Police on duty in Downing Street on 13 & 27 November 2020 and 18 December 2020

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.21.022318

I note you seek access to the following information:

- Whether any instructions were given to Police on duty in Downing Street on 13 & 27 November 2020 and 18 December 2020 in relation to visitors to Downing Street; and if so, what those instructions were

- What actions the Met would expect Police Officers to take were they to suspect or observe that gatherings were taking place contrary to the regulations in place at the time to prevent the transmission of Covid19

- For publication of the sign-in logs for Downing Street on the above dates

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(1) - National Security
Section 30(1)(a) - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities
Section 31(1)(a) - Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

I have decided to address your questions separately.

Regarding Part 1 of your request, to disclose details of any instructions given to officers on duty at Downing Street on particular dates would provide details of policing tactics used in relation to security and protection operations. This would allow those with a criminal or extremist intent to gain an operational advantage over the MPS and therefore undermine the safeguarding of National Security and compromise our law enforcement functions.

Furthermore, the MPS has recently launched an investigation into a number of events that took place at Downing Street and Whitehall in the last two years in relation to potential breaches of Covid-19, therefore disclosure of information in relation to this may impact upon our current investigation.

For Part 2 of your request I have today decided to disclose the requested information. Please see the ‘Disclosure’ Section below.

In relation to Part 3, searches failed to locate any information relevant to your request, therefore, regrettably the information you have requested is not held by the MPS.

I would like to take this opportunity to advise why this information you have requested is not held. The MPS’s primary responsibility is to provide security at this location. The Cabinet Office are responsible for access to No. 10 Downing Street and the management of these records.

Therefore, you may wish to consider redirecting your query to the following:

Postal -
FOI Team
Cabinet Office
Room 405
70 Whitehall
London
SW1A 2AS

Email - [email protected].

Section 24 - National Security
Section 30 - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities
Section 31 - Law Enforcement

FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as, once the information is published, the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant it could be of use to those who seek to disrupt any police investigation as it would provide valuable intelligence to criminals, terrorists and/or extremists on the specific instructions deployed by the teams stationed at Downing Street.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, as set by the security service (MI5) based upon current intelligence. With the current threat level to the UK given as ‘severe’, the Home Office website explains that ‘this means that a terrorist attack is highly likely’.

In consideration of the ramifications of these threat levels, it would not be wise to release details as to how we manage risk and identify and assess intelligence as to do so could possibly compromise the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS, particularly at this site. Modern day policing is intelligence led and this is particularly pertinent with regard to both law enforcement and national security. The public expect police forces to use all powers and tactics available to them to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety. Disclosure of information of this nature, needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS, particularly at this site. There are significant risks associated with the release of such information as this may provide those seeking to commit criminal acts with an advantage over the MPS, as the information can indeed be viewed as operational 'intelligence' and operationally sensitive. Disclosure could have a negative effect on the MPS’s ability to provide the necessary service required should the release of information be used and manipulated by those who are intent on carrying out criminal, terrorist or extremist activities. To disclose the requested information would therefore provide them with an opportunity of disrupting police activity at a protected site.
If the MPS were to disclose the specific instructions given to staff at Downing Street, this would undermine the MPS’ policing capabilities of protected sites and individuals. This would consequently be detrimental to their ability to deal with any threats to protected sites and individuals, along with the public surrounding them.

Providing information relating to the protection of a particular site would render security measures less effective. In addition, personal protection is provided by the MPS to a number of people where it is in the national interest or where intelligence (information) suggests protection is necessary. Specific protection arrangements are applied in order to safeguard national security by ensuring that appropriate safety and security is provided to key figures such as the Queen and the Prime Minister. The disclosure of any other information would ultimately increase the risk of harm to those afforded personal protection and to the general public within their vicinity.

The release of any details that may relate to an ongoing investigation could hinder the prevention or detection of crime and impact upon that investigation. The MPS released press lines on 25/01/2022, which outlines our position.

Therefore, we would not wish to reveal any further details, such as what and when information is recorded and the extent of our investigation as this would clearly undermine the law enforcement and investigative process. This would impact on police resources and more crime would be committed, placing individuals at risk.

Providing the requested information would reveal operational information that would lead to police tactics being compromised, which would ultimately hinder the MPS’s law enforcement role. Security arrangements and tactics are re-used and have been monitored by criminal groups, fixated individuals and terrorists. Disclosure of this information would likely lead to more crimes being committed by terrorist or extremist groups, or fixated individuals against protected individuals and Downing Street officers.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information that would place the safety of an individual in receipt of protection at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police operations in the highly sensitive area of the protection of sites of national importance.

The public interest is defined not as what the public might find interesting but there must be some tangible benefit to the public in the disclosure of the interest. In this case, where the request is about police instructions in relation to protection and security arrangements, the net result of publishing that information would be that a review would need to be conducted to ensure that the threat level was effectively challenged, which would require additional resources to be provided.

The requested information may not be considered overly sensitive in itself. However, when potentially gathered with several pieces of information by someone with malicious intent and whom can plan attacks, then having knowledge of any specific instructions issued can be useful.

All people are entitled to live and work without the threat of violence being directed against them. It is not in the public interest for a protected person to be placed in an increased position of vulnerability by revealing any officer instructions, which would impact on their protection.

Disclosure of this information will very likely impact on Downing Street officer’s operational tactics and safety, compromising future operations and placing individuals at risk. This will likely result in more crimes being committed and make the security measures less effective.

It is also considered in these circumstances that there is a public interest in safeguarding the integrity of any police investigations and operations that may be ongoing. There is a need to ensure that any investigation is not compromised by releasing information before the conclusion of a case.

Disclosure

- What actions the Met would expect Police Officers to take were they to suspect or observe that gatherings were taking place contrary to the regulations in place at the time to prevent the transmission of Covid19

The following information is disclosed in response to Part 2 of your request.

The actions the Met would expect Police Officers to take if they suspect or observe gatherings were taking place contrary to the regulations in place at the time, would be to follow the 4 E’s escalation principles as defined in the NPCC guidance below. However, this would need to be balanced with other operational priorities the officer was facing at the time of the suspected breach of regulations;

“Police and local authority enforcement
Police will lead enforcement in relation to breaches of requirements placed on individuals.
Officers should continue to engage members of the public and explain changes. If necessary they should offer encouragement to comply. However if the individual or group do not respond appropriately, then enforcement can follow without repeated attempts to encourage people to comply with the law.
We police by consent. The initial police response should be to encourage voluntary compliance. Policing will continue to apply the four-step escalation principles:

1. Engage
2. Explain
3. Encourage and only
4. Enforce as a last resort

Enforcement action in relation to breaches by businesses will be led by Local Authorities (Environmental Health Officers and Trading Standards Officers). The police should only be required as a last resort and to provide support.”