MPS Organisational chart & responsibility for investigations

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.025227

I note you seek access to the following information:

1. A detailed copy of the most updated MPS Organisational structure chart, as well as all historical versions from 2013 onwards.

2. When and how are investigations assigned to specialist units, or other non-BCU units/departments, specifically for the following serious offences? E.g. would any investigation involving child abuse, regardless of how serious it was, be referred automatically to the Child Abuse and Sexual Offences Command?

a) murder
b) terrorism
c) rape & sex offences
d) child sex offences/pornography
e) other violent offences
f) any other offences for which MPS has a specialist unit

3. If certain investigations are required to be sent to another organisation, such as NCA, what are the procedures and for what offences would this normally occur?

4. Likewise, for the purposes of tracking fugitives, are most cases handled by officers within the same police station/BCU responsible for the initial investigation/arrest?

5. When and how does responsibility for tracking fugitives fall to specialist units, or other non-BCU units/departments, specifically for the following serious offences (same as Q2)?

6. If changes in the structure of the MPS over time would result in different responses to questions 2-5 above, please provide a separate response for each calendar year (or other suitable time interval for which MPS holds data). The relevant timeframe should be 1 Jan 2013 to the present date.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) Information relating to the Security bodies;
Section 24(1) National security
Section 30 (3) Investigations
Section 31(1) Law enforcement
Section 31 (3) Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

Section 24 – National Security - (1)Information which does not fall within section 23(1) is exempt information if exemption from section 1(1)(b) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

By providing information regarding all other specialist Units, which in turn would be harmful to disclose brings the existence of certain specialist, covert areas of policing into public frame could render Security measures less effective by revealing the tactically sensitive capacity of the MPS. This would be of use to the criminal fraternity and or any terrorists who may seek to harm the public. This could lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not release information if to do so could undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by the criminal fraternity, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.

Section 31 Law Enforcement - By providing information regarding all other specialist Units, which in turn would be harmful to disclose brings the existence of certain specialist, covert areas of policing into public frame would compromise law enforcement tactics and undermine the prevention or detection of crime. This would impact on police resources, more crime would then be committed and individuals placed at risk by revealing tactics and intelligence used would provide knowledge on capacity of the MPS in respect of law enforcement capability. This would be of use to the criminal fraternity and or any terrorists who may seek to harm the public. This could lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security and Law enforcement this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Full disclosure of questions 2 would render security measures less effective and would be of use to those with a nefarious purpose in mind, to use that information to disrupt ongoing or future operations to MPS services. Transparency of our policies and the way we manage resources should be provided where necessary unless the negative effect of doing so would cause an unreasonable and unjustified risk to the public. I believe the non-disclosure of questions 2 would be the greater good and in the public interest.

NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY

Section 23(5) Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters & Section 24(2) National security - By confirming or denying the procedures and for what offences would this normally occur when certain investigations are required to be sent to another organisation, which could render Security measures less effective. This could lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so could undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by the criminal fraternity, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

Section 30(3) Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities - By confirming or denying the procedures and for what offences would this normally occur when certain investigations are required to be sent to another organisation, would negatively affect MPS’s future law enforcement capabilities. This would hinder the prevention and detection of crime.

During the course of any investigation enquires are made to secure evidence. These enquires are made for the duration of the case and are based upon proven methods as well as the judgement and experience of the officer(s) in charge of the investigation.

The MPS is reliant upon these techniques to conduct its investigations and the public release of the modus operandi employed during the course of any enquiry could prejudice the ability of the MPS to conduct further, similar investigations. This also applies to not disclosing methods and procedures used by the MPS. Confirming or denying information if it were held could disrupt any future investigations, by empowering an awareness of it to the criminal fraternity which could cause a change of criminal tactics to counteract the use of information. Therefore it cannot be in the public interest to do so. However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any further information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.

Section 31(3) Law enforcement - By confirming or denying whether such techniques were used would compromise law enforcement tactics and undermine the partnership approach which would hinder the prevention or detection of crime. This would impact on police resources, more crime would then be committed and individuals placed at risk.

There is also no requirement to satisfy any public concern over the legality of police operations and the tactics we may or may not use. Forces are already held to account by statute, for example the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and independent bodies such as Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner. Our accountability is therefore not enhanced by confirming or denying whether any information is held.
Therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any information is held regarding question 3 is not made out. This argument is obviously transferable to all police tactics.

Disclosure

Q1 - A detailed copy of the most updated MPS Organisational structure chart, as well as all historical versions from 2013 onwards.

Please see attached files titled. Executive structure charts are not before 2017.

Executive structure chart November 2020 is the latest published structure chart.

MPS Workforce Organisational Chart3

Executive structure March 2020
Executive structure September 2019
Executive structure January 2019
Executive structure October 2017
Executive structure April 2017

Q2 - When and how are investigations assigned to specialist units, or other non-BCU units/departments, specifically for the following serious offences? E.g. would any investigation involving child abuse, regardless of how serious it was, be referred automatically to the Child Abuse and Sexual Offences Command?
a) murder
b) terrorism
c) rape & sex offences
d) child sex offences/pornography
e) other violent offences
f) any other offences for which MPS has a specialist unit

The general principle is that the investigations are recorded allocated and investigated in accordance for the Home Office Counting Rules for Recorded Crime and that subsequently responsibility for ownership and investigation belongs to the BCU that covers that location.

Crimes are then allocated to individual officers according to Local Policy based on the severity and type of offence and not on who the arresting officer is/was
The vast majority of localised offences will be dealt with by the BCU where they happen, but some more serious crimes (such as homicide) will be investigated by specific units.

For homicide and unexplained deaths requiring further investigation the MPS has corporate policy setting out when Specialist Crime Murder investigation teams (MIT) will take primacy. This policy will also apply to Child Deaths requiring further investigation. There are no longer specific Child Abuse MIT teams as these were disbanded.

The MPS engages section 24(1) and Section 31(1) for any further information in relation to question 2. Please see ‘Reason for decision’ above.

Q3 - If certain investigations are required to be sent to another organisation, such as NCA, what are the procedures and for what offences would this normally occur?

The MPS works in partnership with other law enforcement bodies nationally, and internationally, dependent on the requirements of the investigation.
The MPS can neither confirm nor deny that it holds further information pertinent to Question 3 of this request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Act does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) Information relating to the Security bodies;
Section 24(2) National Security;
Section 30(3) Investigations;
Section 31(3) Law enforcement;

Q4 - Likewise, for the purposes of tracking fugitives, are most cases handled by officers within the same police station/BCU responsible for the initial investigation/arrest?

No Information located.
The MPS does not hold information to the effect that confirms or denies whether in “most cases” certain Units/Departments are responsible for conducting investigations or arrests of fugitives.

Q5 - When and how does responsibility for tracking fugitives fall to specialist units, or other non-BCU units/departments, specifically for the following serious offences (same as Q2)?

Responsibility for tracking fugitives will normally sit with the BCU or OCU conducting the investigation into the criminal offence.

The MPS engages section 23(5) and Section 31(3) for any further information in relation to question 5. Please see ‘Reason for decision’ above

Q6 - If changes in the structure of the MPS over time would result in different responses to questions 2-5 above, please provide a separate response for each calendar year (or other suitable time interval for which MPS holds data). The relevant timeframe should be 1 Jan 2013 to the present date.

See answers to question 1 to 5. The same response applies retrospectively.