Data on Section 43 of the Terrorism Act 2000 in 2021

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.022643

I note you seek access to the following information:

1. Between the 1 January 2021 and the 1 January 2022 how many persons have been searched under Section 43 of the Terrorism Act 2000 by officers from your force, (if possible, can you provide a breakdown of the date and outcome of the search).

2. Between the 1 January 2021 and the 1 January 2022 how many arrests have been made by officers from your force as a result of a search of an individual under Section 43 of the Terrorism Act 2000, (if possible, can you provide a breakdown of the date and outcome of the arrest, charged or released no further action).

3. Between the 1 January 2021 and 1 January 2022 how many persons have been arrested within your Police area for offences related to terrorism and if possible could you provide a breakdown by date and offence, outcome if known.”

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 21 – Information Reasonably Accessible By Other Means
Section 24(1) - National Security
Section 31(1) - Law Enforcement
Section 40(2)&(3)(a)(i) - Personal Information

Reason for decision

Section 21 – Information accessible by other means -
Firstly, it may be of interest to you that the Home Office regularly publishes quarterly and annual national terrorism data, including some MPS data, and I am pleased to inform you that the total number of people searched under Section 43 of the Terrorism Act in 2021, and the total arrests resulting from those searches for 2021 (1/1/2021 to 31/12/2021), relevant to your questions 1 and 2, are included in the published data. As this information is reasonably accessible by other means Section 21 of the Act has been applied to refuse disclosure.

You can access the information at chapter 5 of the published document: “Other police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000”, for information relevant to your questions 1 and 2.

Section 24(1) - National Security -
To disclose this information would render security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK. The risk of harm to the public would be increased if the location of vulnerable areas of the UK were made public as this would provide opportunity for terrorist planning. Ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infrastructure of the UK would be compromised as terrorists could map across the country the level of counter-terrorist activity, giving them the knowledge of force’s individual capabilities.

Section 31(1) – Law Enforcement -
The threat of terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently categorised as ‘substantial’.

The disclosure of the requested information would undermine the individual force Counter Terrorism units (CTU) which would consequently be detrimental to our ability to be able to deal with the on-going terrorist threat we face. Providing the requested data would allow comparison of CTU’s across the country and enable terrorists to build a picture of what resources are in place and where they are deployed. It is felt that the disclosure of this information would prejudice the effectiveness of the national counter terrorism effort and would allow inferences to be drawn about force level Counter Terrorism (CT) activity.

Disclosure of information below a national figure could allow individuals to exploit what might appear to be less active or resourced areas, by analysing patterns of police activity and deployments over time, ultimately to avoid detection. This would infer CT policing resources and by analysing similar data from around the country, it would allow criminals to understand national CT policing activity. For example, it would enable terrorists to make judgments on where they perceive there to be greater vulnerability, lower staff levels and lesser probability of being apprehended, which would ultimately increase the risk and vulnerability to the security of the UK from terrorist attack.

By disclosing this information law enforcement tactics would be compromised, which would hinder the prevention and detection of terrorist crime. More crime would be committed because terrorists would know which areas had less CT capability and capacity and individuals would therefore be placed at a greater risk. A fear of crime would be realised because if the terrorists identified more vulnerable areas or identified areas where there is more police activity, they would target and exploit these areas and the public would be in fear of more terrorist activity occurring. The Home Office regularly publish national statistical data on terrorism arrests.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of an individual at risk or undermine National Security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by terrorists, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in the highly sensitive area of terrorism.

As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. CTU capabilities are high-profile sensitive issues of intelligence value to the terrorist and therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for disclosing the information requested is not made out.

Section 40(2)&(3)(a)(i) – Personal Information - Section 40(2) & (3) becomes absolute and class based in cases where disclosure would contravene the principles of the Data Protection Act, and requires neither evidence of harm or public interest test in justification of its use. When this exemption is applied, it is accepted that harm would result from disclosure.

Under Section 40(2) and (3) of the Act, Public Authorities are able to withhold information where its release would identify any living individual and breach the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA). I have applied this exemption in that the disclosure of the requested information could identify individuals and release personal sensitive information about those individuals into the public domain. If this occurs due to information provided by the MPS, this constitutes personal data, which would be in breach of the rights provided by the DPA.

Section 40(2)(a)(b) of the Act provides that any information to which a request for information relates, is exempt information if the first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) is satisfied. The first condition of Section 40(3A)(a) states that personal information is exempt if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles. If the disclosure of the requested personal data would not contravene the data protection principles, the disclosure must also not contravene Sections 3A(b), 3B of the Act.

There are six data protection principles that are set out in Section 34 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The first principle requires that the disclosure of the requested personal data must be lawful and fair.

I note that you have also asked us to provide, if possible, a break-down of any data located in response to your questions 1, 2 and 3 (1. date and outcome of search; 2. date and outcome of arrest [charged or released no further action]; 3. date and offence, outcome if known). Unfortunately however, due to the low figures located in response to each of your questions 1, 2 and 3 when broken down to the granularity you are seeking it is not possible to provide this break down as to do so would identify specific incidents and individuals concerned. This would release sensitive personal information about individuals and investigations into the public domain. Any such disclosure would prejudice ongoing (and future) investigations and impact on national security and law enforcement. The exemptions afforded by Sections 24(1), 31(1), and 40(2)(3) of the Act have therefore been applied to refuse disclosure of the breakdown you are seeking.

Finally, please be informed that we are unable to disclose any data for 01/01/2022 (relevant to your questions 1, 2 and 3) as disclosing data for a single date, particularly when broken down by the reason for the search or arrest and outcome, would release sensitive personal information about individuals into the public domain, would prejudice ongoing investigations and impact on national security and law enforcement, and the exemptions afforded by Sections 24(1), 31(1), and 40(2)(3) of the Act have again been applied to refuse disclosure of any information held for this date.

Please see the disclosure section below for information that has been located and assessed as suitable for disclosure.

Disclosure

Q3 - Between the 1 January 2021 and 1 January 2022 how many persons have been arrested within your Police area for offences related to terrorism and if possible could you provide a breakdown by date and offence, outcome if known.

We can confirm that 42 TACT arrests took place in the MPS between the period 01/01/2021 and 31/12/2021.