MetBats policy and latest presentation

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.024312

I note you seek access to the following information:

Please could I request the following with regards ‘MetBats’, your briefing and tasking system:

1. Any policies and/or procedures in relation to MetBats briefing and tasking system
2. A copy of a recent MetBats presentation (I fully appreciate sensitive info will need to be redacted)

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(1) National Security
Section 31(1) Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3A)(a) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under Freedom of Information, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world and not just to one individual.

Section 24(1) - National Security - Whilst national security is not defined under the Freedom of Information Act, it does include the security of the United Kingdom and its people.

It is important to note that the UK faces a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists and this threat is greater in scale and ambition than any of the terrorist threats in the past. Government reports suggest that at any one time the police and security agencies are contending with many terrorist plots, terrorist groups or networks and individuals who are judged to pose a threat to the well-being of the UK and or UK interests.

Significantly, if the public were made aware of what type of tactics and resources the MPS is likely to have available, this would also highlight capabilities and resources that they do not have, which would reveal vulnerabilities which could be exploited by criminals, including terrorists.

The release of such information would cause significant operational harm to the MPS and would affect our ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement and provide a duty of care to our officers and all members of the public.

Providing the requested information in full would divulge policing tactics and methodology which would increase officer safety risks, risks to the public and to national security. This would not be in the public interest.

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by terrorism, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of policing operations.

In this case, providing the information requested in its entirety would undoubtedly be of interest to the public, however, it is not in the public interest to reveal the methodology used to ensure the safety of police officers or members of the public. Any such release would risk officer safety, public safety, compromise the effective delivery of operational law enforcement and undermine national security.

The Police Service takes its responsibility to protect the safety of individuals seriously. Any release that would put the safety of individuals at risk, whether officers or the general public, would never be in the public interest.

Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement - To disclose all of the information contained in the attached documents would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain, which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map tactics and strategies used by the MPS.

The MPS has a statutory role in investigating criminal offences and deploys a range of tactics and investigative techniques to do so. Providing information through the duty to confirm or deny would, in this case, inform the general public whether or not the MPS uses specific tactics and strategies. This would be harmful, as this would inform potential offenders what options are available to the MPS in investigating criminal offences.

The MPS would not release information that would compromise its ability to detect and investigate crimes and/or encourage or facilitate crime. This would give those with intent a greater understanding of the MPS’ methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities.

Some of the information in the attached documents relate to law enforcement. We believe that providing all of the information contained in these documents would compromise law enforcement which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. This would result in more risk to the public and consequently require the use of more police resources. To provide information on tactical options that the MPS utilises in its investigations would not be in the public interest as this would be providing valuable intelligence to criminals.

Having considered your request, I accept that there is a public interest in transparency when any request is made for police information. The public interest favouring release must be balanced against any associated risk and/or prejudice that would be caused by disclosure.

Given this and the fact that the removal of this information does not detract from the quality of the information being disclosed, I have found that the release of this information is not in the public interest. I have accordingly refused to release all of the information contained in the attached documents in response to your request for information.

Section 40(2)(3A)(a) – Personal Information - The requested documents contain telephone contacts and email addresses which we have redacted. We believe that the public release of this information would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS with information that would assist them to do so. In this regard, a person with this intent would be likely to use this information to make inappropriate contact with these areas of the MPS which would impede upon the resources of these members of staff and cause disruption to the work of the MPS.

The provision to refuse access to information under Section 40(2)(a)(b) and (3A)(a) of the Act is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to demonstrate what that harm may be in refusing access to information.

Section 40(2)(a)(b) of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act.

There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:

a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.

Disclosure

Please find attached two documents:
1. MetBats Briefing Template
2. MetBats Guidance

Please note that both documents have been provided in a redacted format.
With reference to the MetBats Briefing Template, please note that the threat levels noted on page 19 may vary and are amended to reflect current threat levels. These are currently ‘Substantial’ rather than ‘Severe’. Threat levels can be found online and I have provided a link below for your reference:
Terrorism - National Emergency