signs are used to contact these specific units, vehicles or officers so that they can be directed to incidents. As such, the use of call signs will identify where those units, vehicles or officers are at a specific time.

To release call signs would reveal tactical capability, as outlined above. These tactical capabilities could be negatively used, should those with negative intentions be used to gain access to a police radio, to disrupt local policing, avoid detection and negatively affect the MPS law enforcement function.

In addition to this if the amount of units from VSU that patrol Lambeth were released into the public domain there could potentially be substantial harm to the Police Service, as it could inhibit its ability to fulfil its core functions. The release of operational tactics relating to a specific borough would furnish individuals or groups having the necessary intent to disrupt police activity with the necessary information to effectively do just that, thereby hindering future operational activity.
This would consequently increase the capability for criminals to target innocent members of the public. Any release of information that would be likely to prejudice a police services' ability to prevent and/or detect crime could only be viewed as being harmful to members of the public.

To disclose information on call signs would reveal tactical capability and would place the MPS at a tactical disadvantage as outlined in the harm above. It cannot be in the public interest to disclose information which would undermine our ability to detect crime and bring offenders to justice. As detailed within the 'harm', this would be a valuable asset to individuals and/or organisations wishing to commit crimes. The infiltration of police communication/intelligence systems would disrupt the deployment of units and officers to any crime which, in turn, would enable offenders to destroy evidence and evade apprehension.

I would like to take this opportunity to add that we have in the past released call signs under the FOIA. However with the passage of time we have radically changed our call sign structure and policy. Therefore information in the public domain is therefore obsolete and of little operational value. The new approach we have adopted better identifies the skills and capabilities of a particular unit, which could be of intelligence value to a person or persons with criminal or malicious intent. Knowledge of these skills and capabilities could therefore provide those with malicious intent to form some form of attack on an operational unit, or avoiding that unit etc. It is for these reasons that I have applied section 31(1)(a)(b) of the Act to the information being requested.

In addition to this to release the requested information about the number of units from VSU that patrol Lambeth, and by default the number of officers, on a specific borough could prevent the Service from preventing and detecting crime, as well as hinder our ability to apprehend offenders.
Information regarding police deployment data is a valuable commodity to individuals (and/or organisations) wishing to commit crime, as it provides an insight into tactics and resources available to the MPS. Therefore, those seeking to commit criminality could counter any future policing tactics and elude justice. This will ultimately have a detrimental impact on innocent members of the public living or traveling within the Lambeth Borough.

Releasing the requested information regarding VSU patrol data could leave Lambeth Borough vulnerable to criminals utilising the information for malicious intent. This could lead to an increase in crime if offenders believed they were less likely to be apprehended in the future. This is particularly the case if they obtained the information for various London boroughs enabling them to 'map' periods of vehicle and officer deployment over the capital.
As crime prevention/detection is in the 'public's interest', any release of information which would be likely to prejudice our ability to prevent and/or detect crime could only be viewed as being harmful to the public interest.

Disclosure

Please find below information deemed suitable for release:

Request 1
Q2 - Is Violence Suppression Unit under VCTF? or are they separate units.

The VSU and VCTF are separate units

Q4 - Are you able to provide the name of the Superintendent in charge of the Violence Suppression Unit?

Dan Smith is the Detective Superintendent for the VSU