Deployment of drones at events since the approval of use in 2019

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.023770

I note you seek access to the following information:

NEW REQUEST:
The number of times MPS have deployed drones at events since the force approved the use of drones in 2019.

The protocol that MPS follows when illegal use of drones is reported at events.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or concerning, certain security bodies
Section 24(2) - National Security
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2) and (3) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication.

This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. The use of drones is a rapidly developing technique, which can be used by the police service as a whole in a variety of ways to combat crime. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, providing details relating to the use of UAVS/drones at public/protest events would allow criminals or those who seek to disrupt peaceful demonstrations with valuable intelligence on the policing of these events and knowledge to allow them to establish in what circumstances a drone would be deployed.

Similarly, it could allow other criminals and possible terrorists operating in that vicinity to be aware of whether a drone was to be in operation and allow them to move their operation elsewhere to avoid detection.

With regards to those who may seek to disrupt any lawful and peaceful protest to provide information on how and when the MPS are likely to deploy the use of UAV/drones at such events would enable them to devise measures to counteract measures that the MPS has in place. Thus ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and, subsequently, future prosecutions. Any information which could identify the likely focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of criminal organisations or extremists. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement. Public safety would be put at risk if criminals and terrorists targeted areas where drones were not used.

The public expect police forces to use all powers and tactics to prevent and detect crime or disorder and maintain public safety. Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of extremist or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these operational activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on our law enforcement functions.

Disclosing policy documentation on drone usage during public/protest events would compromise law enforcement tactics, which could lead to more crime being committed and individuals being placed at risk. It may also be used by criminals/terrorists who are intent on pursuing their criminal activity, to identify and exploit the limitations of these resources, thus hindering the prevention and detection of crime and increasing the risk to public safety.

Extremists would have a greater understanding of what measures were likely to be deployed and therefore have an opportunity to aid their planning by counteracting these measures, thereby disrupting police activity. The disclosure of any information which allows criminal activity to flourish and hinders the prevention and detection of crime as well as the possible apprehension and prosecution of an offender cannot be in the public interest.

Additionally, it can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing this information, since they may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of security and law enforcement, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The use of drones is a police tactic that is open to police forces for the purpose of law enforcement and can assist in the prevention and detection of crime. Any disclosure which hinders our capability and assists criminals cannot be in the public interest.

Section 40 - Personal information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that the details of the officers who were involved in creating this policy document would constitute personal data which, if released, be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that the release of the details of any individual whose responsibility was to create this document constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the person(s) concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.

In reaching my decision, I have, in each case, given due regard to the condition at Article 6(1) (a) and 6(1) (e) of the GDPR. Condition one of the GDPR requires that consideration is given to whether consent for disclosure has been given whilst Condition six requires that consideration is given to performance of a public task in the public interest.

Having considered both conditions, I have established that no consent is present or would likely be received to release this information.

This exemption is both absolute and class based. When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. There is accordingly no requirement to consider whether release of information is in the public interest or demonstrate what harm would result from disclosure.

In addition the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm or deny whether it holds any other information relevant to this request as the duty in Section 1 (1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23 - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters - Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in this case. Confirming or denying whether any information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information supplied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.

Section 24 - National Security - Information which does not fall within section 23(1) is exempt information if exemption from section 1(1)(b) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, exemption from section 1(1)(a) is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Section 31 - Law Enforcement - This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. The use of drones is a rapidly developing technique, which can be used by the police service as a whole in a variety of ways to combat crime. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, providing details relating to the use of UAVS/drones at public/protest events would allow criminals or those who seek to disrupt peaceful demonstrations with valuable intelligence on the policing of these events and knowledge to allow them to establish in what circumstances a drone would be deployed.

As you will be aware, disclosure under FOIA is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that any other information is held regarding the use of drones for covert purposes, would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the force are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities.

Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the police service may or may not deploy drones, would lead to an increase of harm to covert investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored, and it is well established that police forces use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour. As such, it has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.

Confirming or denying that the MPS hold any other information in relation to covert use of drones, or unmanned aerial devices, would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police forces’ methods and techniques, enabling them to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities. This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK, will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics are or are not deployed. This can be useful information to those committing crimes. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.

By confirming or denying whether any other information is held would render Security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.

Confirming or denying that any other information is held regarding the covert use of drones for maritime/border surveillance would have the effect of compromising law enforcement tactics and would also hinder any future investigations. In addition, confirming or denying methods used to gather intelligence for an investigation would prejudice that investigation and any possible future proceedings.

It has been recorded that FOIA releases are monitored by criminals and terrorists and so to confirm or deny any other information is held concerning specialist covert tactics would lead to law enforcement being undermined. The Police Service is reliant upon all manner of techniques during operations and the public release of any modus operandi employed, if held, would prejudice the ability of the Police Service to conduct similar investigations.

By confirming or denying whether any other information is held in relation to the use of drones would hinder the prevention or detection of crime. The MPS would not wish to reveal what tactics may or may not have been used to gain intelligence as this would clearly undermine the law enforcement and investigative process. This would impact on police resources and more crime and terrorist incidents would be committed, placing individuals at risk. It can be argued that there are significant risks associated with providing information, if held, in relation to any aspect of investigations or of any nation's security arrangements so confirming or denying that any information is held, may reveal the relative vulnerability of what we may be trying to protect.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the MPS will not divulge whether any information is or is not held regarding the use of drones if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk, undermine National Security or compromise law enforcement.

Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the MPS is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and all areas of operations carried out by police forces throughout the UK.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The use of drones in any covert capacity is a sensitive issue that would reveal police tactics and therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any information is held regarding the use of drones is not made out.

However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.

Q1 - The number of times MPS have deployed drones at events since the force approved the use of drones in 2019.

Neither confirm nor deny response for - Any Further Information regarding the use of drones at events.

Q2 - The protocol that MPS follows when illegal use of drones is reported at events.

The MPS confirms the protocol exists but has engaged Section 31(1) and Section 40(2)(3) to the contents.

Additionally the MPS Neither Confirms nor Denies any further details in relation to the protocol.

Disclosure

Question 1 - The number of times MPS have deployed drones at events since the force approved the use of drones in 2019.

MPS Response - Deployments from 01/01/2019 to date is 720.
Neither confirm nor deny response for - Any Further breakdown of figures regarding the use of drones at events.