MEPO 38/104 - Subhas Chandra BOSE

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.21.022149

I note you seek access to the following information:

Subhas Chandra BOSE: exiled President of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee: refused permission to land in the UK

Date: 1933-1949

Respected Authorities,

I am doing some research on Subhas Chandra Bose. I want to describe everything that has not been told about him till now, good and bad. During the research, this title of the National Archive of UK was seen. It caught my attention and made me want to know more about it.

On contacting the National Archive, it was found that we can get these papers from you only. If possible please provide me with these documents. I'll be grateful.

Decision

MEPO 38/104 was previously requested under FOIA in 2016 and partially disclosed. However, given the time that has elapsed, a further review has now been conducted. Following this latest review, I have decided that whilst a partial disclosure is still relevant, further information is suitable for disclosure.

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(1) – Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 24(1) – National Security
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 24 - National security

23(1) and Section 24(1) exemptions can be applied together by a public authority in order to withhold information that provides information that would undermine national security or reveal the extent of any involvement of the security bodies by the disclosure of these records. Applying these two exemptions in the alternative means that either one or both of the exemptions applies to information contained within the document, however, it would be inappropriate to confirm which in fact applies.

Section 23(1) applies to information that may relate to one of the listed security bodies, and so if one of those bodies had an interest in Subhas Bose, providing the requested information would inevitably disclose information relating to one of those bodies. If this were the case, the information would be exempt under Section 23(1). It is possible that no Section 23 security body had an interest in the above, however, to disclose all the information contained in the records would identify the areas of interest for specific departments within the Metropolitan Police. This would prejudice national security and in such circumstances the information could be withheld in order to safeguard national security.

ICO guidance emphasises there is no definition of national security and refers to the Information Tribunal (EA/2006/0045) who summarised:

• “National security” means the security of the United Kingdom and its people;

• The interests of national security are not limited to actions by an individual which are targeted at the UK, its system of government or its people;

• The protection of democracy and the legal and constitutional systems of the state are part of national security as well as military defence;

• Action against a foreign state may be capable indirectly of affecting the security of the UK;

• Reciprocal co-operation between the UK and other states in combating international terrorism is capable of promoting the United Kingdom’s national ecurity.

Based on this definition national security encompasses a wide spectrum and it is our duty to protect the people within the UK and abroad. Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose any requested information.

To release this information would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security. The subject of this MEPO file was a significant figure in the Indian independence movement and some of the tactics employed to achieve this aim have been deemed to be controversial. Therefore, to disclose information contained within MEPO 38/104, although relating to events occurring over 80 years ago, could cause conflict amongst communities within the UK and stir up feelings of resentment towards members of the British government. Disclosing this information could potentially result in its misuse, proving detrimental to national security.

In this current environment, where there is a possibility of increased threat of terrorist or extremist activity, providing any details that could assist any terrorist or extremist faction would undermine the safeguarding of national security.

To release details of the policing arrangements employed relating to Subhas Chandra Bose, which highlight issues of national concern and the focus of police attention would render security measures less effective. A disclosure of this nature would compromise ongoing or future operations and investigations which are designed to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK, thereby increasing the risk of harm to either specific individuals, including those who are visiting the UK, or the general public as a whole.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, to disclose the requested information may allow those with a criminal intent to gain a better understanding of policing tactics and determine how police obtain, manage and record referrals in an effort to counter extremist activity.

To disclose this information could therefore be harmful to current and future investigations, as it would allow members of the public to define the general steps taken in relation to law enforcement, in that they would be able to identify the type of tactics employed by the MPS. There remains the possibility that the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS may be compromised by releasing information relating to operational tactics. There are significant risks associated with providing information in relation to any aspects of a police operation, whether it be historical or current, as to provide such details would reveal how information is garnered, which would provide criminals of today with an insight to how the police operate, and people who wish to harm the citizens of London, or those in the wider UK, with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and might require the MPS to actually have to increase the amount of officers available to them, thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics, as by disclosing the methods being employed to mitigate the risk of a terrorist or criminal incident etc. would hinder the future prevention and detection of crime. More crime would be committed and individuals would be placed at risk.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try to map strategies used by the MPS and assist them in evading capture.

The MPS is reliant upon the techniques used during investigations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during these would prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct policing of similar investigations.

Additionally MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected as this information could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge whether information is held if to do so would place the safety of an individual or people at risk or undermine National Security and law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in the highly sensitive area of crime and terrorism prevention.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Areas of interest to the police are sensitive to the extent that they reveal local intelligence. The most persuasive reasons for disclosing the information would be transparency surrounding investigations conducted by the MPS and the liaisons which take place during the course of enquiries. This would lead to greater public awareness and increased debate.

However, these need to be weighed against the strongest negative reasons which, in this case, are that releasing information would compromise and undermine the MPS’s law enforcement capabilities in its ability to prevent and detect crime and apprehend and prosecute offenders. Disclosure would be harmful to future investigations if information relating to how the MPS conducts its enquiries, gathers and records intelligence were disclosed. It is noted that some of these investigative tactics were employed over 80 years ago; however, the basis of some of the methods adopted is still applicable to present day policing and to disclose these details would allow those with a criminal intent to know how to identify what level of policing activity is likely to take place and what tactics may or may not have been employed in an investigation.

The effect of this information being available to the applicant and, more importantly, those who might wish to disrupt Police tactics, would be a requirement for a full review of police tactics and possible increase in costs to the public purse.

Similarly, in matters of national security, to allow those with a criminal intent to gain an awareness of policing decisions, therefore rendering them ineffective, would dramatically weaken the MPS’s ability to safeguard national security in the fight against terrorism and extremism on a local, national or international scale. Therefore, whilst there is a public interest in keeping everyone informed about security measures, there is a stronger duty to ensure public safety

Disclosure

Please find 5 attachments containing copies of the released documentation relevant to file MEPO 38/104.