Discussions between the MPS Commissioner and/or the MPS’s Senior Command

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.21.018280

I note you seek access to the following information:

This request concerns discussions that have taken place between the Metropolitan police commissioner and/or the Met’s senior command with the home secretary and/or Home Office ministers on the issue of policing protests.

Please provide a copy of:

1. A list of all meetings between Dame Cressida Dick, and/or her deputy Sir Stephen House and/or Assistant Commissioner Nick Ephgrave with Home Office ministers in the past 12 months about policing of protests. Please provide the attendees of these meetings, the minutes of the meeting, and any annexes, or reference documents provided for and/or utilised at the meetings.

2. Any briefings prepared for officers or staff attending, ahead of these meetings.

Please provide information from 1 May 2020 to date.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(1) - Information supplied by, relating to, bodies dealing with security matters
Section 24(1) - National Security
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law enforcement
Section 36(2) - Prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs
Section 40(2) & (3A) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

In relation to the remainder of your request (the minutes of the meeting, and any annexes, or reference documents provided for and/or utilised at the meetings), I have determined that the MPS is not required under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) to release the information requested to you.

The meeting on 08/12/2020 related to a visit by the policing minister. The remainder of the meetings consisted of conference calls.

Records of the meetings were produced by the MPS in the form of an email relating to each meeting sent to senior leaders in the MPS (the ‘relevant emails’).

The email dated 05/06/2020 involving the Director of the No.10 Policy unit contained 1 attachment consisting of:

- a draft letter on health regulations

The email dated 05/06/2020 involving the Home Office Policing Minister contained 2 attachments consisting of:

- 2 Memorandum of Understanding documents

These constitute ‘reference documents provided for and/or utilised at the meetings’.

The email relating to the visit on 08/12/2020 contained an attachment consisting of a briefing document that further referenced supporting material in the form of letters from:

- MPS Commissioner to the Home Secretary regarding Covid Regulations and Protest
- MPS Deputy Commissioner to the Home Secretary regarding Breach of the Peace
- MPS Assistant Commissioner to former Policing Minister regarding Protest Powers

This would consitute a ‘briefing’ document and ‘reference documents provided for and/or utilised at the meetings’.

Aside from the relevant emails and email attachments referred to above, for the avoidance of doubt no associated agendas, materials shared during the calls, briefing notes, papers or other minutes held by the MPS have been identified.

For the reasons set out in the annex to this notice, the content of the relevant emails in their entirety are exempt information pursuant to the exemption in section 36 of the Act (prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs) and it has been determined that in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the relevant emails to you. Accordingly, the MPS is under no obligation to communicate the contents of the relevant emails to you.

While the application of section 36 here provides that the MPS is under no obligation to provide the contents of the relevant emails to you, in any event for reasons set out in the annex to this notice, some of that content is also exempt information (such exemption the public interest lies in favour of maintaining) under section 23 (Information supplied by, relating to, bodies dealing with security matters), section 24 (National Security) and section 31 of the Act (Law Enforcement).

Lastly, the exemption at section 40 is also engaged with respect to some recipients’ names who formed part of the email distribution list (in the relevant emails).

Section 31(1) Law enforcement creates an exemption from the right to disclose information if releasing it would, or would be likely to, cause significant harm to the functions of a public authority. In relation to this case, the MPS considers that disclosure of the information would be likely to cause significant harm to its ability to prevent and detect crime, and would hinder its ability to apprehend and prosecute offenders. This is because disclosure of this information would provide the public, including those with criminal intent, the necessary information to disrupt the MPS’s provision of services by exploiting any perceived weaknesses in specific areas.

The emails make reference to police tactics, intelligence and MPS resources. This poses possible risks to security/the operation or possible obstacles/difficulties that came to light during the demonstrations, which could impact on the planning and security of current and future event. Disclosure of challenges the police face during demonstrations would provide insight into actions that can put a strain on police resources at public order events. The information would also enable those who seek to partake in criminal activity, with the ability to plan criminal action by taking into account exactly what type of action can potentially put an additional strain on police resources.

To enable the public to be better informed about the intelligence, capabilities and resources available to the MPS when formatting their strategies and tactics, would greatly impact on police resources and future planning. Whilst the majority of demonstrators are peaceful, there are some who would seek to obtain tactical and strategic detail within these documents to improve on their plans to avoid being detected and apprehended at a demonstration during or after disorder. Some demonstrators will often do all they can to cause a breach of the peace, by trying to evade the police at demonstrations. To disclose the exempt information contained within the relevant emails is likely to impact on police resources, should the MPS continually have to change their considered plans of action, tactics and methodology as a result of an FOIA disclosure.

It is considered that disclosure would hinder the ability of the MPS to prevent crime or breach of the peace at future demonstrations if the public become aware of the resources and capabilities available to the MPS at specific points in time. This information can be used to try and evade future detection at demonstrations. This is particularly so if the public are aware of what type of intelligence and resources the MPS are likely to have available and use, as it also indicates what information they are unlikely to obtain and decisions they may take in a given difficult circumstance.

In addition, the section 31 exemption applies to the disclosure of the email addresses of senior members of staff, as this information7 would provide persons intent on disrupting the work of the MPS, with information that would assist them to do so. In this regard, a person within this intent would be likely to use this information to make inappropriate contact with senior members of staff or send them vast amounts of unsolicited correspondence. This would tie up the resources of these senior members of staff and cause disruption to the work of the MPS.

The relevant emails also contain information relating to crowd numbers. Where records of estimated numbers are made these will be held as police intelligence and not disclosable under the FOIA.

Accordingly the relevant emails contain information which is exempt information for the purposes of section 31 of the Act.

The tactics and methodology could be utilised when planning for future protests and demonstrations made by this and other organisations. It is also not in the public interest to disclose information that demonstrates the capabilities and intelligence available to the MPS at specific points in time.

The withheld information would assist those planning to commit acts of violence, for example against individuals, the police or buildings. Disclosure of the type of intelligence and capabilities available to the police at a specific point in time would enable individual's intent on committing criminal activity to circumvent methods deployed to keep the peace. This in turn hinders the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime when planning for future demonstrations.

To enable the public to be better informed about the intelligence, capabilities and resources available to the MPS when making decisions, would greatly impact on police resources. There are likely to be individuals who seek to obtain tactical and strategic details within these documents. This information can be used to improve their criminal plans on avoiding detection and apprehension at a demonstration, whilst placing individuals at greater risk. It would not be in the public interest to disclose the exempt information as it is likely to impact on the MPS.

The MPS considers that disclosure of sensitive operational information would place the public at greater risk at future demonstrations and would place the public at greater risk of unlawful behaviour if would-be criminals are provided the sensitive tactical and intelligence contained within the documents. This is contrary to the public interest.

The MPS are likely to need to adapt their tactics and strategies at future demonstrations if through the FOIA, the public at large are able to ascertain the likely decisions of officers in command. Disclosure of the operational decisions taken at each and every stage of the demonstration based on their operational capabilities and intelligence obtained would enable criminals to evade apprehension and detection at future demonstrations.

In addition, the exempt information contains capability, resource and option details available to the MPS during a demonstration. Disclosure would hinder the ability of the MPS to prevent and detect crime at future demonstrations, if they become aware of the resources and capabilities available to the MPS. This information can be used to try and evade future detection at demonstrations. This is particularly so if the public are aware of what type of intelligence and resources the MPS are likely to have available and use, as it also indicates what information they are not likely or unlikely to obtain and decisions they may take in a given difficult circumstance.

Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs - The conference calls form part of regular discussions between the Commissioner and the Home Secretary (and other members of Her Majesty’s Government and the Chair of the NPCC). The issues being discussed during the calls include live issues that require a safe space for the exchange of advice and exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation. The calls are a forum in which the parties in attendance are able to candidly discuss the operational, policy and political dimensions to (in this case ongoing) major policing challenges of the day, both in London and nationally. It is important for these discussions to take place with minds focused firmly not on the public eye but on public safety.

Furthermore, the calls are a forum in which relevant advice is exchanged between those attending and where views are expressed for the purposes of deliberation (i.e. as to how such challenges are to be responded to). Those taking part in the calls do so on the basis that they are able to work through these issues in free and frank exchange without an expectation that the discussions will be made public.

The release of notes of the calls (as contained in the relevant emails) would accordingly be likely to lead to more guarded opinion being expressed in the meetings and consequently, less quality free and frank provision of advice. The impact of this would be significant and could affect how senior leaders in policing and in Government are able to handle difficult and sensitive live policing matters.

Lastly, the intention of the notes of the calls (as contained in the relevant emails) is to provide briefing to senior leaders in the MPS to equip them quickly with as good as possible an understanding of the high level political and policy context in which they perform their public duties for the MPS in the pursuit of keeping people safe. Release of the relevant emails would lead to a practice of notes being drafted with a public audience in mind and framed in more guarded and neutral terms so as to avoid, for example anything that could be misconstrued by the public without full context. This would be likely to undermine the purpose and utility of the notes and thus undermine the conduct of public affairs.

- The Mosaic Effect: FOIA disclosures are placed into the public domain. Disclosures which appear harmless, pieced together with other disclosures can be used in a ‘mosaic effect’ to give a fuller picture to those wishing to disrupt the operational, policy and political dimensions to major policing challenges, both in London and nationally. This ‘cumulative prejudice’ or the ‘mosaic effect’ whereby the information requested may be of increased significance when combined with other information obtained through other means and/or at a later date. Combining the items illuminates their interrelationships and breeds analytic synergies, so that the resulting mosaic of information is worth more than the sum of its parts.

The information would provide a national picture of where work is being undertaken, creating a mosaic effect on data disclosure and allowing criminals to map together information to target identified weaknesses. This would clearly hinder the Met’s effectiveness to enforce the law and place risk on National Security.

There is a requirement for constructive relationships to be maintained between government departments and senior officers in the MPS for early engagement on issues as they arise.

Whilst advice, responses and other information in the public interest is published in order to ensure transparency in the disclosure around demonstrations in London, there is the need to have a safe space where officials can discuss to develop ideas, debate live issues, and reach decisions away from external interference and distraction.

Disclosure of the information requested, would be likely to inhibit free and frank discussions in the future. The loss of frankness and candour is likely to damage the quality of advice and deliberation. This is particularly important for parties to fully consider issues and ensure the best outcomes are reached.

Section 40(2)&(3) - Personal Information - Section 40(2)(a)(b) of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b) and 3B of the Act.

There are six principles that are set out in Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) that dictate when the processing of personal data is lawful. The first principle requires that any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:

a. There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
b. The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
c. The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.

The requested emails contains the names of persons holding the rank of Superintendent and below and Band A and below. Having considered the legitimate interest test in respect of this personal data, I have found that:

Names of Members of Staff -
a. The employees holding the rank of Superintendent and below and Band A and below, that were copied these records/correspondence, are unlikely to expect their names to be published in response to this Freedom of Information Act request. Given their roles and level of responsibility within the MPS, I have not identified a legitimate interest that would be satisfied in disclosing their personal data in response to this request for information.

Disclosure

Please see the table below which lists the meetings between Commissioner Cressida Dick, Deputy Commissioner Sir Stephen House and/or Assistant Commissioner Nick Ephgrave, with Home Office ministers in the past 12 months about the policing of protests, inclusive of the attendees of the meetings. I have disclosed this information to you in redacted format, that is, I have removed information that I consider to be exempt under the Act. A series of asterisks denote where exempt information has been removed.

Date	Attendees
08/12/2020	Home Office Policing Minister Kit Malthouse visit to MPS accompanied by Home Office Visits Manager *********** hosted by: Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) Matt Twist (MPS) Chief Superintendent Claire Clarke (MPS) T/Commander Ade Adelekan (MPS)
07/12/2020	Policing Minister NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) Chief Constable Jo Shiner (Sussex Police) ********************* Home Secretary’s Special Adviser ************** Home Office Officials
23/11/2020	Commissioner Cressida Dick (MPS) NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Chief Constable Charlie Hall (Hertfordshire Constabulary) ********************* Home Office Officials
20/11/2020	Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) Home Office Policing Minister Assistant Chief Constable Owen Weatherill (NPCC Covid lead) Chief Constable Gareth Morgan (Staffordshire Police) ********************* Home Office Officials
21/09/2020	Home Secretary Policing Minister Home Office Policing DG Security Minister NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt MPS Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) Chief Constable Jo Farell (Durham Constabulary) Home Office Chief Scientific Adviser John Aston ********************* Home Office Officials
11/09/2020	Home Secretary Home Office Communications Director NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Home Office Officials
01/09/2020	Policing Minister (Chair) NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Commissioner Cressida Dick (MPS) *****************************
28/08/2020	Security Minister (Chair) NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Chief Constable Martin Jelley (Warwickshire Police) Commissioner Cressida Dick (MPS) **************
26/06/2020	Home Secretary NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Commissioner Cressida Dick (MPS) Chief Constable Richard Lewis (Cleveland Police) *********************************** Home Office Officials
24/06/2020	Home Secretary Policing Minister Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) Staffordshire Police Chief Constable Gareth Morgan Assistant Chief Constable Owen Wetherill (NPCC) ***********************************
19/06/2020	Home Secretary Assistant Chief Constable Owen Weatherill National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) (for NPCC Chair) Commissioner Cressida Dick (MPS) Chief Constable Steve Jupp (Suffolk Police) ******************************* Home Office Officials
17/06/2020	Home Secretary Policing Minister NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) Chief Constable Rod Hansen (Gloucestershire Police) Home Office Policing DG Home Office Chief Scientific Adviser John Aston Home Office Officials
15/06/2020	Home Secretary NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) Commissioner Ian Dyson (City of London Police) *************************** Home Office Officials
12/06/2020	Home Secretary NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) Chief Constable BJ Harrington (Essex Police and NPCC public order lead) Home Office Officials
10/06/2020	Home Secretary NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Commissioner Cressida Dick (MPS) Chief Constable Anthony Bangham (West Mercia Police) ************************** Home Office Officials including Home Office Chief Scientific Adviser John Aston
08/06/2020	Home Secretary Munira Mirza (Director of the No.10 Policy Unit) Chief Constable Andy Marsh (Avon and Somerset Police) Chief Constable BJ Harrington (Essex Police and NPCC public order lead) Commissioner Cressida Dick (MPS)
05/06/2020	Home Secretary Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) Director of the No.10 Policy Unit Munira Mirza Home Secretary’s Special Advisor ******************** Home Secretary’s Private Secretary ***************** Home Office Director of Communications Simon Baugh Chief Constable BJ Harrington (Essex Police and NPCC public order lead)
05/06/2020	Home Office Policing Minister NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) ***************************** Home Office Officials
04/06/2020	Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) Home Secretary
03/06/2020	Policing Minister NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Deputy Commissioner Stephen House (MPS) **************************** Chief Constable Kier Pritchard (Wiltshire Constabulary) Home Office Officials
01/06/2020	Home Secretary Home Office Ministers Home Office Director of Communications NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt Commissioner Cressida Dick (MPS) Chief Constable BJ Harrington (Essex Police and NPCC public order lead) Home Office Officials

The meeting on 08/12/2020 related to a visit by the Minister for Crime and Policing, Kit Malthouse to understand more about how the MPS manages protests/public order events.

The other meetings consisted of conference calls.