Gangs Violence Matrix from January 2019 to June 2022

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.024984

I note you seek access to the following information:

This request relates to the Gangs Violence Matrix (GVM). It seeks to obtain the most up to date statistics regarding the composition of the GVM population.

The earlier figures regarding this were published in the MPS’s GVM Equality Impact Assessment (‘EIA’), created on 15/11/2018 and last reviewed on 01/06/2022.1
Whilst these documents have been made publicly available by the MPS, as
expressed above we seek to obtain more recent statistics.

Therefore, please provide the following information:
1. The proportion of serious violence identified as gang related, broken down by serious violence type, in the year 2021.
2. The proportion of the GVM population that are of African Caribbean ethnicity, broken down by year, from the year beginning January 2019 to present (or as much of that period as records exist for).
3. The proportion of African Caribbean ethnicity as offenders, broken down by year and crime type, from the year beginning January 2019 to present (or as much of that period as records exist for).
4. The proportion of African Caribbean ethnicity as victims, broken down by year and crime type, from the year beginning January 2019 to present (or as much of that period as records exist for).

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 31(1)(a)(b)) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3)&(4)) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

Before I explain the reasons for the decisions I have made in relation to your request, I thought that it would be helpful if I outline the parameters set out by the Act within which a request for information can be answered. The Act creates a statutory right of access to information held by public authorities. A public authority in receipt of a request must, if permitted, confirm if the requested information is held by that public authority and, if so, then communicate that information to the applicant.

The right of access to information is not without exception and is subject to a number of exemptions which are designed to enable public authorities to withhold information that is not suitable for release. Importantly, the Act is designed to place information into the public domain, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received.

Section 31(a)(b) - Law Enforcement - is engaged in this case as disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention and detection of crimes and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

In order for the exemption provided under Section 31(1) to be engaged in this case, the MPS must show that disclosure under the Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice law enforcement functions, namely Section 31(1)(a) the prevention and detection of crime and Section 31(1)(b) the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

In this case, this exemption has been applied as disclosure of the information requested would prejudice areas within law enforcement such as the detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

The MPS is charged with enforcing the law and preventing and detecting crime. Any information released under the Act which reveals information related to the gathering of intelligence and police strategies and tactics would prejudice the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

Release would have the effect of compromising law enforcement processes and would also hinder the ability of the MPS to fulfil its primary aim of enforcing the law and protecting the public.

Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map strategies and tactics used by the MPS and possibly counter them, or become an intrusive hindrance to anyone involved in enquiries, which in turn could make people less likely to come forward as witnesses.

The disclosure of this information to the public by the MPS would undermine public trust in the MPS. Release of all information would allow those wishing to disrupt police operations to use the information to assist in evading detection should they be planning any unlawful acts.

Section 40 (2)(3) - Personal Information - Details of an investigation could cause an individual to be identified and is therefore exempted in this case. Section 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 confirms that information which relates to an identified or identifiable living individual is Personal Data.

The Freedom of Information Act provides an exemption for Personal Data and this is known as the section 40 exemption.
Some of the information sought under your Freedom of Information request includes the following which we consider to be Personal Data

• Low numbers of people within the data, that could, if disclosed, identify an individual.

Where the request is seeking access to third party personal data the section 40(2) exemption may be engaged.

In order to apply the Section 40(2) exemption the disclosure of the requested information must satisfy either the first, second or third conditions as defined by subsections 3A, 3B and 4A of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (as amended by

Section 58 of the Data Protection Act 2018).
The first condition ensures that the exemption would apply in circumstances where the disclosure of the information would breach any of the Data Protection Act 2018 principles.

There are six Data Protection principles set out in the 2018 act and these can be found at section 34.
In this instance I have decided that the disclosure of the Personal Data would be incompatible with the first Data Protection principle which states that the processing (in this case the disclosure) of the data must be both lawful and fair.

Disclosure

The harm of disclosure is reduced by redacting the low numbers within the data as so people could not be identified. Please see attached file titled 22_024984 Final Reportv2, pursuant to your request for information.

Table titled - Proportion Victims that are Afro-Caribbean recorded from 01/01/2019 to 30/06/2022

• Possession of Weapons 2019 – Redacted low counts of people to could, if disclosed identify an individual or someone could self-identify.

• Other Accepted Crime 2019 - Redacted low counts of people to could, if disclosed identify an individual or someone could self-identify.

• Drug Offences 2020 - Redacted low counts of people to could, if disclosed identify an individual or someone could self-identify.

• Possession of Weapons 2020 - Redacted low counts of people to could, if disclosed identify an individual or someone could self-identify.

• Drug Offences 2021 - Redacted low counts of people to could, if disclosed identify an individual or someone could self-identify.

• Possession of Weapons 2021 - Redacted low counts of people to could, if disclosed identify an individual or someone could self-identify.

• Other Accepted Crime 2021 - Redacted low counts of people to could, if disclosed identify an individual or someone could self-identify.