Digital Forensics

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.022821

I note you seek access to the following information:

New Request
Q1) Please can you tell me how many digital forensic departments/functions ‘the Met’ has in total? Including any contained within specialist departments such as ROCU, Counter Terrorism, PSD etc.

Q3) If ‘the Met’ does have additional digital forensics units in specialist departments, are these entirely self-contained in respect to budgeting, equipment, ISO standards etc?

Q4) Does the DPS/PSD have its own Digital Forensics provision?
If it does, how many staff work within the unit, are these Police Officer or Police Staff?
Does this unit (if it exists) speak, belong or engage with any other digital forensic function ‘inside’ of ‘the Met’? *I note in a news publication some years back where the head of DPS/PSD stated he had his own Digital Forensics.

Q5) How many members of staff does ‘the Met’ employ in digital forensics all together? Including any specialist departments. Could you give a breakdown on numbers per specialist department?

Initial Request
Q1) Would I be able to request a redacted copy of the Digital Forensics ISO17025 Quality Manual.
And Or
Redacted versions of your PC Acquisition and Mobile Forensics ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ ?

There should be no reason why this information cannot be provided, as this isn’t a request for personal information.

Usually all digital forensics techniques and how they are conducted can be provided in court upon request - with the exception to this being classified or covert tactics.

Q2) Please can you tell me how many digital forensic departments/functions ‘the Met’ has in total? Including any contained within specialist departments such as ROCU, Counter Terrorism, PSD etc.

Q3) If ‘the Met’ does have additional digital forensics units in specialist departments, are these entirely self-contained in respect to budgeting, equipment, ISO standards etc?

Q4) Does the DPS/PSD have its own Digital Forensics provision?

If it does, how many staff work within the unit, are these Police Officer or Police Staff?
Does this unit (if it exists) speak, belong or engage with any other digital forensic function ‘inside’ of ‘the Met’?

*I note in a news publication some years back where the head of DPS/PSD stated he had his own Digital Forensics.

Q5) How many members of staff does ‘the Met’ employ in digital forensics all together? Including any specialist departments.

Could you give a breakdown on numbers per specialist department?

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1) – Law Enforcement
Section 23(5) Information relating to the Security bodies;
Section 24(2) National Security;
Section 31(3) Law enforcement;

Reason for decision

Section 31(1) – Law Enforcement - Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics and strategies and would also hinder any future investigations or review investigations into similar matters.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies and tactics used by police forces.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement processes and would also hinder the ability of the MPS to fulfil its primary aim of enforcing the law and protecting the public. Any intelligence contained within data is in use by Officers any release of tactical capability information could harm our ability to conduct that assessment and reduce our ability to conduct future investigations.

Disclosure would technically be releasing information into the public domain which would enable those with the capacity and inclination to try and use the information to commit crime or evade justice.

Care must be taken to not compromise any strand of an investigation or cause any undue harm to any people or families involved.

The MPS has a duty to protect both witnesses and suspects of criminal investigations and the integrity of tried and tested investigative techniques used now and for future criminal investigations.

The disclosure of this information to the public by the MPS would undermine individuals' confidence in helping the MPS with investigations. Anything that undermines this would have a detrimental effect, reducing the quality of information the MPS receives and consequently compromising the effectiveness of any investigation.

The disclosure of this information to the public by the MPS would inhibit the flow of free and frank discussion, sharing of advice and best practices for investigations between police services. Anything that undermines this would have a detrimental effect on the thoroughness, efficiency and effectiveness of police investigations and ultimately the apprehension and prosecution of offenders.

The MPS can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to Questions 1 part (B) (previously question 2), Q3 and Q4(C) of your request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Act does not apply.

Section 23(5) Information relating to the Security bodies - Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection

A certificate signed by a Minister of the Crown certifying that the information to which it applies was directly or indirectly supplied by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3) shall, subject to section 60, be conclusive evidence of that fact.

(3)The bodies referred to in subsections (1) and (2) are—
(a) the Security Service,
(b) the Secret Intelligence Service,
(c )the Government Communications Headquarters,
(d) the special forces,
(e) the Tribunal established under section 65 of the Regulation of M1Investigatory Powers Act 2000,
(f) the Tribunal established under section 7 of the M2Interception of Communications Act 1985,
(g) the Tribunal established under section 5 of the M3Security Service Act 1989,
(h) the Tribunal established under section 9 of the M4Intelligence Services Act 1994,
(i) the Security Vetting Appeals Panel,
(j) the Security Commission,
(k) the National Criminal Intelligence Service, F1. . .
(l) the Service Authority for the National Criminal Intelligence Service.
(m) the Serious Organised Crime Agency.]

(4)In subsection (3)(c) “the Government Communications Headquarters” includes any unit or part of a unit of the armed forces of the Crown which is for the time being required by the Secretary of State to assist the Government Communications Headquarters in carrying out its functions.

(5)The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section 1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).

Section 24(2) National Security - Information which does not fall within section 23(1) is exempt information if exemption from section 1(1)(b) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, exemption from section 1(1)(a) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

A certificate signed by a Minister of the Crown certifying that exemption from section 1(1)(b), or from section 1(1)(a) and (b), is, or at any time was, required for the purpose of safeguarding national security shall, subject to section 60, be conclusive evidence of that fact.

A certificate under subsection (3) may identify the information to which it applies by means of a general description and may be expressed to have prospective effect.

By confirming or denying the use of specialist techniques could render Security measures less effective. This could lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so could undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by the criminal fraternity, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

There is also no requirement to satisfy any public concern over the legality of police operations and the tactics we may or may not use. Forces are already held to account by statute, for example the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and independent bodies such as Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner. Our accountability is therefore not enhanced by confirming or denying whether any information is held.

Section 31(3) (a)(b) - Law enforcement - By confirming or denying whether such techniques were used would compromise law enforcement tactics and undermine the partnership approach which would hinder the prevention or detection of crime. This would impact on police resources, more crime would then be committed and individuals placed at risk.

By confirming or denying whether any further information is held, the criminal fraternity including terrorists would be likely to use this information to try and circumvent police law enforcement capabilities and tactics.

It is inevitably harmful to provide the criminal fraternity including terrorists with current intelligence of the MPS. Law enforcement measures (whether additional information is held or not) would be rendered less effective should the MPS confirm or deny whether any additional information is held.

To confirm or deny whether additional information is held may compromise potential ongoing or future operations and or prosecutions, the consequence of which would hinder the prevention and/or detection of crime. It therefore remains the case that any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorist or criminal organisations. Likewise, confirming whether the

MPS does not have additional information provides intelligence that can be used by criminals to undermine the operational integrity of policing that would be likely to adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on the ability of the MPS to protect the public and uphold the law.

There is no doubt that terrorists are able to use publicly disclosed intelligence to counter police measures. Confirmation or denial of whether additional information is held could therefore lead to an increase in crime based on criminals understanding of our capabilities. Such an effect would in turn impact on MPS resources and detract officers and staff from its role in law enforcement.

Therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any information is held regarding these specialist techniques is not made out. This argument is obviously transferable to all police tactics.

Q4 -
A) Does the DPS/PSD have its own Digital Forensics provision?
B) If it does, how many staff work within the unit, are these Police Officer or Police Staff?

The MPS refuses access to the requested information (Question4. B) By virtue of the following exemption, Section 31(1) - Law Enforcement
Section 31(1)(a)(b) is engaged in this case as disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention and detection of crimes and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

Disclosure

Q1 - Please can you tell me how many digital forensic departments/functions ‘the Met’ has in total? Including any contained within specialist departments such as ROCU, Counter Terrorism, PSD etc.

Four (4)
Any further breakdown is Neither Confirmed Nor Denied.

Q3 If ‘the Met’ does have additional digital forensics units in specialist departments, are these entirely self-contained in respect to budgeting, equipment, ISO standards etc?

Full NCND

Q4A - Does the DPS/PSD have its own Digital Forensics provision?

Yes

Q4B - If it does, how many staff work within the unit, are these Police Officer or Police Staff?

Exempt - Section 31(1) Law Enforcement

Q4C - Does this unit (if it exists) speak, belong or engage with any other digital forensic function ‘inside’ of ‘the Met’?
*I note in a news publication some years back where the head of DPS/PSD stated he had his own Digital Forensics.

Full NCND.

Q5 - How many members of staff does ‘the Met’ employ in digital forensics all together? Including any specialist departments. Could you give a breakdown on numbers per specialist department?

No information located

Any statistical data relating to specialist units within the MPS fall within the NCND element and this data. There are so many nuances in this area, e.g., officers who conduct ad hoc kiosk examinations in addition to their day job, an exact figures is not likely to be accurate.