Equality Impact Assessments - Operation Boxster

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.023245

I note you seek access to the following information:

Please can I request the following information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000:

1. Please could you provide me with the full Equality Impact Assessments (EIA) for Operations
Wordwell,
Orochi,
Crosshair,
Oregrande,
Boxster, and
an unnamed Metropolitan police operation carried out from 12 to 14 October 2021 in coordination with Surrey, Kent, Essex, Hertfordshire, Thames Valley, and British Transport police forces.

Please ensure that any documents referred to in these six operations’ EIAs are also provided.

2. For each of the EIAs please advise who completed them.
Please give their name and
their role or job title.
If you cannot give their name for GDPR reasons, please give their role or job title. You should be able to provide their role in a non-identifying way.

3. Please also provide a complete list of people/organisations consulted on for the EIAs ('the consultees').

Please further provide me with any documentation given to the consultees to assist them in responding to the EIA consultation.

Additionally, please advise the medium by which consultees responded and please provide their responses (e.g. emails, notes of calls etc).

4. If the EIA for a given operation identified that it would disadvantage or disproportionately impact a particular group/groups please advise who made the decision for the operation to go ahead (name and job title unless the name cannot be provided for GDPR reasons) and please provide the full justification and reasons for why the operation went ahead.

This may be contained with the EIA or in separate documents (and please provide these separate documents).

If no such justification/reasons exist, please explain why.

I am aware that these forms might need to be redacted. Please redact only exempted information and provide explanations for those exemptions.

I kindly remind you that, according to the Information Commissioners Office, the UK GDPR only applies to information which relates to an identifiable living individual. Information relating to a deceased person does not constitute personal data and therefore is not subject to the UK GDPR.

I also remind you that the time taken for redactions does not usually contribute towards the cost cap under FOI.

If it is not possible to provide the information requested for cost reasons (Section 12 of the Act), please provide advice as to how I can refine my request.

If this request is unclear, I would be grateful if you could contact me as I understand that under the Act, you are required to advise and assist requesters. If any of this information is already in the public domain, please can you direct me to it.

If the release of any of this information is prohibited on the grounds of breach of confidence, please supply me with copies of the confidentiality agreement. I remind you that information should not be treated as confidential if such an agreement has not been signed.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 40(2) - Personal Information
Section 30(3) - Investigations
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(5) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

Section 40(2)(3)&(4) – Personal Information is designed to address information that is covered by the Data Protection Act 2018.

To confirm or deny whether personal information exists could publicly reveal information about an identifiable individual or individuals, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2018.

Section 30(3) – Investigation/Operation - Section 30(3) provides an exclusion from the duty to confirm or deny whether information is held, if doing so would reveal, if held, information that would be held for the purpose of a criminal investigation. The public interest must also support neither confirming nor denying that the information requested is held.

Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement - Under this Section of the Act, the MPS is not required to confirm or deny whether information is held when doing so would prejudice the prevention or detection of crime.

Section 31(3) of the Act provides an exclusion from the duty to confirm or deny whether information is held, if doing so would reveal, if held, information that would prejudice the prevention or detection of crime. The public interest must also support neither confirming nor denying that the information requested is held. There is also a requirement to set out the prejudice/harm that would result from confirming or denying that the information sought is held.

Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement - To confirm or deny whether information of the description specified by this request is held by the MPS, would publicly confirm whether it has conducted an operation named ‘Op Oregrande’. Police operations are inherently confidential. The MPS does not confirm when, where and against whom it has launched an operation as to do so would make public, areas of police interest/investigation. This could also directly or indirectly, reveal police intelligence and/or sources of information. Ultimately, confirming or denying whether information is held would have an adverse effect upon the ability of the MPS to conduct operations and investigations which would, in turn, affect its ability to both prevent and detect crime. Please find the public interest test factors that I have identified and evaluated when considering your request below.

There are occasions where it is correct that the MPS does not confirm or deny that information is held. In this case, confirming or denying that information is held would disclose whether the MPS conducted an operation named ‘Op Oregrande’. Police investigations are inherently confidential, largely owing to their sensitive personal nature and the fact that confirming or denying the existence of police activity can prejudice current and future police investigations and/or reveal police intelligence and/or sources of information. The public interest does not support routinely confirming or denying the existence of police operations or investigations given the potentially prejudicial effect of doing so.

Police investigations are inherently confidential owing to their sensitive nature. The MPS, through its Media Policy Toolkit, has a process for making information about particular police investigations or operations available to the general public. It is not current MPS policy nor practice, to confirm or deny whether the MPS has conducted an operation or investigation outside of the framework of this policy. Providing information through a confirmation or denial under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, would not accordingly, be in line with current MPS policy or procedure.

The MPS does not, as a matter of course, confirm or deny whether it has mounted an operation and/or disclose whether that operation proved to be successful or unsuccessful. To do so would allow a picture of the Met’s operations to be established. To ensure that the MPS does not inadvertently disclose information through the mosaic effect, the MPS must consistently ‘neither confirm nor deny’ whether it has conducted an operation or through comparison of a number of requests, sensitive police information could be revealed. For this reason, the MPS does not confirm nor deny whether information is held in response to this request for information.

This request for information asks the MPS to confirm whether it has conducted an operation under the name ‘Op Oregrande’. The MPS does not, as a matter of course, confirm or deny whether it has mounted operations, as doing so where the operation is/was sensitive, could prejudice current and future police investigations and/or reveal police intelligence and/or sources of information. The MPS cannot therefore, confirm the existence of an operation when it is not sensitive, as this would, through comparison, allow those cases where a different response has been received, to be identified. The MPS must accordingly, maintain a consistent position of neither confirming nor denying whether information is held, to protect those instances where confirming the very existence of an operation would be harmful.

Having considered all opposing public interest factors, it is my view that the public interest supports neither confirming or denying whether the MPS has conducted an operation under the name ‘Op Oregrande’. For this reason, the notice does not confirm or deny that information is held.

Section 40(5A)&(5B)(a)(i) - Personal Information - provides an exclusion from the duty to confirm whether personal data is held, if doing so would breach one of the Data Protection Principles.

There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:

a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.

This request asks the MPS to confirm or deny whether it has conducted an operation named ‘Op Oregrande’. Further questions are asked about the operation which would, if held, constitute personal data.

Any operation/investigation launched by the police targets an individual or individuals who are believed to be the perpetrators of a criminal offence(s). Whilst I accept that there is a legitimate interest in confirming or denying whether information is held, given that the MPS prevent and detect crime on behalf of the general public, I do not believe that the legitimate interest test has been met. The MPS has an established policy/process for making information about particular police operations available to the general public. It would be inconsistent and incompatible with this process to confirm or deny whether personal data is held, outside of the terms of the policy/practice. For this reason, this notice constitutes a refusal under Section 40(5) of the Act and does not confirm nor deny whether any information does or does not exist.

The EIA for Op Boxster contains personal information – these have been redacted. We have provided the rank instead.

With regards to ‘Op Oregrande’ - This request attracts an NCND response, as to confirm or deny that information is held prevents disclosure. By neither confirming nor denying that information is held prevents disclosure of whether a specific investigation/operation had been conducted and the extent of those enquiries, which could cause harm to members of the public, thereby engaging Sections 30(3) of the Act. In addition, Section 40(5) is engaged as to confirm or deny whether any individual(s) was investigated for a specific crime would be disclosing personal information.

Please note this response should not be taken to as an indication of whether or not the requested information is held.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Wordwell - Information not held. Equality Impact Assessment was not completed.

Orochi - Information not held. Equality Impact Assessment was not completed.

Crosshair - Information not held. Equality Impact Assessment was not completed.

An unnamed Metropolitan police operation carried out from 12 to 14 October 2021 in coordination with Surrey, Kent, Essex, Hertfordshire, Thames Valley, and British Transport police forces.

You asked about the unnamed operation – this is called Operation Pandilla – a joint South East England operation which targets the network of arterial roads to reduce and prevent violence activity.

Information not held. Equality Impact Assessment was not completed.

Disclosure

Please see attached EIA for Op Boxster – Names have been redacted.

In addition, no people/organisations were consulted.