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Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.023616
I note you seek access to the following information:
In February 2022, how many demonstrations - both static and mobile - were recorded by the Metropolitan Police as being held at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Kensington Gardens?....
On what dates did these occur and which groups took part?....
Likewise, in February 2022, how many demonstrations - both static and mobile - were recorded at the Embassy of the United States in Nine Elms Lane?....
On whae dates did these occur and which groups took part?...
I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 31(1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)(3) - Personal Information
Reason for decision
To disclose the name of any groups taking part in these demonstrations would reveal and could potentially compromise law enforcement tactics and hinder the prevention or detection of crime. Disclosure of these names in correlation with the dates could reveal patterns, which would potentially endanger the groups involved whilst affecting police intelligence, planning and responses. In addition, revealing the group name could also lead to the identification of an individual or associating a protest or protest group potentially to an individual.
Section 31 - Law Enforcement - FOIA is considered to be a release to the world as once the information is published the public authority, in this case the MPS, has no control over what use is made of that information.
To disclose the name of any group that took part in the demonstrations at embassies in London would cause operational harm to the MPS and affect our ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement. Disclosure would technically be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain. This could allow those members of the public with a criminal intent to improve their plans for causing disruption and would assist them in avoiding detection and apprehension. Disclosure of this would then place individuals or demonstration groups at greater risk, along with MPS officers. As a result, this will be likely to impact on police resources and may cause the MPS to consider adapting their tactics and strategies when policing any demonstrations or similar operations.
Disclosure of the name of any group that take part in the demonstrations at embassies could dissuade other members of the public from engaging with the police in the future if they infer the MPS is not considerate in its approach to their confidentiality and demonstration notification.
Disclosing the name of any group that took part in the demonstrations could compromise the current or future law enforcement role of the MPS. Modern-day policing is intelligence led and information of this nature needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity, as it could have a detrimental effect on the future operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with the release of such information as this may provide those seeking to commit criminal acts with an advantage over the MPS and other forces. This is because the information can indeed be viewed as operational 'intelligence' and operationally sensitive, which would impact on future MPS intelligence, planning and responses for similar operations. Disclosure could therefore place the groups in question, and individuals within these groups, at risk of being targeted through patterns potentially emerging, particularly when combined with the dates of demonstrations. It could also have a negative effect on the MPS’s ability to undertake similar types of operations.
To disclose the requested information would therefore provide those seeking to commit criminal acts with an opportunity of targeting individual protests or protestors and disrupting future police activity. Therefore, disclosure could be a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public and the detriment of providing an efficient policing service.
Release alongside the dates of demonstrations would have the effect of compromising law enforcement activity, as by disclosing the names of groups that take part in these demonstrations would hinder the prevention and detection of crime, as well as the ability to gather intelligence. Individuals could be placed at risk and more crime could be committed.
Disclosure of these specific details could be used by those with a criminal intent to seek to identify and exploit perceived vulnerabilities at a specific location. This could enable individuals to assess when and where they have a higher chance of undertaking a criminal offence without being detected or evading capture, while also revealing patterns which could lead to the groups and individuals being targeted. The MPS intelligence, planning and responses regarding any future protests will also be severely impacted. The information could be manipulated by those with criminal intent to target the MPS, its officers and the public.
Disclosure would be releasing sensitive operational information into the public domain which would enable those with the time, capacity and inclination to try and map plans and strategies used by the MPS in such operations.
Additionally MPS resources and its ability to operate effectively and efficiently would directly be affected, as this information could be used and manipulated by those with criminal intent to operate in those areas.
There is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the Police Service is appropriately and effectively policing public protests, embassies and demonstrations, whilst engaging with any threat posed by various groups or individuals. However, there is a very strong public interest in protecting the public and safeguarding the integrity of police operations in the highly sensitive area of crime prevention.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime as well as protecting the communities we serve. Any disclosure of information, which could assist an offender and prejudice the MPS’s ability to bring that perpetrator to justice, cannot be in the public interest. This information is therefore sensitive information of intelligence value to a criminal or terrorist.
Section 40 - Personal information - Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that disclosing group names in combination with the dates of incidents of the report could lead to the identification of an individual or associating an incident to an individual. It places information about an individual into the public domain without a fair or lawful purpose. This would constitute personal data which, if released, would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.
The six principles of the DPA govern the way in which data controllers must manage personal data. Under principle one of the DPA, personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. I consider that providing information that identifies individuals constitutes personal data. The release of this information would be unfair as the persons concerned would have no reasonable expectation that the MPS would make this information publicly available.
Disclosure
Please see below for information pursuant to your request.
The following are lists of the number of demonstrations which were recorded as occurring at each embassy, including the dates these took place.
Russian Embassy
04/02/2022 – 1 demonstration
09/02/2022- 1 demonstration
17/02/2022 - 1 demonstration
23/02/2022- 2 demonstrations
24/02/2022- 4 demonstrations
25/02/2022- 1 demonstration
26/02/2022- 3 demonstrations
American Embassy
27/02/2022- 1 demonstration