CCTV cameras and body worn cameras under MPS control

Freedom of information request reference no: 01.FOI.21.021493

I note you seek access to the following information:

I am looking at the amount of CCTV cameras under the met control for the whole of London. Also looking at CCTV cameras in each specific Borough/district if able.

Can you also provide the amount of body worm cameras in use by the Met.

If you have any other CCTV camera in operation could you also provide this.

It's for a positive story focusing on CCTV.

Decision

I have today decided to disclose some of the requested information. Some data has been withheld as it is exempt from disclosure and therefore this response serves as a Refusal Notice under Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(2) National Security
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Reason for decision

You have asked for the following information.

If you have any other CCTV camera in operation could you also provide this.

The MPS can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to your request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Act does not apply, some of the information will be exempt under the following exemptions.

Section 24(2) National Security;
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

By confirming or denying that the MPS holds any other information regarding covert surveillance and any relevant equipment for that purpose, would in itself disclose exempt information. Stating information is held would confirm usage and the opposite if there is no such information.

Although covert techniques are in the public domain, it is how and when they might be used, that are the sensitive issues for the Police Service. These techniques could be deployed for more high profile sensitive operations, albeit not necessarily in your force area, therefore the NCND is required to protect other forces that may use them.

Any disclosure under FOIA is a disclosure to the world at large, and confirming or denying the use of specialist techniques which may or may not exist, and which (should they exist) the Police Service may or may not deploy in specific circumstances, would prejudice law enforcement. Irrespective of what information may or may not be held relating to covert surveillance and any relevant equipment for that purpose, confirmation of this fact would reveal that the police has access to sophisticated, and specific techniques. This would be damaging as it would (i) limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police's methods and techniques, enabling them to take steps to counter them; and (ii) provide an indication to any individual who may be undertaking criminal/terrorist activities that the Police Service may be aware of their presence and taking counter measures.

Conversely, if information were not held by the MPS, and a denial were issued, this would reveal to those same individuals that their activities are unlikely to have been detected by the police. It may also suggest (whether correctly or not) the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing a potential vulnerability. Disclosure of the information could confirm to those involved in criminality or terrorism that they are or have been the subject of such activity, allowing them to gauge the frequency of its use and to take measures to circumvent its use. Any compromise of, or reduction in technical capability by forces would substantially prejudice the ability of forces to police their areas which would lead to a greater risk to the public.

This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics are or are not deployed. This can be useful information to those committing serious crimes and terrorist activities.

For example, to state that no information is held in one area and then exempt information held in another, would itself provide acknowledgement that the technique has been used at that second location. This could have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations, enabling individuals to become aware of whether their activities have been detected. This in turn could lead to them moving their operations, destroying evidence, or avoiding those areas, ultimately compromising police tactics, operations and future prosecutions.

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both national security and law enforcement.

By confirming or denying whether any other information is or isn’t held regarding covert surveillance and any relevant equipment for that purpose, could render security measures less effective. This could lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public

By confirming or denying whether such techniques were used would compromise law enforcement tactics and undermine the partnership approach which would hinder the prevention or detection of crime. This would impact on police resources, more crime would then be committed and individuals placed at risk.

The security of the country is of paramount importance and the police service will not divulge whether any other information is or is not held if to do so could undermine national security or compromise law enforcement. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by the criminal fraternity, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations in this area.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

There is also no requirement to satisfy any public concern over the legality of police operations and the tactics we may or may not use. Forces are already held to account by statute, for example the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and other independent bodies. Our accountability is therefore not enhanced by confirming or denying whether any other information is held relating to covert surveillance and any relevant equipment for that purpose.
Therefore it is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying whether any information is held regarding these techniques is not made out. This argument is obviously transferable to all police tactics.
None of the above can be viewed as an inference that the information you seek does or does not exist.

Disclosure

Can you also provide the amount of body worm cameras in use by the Met.

The MPS has 26,500 Axon BWV cameras

Also looking at CCTV cameras in each specific borough/district if able.

The MPS do not hold a specific breakdown of cameras per borough. The MPS response for this question is no information held.

If you have any other CCTV camera in operation could you also provide this.

At the present time, the number of cameras under direct control of The Metropolitan Police Service is approximately 300 cameras. These are owned and operated by the GSZ (Government Security Zone) and Westminster Basic Command Unit. These include a mixture of static and PTZ (pan tilt zoom) units.

The MPS can view a limited number of images from the remaining 31 London boroughs (not including Westminster). However, the MPS do not own nor cannot control these cameras. Any information regarding non-MPS cameras should be directed to each individual Local Authority or their website where many already publish this information.

The MPS also own and deploy a small number of temporary cameras which are deployed for specific short-term operational needs.