Officers at No10 Downing Street

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.21.022327

I note you seek access to the following information:

I would like you to investigate the staff at 10 Downing Street's activities on the 18 December 2020. It is reported that an illegal party ensued within the premises of 10 Downing Street.

I would like to request Freedom of Information on how many police officers were on scene, on that date?

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

• Section 24(1) – National Security
• Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

The first part of your request does not technically seek recorded information that may be held by the MPS and as such, under Section 8(1)(c) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, is deemed invalid. This is because a request must clearly describe the information that is being requested and, as you have made a comment regarding an unsubstantiated report, the MPS is within its rights not to provide you with a response under the Act.

However, having considered the basis of your comments, I am able to provide you with MPS press lines, as detailed at the bottom of this page.

In addition, in regards to the second part of your request, having located and considered the information relating to the number of police officers located at Downing Street on the above mentioned date, I am afraid that I am not required by statute to release the information requested.

The MPS can confirm that it does maintain a permanent police presence at Downing Street. However, to disclose details of the number of officers deployed, particularly in relation to a specific site or at a specific time, would provide details of policing tactics and resources used in relation to security and protection operations. This would allow those with a criminal or extremist intent to gain an operational advantage over the MPS and therefore undermine the safeguarding of National Security and compromise our law enforcement functions.

Therefore, in light of the above rationale, the following exemptions in the Act have been engaged:

Section 24 - National Security & Section 31 - Law Enforcement

FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as, once the information is published, the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, to provide details of resources relating to the protection of specific sites or individuals, would enable those who sought to threaten the safety of protected individuals to identify actual or perceived vulnerabilities in these arrangements.

The disclosure of the requested information to the applicant, and more importantly to those who might wish to cause harm to those in receipt of protection, such as terrorists, criminals and fixated individuals, would therefore be detrimental to those in receipt of protection. Those with the necessary criminal intent, inclination and capacity could use the information to seek to identify 'weak/vulnerable targets' or vulnerabilities to particular kinds of attack. Disclosure of such information also damages the need to ensure protection arrangements remain covert, purely in the interests of operational sensitivity.

It is important to note that the UK does face a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists and this threat is greater in scale and ambition than any of the terrorist threats in the past. Government reports suggest that at any one time the police and security agencies are contending with many terrorist plots, terrorist groups or networks and individuals who are judged to pose a threat to the well-being of the UK and or UK interests. While the plots may not necessarily all be directed at attacks on the protected individuals or sites, the MPS bear in mind that an attack on members of government or significant individuals afforded protection would be of national significance to our country. To provide information regarding protection arrangements for individuals is likely to place them at serious risk due to their prominence across the globe.

In this current environment of an increased threat of terrorist activity, disclosure of information held that could assist an extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.

The ICO guidance also states ‘safeguarding national security also includes protecting potential targets even if there is no evidence that an attack is imminent…the Commissioner also recognises terrorist can be highly motivated and may go to great lengths to gather intelligence. This means there may be grounds for withholding what seems harmless information on the basis that it may assist terrorists when pieced together with other information they may obtain.’

Based on this definition national security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose any requested information.

Providing information relating to how and when resources are allocated to the protection of a particular site would render security measures less effective. In addition, personal protection is provided by the MPS to a number of people where it is in the national interest or where intelligence (information) suggests protection is necessary. Specific protection arrangements are applied in order to safeguard national security by ensuring that appropriate safety and security is provided to key figures such as the Queen and the Prime Minister. The disclosure of any other information would ultimately increase the risk of harm to those afforded personal protection and to the general public within their vicinity.

Providing the requested information would reveal operational information that would lead to law enforcement tactics being compromised, which would ultimately hinder the MPS’s law enforcement role. Security arrangements and tactics are re-used and have been monitored by criminal groups, fixated individuals and terrorists. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing this information, since they may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information that would place the safety of an individual in receipt of protection at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively managing its resources, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police operations in the highly sensitive area of the protection of sites of national importance.

Disclosure

The searches located information relevant to the second part of your request regarding the number of police officers stationed at Downing Street.