Machine Learning and Deep Learning Software
Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.022489
I note you seek access to the following information:
I am writing to request information around your forces use of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Deep Learning Software.
1. Could you please let me know if your police force currently uses AI in any forward or policing work, or where you are conducing researching or exploring using this technology in any way in the future.
I am seeking details on the following:
2. How will/is AI being used and for what (e.g. judicial judgements)? Do you have any plans for the future.
3. How wide spread will the/is the use of this technology?
4. Who are you working with in the private sector to develop the technologies used?
5. Do you have any contracts with IBM, Amazon or Clearview AI?
6. What datasets are used to ‘train’ any AI.
7. What measure are in place (if any) to mitigate bias?
Decision
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act).
In addition, and irrespective of what other information may or may not be held relating to any possible covert use of Facial Recognition this request also requires the MPS to Neither Confirm nor Deny whether it holds any further information. This is because the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions;
• Section 23(5) Information concerning security bodies
• Section 24(2) National Security
• Section 31(3) Law Enforcement
Reason for decision
Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives behind this specific request, confirming or denying that any information relating to any possible covert practice of Facial Recognition would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct/undertake their criminal/terrorist activities.
Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the Police Service may or may not deploy the use of Facial Recognition would be likely to lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, the UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists and the current threat level is set at ‘substantial’.
It is well established that police services use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.
Confirming or denying whether any information is or isn’t held relating to the covert use of Facial Recognition would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities.
This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics may or may not be deployed. This can be useful information to those committing (or those intent on committing or planning) crime. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.
Please note this response should therefore not be taken to as an indication of whether or not further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is held within this response for your questions.
Section 23(5) Information concerning security bodies & Section 24(2) National Security - The confirmation or denial that the MPS holds information in relation to the covert use of Facial Recognition would provide an insight into the type of technology possibly used and also provide greater transparency in when and how it is used by the MPS for covert surveillance to protect national security.
Confirming or denial that any other information exists relevant to the request than that already provided would lead to a better informed public and the public are entitled to know how public funds are spent.
The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security.
Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both National Security and the integrity of the police in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of National Security. This will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
To confirm or deny whether the MPS hold any additional information would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security. By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure on the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.
The strongest reason favouring confirming or denying if information is held is taking into account if there is a public interest in any possible use of this technology.
The strongest reason favouring nether confirming nor denying whether additional information is held is to ensure law enforcement capabilities to protect national security are not undermined in any way whether additional information in this case is held or not.
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement - By confirming or denying whether any further information is held would mean that law enforcement tactics would be compromised which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime.
Security arrangements and law enforcement tactics are often reused and have been monitored by criminal groups, fixated individuals and terrorists. These security arrangements and tactics would need to be reviewed which would require more resources and would add to the cost to the public purse if an adverse FOIA disclosure undermined any possible operational methodology/work.
The MPS is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The ability to protect uphold and protect law enforcement capabilities within the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine law enforcement capabilities due to adverse disclosure.
Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat from criminals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding law enforcement methodology and capabilities, as well as the integrity of the police in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced.
The strongest reason favouring neither confirming nor denying whether additional information is held is to ensure law enforcement capabilities and methodology (whether or not used in this instance) are not undermined by an adverse disclosure.
Additional Partial NCND Response - in respect of engagement of Section 24(2) (National Security) and Section 31(3) Law Enforcement) -
Confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation, for example to any possible covert use of Facial Recognition would potentially show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities.
Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not information in relation to the covert use of Facial Recognition is held or not.
Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not further information is held, other than what the MPS have confirmed is held within this response for your questions.
Confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation, for example to any possible covert use of Facial Recognition would potentially show individuals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the MPS are. Disclosure under FOIA would allow individuals to target specific areas of the UK to conduct possible criminal/terrorist activities or activities that undermine the role of the police.
Please note this response should not be taken as an indication of whether or not information in relation to the covert use of facial recognition is held or not.
Disclosure
Q1 - Could you please let me know if your police force currently uses AI in any forward or policing work, or where you are conducing researching or exploring using this technology in any way in the future.
The MPS does use AI technologies in the form of Live Facial Recognition (LFR)/Retrospective Facial Recognition (RFR) which are all considered within the window of overt use only (terminology-overview.pdf (met.police.uk)
Q2 - How will/is AI being used and for what (e.g. judicial judgements)? Do you have any plans for the future.
The FOIA relates to information held and there is no obligation to create new information to respond to general questions. Information corresponding with your request is not held.
Q3 - How wide spread will the/is the use of this technology?
The FOIA relates to information held and there is no obligation to create new information to general questions.
Q4 - Who are you working with in the private sector to develop the technologies used?
The FOIA relates to information held and there is no obligation to create new information.
Q5 - Do you have any contracts with IBM, Amazon or Clearview AI?
This question is covered by Section 24(2) National Security and Section 31(3) Law Enforcement above.
Q6 - What datasets are used to ‘train’ any AI.
The FOIA relates to information held and there is no obligation to create new information to general questions.
Q7 - What measures are in place (if any) to mitigate bias?
The FOIA relates to information held and there is no obligation to create new information to general questions. However, under S.16 duty to assist we can confirm that the MPS is alive to risks relating to bias and would take measures to ensure its obligations under Section 149 of the Equalities Act 2010 – the public sector equalities duty are fully discharged. An example of how these issues are approached in the context of facial recognition can be found at: Impact Assesement for LFR.pdf