Covid 19 breaches by Police Officers (including arrests, cautions, FPN's) from October 2020 to April 2021

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.21.022376

I note you seek access to the following information:

Since the pandemic began in March 2020, up until this present date, how many Metropolitan Police officers have been cautioned and/or arrested and/or prosecuted for breaching lockdown rules? How many officers have been been subject to internal disciplinary measures as a result of breaching lockdown rules.

In what ways did they do to breach lockdown rules? Please specify with given examples. And what sanctions, including fines, did the officers receive for breaching those rules?

How many police officers breached the lockdown rules specifically from 31 October 2020 until 12 April 2021, and why?

Finally, have any of the Met Police senior police officers, listed below, or their family members (they won't tell you about private individuals) breached lockdown rules? If so when, and what did they do:

Commissioner: Cressida Dick
Deputy Commissioner: Steve House
Chief of Corporate Services: Robin Wilkinson
Frontline Policing: Assistant Commissioner Nick Ephgrave
Specialist Operations: Assistant Commissioner Matt Jukes
Met Operations: Assistant Commissioner Louisa Rolfe
Professionalism: Assistant Commissioner Helen Ball
Chief Digital & Technology Officer: Director John Clarke.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 30(3) - Criminal Investigations
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(5B)(a)(i) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

With reference to your final question where you provide a list of named individuals, and ask whether any information about those individuals and/or their families is held, please be advised that the MPS can neither confirm nor deny whether it holds any information, as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Act.

Section 30(3) of the Act provides: Investigations and proceedings
The ICO guidance titled ‘Investigations and proceedings (Section 30)’ states:

‘In broad terms, the section 30 exemptions exist to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of offences and the protection of confidential sources. They recognise the need to prevent disclosures that would prejudice either a particular investigation or set of proceedings, or the investigatory and prosecution processes generally, including any prejudice to future investigations and proceedings.’

Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement - Section 30 is a ‘class-based’ exemption and would apply to any ‘class’ of information that would, if held, have been held by the MPS for the purpose of an investigation that we have a duty to conduct. The harm in disclosing information relating to an investigation is inherent in the exemption.

The ICO’s guidance titled ‘Law Enforcement (Section 31)’ also states:

‘83…Typically, where a request identifies an individual or an organisation as the possible subject of an investigation or a particular line of enquiry a public authority could be pursuing, the more chance there is that confirming the information’s existence would, or would be likely to, prejudice that investigation.
84. Clearly confirming there was, or had been, an investigation would not be prejudicial if there had already been official acknowledgement of its existence.
85. The example above demonstrates the need, in some circumstances, to apply the NCND provision consistently. Where confirmation or denial would reveal whether a particular person was under investigation and where this would, or would be likely to, prejudice such investigations, public authorities should be alert to the need to apply the NCND provision. If it is only applied where the requested information is held, this will become apparent over time and defeat the purpose behind the exemption.’

The MPS has a duty to conduct investigations with a view to ascertaining whether an offence has been committed, and if so, whether a person should be charged with that offence, and whether a person charged with an offence is guilty of it. Consequently the MPS as a public authority is entitled to rely upon Section 30(3) to the extent that the requested information, if held, would have been held for the purpose of such investigations. If this information were held, it would be held in order to determine whether an offence had occurred, and whether named individuals may have been involved.

As outlined at the start of this response, it is necessary to use NCND exemptions consistently, regardless of whether the requested information is held or not. Consequently, citing this exemption in no way confirms or denies the existence of the information you seek, as this is the response that would be issued with regard to any request for whether information was held on any other individuals unless we had previously publicly commented for any reason.

Any information generated by an investigation needs to be treated with sensitivity. In some cases, it is the confirmation, or otherwise, about who may be the subject of any such investigations which would disclose facts that would prejudice the evidence gathering within an investigation.

In addition, it would not be in the public interest to disclose information (even inadvertently, through a confirmation or denial) which could identify our investigative activity, and subsequently undermine those processes. To do so would hinder the prevention or detection of crime, and apprehension and prosecution of offenders.

Section 30 and Section 31 are often used in conjunction when applying the neither confirm nor deny stance in order to protect whether or not an investigation may have been conducted.

To confirm or deny whether information is held in relation to any other allegations would be likely to prejudice our law enforcement functions of preventing and detecting crime, and apprehending and prosecuting offenders. Issuing confirmation or denial responses in relation to other allegations, except for those that have already been publicly confirmed, would enable the public to build up a picture of who may have been subject of any allegations. This would be prejudicial to our policing functions, as individuals may be less willing to come forward or assist with our enquiries if they were to believe that this information may become public.

To confirm or deny that information is held in regards to any named individual in relation to this matter has the potential to prejudice the MPS future ability to prevent and detect crime or apprehend or prosecute offenders.

Section 40(5B)(a)(i) – Personal Information - The release of information under Freedom of Information (FOI) is a release into the public domain and not just to the individual requesting the information. Once information is disclosed by FOI there is no control or limits as to who or how the information is shared with other individuals. Therefore a release under FOI is considered a disclosure to the world in general.

To confirm or deny that the MPS hold or do not hold information about any named individual, or individuals, would in fact disclose information about a living, identifiable individual. This would amount to a release into the public domain of personal information about an individual – namely whether or not that person was in any way linked to any allegations of wrongdoing. The individuals in question would have no expectation that this information would be released into the public domain, and therefore their rights under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) would be breached by release.

To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows the processing of personal data if that processing would be compliant with the Data Protection principles. These principles are outlined under section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5 of the
GDPR.

In this instance, processing this information (by issuing a confirmation or denial) would breach the first principle, that of ‘lawful, fair and transparent’ processing. When balancing the legitimate interests of the public against the interests of the individual and the harm and distress that would be caused by a confirmation or denial, the processing of information in this way becomes unlawful and Section 40(5A)(a)(i) is made out.

To confirm or deny whether we hold this information would do little to further the public interest arguments, and in fact would have a negative impact upon our ability to protect public safety and the promise of confidentiality inherent in our communications with those assisting with our enquiries.

This does not confirm or deny that the MPS holds the information that you have requested.

Disclosure

Please see the attached spreadsheet for information relevant to your request. Please ensure that the data provided is read in conjunction with the notes page of the attached spreadsheet to ensure correct interpretation of the data provided.