Central East Command Unit hosting an Israeli police delegation

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.024983

I note you seek access to the following information:

REQUEST 1:

On Wednesday 18 May 2022, the Met's Central East Command Unit hosted an Israeli police delegation. This was announced on Twitter by Hackney police that day, though the tweet was later deleted.

One of the photos attached to the tweet contained an agenda for the day visible in a presentation being shown on a TV screen. Since it is in the background of the image, this agenda can only partially be made out.

Please may you provide me with:
1. A breakdown of the total cost incurred by the Met as a result of the Israeli police delegation's 18 May 2022 visit. These numbers should be given in British pounds sterling. Reasonable estimates are acceptable if it would be prohibitive or impossible to provide precise figures.

2. The agenda for the Israeli police delegation's 18 May 2022 visit - as it occurred rather than as planned beforehand, with a full list of sessions. This should include the locations at which these sessions took place and the times between which they occurred. This should also include a list of all those present at each session (with agencies, positions and names for senior officials, and agencies and positions for those to whom Section 40 or other exemptions are applied). This should also indicate who led each session (identifying them by agency, position and name for senior officials, and agency and position for those to whom Section 40 or other exemptions are applied).

Exemptions under sections of the 2000 Act such as Section 24 (national security) do not apply to the agenda information requested. This information was partially visible in a photograph posted as part of a tweet by the Hackney police on 18 May 2022. While this tweet was later deleted, this was because "it became clear that there was not enough context about this being a long-standing arranged visit by an overseas delegation; such visits are a regular occurrence for the Met". This is according to Met spokesperson Simon Fisher's Wednesday, 25 May 2022 response to questions I emailed to the Met's press bureau. Fisher did not make any reference to this information being sensitive.

Information about who attended from the Israeli police cannot be deemed confidential under Section 27(2) (international relations) since members of the delegation appear to feature in photographs attached to the Hackney police's now-deleted tweet. Were the identities of the Israeli police delegation's members confidential, these images would not have been published on a public platform.

REQUEST 2:
On Wednesday 18 May 2022, the Met's Central East Command Unit hosted an Israeli police delegation. This was announced on Twitter by Hackney police that day, though the tweet was later deleted.

One of the photos attached to the tweet contained an agenda for the day visible in a presentation being shown on a TV screen. Since it is in the background of the image, this agenda can only partially be made out.

Please may you provide me with:
1. A breakdown of the total cost incurred by the Met as a result of the Israeli police delegation's 18 May 2022 visit. These numbers should be given in British pounds sterling. Reasonable estimates are acceptable if it would be prohibitive or impossible to provide precise figures.

2. The agenda for the Israeli police delegation's 18 May 2022 visit ‒ as it occurred rather than as planned beforehand, with a full list of sessions. This should include the locations at which these sessions took place and the times between which they occurred. This should also include a list of all those present at each session (with agencies, positions and names for senior officials, and agencies and positions for those to whom Section 40 or other exemptions are applied). This should also indicate who led each session (identifying them by agency, position and name for senior officials, and agency and position for those to whom Section 40 or other exemptions are applied). This should additionally include a brief summary of what was discussed at and the purpose of each session.

Exemptions under sections of the 2000 Act such as Section 24 (national security) do not apply to the agenda information requested. This information was partially visible in a photograph posted as part of a tweet by the Hackney police on 18 May 2022. While this tweet was later deleted, this was because "it became clear that there was not enough context about this being a long‒standing arranged visit by an overseas delegation; such visits are a regular occurrence for the Met". This is according to Met spokesperson Simon Fisher's Wednesday, 25 May 2022 response to questions I emailed to the Met's press bureau. Fisher did not make any reference to this information being sensitive.

Information about who attended from the Israeli police cannot be deemed confidential under Section 27(2) (international relations) since members of the delegation appear to feature in photographs attached to the Hackney police's now‒deleted tweet. Were the identities of the Israeli police delegation's members confidential, these images would not have been published on a public platform.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by or concerning certain Security Bodies
Section 27(1)(a)&(b) – International Relations
Section 31(1)(a) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

Before I explain the decisions that I have made in relation to your request, I thought that it would be helpful to outline the parameters set out by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act), within which a request for information can be answered. The Act creates a statutory right of access to information held by public authorities. A public authority in respect of a request must, if permitted, state under Section 1(a) of the Act, whether it holds the requested information and, if held, then communicate that information to the applicant under Section 1(b) of the Act.

The right of access to information is not without exception and is subject to a number of exemptions which are designed to enable public authorities to withhold information that is unsuitable for release. Importantly, the Act is designed to place information into the public domain, that is, once access to information is granted to one person under the Act, it is then considered public information and must be communicated to any individual should a request be received.

Section 23(5) - Information supplied by or concerning certain Security Bodies - Confirming or denying the existence of whether any other information is or isn’t held would contravene the constrictions laid out within S23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies

PURPOSE OF ISRAELI DELEGATES VISIT

The purpose of the visit from the Israeli Police delegation was so they could learn from the MPS about how we work with communities.

There are occasions where the MPS are called upon to assist police forces in other countries in certain scenarios. This can be for various reasons including learning/training amongst others.

(5) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section 1(1)(a) would involve the disclosure of any information (whether or not already recorded) which was directly or indirectly supplied to the public authority by, or relates to, any of the bodies specified in subsection (3).

In addition and irrespective of what other information may or may not be held. Confirming or denying the existence of whether any other information is or isn’t held would contravene the constrictions laid out within s23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.

Section 27(1)(a)&(b) – International Relations - provides an exclusion from information being disclosed, if doing so would prejudice relations between the UK and any other State.

Section 27 recognises that the effective conduct of international relations depends upon the maintenance of trust and confidence between states and international organisations. If the UK does not maintain this trust and confidence, its ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations will be severely diminished. Disclosure of such information would very likely be seen as a breach of trust, which is fundamental to international relations in general. In this particular instance, it is vital to the UK’s ability to conduct effective relations with these countries.

Furthermore, disclosure of the officers’ names could well have the effect of preventing other international states from working with and seeking the assistance of the UK in the future; it cannot be assumed that provision of training and assistance by the MPS is purely for financial gain. The provision of such services has a much wider impact on the wellbeing of the UK’s relations with international law enforcement partners, as well as the UK’s economic, diplomatic and intelligence interests.

Disclosure of the officers’ names could well have the effect of preventing other international states from working with and seeking the assistance of the UK in the future; it cannot be assumed that provision of training and assistance by the MPS is purely for financial gain. The provision of such services has a much wider impact on the wellbeing of the UK’s relations with international law enforcement partners, as well as the UK’s economic, diplomatic and intelligence interests.

Also disclosure is likely to prejudice and cause irreparable damage to relations between the UK and other states. It would be very likely to be seen as a breach of trust by the UK, and confidence which is fundamental to such international relations would in turn compromise the ability of the UK to promote and protect its interests abroad whilst also undermining the UK’s ability to form new and mutually beneficial relationships with other states. The damage that disclosure is likely to cause to the UK’s international relations cannot be said to be in the public interest.

Policing authorities rely on international co-operation when combatting crime, particularly that which is cross-border in scope. Should other countries and agencies believe that working with us may result in prejudicial disclosures, they may be less likely to work alongside us in future. This could hinder future investigations and intelligence sharing in many fields, which would have an obvious damaging effect on policing.

There is considerable risk that disclosure of the information requested would be seen by some as a breach of vital trust and confidence, and would cause severe and lasting damage to UK relations with other states. The release of information that is likely to prejudice the interests of the UK abroad, and further undermining the ability of the UK to protect and promote its interests abroad cannot be in the public interest, and therefore the public interest test favours withholding the requested information.

Section 31(1)(a)(b)(c) - Law Enforcement - states: “information is exempt if its disclosure under this Act (Freedom of Information Act 2000) would, or would be likely to:

a) Prejudice the prevention or detection of crime
b) The apprehension or prosecutions of offenders
c) The administration of justice.

Visits from external partners and organisations will continue to take place within MPS. Knowledge of the exact location within a specific location within the Central East Command Unit could enable targeted malicious actions should an offender have knowledge of a visit. If we consider this in the context of the current threat level, both now and possibly in the future, the release of exact locations could be negatively used and harmful.

You have requested the 'Agenda for the Day' document. You have been provided with an overall picture of what took place on the visit, via the itinerary, as well as the names of some of the staff that were involved on the 18th May 2022. FOIA disclosures effectively constitute a disclosure to the world at large, and with this in mind, I believe that what has been disclosed is of value to the public. However, I would argue that the redacted detail would be of little value to the public, but importantly their inclusion could cause harm.

It is worth noting that information that is made available under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is published by the MPS via the publication scheme, making it readily available to the public, and not just the individual making the request. Via a public interest test I have presented two opposing arguments for and against releasing the location data. I have found that there is a public interest in being made aware of how police utilise their spaces and in providing further information in relation to an visit which is already in the public domain.

However, there is also a compelling argument that the release of such data could cause harm. This information could be negatively used, for instance, if a person that wishes to cause harm did gain unauthorised access to a police station and was aware of the specific locations where visits with external organisations were taking place, this would present a danger. If such an individual arrives with the intention of causing harm to police operations, they would be armed with all the information needed to cause disruption. It is clear that the release of such data would not prevent crime but rather encourage it, which would negatively affect the MPS’s law enforcement capability.

Section 40(2) and 40(3A)(a) - Personal Information - is applicable as disclosure of details of members of the public, staff members, external guests that were in attendance would breach the 1st data protection principle that requires personal data to be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to individuals.

There is no presumption of disclosure in relation to ‘personal data’ which is defined as: ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual’

“Identifiable living individual” means a living individual who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to—
(a) an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data or an online identifier, or
(b) one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of the individual.’

For such disclosure to be lawful, it would be necessary to satisfy a condition within Article 6 of the GDPR. Article 6 sets out the six lawful bases, applying to all processing; one of which must be in place in every case of disclosure of personal data under FOIA, in accordance with the First Data Protection Principle.

Section 40 is both an absolute and class based exemption which means there is no requirement on the MPS to consider whether there is a public interest in disclosure. When this exemption is claimed, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure. Section 40(3A)(a) states that public authorities will not disclose information which constitutes personal data and if the disclosure would contravene any of the Data Protection principles.

To disclose all the requested data could publicly reveal information about an individual or individuals which would contravene Data Protection principles. The Data Protection Act 2018 defines personal data as any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual. There are six data protection principles set out in section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5(1)(a) of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). The first principle requires personal data to be processed in a ‘lawful and fair’ manner. The basis for determining what constitutes lawful and fair is outlined under section 35 of the DPA. Under section 35(2) it states:

• the data subject has given consent to the processing for that purpose, or
• the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for that purpose by a competent authority.

It is important to note that we do not have the consent of the data subjects and the release of the data will not be used for a law enforcement process.

Under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, the disclosure of personal data is considered to be lawful if:

• There is a legitimate interest in the disclosure of that personal data.
• The disclosure of the personal data is necessary to meet that legitimate interest.
• The disclosure would not cause unwarranted harm to the data subject.

Having considered your request, I have found that the record located in response to your request contains a range of personal data, in relation to police staff and members of the public. By means of a legitimate interest test I have considered the release of the personal data, and I have found that:

The names of Staff members -
• Disclosing the requested information would provide greater detail into the visit of the Israeli police. The public may have a general interest in finding out who took part in the visit.

• The legitimate interest in transparency would be further satisfied through the release of this information.

• Some of the police officers who were part of the visit hold the rank of Superintendent and below. Officers of that rank would not therefore, reasonably expect their names to be published in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. In this regard, the public release of their personal data would be unexpected, unfair and distressing to the data subject(s) and could lead to unwanted and unsolicited intrusion from the media and/or others interested in the specifics of their role in the visit.

The names of external guests -
• Disclosing the names of external guest’s would show who else was invited to a very specific event held by the Central East Command Unit on the 18th May.

• The legitimate interest in transparency would be further satisfied through the release of this information.

• High ranking MPS officers would expect to be named in relation to FOIA requests, external guests who were invited at the behest of the MPS, would not. They would have a legitimate expectation that the MPS would not publicly release and publish their names in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. This could cause alarm and distress to the data subject.
In addition and irrespective of what other information may or may not be held, this request also requires a partial NCND.

Disclosure

Q1 - A breakdown of the total cost incurred by the Met as a result of the Israeli police delegation's 18 May 2022 visit. These numbers should be given in British pounds sterling. Reasonable estimates are acceptable if it would be prohibitive or impossible to provide precise figures.

The MPS do not hold a breakdown of the costs but can provide the total sum, which is:

£412 to the Central East Borough Command Unit (CE BCU)

Q2 - The agenda for the Israeli police delegation's 18 May 2022 visit - as it occurred rather than as planned beforehand, with a full list of sessions. This should include the locations at which these sessions took place and the times between which they occurred. This should also include a list of all those present at each session (with agencies, positions and names for senior officials, and agencies and positions for those to whom Section 40 or other exemptions are applied). This should also indicate who led each session (identifying them by agency, position and name for senior officials, and agency and position for those to whom Section 40 or other exemptions are applied).

The MPS do not hold an agenda in the format specified in your request. I have provided you with the below redacted agenda:

The agenda for the day was as follows:
(Please see the attached PDF Document)