Crimes at Buckingham Palace, Kensington Palace, St James’s Palace and Clarence House from 2019 to 2021

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.22.023330

I note you seek access to the following information:

For each of the calendar years 2019, 2020 and 2021 and the period 1 January 2022 to 14 February 2022, please could you tell me:

1) The number of reported crimes at Buckingham Palace, Kensington Palace, St James’s Palace and Clarence House

2) A brief summary of each reported crime (i.e the details written in the MO field of the crime report)

3) The outcome of each reported crime if known (i.e. if a suspect was arrested, charged or no further action taken)

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(1) – National Security
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 30(3) – Investigations and proceedings conducted by the public authority
Section 40(5) – Personal Information

Reason for decision

The MPS is unable to respond to requests for data covering short part-year periods, such as part-month data, as providing offence data in this way would enable the possibility of crime patterns to be exposed through multiple individual requests.

In addition, to disclose a breakdown of which of the royal residences a crime had been committed in or within its vicinity, along with a summary of each crime, would negatively affect the security measures in place and therefore prejudice law enforcement.

As such, the following exemptions are engaged:

Section 24(1) – National Security
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement

In addition, the MPS can neither confirm or deny whether it holds any further information relating to this request as the duty in Section 1 (1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 30(3) – Investigations and proceedings conducted by the public authority
Section 40(5) – Personal Information

Section 24 - National Security & Section 31 - Law Enforcement - Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be taken into account in deciding whether to disclose specific crime location data.

To disclose the requested information would allow interested criminal parties to gain an advantage and increased awareness of policing decisions used to safeguard national security. All royal residences are considered sites of national interest. Any possible threat to these buildings or individuals within, whether that be visitors, staff or Members of the Royal Family, would be considered a threat to the prime institution of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements and therefore a threat to national security. Disclosing at which royal residence a specific crime occurred and the type of crime would render security measures less effective and compromise the security of individuals and the buildings.

A Freedom of Information Act request is not a private transaction. Both the request itself, and any information disclosed, are considered suitable for open publication. This is because, under the Act, any information disclosed is released into the wider public domain, effectively to the world, not just to an individual. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant to provide crime location data, in addition to the type of crime, could be harmful in that if specific crimes were shown to have a low detection rate. This could indicate relative vulnerabilities of security provisions at one of the locations. As a result, this would provide those intent on committing criminal or terrorist acts at those residences with valuable information as to the level of resistance they might expect to encounter. They would therefore gain an understanding of the capabilities of the Force and potential vulnerabilities could be more easily identified.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006 the UK Government have published the threat level, as set by the security service (MI5), based upon current intelligence and that threat level has predominantly been set at the second highest level severe. Following the Manchester Arena Bombing in May 2017 and the terrorist attacks in London in 2017, the threat level was raised to the highest, critical. The current threat level to the UK is substantial, the Home Office website explains that ‘The threat level indicates the likelihood of a terrorist attack in the UK’,

Disclosure of the requested information would prejudice the prevention of crime. To provide details of which crimes had occurred at or within the vicinity of a specific royal residence would highlight to a criminal which crimes are likely to go undetected at that location or within the immediate surrounding area. This may encourage them to commit further similar offences or modify their criminal behaviour to reduce the probability of being apprehended.

Modern-day policing is intelligence led and information of this nature, needs to be treated with extreme sensitivity as it could have a detrimental effect on the operational effectiveness of the MPS. There are significant risks associated with the release of such information, as to provide the requested data would allow criminals an insight to how the police operate. It would also provide people who wish to harm visitors, staff or Members of the Royal Family and members of the public with the opportunity of disrupting police activity.

This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public. Additionally, it might require the MPS to have to increase the amount of officers available to them, thus increasing the cost to the public purse.

It is not in the public interest to disclose the requested information as it would detrimentally affect the safeguarding of national security in respect of these buildings and individuals within them. Those planning criminal or terrorist acts are known to conduct extensive research into the levels of opposition they might encounter. Disclosure of the information requested would provide such individuals or groups with valuable information in respect of protection afforded to Royal residences.

Given current threat levels, disclosure would therefore be detrimental to the safeguarding of national security. The disclosure of additional information would also require police tactics to be reviewed, which would create an unnecessary burden on both staffing and financial resources. Such unnecessary expenditure would not be in the public interest.

The public interest is not what interests the public but what will be of greater good if released to the community as a whole. It is not in the public interest to disclose information that may compromise the MPS’s ability to accomplish its core functions of law enforcement. Disclosure of any further information would compromise security arrangements by providing terrorists, criminals or fixated individuals with vital intelligence as to the levels of protection that might be afforded to royal residences and to the level of resistance that they may encounter in committing criminal or terrorist acts.
To provide the additional requested information would assist offenders in gauging what type of crime is likely to go undetected at a specific location and could therefore increase the probability of crimes being committed.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of the public or an individual at risk or undermine national security and law enforcement and therefore compromise the work of the Police Service. Whilst there is a public interest in transparency of the use of policing resources and its effectiveness against the threat posed to the Royal Family and royal residences; and in policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by criminal or terrorists, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police arrangements in this highly sensitive area.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. The strongest reason favouring disclosure is transparency. It is recognised that there is a genuine public interest in information relating to crimes which have occurred at these royal residences being disclosed and being able to measure the effectiveness of the MPS in obtaining a successful outcome. The strongest reason favouring non-disclosure is ensuring that security measures are not rendered less effective by providing additional details of crimes committed at each royal residence. In addition to this, also making sure that criminals are not provided with information which allows them to commit acts and evade capture, therefore hindering the effective delivery of operational law enforcement.

Additionally, the Metropolitan Police Service can neither confirm or deny whether it holds any further information relevant to this request as the duty in Section 1 (1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 30 - Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities - To confirm or deny the existence of any further information relating to crimes occurring at or within the vicinity of royal residences would be commenting on information, which might or might not form part of an investigation. The MPS would not wish to confirm or deny that any further data is held relating to an offence for an ongoing investigation, as this would clearly undermine the law enforcement and investigative process.

Confirmation or denial would highlight how many investigations could be ongoing and alert possible offenders to the importance that might be placed on this area of crime. Any subsequent enquiries or investigations could therefore be compromised.

To confirm or deny what level of policing activity has or has not occurred in any specific area would enable those engaged in criminal or terrorist activity to identify the focus of policing activity and any tactics that may or may not be deployed.
Confirming or denying the existence of any further information would also reveal policing tactics regarding who was of interest to the police generally. This could be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.

Confirmation or denial that any further information is held may hinder and undermine the partnership approach to law enforcement in this complex area.

The most persuasive reasons for confirming or denying any further information is held would be greater assurance to the public that any reported crimes to the police are investigated thoroughly and would give an indication of the level of crime that is being reported in this area.

The effectiveness of any potential ongoing investigations may be compromised as potential offenders would be alerted and able to identify the focus of police activity. They could then take steps to disrupt this investigation and evade prosecution, which could ultimately lead to the need for more police resources.

Section 40 - Personal information - Section 40 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 is designed to address information that is covered by the Data Protection Act 2018.

Under section 40(5), the MPS is not required to comply with the requirements of section 1(1) (a) i.e. the duty to inform the applicant whether or not the information is held.

In most cases Personal Data is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act as I will explain below.

To confirm or deny whether personal information exists could publicly reveal information about an identifiable individual or individuals, thereby breaching the right to privacy afforded to persons under the Data Protection Act (DPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2018.

Where an individual is requesting his or her own personal data the information is always exempt. Such information can be requested under other legislation.
Where an individual is requesting third party personal data the MPS must ensure that any action taken adheres to the principles of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the GDPR. To clarify, the Freedom of Information Act only allows disclosure of personal data if that disclosure would be compliant with the principles for processing personal data. These principles are outlined under section 34 of the DPA 2018 and under Article 5 of the GDPR.

Disclosure

Please see below for information pursuant to your request. This data was recorded on the Crime Reporting Information System (CRIS), which is a database where information relating to criminal activity and its investigation is recorded. The data captured is from the period 01/01/2019 to 31/12/2021 and is provided for the three calendar years.

I would like to take this opportunity to advise that the information disclosed has the following caveat:

The data includes crimes recorded as being ‘at’ or ‘outside’ Buckingham Palace, Kensington Palace, St James Palace and Clarence House, those recorded as ‘opposite’ or ‘near’ have been excluded

In relation to Q1 - The number of reported crimes at Buckingham Palace, Kensington Palace, St James’s Palace and Clarence House, the recorded number of crimes at these locations are as follows:

Year	Number
2019	383
2020	64
2021	23

Regarding Q2 - A brief summary of each reported crime (i.e the details written in the MO field of the crime report), although I am unable to provide a summary of each crime, I am able to confirm that the recorded Major Offence Category of these recorded crimes is as follows:

Category	2019	2020	2021
Arson and Criminal Damage	5	6	4
Burglary	1	0	0
Drug Offences	6	5	6
Miscellaneous Crimes Against Society	0	1	0
Possession of Weapons	18	5	2
Public Order Offences	3	2	3
Robbery	6	1	0
Theft	333	42	5
Vehicle Offences	1	0	0
Violence Against the Person	10	2	3

 For Q3 - The outcome of each reported crime if known (i.e. if a suspect was arrested, charged or no further action taken), the outcomes for these recorded crimes are recorded as follows:

Category	2019	2020	2021
Charged/Summonsed	3	4	2
Caution - adult	0	1	0
Penalty Notice for Disorder	0	0	1
Community Resolution	7	3	6
Not in public interest (Pol)	1	0	0
Evidential difficulties victim based	3	2	0
Susp id; V supports; evidential difficulties	18	3	3
Susp id; V not support; evidential difficulties	5	0	0
Invest. complete: no susp id	343	50	11
Further Investigation Not in public interest (Police)	3	1	0