Metropolitan Police Service

4 DAYS IN AUGUST
Strategic Review into the Disorder of August 2011

FINAL REPORT MARCH 2012
I cannot conceive that there is a single person in this country who was not affected in some way by the events of last August; the Duggan family, those whose lives and livelihoods were damaged or destroyed by the violence that spread across London, those who chose to engage in criminal acts, those who watched, heard or read events unfolding on the media or the many police officers and staff who worked tirelessly to deal with the violent scenes.

This review is the Metropolitan Police Service’s assessment of what happened, importantly containing our key findings and recommendations, detailing what work we have undertaken and will continue to take forward in the future.

Since August we have worked alongside all of the other reviews to ensure that there is a measured assessment of what happened and we will continue to participate fully in these processes.

We remain committed to calm and considered analysis undertaken in a mature, open and wholly transparent way as the communities of London deserve nothing less. I continue to feel immensely proud of the many officers and staff who did their duty over those four days and beyond, in our best attempt to protect London and its people. From these wholly unprecedented events there are clearly things that we would do differently in the future or where we will have to enhance or invest in our approach and I, and my Management Board, will carefully consider those plans as they come forward to ensure we are best placed to protect London in the future.

Bernard Hogan-Howe, QPM, MBA, MA (OXON)
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
Scenes after the disorder in Clapham Junction. Photograph Courtesy of Press Association.
CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
2. INTRODUCTION
3. THE EVENTS OF AUGUST 2011 - OVERVIEW
   3.1 Overview
   3.2 Timeline
4. HARINGEY - AN IN DEPTH STUDY
   4.1 The Critical Incident - Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and Independent Police
      Complaints Commission (IPCC) working protocols
   4.2 Family Liaison
   4.3 Media
   4.4 Community Engagement Haringey Borough
   4.5 Outside Tottenham Police Station
   4.6 Intelligence handling prior to disorder
   4.7 Policing plans and resource considerations prior to the disorder
5. NIGHT ONE - DISORDER IN TOTTENHAM - 6TH AUGUST
   5.1 Overview
   5.2 Responding to the disorder
6. THE FOLLOWING DAYS
   6.1 Day Two | Sunday 7th August - Including Enfield case study
   6.2 Day Three | Monday 8th August - Including Croydon and Wandsworth case studies
   6.3 Day Four | Tuesday 9th August
7. THE FINDINGS
   7.1 Independent Advice
   7.2 Community Engagement - Local and London
   7.3 Intelligence
   7.4 Mobilisation
   7.5 Resources
   7.6 Public Order Tactics
   7.7 Investigation
   7.8 Criminal Justice
8. RIOT DAMAGES
9. CONCLUSION
10. GLOSSARY OF TERMS
11. APPENDICES
This report details the key issues that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) experienced during the disorders of August 2011 and outlines what went well and what did not, what developments have occurred and further changes that need to be made.

In compiling this report the MPS has sought to take a comprehensive view, to provide an accurate reflection of events and identify opportunities to improve as an organisation.

Whilst this is the final report of this review, extensive work will continue within the MPS in order to develop its findings and take the recommendations forward under the direction of Assistant Commissioner Specialist Crime and Operations.

The MPS has already taken forward a significant amount of work as a result of its review. Findings, areas of work underway and further work commissioned as a result of the review are summarised below under themed headings. The senior MPS officer responsible for delivering the improvements is indicated, as well as the timetable, where appropriate.

1. Critical Incident Management

1.1 Following the shooting of Mark Duggan the MPS took all appropriate actions to manage the immediate events, complying with the national standards of critical incident management.

1.2 The MPS did not counter inaccurate reporting about the circumstances of Mark Duggan’s death. This was due to its belief that it was limited by the protocol agreed between the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) and Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in relation to commenting on information so clearly pertinent to the IPCC’s investigation.

1.3 The review found widespread confusion in the MPS about what the police can say about an investigation involving the IPCC. MPS officers and staff interpreted the rules as meaning there were limitations on what they could communicate publicly. The seriousness of the Duggan investigation may have made them even more cautious. The MPS accepts that it should have corrected the information once it became clear that the IPCC was not going to correct the misreporting.

1.4 A new protocol between the IPCC and the police in England and Wales on communication has now been published to provide greater clarity for police forces and the IPCC.

2. Independent Advice

2.1 Haringey Borough made extensive use of a community engagement model, which is in common use across the MPS, to obtain independent advice and community intelligence. Central to this model is the use of Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs). The engagement model did not achieve its purpose in relation to the August disorder. It did not enable the disorder to be predicted and did not help in facilitating effective communication with Mark Duggan’s family during the vigil outside Tottenham Police Station on Saturday 6th August, significantly at what turned out to be a crucial turning point in the dynamics of the crowd.

2.2 Independent members of the community who are willing to give up their time and offer advice to the police are vital to the modern MPS. But the current MPS model for community engagement and generating independent advice is inconsistent and sometimes not transparent. In addition it is noteworthy that the complexity and diversity of London’s communities has grown since its establishment. The MPS is fundamentally reviewing the structure and process of its community engagement model. It is looking at its effectiveness in penetrating communities and reaching key groups, including young people.

2.3 This is involving not only talking to existing IAG members but also seeking a new and wider
range of community voices that may not be heard in the current system. The review is undertaking an audit of all MPS IAGs to include membership and diversity profile and arrangements for their use. It will provide a clarity regarding the relationship of an independent member to the MPS and expectations of that member. This will, in particular, address the question of advisors attending police planning meetings and then taking part in the public activity which is the subject of that planning. More effective recording of the advice given, in order that disputes over what was said can be resolved later, will be developed. This will also allow the MPS to assess how effectively it acted on specific advice.

2.4 In the shorter term, and in specific relation to Haringey Borough, the review recommends that the borough continues to work with its independent members and that representation is broadened from the black community and those under the age of 30 to ensure younger voices are heard.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Territorial Policing) - work to be completed by June 2012.

3. Community Engagement

3.1 Alongside IAGs, an additional element of the MPS model of community engagement makes use of Key Individual Networks (KINs) - lists of key individuals within the local community. These were used specifically in Haringey Borough and elsewhere in London during the August disorder. However the MPS did not gain an understanding of the mood in communities and did not form an accurate community intelligence picture.

3.2 In recognition that it is the MPS’s responsibility to extend its reach into all communities, to fully understand what is happening locally, KINs are also subject to fundamental review as part of the MPS community engagement model. Initial work has identified that, if they continue to be the engagement mechanism, the membership needs to be wider, particularly to include young people. How the MPS makes the most effective use of these networks will also be an important aspect of this review.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Territorial Policing) - work to be completed by June 2012.

3.3 The community impact assessment in Haringey suggested tension before the first night of violence was at a relatively low level, raising questions about the effectiveness of the MPS model of tension monitoring. To ensure a consistent and effective MPS-wide approach to the monitoring of community tension, the review recommends a detailed examination of the current Community Impact Assessment process.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Territorial Policing) - work to be completed by April 2012.

3.4 Whilst the review has identified many good examples of communication with local communities and business groups during and after the disorder of August 2011, it has identified that activity was inconsistent and there was a degree of dislocation between local and pan-London events. The MPS has started a project to improve community engagement across London, identifying lessons from those boroughs which handle it well.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Territorial Policing) - work to be completed by June 2012.

3.5 The review has identified good examples of partnership working in a number of situations, particularly the strong relationship with London Fire Brigade. The MPS accepts that it should assess large scale public order incidents at an initial stage to assess whether the earlier utilisation of the London Local Resilience Partnership would be of benefit. To this end the MPS has already introduced this approach within its public order training courses.

3.6 The MPS has identified the need to broaden its engagement activity. In particular social media presented a portal through which the MPS should have engaged with its communities more effectively, specifically by countering, in the interests of public safety and confidence, information the MPS understood to be incorrect.

3.7 Through the launch of the ‘MPS Digital Communications Steering Group,’ the MPS has undertaken significant work to sharpen its use of social media and digital communications to engage more widely with the people of London. It has already increased the number and use of its twitter accounts and launched individual borough accounts, with an undertaking for all boroughs to have an account in 2012. It has also developed a new facebook page and made use of ‘Bambuser,’ a live streaming website. This work will remain a high priority for years to come.

3.8 Public attitude surveys suggest there has been no significant change in the public’s general confidence in the MPS. However, the MPS is aware of perceptions that stop and search is a major source of discontent with the police. The most
significant issue raised with the MPS is not the use of the stop and search power itself but the nature of the encounter. The MPS accepts, as it always has, that the quality of interaction can improve. The MPS has undertaken work to review not only its stop and search strategy but also the wider engagement of its officers, particularly those in the front line who regularly come into contact with young people.

3.9 The Deputy Commissioner has already set out the MPS’s new approach as part of the Commissioner’s Total War on Crime - the use of stop and search must become more targeted and effective, with a greater focus on tackling violence and increasing trust and confidence among communities. The focus is not on reducing the use of stop and search but making it more effective and ensuring every encounter is first class. The vision is to achieve the highest level of trust and confidence in the MPS’s use of stop and search as a tactic for keeping London’s streets safer.

**Commander (Territorial Policing)**
- work to be completed by April 2012

4. Intelligence

4.1 The MPS struggled with the volume and task of identifying accurate intelligence during the disorder. The MPS could not comprehensively monitor social media in real-time and was therefore not in a position to be moving ahead of events. The MPS launch of the ‘Digital Communications Steering Group’ is a commitment to developing its ability to use social media as a tool to understand and know what is going on in the community, as well as to measure the pulse and temperature of public attitude and concern on police-related issues.

4.2 Significant work is underway to obtain the appropriate technology for use in the police intelligence arena. Furthermore, the Home Office have agreed to fund the MPS in developing social media intelligence technology ahead of the Olympic Games, including relevant training.

**Commander (Intelligence and Covert Policing)**
- responsible for the overall ‘MPS Digital Communications Steering Group’ - work ongoing.

5. Mobilisation and Resources

5.1 During the operational response to the disorder resources were mobilised and allocated proportionately across London, determined by information and intelligence. However, in hindsight, the numbers were not enough and they did not arrive quickly enough to deal with the speed with which the violence escalated and its spread. The review highlights the bravery and dedication of the individual actions of MPS officers and staff who were placed in demanding and difficult situations.

5.2 To assemble trained, equipped and fully briefed officers quickly the MPS recognises the need for a dynamic and flexible Service Mobilisation Plan (SMP). Since August the MPS has improved the process for assembling public order trained officers. They can now be mobilised more quickly. However, there are still practical difficulties in getting significant numbers of public order officers on the streets. In order to overcome this, the MPS is addressing two key aspects; increasing the overall number of public order trained officers and ensuring a minimum number are available locally to aid speedy deployment.

5.3 Significant work is being examined to increase the number of Level 1 (by 25%) and Level 2 (by 50%) public order trained officers\(^1\). This resource increase will also include the necessary equipment and vehicles.

5.4 The ongoing Territorial Policing Development Programme will now incorporate the need to deliver public order resource in the shortest time possible to achieve an agile Service Mobilisation Plan.

5.5 The MPS is also looking at ways of achieving a wider and swifter mobilisation of specialist staff, including intelligence experts, crime investigators and police staff.

**Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order)**
- SMP improvement to be completed by April 2012, training to support uplift in public order officers to take place October 2012.

5.6 The software used in the MPS Special Operations Room (SOR) command centre was not designed for dynamic incident management. It did not easily allow the Strategic (Gold) and Tactical (Silver) Commanders to monitor key incidents and staff deployments, nor did it enable quick communication with their ground commanders. The scale of the disorder and the number of officers deployed in response to it exacerbated these challenges.

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\(^1\) Level 1, 2 and 3 officers have different levels of public order policing skills according to the training they have received: Level 1: Training based upon a 5 week cycle, includes shield tactics, including petrol bombs/missiles, barricades, containment to arrest, crowed entry, house entry & search, violent person handling. Further training includes prison tactics and working with firearms and baton rounds. Level 2: Officers trained for two days every 6 months, trained to the same standard as level 1; with respect to basic shield tactics, violent person handling, crowd entry, search and containment tactics. Level 3: Basic public order training delivered to all police recruits during their initial training. It provides basic training around foot duty cordons, and deployments with mounted branch. This is the only training an officer will receive unless they progress to level 2.
5.7 The shortcomings that were identified during these events will be fed into the requirements for new command and control systems which are already in the planning stages. The MPS is testing a new tracking system aimed at improving the ability of senior commanders to coordinate officers across London.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order)  
- new tracking system trials to be completed and evaluated by July 2012.

6. Public Order Tactics

6.1 The MPS acknowledges that there are examples of the public feeling let down where police were not immediately able to come to their aid or prevent the destruction of property. This was mainly because there were not enough officers to deal with the unprecedented scale and geographical spread of the disorder.

6.2 Events have prompted the need to review current public order tactics and to explore new ways of responding to fast-moving disorder of the kind experienced in August. A working group of experienced public order leaders, trainers, front-line officers and firearms specialists was set up after August to look at more flexible and dynamic tactics.

6.3 The work of the group has already led to the re-introduction of the use of specialist officers in plain clothes (with uniform support) in public order situations. This has led to arrests at some recent public order events. A revised MPS public order training programme will be circulated in the MPS in 2012. Specifically the use of ‘Go Forward Tactics’ has been re-introduced in relation to intervention tactics and the use of vehicles. In addition the MPS is looking at options to enhance its ability to make multiple arrests without removing officers from the streets for long periods.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order)  
- work to be completed by April 2012.

6.4 Inspectors on the ground played a pivotal role during August. They have good understanding of public order-related legislation but the MPS needs to ensure that they are empowered by feeling confident that their fast-time, dynamic decisions will be supported. The MPS has introduced a programme for the professional development of all public order trained inspectors, including mentoring and joint training with senior public order commanders.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order)  
- work to be completed by April 2012.

6.5 The MPS is undertaking work on the use of more assertive tactics in a public order context, but does recognise that there is a need for wider public debate and engagement around such use.

6.6 AEPs (commonly referred to as baton rounds) were not used in August because they were not available at times and in places where they might have been used. The MPS is looking at ways of making AEPs more readily available but it recognises the need to consult widely on this issue. It has already increased the number of officers trained to work with Kestrel Teams (specialists that deploy with baton rounds).

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order)  
- work is ongoing.

6.7 The events of August generated a public debate about whether water cannons are appropriate for use on the UK mainland. Work is ongoing at a national level to develop the tactics to facilitate the deployment of water cannon. It is estimated that ACPO will be in a position to issue agreed guidelines to forces in May 2012. The MPS is contributing to national discussions about the potential purchase of three water cannon vehicles, to be based regionally in England and Wales.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Public Order)  
- work is ongoing.

7. Investigation

7.1 The crime investigation (Operation Withern) of almost 4,000 offences during the disorder, was well managed by the MPS and its criminal justice partners. The operation has underlined the vital importance of CCTV evidence which enabled the MPS to bring thousands of criminals to justice. The MPS is working to ensure that every borough has an effective viewing facility with dedicated supervisors and trained staff. There are already significantly more CCTV viewing stations, and more trained ‘viewers’ - both MPS staff and volunteers. The wider ‘MPS Digital Imagery Strategy’ is a far reaching project but includes an aim to promote the professional skills needed to make the most effective use of CCTV evidence.

MPS Digital Imagery Strategy: Commander (Specialist Crime and Operations Command)  
- work to be completed by April 2014.
8. Criminal Justice

8.1 The investigation and criminal justice response to the disorder is widely recognised as a success. The MPS has identified many examples of effective working between the police and partners such as the Crown Prosecution Service, National Offender Management System and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. To build on this good practice, the MPS has prepared a formal contingency plan to set out the roles and responsibilities of the police and criminal justice partners in public disorder situations. This includes identifying the circumstances which would trigger the involvement of partners at the earliest opportunity.

Commander (Criminal Justice) - work completed.

8.2 The MPS’s existing custody management model for centralised cell allocation proved successful for managing demand. The model has been developed and is already successfully operating at one of the MPS’s three Central Communications Command centres and will extend to cover the whole of London. The criminal justice system used was still a paper-based one which presented file building challenges. The MPS aims for all boroughs to use a digital criminal justice file building system. It has already rolled this out in 24 boroughs.

Commander (Criminal Justice) - work to be completed by April 2012.

The MPS continues to work with all other reviews being conducted into these events and remains of the view that an open, calm and considered approach is essential to develop an understanding of what occurred to prevent a reoccurrence. It is the view of the MPS that much of this will be beyond the remit of the police service.
Operation Kirkin was the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) response to the pan-London disorder which took place in early August 2011. Assistant Commissioner Lynne Owens has reviewed Operation Kirkin on behalf of the Commissioner. Following her appointment as Chief Constable of Surrey Police, Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley assumed responsibility for finalising the review and driving through its recommendations.

The overarching objective of the Operation Kirkin Strategic Review was:

‘To develop a detailed understanding of the MPS response to significant public disorder in London between Thursday 4th August and Friday 19th August 2011 in order to inform future policing operations by ensuring organisational learning is recognised and developed for the future. This learning and the subsequent costed plans will be shared promptly, as appropriate, with key internal and external stakeholders.’

The strategic intentions underpinning this objective were:

- To gain a detailed understanding of the community, stakeholder and policing issues surrounding the death of Mark Duggan that precipitated significant public disorder in the capital.
- To review the MPS response to widespread and unprecedented public disorder in London to inform senior police leaders and external stakeholders.
- To ensure that all relevant written and electronic data is centrally retained or reliably retrievable to ensure that the MPS response to any future accountability process is complete, transparent and authoritative.
- To learn the lessons with respect to the MPS strategic community and stakeholder engagement, policing response, planning, tactics, intelligence and investigation to inform future operational activity.
- To recognise and disseminate organisational learning and good practice.

The full terms of reference are attached at Appendix A.

The MPS will continue to learn from a range of other reviews and enquiries being conducted into the disorder and will share its findings and contribute as wholly as possible to improving the capability of the MPS and partners in dealing with public disorder and criminality.

The review has undertaken comprehensive analysis of the events of August 2011 - to examine the MPS response, systems and the results of its action. This has involved work and input from across the police family in order to provide the fullest picture possible. The review will identify the policing themes that have been subject to thorough review, learning and improvement. It will explain progress and changes to current procedures and operational tactics that have already been implemented and further work that is planned.

The report seeks to provide specific detail around events that took place in Haringey between Thursday 4th August and Saturday 6th August 2011. It will then similarly explore the events of Sunday 7th August, Monday 8th August and Tuesday 9th August 2011 before providing the overall findings under eight broad headings:

- Independent Advice
- Community Engagement - Local and London
- Intelligence
- Mobilisation
- Resources
- Public Order Tactics
- Investigation
- Criminal Justice

The report will also deal with the MPS’s involvement in addressing claims under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886.
“My initial resources were a mixture of local response teams, safer neighbourhoods officers and pretty much anyone we could round up including CID officers...only a very small proportion of these officers were public order trained, most were wearing regular uniform and for the CID officers it was a question of grabbing whatever was available...”

Chief Inspector Mark Nanji
Croydon Borough
3 THE EVENTS OF AUGUST 2011
The events of August 2011 were unprecedented in the capital’s history. A number of factors set them aside from anything that had been witnessed before.

The rapidly changing character of the disorder was one such factor. What began as a peaceful protest in response to the police shooting of Mark Duggan escalated to violent local protest during the evening of Saturday 6th August 2011. This local protest outside Tottenham Police Station itself spread to wider parts of Haringey Borough and evolved from anger directed towards police to the opportunistic looting of local shops in the knowledge that police resources were committed elsewhere.

On day two disorder spread geographically to a total of five London boroughs. The disorder intensified rapidly which tested police resources unremittingly by the speed and scale of its escalation. Arson and looting became key features and it also became clear that social networking was being used to coordinate groups in direct conflict with the police.

Day three exceeded the expectations of authorities and the public alike as intense disorder and criminality proliferated across 22 of London’s 32 boroughs. Repeated attempts to quell disorder in one area met with its outbreak in other areas. Resources were stretched across the capital resulting in an insufficient response to some of the worst violence London had ever witnessed.

Whilst the spread of disorder had begun to travel across the country on day three, day four saw this aspect become the primary feature. London meanwhile was flooded with police resources and order was restored.

What Happened?

Mark Duggan was fatally shot in Tottenham on 4th August 2011.

Between 6th August and 9th August 2011 disorder broke out in London presenting unprecedented levels of policing demand for the MPS.

Overall, as of February 27th 2012, 3,931 offences have been recorded which were connected to the disorder:

- 1,265 were non residential burglaries
- 880 were criminal damage (excluding arson)
- 467 were robberies
- 166 were arsons

Who Was Involved?

**Arrestees**
As of February 27th 2012 the MPS has made 4,019 arrests associated to the disorder. Of these - 87% were male, 55% from a black ethnic group and only 8% were older than 35. A total of 70% of arrestees had previously been convicted, received a caution, warning or reprimand.

**Spectators**
Bystanders watched the disorder in person, via blanket news coverage and social media. Mobile technology was utilised to post scenes on social networking sites.

**Victims**
Two individuals lost their lives during the disorder. Across London local shops and stores were mostly targeted. The police also came under attack themselves.

**Public**
Most Londoners say they are positive about the job police do in London and in their local areas. This has not changed as a result of the disorder.
These maps indicate the locations of the highest levels of disorder; there are other locations in which police presence was required to deal with disorder, though not on the scale of these areas.

**Saturday 6th**

Significant levels of disorder including violence were present in one borough: Haringey.

**Sunday 7th**

Significant levels of disorder including violence were present in five boroughs: Enfield, Hackney, Haringey, Lambeth and Waltham Forest.

**Monday 8th**

Significant levels of disorder including violence occurred in 22 boroughs: Barking and Dagenham, Barnet, Brent, Bromley, Camden, Croydon, Ealing, Greenwich, Hackney, Haringey, Hillingdon, Kensington and Chelsea, Lewisham, Merton, Newham, Redbridge, Sutton, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Wandsworth, Waltham Forest and Westminster.
The Events of August 2011 - Overview

18:15 Following a proactive surveillance operation led by Trident, Mark Duggan is shot near Tottenham Hale Station.

18:29 Mark Duggan is pronounced dead at the scene.

18:30 Critical incident is declared. MPS Commissioner assumes overall control of the incident.

18:39 Assistant Commissioner Central Operations briefed full Management Board on the critical incident at Haringey.

19:15 Chief Inspector takes charge of the critical incident at Tottenham Police Station.

19:45 Intelligence received that two hand grenades were in circulation and were to be used to attack police.

19:59 Reports of disorder in Barnet - local officers respond.

20:00 Reports of disorder in Walthamstow - local officers respond.

20:15 Reports of disorder in Enfield - PSUs deployed to support local officers.

20:20 Further reports of disorder in Lambeth - PSUs deployed to support local officers.

20:25 Reports of disorder in Hackney - PSUs at location and responding.

20:30 Serious disorder breaks out in Tottenham and additional PSUs are deployed.

20:35 Service Mobilisation Plan (SMP) initiated; this included 9 PSUs and an on-call command team.

20:40 Special Operations Room (SOR) takes over the coordination of the incident. Command structure put in place.

21:10 Second PSU arrives in Haringey Borough.

21:40 Mobile PSUs begin to arrive.

22:00 Request for mutual aid assistance from forces surrounding London – 4 PSUs (1,000 officers) supplied and deployed to Tottenham.

22:00 Assistant Commissioner Central Operations briefed Temporary Commission and Management Board members.

22:15 Reports of disorder in Walthamstow - PSUs deployed to support local officers.

22:45 Reports of disorder in Ealing - PSUs deployed to support local officers.

23:10 Mr. Trevor Ellis died following a shooting in Croydon.

23:24 Police responding to multiple sites of disorder, extensive damage to property and violence across London. Police resources deployed across 22 of the 32 London boroughs.

23:45 Mr Richard Mannington-Bowes attacked by a group of youths in Ealing whilst trying to stamp out litter fire, subsequently died in hospital on 11th August.

00:00 Building on the experience of the previous day, the resource levels for the policing operation were significantly increased to around 6000 MPS officers.

01:00 MPS formally requests mutual aid from other forces via ACPO Police National Information Coordination Centre (PNICC) to increase resources for the ongoing policing operation. Initial request for eight PSUs with further requests being made throughout the day.

01:10 Tactical plan: PSUs divided into five sectors each led by public order commander to support BOCUs and respond to intelligence. Centrally coordinated from SOR.

01:15 Reports of disorder in Blackfriars - local officers respond.

01:20 Reports of disorder in Hackney - PSUs deployed to support local officers.

01:25 Reports of disorder in Westminster - local officers respond.

01:30 Reports of disorder in Peckham - PSUs deployed to support local officers.

01:35 Numerous sites of disorder now across London.

01:45 Reports of disorder and fires in Lewisham - PSUs deployed to support BOCUs.

02:00 Reports of disorder in Bensfield - PSUs deployed to support local officers.

02:10 Reports of disorder in Ealing - PSUs deployed to support local officers.

02:15 Reports of disorder in Walthamstow - local officers respond.

02:45 Reports of disorder in Greenwich - PSUs deployed to support local officers.

02:50 Reports of disorder in Walthamstow - local officers respond.

03:00 Temporary Commissioner and Management Board take the decision to increase resources from 12,000 to 16,000 officers. This included 50 PSUs (1,250 officers) provided through PNICC.

03:00 Temporary Commissioner briefs the Prime Minister on policing plans for London prior to COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room) meeting.

03:10 Operation WERNER launched to investigate all crimes committed during the disturbances.

03:15 Tactical plan: PSUs and command teams allocated to boroughs to provide high visibility patrolling and mobile response to any incidents. Centrally coordinated from SOR.

03:15 London was comparatively quiet. However disorder and criminality continued in other parts of the country.

03:25 Magistrates Court centres on extended hours up to 2100hrs and night courts open at Westminster and Highbury.
This section examines the MPS response following the death of Mr Mark Duggan through to the events of Saturday 6th August 2011 in Haringey. The review team interviewed police, community members and Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) staff. It also looked at internal records. It is important to note however, that what follows is an MPS account of events, based on its evidence and the consultation it has undertaken.
Mr Mark Duggan was fatly shot by police on Thursday 4th August 2011 whilst subject of an operation conducted by Trident. The IPCC is conducting an investigation into the circumstances leading to his death and therefore this report will not seek to examine those matters.

Trident is the MPS operational command unit dedicated to preventing and investigating shootings in London. Trident was originally established as a policing operation in 1998 as a result of community and police concerns about increased shootings in London’s black community, and in 2008 became a permanent operational command. Gun crime in London still disproportionately affects London’s black community (approximately 75% of all victims of shootings in London are from the black community).

As well as investigating shootings, Trident undertakes a number of operations on those involved in serious firearms criminality and firearms supply. The seizure of firearms is one of the best ways to prevent their use and protect individuals and some of London’s most vulnerable communities. Since April 2011 Trident has seized over 80 firearms, all of which are either capable of firing, or readily convertible to fire, lethal ammunition.

On the 4th August 2011, police received intelligence that Mark Duggan was planning to take possession of a firearm. Trident was supported by armed officers from CO19 and armed surveillance officers from SCD11 in a mobile surveillance operation on Mark Duggan that crossed a number of North London boroughs. A decision was made by the officer commanding the operation to stop the vehicle, which was undertaken by CO19 officers in Ferry Lane, Tottenham. It was during this stop that Mark Duggan was fatally shot by police.

This review has considered two aspects of the response to this event. The police response is governed by the policy and standard operating procedure for managing what are termed ‘critical incidents’. A critical incident is defined as ‘any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the victim, their family and/or their community.’

There is also a protocol that is followed in the event of a police shooting resulting in the death of a member of the public. The MPS responds and takes control of the initial incident but informs the IPCC at the earliest opportunity. The IPCC in turn decides the mode of the investigation that will follow.

An independent investigation is normally declared following a fatal shooting. This effectively means that the IPCC appoint a Senior Investigator and assume responsibility for the entire investigation. The MPS will however continue to be involved in supporting the response to the incident.

The police declared the death of Mark Duggan a critical incident at 1829hrs on 4th August 2011, fourteen minutes after the shooting which resulted in his death. Information regarding the shooting was immediately communicated through police chains of command. At 1830hrs Commander Martin Hewitt was appointed as Gold and assumed overall control of the incident. At 1839hrs Assistant Commissioner Lynne Owens was informed and became the Management Board lead. This in turn led to the Temporary Commissioner Tim Godwin, the Temporary Deputy Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe and Kit Malthouse, the Chair of the Management Board.

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2 The MPS Specialist Firearms Command
3 The MPS Surveillance Command
4 Modes of investigation are Independent (carried out by IPCC investigators and overseen by an IPCC Commissioner); Managed (carried out by police Professional Standards Departments (PSDs) under the direction and control of the IPCC) and Supervised (carried out by police PSDs under their own direction and control). The IPCC will set the terms of reference and receive the investigation report when it is complete.
5 Gold, Silver and Brons are titles of functions adopted by each of the emergency services and are role-related, not rank-related. These functions are equivalent to the 3 levels: strategic, tactical and operational.
6 Management Board is responsible for the leadership, strategy and performance of the organisation, for the delivery of the Business Plan and budget, and for the overall day to day running of the MPS. Members as at August 2011: Commissioner (Chair), Deputy Commissioner (Deputy Chair), Assistant Commissioner Territorial Policing, Assistant Commissioner Serious Crime Directorate, Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations, Assistant Commissioner Central Operations, Director of Resources, Director of Information, Director of Public Affairs.
then Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), all being informed also.

Extensive activity was undertaken in the immediate aftermath to the incident to meet the requirements of a critical incident response. This included scene preservation and management, community engagement, media handling, family liaison, the development of a policing plan for Haringey Borough and the instigation of the Post Incident Procedure7.

The review has audited the actions of the MPS against the national standards for effective critical incident management8, and has found that the standards were complied with.

Following the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan, the MPS’s Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) was immediately informed and Acting Detective Inspector Peter Suggett was nominated as the MPS primary liaison for the IPCC. Through this officer, the IPCC were informed of the incident at 1920hrs. The IPCC determined it as an independent investigation, their on call team assumed responsibility immediately and Mr Colin Sparrow was appointed as the Deputy Senior Investigator. The Senior Investigator, Mr Simon Cousins, and the IPCC Commissioner, Rachel Cerfontyne, were appointed the following day.

Both DPS officers from the MPS and IPCC investigators were deployed to the scene in Tottenham and to the Metropolitan Police Firearms base. DPS officers arrived at the Tottenham scene at 1956hrs and the IPCC investigators shortly after 2100hrs. Following any discharge of a firearm by police there are Post Incident Procedures that determine how evidence is gathered and preserved from the relevant officers. These include all operational officers involved returning to their firearms base where this process is overseen by the IPCC assisted by the DPS. In this case both IPCC and DPS were represented at the base by 1945hrs.

Two areas have come under particular scrutiny when actions in the immediate aftermath of the incident have been reviewed; the support provided to the family and the media handling of the incident. Both are governed by the MPS/IPCC working protocol. Both have subsequently been subject of complaint by the Duggan family.

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7 The term post incident is used to describe situations in which shots have been discharged by the police. The procedures are scalable depending on the significance and consequences of the event, but involve the comprehensive collection of evidence amongst other things.

8 The National Police Improvement Agency’s Protective Services Minimum Standards (2010) sets out 20 standards underpinned by 114 definitions for Forces and their Borough Command Units to maintain in order to ensure an effective response to critical incidents.
Following the shooting of Mark Duggan attention was immediately turned to the priority of delivering the news to his family. Detective Chief Superintendent Stuart Cundy, head of Trident, arrived at the scene at 1930hrs. He was subsequently made aware that an immediate member of Mark Duggan’s family was believed to be present at one of the crime scene cordons and by 1955hrs Detective Chief Superintendent Cundy had requested the attendance of MPS Family Liaison Officers (FLOs). The MPS have a cadre of FLOs whose primary role is engagement with bereaved families to assist with the investigation of offences. They have been trained in communicating with people who have suffered a recent loss.

At around 2050hrs two FLOs from the MPS Directorate of Professional Standards, Detective Constables Alex Manz and Katie Buchanan, arrived at the scene. Detective Chief Superintendent Cundy had since been informed that the member of Mark Duggan’s family had left the scene. The FLOs were briefed and at 2100hrs were informed that other family members had made themselves known at another cordon. They located a second immediate member of the family and a woman who introduced herself as Mark Duggan’s partner. They were both taken to the closest appropriate private venue (within Tottenham Hale underground station) and informed of his death by the FLOs.

For ease of reading and describing events, the immediate member of Mark Duggan’s family will be referred to in this report as Ms A and the woman who introduced herself as Mark Duggan’s partner as Ms B.

The interaction between Ms A, Ms B and the police FLOs has been central to the investigation by the IPCC into a complaint by the Duggan family about contact with them immediately after his death. In light of this investigation taking place, the review team did not approach members of the Duggan family. It is now known that the accounts of Ms A and Ms B differ from those of the MPS FLOs and the IPCC Family Liaison Managers (FLMs) as to this interaction. Rather than present an account based only on the accounts of some parties, this report refers the reader to the published IPCC ‘Report of the investigation into a complaint made by the family of Mark Duggan about contact with them immediately after his death’ for the accounts that have been provided by family, police and IPCC staff.

The MPS accepts the findings of the IPCC investigation into the complaint made by the family of Mark Duggan about contact with them after his death. Whatever the reasons for not doing so, the parents of Mark Duggan were not personally informed of his death and this caused extra distress to them. The MPS notes that the family’s complaint was upheld.

The conclusion of this review is that the decision made by police not to visit Mark Duggan’s parents and inform them personally of his death was made in good faith.

However, on Monday 8th August 2011 the MPS issued a press release apologising for the distress that had been caused to the family of Mark Duggan and contacted his parents via their lawyers to offer to meet them. Following this, on 2nd September 2011, the family agreed to meet Commander Mak Chishty, the Area Commander covering Tottenham who had been leading the work with the local communities both during and following the disorder. Commander Chishty took the opportunity to apologise to the parents of Mark Duggan for the fact that they had not been spoken to directly by police.

Footnotes:
9 Family Liaison Managers undertake the role of family liaison on behalf of the IPCC.
10 IPCC reference 2011/016449
The fatal shooting of Mark Duggan was an incident that attracted urgent and widespread verbal communication between a large number of parties, both within and outside the police. Following the IPCC’s declaration of an independent investigation at 1920hrs, a media strategy was set and recorded by Commander Hewitt.

At 1935hrs he recorded his decision that the MPS would not respond to any media enquiries but would actively liaise with the IPCC to ensure an understanding of the messages that were put out. He reasoned that for the MPS to make comment on the circumstances of the shooting would potentially be seen as an attempt to prejudice the investigation.

Two particularly significant issues arose regarding the shooting and associated media coverage.

Commander Hewitt became aware of the first of these at 2018hrs on Thursday 4th August, when he was informed that the Press Association had quoted an IPCC spokesman as saying ‘We do not know the order the shots were fired. We understand the officer was shot first before the male was shot.’ This statement never formed part of the official press lines from either the MPS or the IPCC. It is likely to have originated from the very first verbal briefings given from the scene to the IPCC including the fact that a police officer had been shot and taken to hospital. Experience informs both organisations that such early information is often unreliable and should not form the basis for press briefings. The subsequent reporting of this gave the impression that Mark Duggan had fired upon police, which was not true.

At 2040hrs the MPS’s Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA), on the instruction of Commander Hewitt, contacted the IPCC Press Office and raised concerns regarding this statement. Commander Hewitt made clear that the MPS had been unaware that this detail was being released and emphasised that it was not the MPS’s agreed position. The IPCC never repeated this detail and the MPS did not express any further concerns about the need to correct misinformation.

At 2126hrs the IPCC informed the MPS of their proposed first formal statement. The ‘exchange of fire’ quote did not form part of it. Commander Hewitt was able to request some changes, including removing reference to an officer being wounded, as this was unconfirmed at the time.

The second erroneous media report of note appeared on Friday 5th August 2011, when the Evening Standard printed an article containing an eye witness account which described Mark Duggan being held down and shot on the ground. It is claimed that the paper contacted the MPS at 1030hrs on Friday 5th August for comment on this account. The MPS does not have a specific record of this contact. That this story had permeated public consciousness is perhaps evidenced by a reference to what would become known as the ‘assassination’ rumour made by Haringey Borough Black Independent Advisory Group (BIAG) members during the Haringey community representatives meeting at 1300hrs on Saturday 6th August 2011.

It was not until Sunday 7th August 2011 that the IPCC released a statement stating, ‘Speculation that Mark Duggan was ‘assassinated’ in an execution style involving a number of shots to the head are categorically untrue. Following the formal identification of the body Mr Duggan’s family know that this is not the case and I would ask anyone reporting this to be aware of its inaccuracy and its inflammatory nature.’

Neither the MPS nor the IPCC actively rebutted the ‘exchange of fire’ story prior to the disorder in Tottenham on the evening of Saturday 6th August 2011. Similarly the ‘assassination’ rumour was not refuted directly until after the disorder on the Saturday.
The MPS undoubtedly acted cautiously in its reticence to speak directly on these issues and it is clear that it relied on its belief that it was constrained by the lead role of the IPCC. The IPCC, on the other hand, state that they were not aware until after the disorder had broken out that inaccuracies and rumours were circulating that needed to be rebutted.

The review has found widespread confusion across the MPS at all levels on the issue of its own freedom to comment on matters connected to an IPCC investigation. Both locally in Haringey and centrally, MPS officers believed that there were limitations on what they could communicate publicly. The seriousness of this particular investigation may indeed have enhanced the tendency to caution in this respect.

The MPS, however, maintains its responsibility for policing London and its communities. Part of that policing will always require public communication to reduce community tension and to address public expectation and the fear of crime. The only legal restriction on the MPS is to refrain from publicly stating anything that may prejudice an investigation or any subsequent trial arising from it. There is widespread understanding of that limitation amongst MPS staff.

The issue of inaccuracy in the media story concerning an exchange of fire between officers and Mark Duggan should have been positively rebutted immediately. However, the MPS believed that as an organisation it was subject to the limitation above and therefore did not speak regarding the issue of the number and origin of shots fired, believing it to be at the very heart of the investigation being conducted by the IPCC.

The specific detail of shots fired did clearly form part of an investigation into the fatal shooting. However the MPS accepts that its responsibilities to its communities, and in particular the community of Haringey, should have led it to raise concerns with the IPCC to correct that point after newspaper reports carried the story on Friday 5th August.

A new protocol between the IPCC and the police on communication has been published. This provides greater clarity on the matters discussed above and a framework for addressing similar issues in the future.
Community engagement is at the core of the MPS policing style. It is a fundamental element of the response to any critical incident whereby the desire to understand community concerns and respond to them is recognised as key to success.

This review has sought to understand who the MPS engaged with and by what means, whether the existing networks were effective and the extent to which the process achieved its purpose of contributing to the management of the impact on the community.

The MPS model of IAG is used throughout policing in the UK. An MPS central IAG was first introduced following the Stephen Lawrence Public Inquiry and was further developed with the formation of IAGs working with individual boroughs, and some specialist command units. Individuals become IAG members by invitation and come from particular communities although do not specifically represent them. The purpose of an IAG is to provide informed critical feedback to the MPS. The MPS in turn share information with the IAG members which would not ordinarily be made public in order to make this feedback meaningful and valid.

IAGs have become one of the principal means of gauging community tension and are heavily relied upon in assessing community feeling and views on many aspects of policing, particularly at times when incidents are likely to have an impact on community confidence.

The membership, manner of engagement and remit of IAGs vary across the MPS. It is certainly the case that the IAG structure at Haringey is unique. There is both an IAG and a self-defined Black IAG (BIAG). The BIAG is a self-governed group, whose members are, on average, in their mid forties. Its members see its function as focusing police attention more directly on the needs of the black community. (For the purposes of this report, BIAG members who play a part in events leading up to the disorder in Haringey Borough will be referred to by the letters C, D, E and F. This will assist the reader in his or her understanding of the narrative.)

The MPS’s continued commitment to community engagement was enhanced in a significant way by the introduction of Safer Neighbourhoods Teams (SNTs) in April 2004. These mixed teams of officers and Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) are deployed to set geographical locations where they are expected to be known to their local communities. Specifically they develop and maintain relationships with Key Individual Networks (KINs).

KIN members are residents and/or local business people who have a commitment to making their community a safer place. They work closely with the local police team to represent the thoughts, feelings and concerns of the local community. They are also relied upon at times of critical incident to act as a portal for information flow.

Haringey’s Safer Neighbourhoods and KINs models reflect those of the wider MPS.

The events of August 2011 have raised important questions about the effectiveness of MPS community engagement. In discussing the community engagement that took place after the death of Mark Duggan it is helpful in the first instance to deal with the first fifty hours, focused primarily on Haringey Borough. Community engagement which took place subsequent to the evening disorder on Saturday 6th August 2011, which was conducted across London, is dealt with in later sections of this report.

The First Three Days
Thursday 4th August
As previously stated, at 1830hrs Commander Martin Hewitt assumed overall control of the critical incident. It is clear that community engagement was seen as an immediate priority. The Haringey
Borough Commander, Chief Superintendent Sandra Looby, was contacted and, in her role as the face of the borough police, immediately attended the scene and began directing her borough’s community engagement response.

Detective Chief Superintendent Cundy had contacted a member of both the Haringey BIAG and the MPS Trident IAG, Mr C, at around 1920hrs whilst travelling to the scene. Mr C attended, was fully briefed and given access to the scene. Chief Superintendent Looby and Detective Chief Superintendent Cundy consulted with him on managing community tension and Mr C provided advice on media lines to provide local reassurance. He continued to be consulted throughout the evening.

Commander Hewitt recognised that the local police owned the relationships with the community that was most affected. Due to the importance of the role of the Borough Commander in community engagement, he appointed Chief Superintendent Looby as the ‘Bronze’ (operational lead) for community engagement in the overall policing command structure. Commander Mak Chishty, responsible for the group of North London boroughs including Haringey, was nominated to support Chief Superintendent Looby in this role.

Chief Superintendent Looby initiated activity to reassure the community and obtain relevant information. The results of this activity would inform a Community Impact Assessment (CIA). She retained the West Green ward’s SNT on duty in order for them to contact KINs from the ward. This ward includes the Broadwater Farm Estate, judged to be most affected by this incident due to Mark Duggan’s familial links to this area and its historic iconic status. The KINs for this particular ward comprise a cross section of the local community, including faith leaders, local councillors and youth workers amongst others, some of whom are also IAG and BIAG members, and were relied upon to make an informed assessment of the impact being felt within the community. In total, 23 KINs were contacted and police received a response from 19.

Community response planning was central to a local police planning meeting chaired by Chief Superintendent Looby at 2200hrs that evening. During this meeting the construction of a CIA and a specific policing plan for the Broadwater Farm Estate were discussed and actioned. Chief Superintendent Looby directed that a member of the Senior Management Team was to be present on Haringey Borough 24 hours a day for the next four days. The West Green Ward SNT’s Sergeant, Mike Tisi, was a key contributor to this meeting.

The policing response specific to the Broadwater Farm Estate was to continue to enter the estate to answer any calls from the public or requests for assistance but to suspend all proactive police activity on the estate, for example the effecting of search warrants, in an effort to avoid any escalation of tension. Thus any pre-planned police operations did not take place. As an extra measure, the local duty officer (inspector rank) was made aware of any calls onto the estate to ensure that any policing action was handled sensitively.

Chief Superintendent Looby also telephoned independent key partners on that Thursday evening - the Chief Executive of the Local Authority, the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) link member, Haringey Council’s leader and the local MP, both to inform them of events and also to listen to their advice and concerns.

At the end of Thursday 4th the picture of community engagement in Haringey was that it possessed structure, appropriate governance and relevant actions in place to progress it.

Friday 5th August

Having briefed the Temporary Commissioner and the Temporary Deputy Commissioner the night before, Assistant Commissioner Lynne Owens briefed the wider Management Board at 0900hrs on Friday 5th August 2011. A Gold Group meeting was then held at 1000hrs in New Scotland Yard, chaired by Commander Hewitt. As well as comprehensive police attendance, Mr C, the BIAG representative who had been at the scene the previous day, was present to provide community views and advice. The IPCC was represented by Mr Simon Cousins and Haringey Borough Local Authority members were also present.

The CIA compiled by the Haringey Borough Community Engagement Team was presented at this meeting and set out the findings from the wide range

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12 Community Impact Assessments are a standard tool for gauging levels of community tension following an incident or specific event. A template is included at Appendix B.

13 A Gold Group is a meeting designed to add value to the police response to an internal or external incident, crime or other matter. This involves bringing together appropriately skilled and qualified internal or external stakeholders who can advise, guide or otherwise support the management of an effective response to the identified incident, crime or other matter.
of engagement activity undertaken by Haringey Borough together with interrogation of police reporting systems and publicly available media up until the time of the meeting. Using the corporate system, the assessment of all information was based against three categories of community tension; ‘experienced’, ‘evidenced’ and ‘potential’ on a scale of 1 to 6, on which 6 is no raised tension. Each was graded 5 at this time, which indicates tension levels above normal but likely to be localised in nature.

During that day Haringey Borough held local police planning meetings every three hours and sent an email to community representatives and council partners, with statements from the Borough Commander and information from the IPCC, on that morning and afternoon. They also contacted established community partners, the majority of whom were IAG members, asking the following specific questions around the incident and its community impact:

- How did you hear about the incident?
- What do you / your community feel about the incident?
- Has there been any talk of any other related incidents that occurred overnight within your community?
- Are any rumours about the incident currently being passed around your community?

Raised tension levels were confirmed but at this stage they were being represented at levels which could be addressed by local police working with the community.

Chief Superintendent Looby showed exceptional dedication and commitment throughout. Having worked continuously since the incident, she seriously considered cancelling a long standing family holiday. She contacted Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stephen Kavanagh who insisted she went and appointed her superior, Commander Chishty, to take over the role of Bronze Engagement. She left early the following morning, at which time there was no indication of the scale of events to take place later that evening. (Following the events of the Saturday night, Chief Superintendent Looby returned as quickly as possible).

Saturday 6th August
At 0835hrs on Saturday 6th August 2011 Haringey Borough received one piece of intelligence that there would be a march upon Tottenham Police Station, as a response to the shooting on the 4th August. This intelligence did not provide details around when it was likely to happen or how many people were planning to attend. Mr D, another BIAG member, later contacted the police and said it was due to start at midday. KINs were contacted and MPS intelligence assets were tasked to develop this information.

At 1020hrs Temporary Detective Superintendent Gurdip Singh, a member of the Haringey Borough Senior Management Team, chaired a local police planning meeting with key strategic borough partners including the local Fire Brigade and Council representatives. The intelligence regarding the possible demonstration was discussed and it was agreed that it should be facilitated with a low key approach and a plan was put in place, some details of which are set out below.

A. Command structure
- Gold - Commander (Territorial Policing)
- Silver - Public Order Chief Inspector (Haringey)
- Bronze - Public Order Inspector (Haringey)

B. Policing Style
- Low key, facilitative - all officers briefed that no protesters to be moved off the road

C. Contingencies
- Barriers erected outside the police station to provide protesters with a designated area
- Council sweeping of the area to remove any potential environmental risks
- Territorial Support Group (TSG) Commissioner’s Reserve (One inspector, three sergeants and 21 constables) on standby at nearby St Ann’s Police Station.
- Operation Blunt\(^\text{14}\) serial (One inspector, three sergeants and 18 constables)
- Four sergeants and 24 constables from nearby football match available if required
- Central Command Control Incident Response and CO111\(^\text{15}\) Chief Inspectors fully briefed and available if necessary
- A traffic plan for the area

\(^{14}\) The MPS operation against knife crime
\(^{15}\) MPS Public Order Command
At this local police planning meeting the Broadwater Farm Estate’s SNT sergeant discussed whether his team should conduct reassurance patrols on the estate. Temporary Detective Superintendent Singh advised against active patrols during the morning in the knowledge that family and friends may be leaving the estate to formally identify Mark Duggan’s body.

Later that day, as well as the three-hourly local police planning meetings that were still taking place Temporary Detective Superintendent Singh chaired a community representatives meeting at 1300hrs with IAG and community representation. Such a meeting is standard community engagement practice and the IPCC are not usually invited. In this case it had been arranged the previous day. In total five IAG and BIAG members attended, alongside a Haringey Councillor and police officers from both the SNT and the central Haringey Community Engagement Team.

During this meeting a number of key issues were discussed. BIAG members spoke of the heightened tension being experienced. Specifically,

- Mr D informed police that, ‘The word on the street is that this was an execution…The community are not happy. No-one from the police has told the family.’
- Mr E stated, ‘I met one of his friends yesterday. “It’s a set up, a planted gun.” There’s a lot of distrust…You are looking for community intelligence, this gives concern and the police should be out in the community…..There are things we need to avert. There are events pending if we don’t deal with the subtleties that are brewing.’

The review team has interviewed individuals who were in attendance at that meeting and, with one exception, no-one interviewed remembers any predictions that disorder was imminent or even that the possibility of its occurrence was ever raised by anyone present. The recollection of Mr D is that he reported to the meeting that if the police did not go and visit Mark Duggan’s parents there would be a Broadwater Farm style riot. These comments are not recalled by anyone else interviewed who was present and the minutes do not reflect them.

Mr D and Mr E made reference to the fact that the Duggan family were unhappy with the lack of contact they had received. This was the first time that police had been made aware of such concerns. There was a discussion providing clarity around the MPS and IPCC responsibilities in light of the independent investigation being undertaken by the IPCC and this resulted in the community members making it clear that it was their view that the IPCC should be providing more information to the family. Furthermore the community representatives made it clear that they felt the IPCC should be communicating directly with the community.

Temporary Detective Superintendent Singh specifically asked the community representatives present for their advice on the policing style to adopt given the tensions they had spoken of. The advice was to keep the policing low-key, non-confrontational and facilitative. Specifically they advised that Territorial Support Group (TSG) officers should be kept away or at the very least should be instructed to handle any interaction with the community sensitively. Mr D offered to go on patrol on the estate with Sergeant Tisi on the Monday morning to reassure the community and pay respects to the Duggan family.

Taking this advice into consideration, Temporary Detective Superintendent Singh was left at the conclusion of this meeting with the belief that the plan in place and the low key approach met with community approval and would be able to manage community impact. Increased tension was acknowledged with a sensitive policing plan that allowed for a number of contingencies. He updated Commander Chishty with an overview of what had happened at the meeting, and the concerns regarding IPCC communication with both the family and the community. It is worthy of note that for the majority of the time that this meeting was taking place family members were engaged with IPCC FLMs at the mortuary.

Commander Chishty directed Temporary Detective Superintendent Singh to resolve the concerns involving the IPCC by raising them with Commander Hewitt, which he did, the time being now around 1605hrs. Commander Hewitt undertook to deal with the issues which were outlined to him over the phone. The IPCC were informed but this did not happen until after disorder had broken out. It is the MPS view however that earlier contact with the IPCC that afternoon would not have made any difference as they were with the family in any event at the time of the comments being made.
By the end of the meeting the march had not happened and in fact police and some members of the community were told it had been cancelled. Despite this Haringey police remained alive to its possibility and the policing plan and its contingencies were maintained. At 1730hrs Temporary Detective Superintendent Singh gave a full handover to Chief Inspector Adelekan.

To summarise, Haringey Borough, between the death of Mark Duggan on Thursday 4th August 2011 and the vigil at the police station on Saturday 6th August 2011, had actively considered community engagement from the outset and had maintained it at the forefront of its thinking throughout those three days. It had sought independent involvement and advice by engaging with IAG members and KINs. The borough police had also sought relevant community intelligence from the relevant SNT and local partners. They were engaged with their Local Authority at an appropriate level.

Despite the review’s finding that standard MPS good practice in relation to community engagement had been followed, the desired outcomes of gauging an accurate picture of community tension and working with the community to address such tension were not achieved. The findings section of this report (section 7) will discuss in greater detail the MPS’s conclusion that it needs to review aspects of its community engagement process and mechanisms, specifically the extent of its reach into its communities, how it uses the networks it establishes and the quality of its relationships with individuals within those networks.
At 1705hrs a further member of the BIAG, Mr F, led a group of people including family and friends of Mark Duggan to Tottenham police station arriving at 1723hrs. It is now known that Mr F and Mr C had been involved in the organisation of the protest. Ms B entered and spoke to the duty officer for Haringey Borough, Inspector French. Ms B said that she wanted an explanation regarding the lack of contact from the police with Mark Duggan’s parents following his fatal shooting. Inspector French was unable to provide an explanation that satisfied Ms B. He offered to document her exact concerns and communicate them to the IPCC. This was also unacceptable to Ms B who then left the police station with her supporters.

At around 1815hrs the most senior police officer on duty, Chief Inspector Ade Adelekan, arrived at Tottenham Police Station to speak to family members and implement the policing plan. On his arrival some members of the crowd chanted ‘murderer.’ He contacted BIAG members that had attended either the Gold Group or community representative meetings with police that day or the day before, and whom he therefore believed would be helpful in assisting him to address the concerns of those present and reduce community tension. He met with a varied response. Mr C informed him that he was present at the scene as a protester and not an IAG member. Mr E, who was also present in the crowd, informed him that he could not assist as the protesters would not allow it. Mr F was present but was leading the protest. Mr D agreed to travel to Tottenham to try and help.

Chief Inspector Adelekan tried to engage face to face with Ms B outside of the police station. In doing so he managed to gain an agreement for her to come inside and make a formal complaint. However this attempt too was unsuccessful when Mr C and Mr F stated to Ms B that Chief Inspector Adelekan was not a senior enough officer for her to talk to. She agreed to this point and remained outside. This was the first time police had received information that Chief Inspector Adelekan, as a member of the Haringey Senior Management Team, would not be senior enough to meet the needs of the family. The MPS would have benefited from such advice in advance in order that it could have ensured the presence of a higher ranked officer at the arrival of the protesters at Tottenham. This would have greatly assisted in lowering community tension and addressing the needs of the family.

Efforts were immediately made to obtain a more senior officer to speak to Ms B. Agreement was reached at 1946hrs between the group outside the police station and Chief Inspector Adelekan that they would wait for an hour for the arrival of a more senior officer.

At 2000hrs, on his way back to the station, Temporary Detective Superintendent Singh asked Mr Simon Cousins of the IPCC to attend Tottenham Police Station to talk to family members. Mr Cousins pointed out that the IPCC had spent several hours with the family that day and declined to attend as he did not think his attendance at that point would assist.

Ms B and the women accompanying her left the area outside the police station at 2026hrs. There are two recorded incidents of missiles being thrown from the crowd prior to the family leaving, at 1852hrs and 2013hrs, but as soon as they did actually leave the situation immediately intensified with multiple missiles thrown at the police station from the crowd and two police vehicles set on fire. This marked the first step change in events. It marked the MPS movement from facilitating peaceful protest and focusing on engagement efforts to having to police a serious public order situation.
Intelligence is always hard to quantify and qualify. In using the word ‘intelligence’ the report refers to all information coming into police possession which had the ability to inform the evolving events following the death of Mark Duggan. It covers a wide range of information types from that generated by police methods to that widely available in public forums, whether on social media networks or indeed the rumours that were circulating on the streets.

As should be expected, the MPS was very aware of the need to be alert to any intelligence that could inform police of consequences that might arise following the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan and thus inform an operational response. Haringey Borough police, as part of their operational plan following the death of Mark Duggan, had directed that the local intelligence unit monitor, collate and develop any information coming in and had in addition requested MPS intelligence assets to inform the intelligence picture.

Haringey Borough maintained this responsibility up until serious disorder broke out in Tottenham on the evening of Saturday 6th August. This intelligence function was separate, but inextricably linked, to the community engagement that was taking place. One crucial product of this engagement was community intelligence and this was the principal tool for ‘taking the temperature’ of community tension and a trusted way of checking the accuracy of the developing picture taken from other forms of intelligence within the police system. The extensive efforts to access this community intelligence are discussed in detail above.

As far as specific intelligence is concerned, there was very little coming in via police systems, despite the fact that it was being proactively sought and Haringey officers were fully aware of the need to provide any intelligence forthcoming. To be precise, Haringey Borough records eight pieces of intelligence on CrimInt, the police intelligence system, prior to disorder breaking out.

- Friday 5th August 2011 11:39hrs - Officers on duty at the scene of the shooting approached by individuals and called the officer, ‘Toy Soldier.’ Officer’s comments - After the shooting there may be anti police sentiment in the Ferry Lane area.
- Friday 5th August 2011 1244hrs - Information that there are a number of references to the shooting of Mark Duggan on social networking sites. An example of the nature of the narrative was “Ders due 2 be another Riot in North London !! I bet ah Pig Bwoy Dead.”
- Friday 5th August 2011 1345hrs - Officer on duty at the scene of the shooting, Ferry Lane, reports that whilst talking to residents, he was approached by and abused by a known local male. The male states that Mark Duggan was shot for nothing.
- Friday 5th August 2011 1433hrs - Officer on duty in Ferry Lane who witnessed the aggression towards his colleague (as detailed in the report above) reports that he overheard the male making threats towards police and advising them to ‘Beware of the Farm.’
- Friday 5th August 2011 1441hrs - Officers on duty in Ferry Lane approached by individuals voicing opinions indicating anti police tendencies such as, ‘Well done Met, see what f***ing happens now.’ and ‘I hope your son gets shot in the head, twice.’
- Saturday 6th August 2011 0835hrs - Information received suggesting that a march on Tottenham Police Station would take place at some time this day. Time and numbers were unknown.
- Saturday 6th August 2011 1514hrs - An officer entered a report collating information from a
social networking site in relation to a post at 1316 hrs - ‘Hearing there’s a riot in Tottenham you know or they planning one. I hope this is the start of a new era and people start deading feds.’ This message appeared on three Twitter accounts. Haringey Borough requested that the Met Intelligence Bureau (MIB) conduct further research on social media. MIB completed the request and returned the result to Haringey. The result was that as of 1615 hrs there was no recent information on the relevant Twitter accounts and one of the accounts’ last updates was that the individual concerned was going to Hackney that night. As an additional piece of research, a separate known Twitter account, assessed to be an individual who would likely be taking part in any discussion of plans to take part in disorder, was also checked and there was nothing of note on the account.

The crucial question is whether the MPS could have predicted the serious disorder in Tottenham. When assessing, in hindsight, the information that was available to police, it is important to contextualise it. Over the three day period, Thursday 4th - Saturday 6th August 2011, Haringey Borough recorded a total of 115 intelligence reports of which eight can be said to relate to the eventual disorder.

Intelligence is also not exact by its very nature. Both social media and street talk will always hold an ambiguous meaning. The police must try and differentiate between loose talk and bravado and what is actually a trustworthy account of what has happened, is happening or will take place. To this end, police evaluate information coming in against a set template which assists in judging whether information is reliable or otherwise.

The reports on Friday 5th August 2011 gave a clear indication of raised tensions and anti-police sentiment. This was a fully anticipated reaction to the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan, but the references to riot, the killing of a police officer and the threat from the ‘Farm’ were all isolated and were found within a context of bravado talk, the majority having been directed specifically at police officers in the location of the shooting incident. More reliable avenues for gaining intelligence were not replicating such talk and certainly no intelligence was forthcoming regarding any specific plan or the coming together of a group intent on committing serious disorder.

Similarly, the reports on Saturday 6th August 2011 did not lead the MPS to predict serious disorder. The information regarding the march was responded to by a specific and proportionate policing plan to reflect the fact that there would likely be an emotionally charged crowd who should be facilitated to carry out their march. The report regarding the taking place or planning of a riot in Tottenham was imprecise in its detail and steps were taken to develop and further inform this intelligence in order to evaluate whether a real risk existed. The results of this development work indicated that it was an unsubstantiated comment isolated to a few individuals.

The intelligence contained within these reports was combined with the community intelligence received from contact with KINs and BIAG members. Significantly KINs were reporting that it was largely all quiet on the Broadwater Farm Estate throughout Thursday and Friday. BIAG members were clear that there was raised tension but were supportive of a low key policing approach.

In summary, the overall intelligence picture was that tensions were raised and that there was an anti-police sentiment present but that there was nothing to indicate a specific threat of violence. Equally there was nothing to indicate that the disorder which happened in Tottenham on the night of Saturday 6th August would be replicated elsewhere in London and eventually countrywide.

If recent history of similar incidents is drawn on, findings are that previous deaths at the hands of police had largely resulted in local protest or disorder on a local scale, and generally immediately following the event. Certainly there has never been an instance of local disorder then spreading across the capital and on across the country. In this way the fact that the disorder was to spread with such speed and mobility across London and the country had no precedent to inform assessments.

The MPS fully accepts its limitations in its use of social media as an intelligence tool. With greater capacity, appropriate software and more developed training in its use, the MPS may have achieved different results from its development and evaluation of social media talk that was discovered. By the very nature of social media, it is extremely difficult to explore retrospectively whether further information was available on social media at the relevant time. Following the August disorder, the MPS made immediate and significant steps to accelerate its capabilities and use of social media. A fuller account of this work is included in section 7 of this report.

16 The MIB provides a corporate intelligence service in support of Pan-London activity and work in conjunction with intelligence units across the MPS. It provides the link for intelligence activity with other Police Forces and many other partners.

17 Current best practice agreed by ACPO dictates that intelligence is evaluated according to three factors, namely the source, the intelligence, and the permitted dissemination. The evaluation is recorded in a coded format known as the 5x5x5 system.
Considerations of the resources required to deliver an appropriate policing plan were made at various times following the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan.

Haringey Police’s first consideration on Thursday 4th August was to establish an appropriate policing plan for the Broadwater Farm Estate, as detailed above. In addition, at 2154hrs Temporary Detective Superintendent Singh requested that the availability of additional central MPS resources be assessed, including officers who were deployed on Operation Blunt and TSG officers acting as Commissioner’s Reserve (the MPS system whereby public order trained officers are on duty and available to be deployed across London according to need throughout a 24 hour period).

At 2230hrs that night a policing plan was put in place for the borough. This included the low key approach to the policing of the Broadwater Farm Estate and the assigned Commissioner’s Reserve Police Support Unit (PSU)\(^\text{18}\) to remain at Haringey on stand by. It was stipulated that they should not go on roaming patrols as a further effort to avoid any action triggering an incident which would inflame community tension.

At 0811hrs on Friday 5th August 2011 Chief Superintendent Looby directed that the policing strategy for Haringey Borough should remain reassuring and calm. This approach was decided upon in response to the KIN feedback that the police had received overnight.

Projected resources available to Haringey Borough between 0600hrs on Saturday 6th August 2011 until 0600hrs on Sunday 7th August 2011 were established recognising the fact that intelligence indicated that tension levels remained raised throughout Friday 5th August 2011. In addition to the duty teams for the weekend, Haringey Borough were supplying an additional inspector, six sergeants and 30 constables to police a pre-season friendly match on the afternoon of Saturday 6th August at Tottenham Hotspur Football Club.

When intelligence was received at 0835hrs on Saturday 6th August 2011 that a march was planned, immediate enquiries were made centrally to ascertain what further resources would be available should the march go ahead. At 1034hrs the Commissioner’s Reserve (approximately 25 public order trained officers) early shift PSU was assigned to Haringey and instructed to remain on stand by away from the police station. Details of the policing plan are included earlier in the report.

The march did not happen but Haringey remained alive to its possibility and the policing plan, together with its contingencies of additional resources, was maintained.

At 1445hrs, the early shift Commissioner’s Reserve PSU was stood down, but Haringey requested that the incident log remained open as the march could still take place.

Chief Inspector Ade Adelekan was on duty for the friendly football fixture Tottenham Hotspur v Athletic Bilboa, kick off at 1730hrs at White Hart Lane. He had been briefed about the other events that were taking place on the borough when he had come on duty at 1330hrs. This briefing included the potential protest to the police station that had been expected at 1200hrs but had not taken place. His resources for the fixture were one inspector, five sergeants and twenty five constables, supported by a contingent of ten mounted branch officers. He agreed to adapt his policing response plan for the football to support the borough with a contingency plan for any protest march. He agreed to deploy an inspector, one sergeant and seven constables from the football resources. They were briefed on the role.

\(^{18}\) A Police Support Unit comprises of one Inspector, three sergeants and twenty-one constables.
At about 1705hrs a group of about forty people were seen to be leaving the Broadwater Farm Estate heading towards Tottenham Police Station. At 1733hrs a critical incident outside Tottenham Police Station was declared. The contingency of one inspector, one sergeant and seven constables from the football resources were deployed to police the event.

At 1748hrs Chief Inspector Adelekan made his way to the police station from Tottenham Hotspur Football Club to take command of the policing operation.

The numbers outside the police station increased to about 100. Although the agreed policing plan to conduct a facilitative and engaging policing style was maintained, Chief Inspector Ade Adelekan recognised that he may need additional officers. He made a request for extra resources to be mobilised to the immediate area. These included Haringey officers at the football ground, traffic officers to assist with the blocking of the roads by crowds, the officers deployed on Operation Blunt (two sergeants and 14 constables) and a Commissioner’s Reserve PSU.

In total efforts were made to mobilise over 50 officers to Tottenham Police Station.

The Commissioner’s Reserve PSU was requested to be assigned to the protest at 1755hrs and arrived at the rear of Tottenham Police Station at around 1845hrs. Inspector John Murphy was in charge of this unit. He and his sergeants were briefed at 1855hrs by Chief Inspector Adelekan and asked to provide a low key police presence in support of local Haringey officers. At 1910hrs Inspector Murphy briefed his officers and deployed them in pairs wearing high visibility police uniform a few minutes apart to the High Road where the crowd was gathered. He then sent his carriers away from the police station in a further effort to maintain a low key approach.
5 NIGHT ONE
Disorder in Tottenham
Saturday 6th August 2011
5.1 Overview

At 2030hrs serious disorder broke out in Tottenham with police vehicles coming under attack and one being set on fire. Inspector Murphy requested the authority of Chief Inspector Adelekan to place his officers in full public order kit, including public order helmets and short shields to protect them from further missile attack. This was authorised and the carriers therefore returned to Tottenham Police Station with the officers’ kit.

At 2045hrs the unit was deployed in full public order personal protective equipment and a filter cordon of officers, which is used to control the movement of large numbers of people, was put in place across the High Road outside the police station. The Haringey officers were deployed south in the High Road to clear and maintain a safe operating area. Numerous missiles were being thrown at officers.

An additional Commissioner’s Reserve PSU (approximately 25 public order trained officers) was requested at 2045hrs and they arrived outside Tottenham Police Station at 2110hrs, just as a second police vehicle was set on fire in the High Road.

In addition to its routine resourcing the MPS operates a process called the Service Mobilisation Plan (SMP) for use at times of heightened demand. It provides the mechanism for providing additional Level 1, 2 and 3 public order trained police officers for deployment to spontaneous major events. On activation of the SMP all boroughs are sent a message instructing them to either identify available resources (AMBER message) or to mobilise resources (RED message).

The SMP was activated in relation to events at Tottenham at 2030hrs on Saturday 6th August by Superintendent Roger Gomm who was on call for the MPS’s Public Order Command and had received a phone call informing him of events in Haringey. Superintendent Gomm instructed that the Special Operations Room (SOR) be opened and that the SMP should go to phase RED, in other words resources should be immediately mobilised. For reasons that are not clear this instruction was not followed and the AMBER message was instead sent to boroughs.

When Superintendent Gomm arrived at the SOR he immediately checked the status of the SMP and found that the resources had not been mobilised from boroughs and were still at the AMBER phase. He immediately sent the RED message at 2133hrs.

The SMP eventually provided nine PSUs (approximately 225 officers) which arrived in Tottenham from 2240hrs onwards. In addition to these PSUs the 37 officers who had been at Tottenham Hotspur Football Club, together with a contingent of ten mounted officers and the officers who had been deployed on Operation Blunt, were all redeployed to Tottenham.

Other units, including the dog section, an additional specialist team equipped with armoured vehicles (Jenkels), traffic officers and four PSUs (approximately 100 officers) from Essex, Kent, Surrey and Thames Valley Police were called to assist the MPS mobilisation that night.

For reasons explained later in the report, exact times of arrival have proved difficult to pinpoint but by the early hours of the following morning, the activation of the SMP had achieved a level of resource in line with its target levels. The MPS accepts, however, that the number of officers was not enough and they did not arrive quickly enough to deal with the speed with which the violence escalated.

The MPS recognises the frustration of some that officers appeared to “stand off” from intervening at points in Tottenham. The initial policing plan in response

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19 The SOR (Special Operations Room) is the central control room providing communications support to the command of all pre-planned or spontaneous major incidents and events occurring throughout the Metropolitan Police District (MPD).
to the disorder on the 6th August was to preserve life and property. However, with the resources the MPS had available and the explosive nature of the disorder, the MPS chose to preserve life above property. The MPS is aware that this approach was construed as police ‘backing off,’ however it was in fact the reality of policing a rapidly evolving incident of serious public disorder. Officers had to make very difficult decisions in a challenging environment where violence was relentless throughout the night.

The MPS made every attempt to preserve property and prevent crime as more resources arrived, which included working to protect the London Fire Brigade (LFB) in order that they could tackle fires, and enabling the London Ambulance Service (LAS) to treat casualties. The MPS does however clearly recognise the impact that the loss of and damage to property has had on the local residential and business community and regrets that it was not able to do more to support them.
Chief Inspector Ade Adelekan was present outside the police station from about 1930hrs until his tour of duty ended at 1000hrs on Sunday 7th August following over 20 hours on duty. In addition to the local officers available to him, Chief Inspector Adelekan also deployed the two TSG units (PSUs) that had been assigned to the disorder. The first unit was policing the protest in normal beat uniform, having been asked to provide a low key police presence to support local officers in policing a peaceful protest.

At 2030hrs disorder broke out at St Loy’s Road N17 with police vehicles coming under attack and one being set on fire. Missiles were also being thrown towards police officers. By 2045hrs all the officers were deployed in full protective kit and together with the local officers they attempted to clear and maintain a safe operating area on Tottenham High Road outside the police station. However with the mounting violence and frequency of missile attacks on police lines it was clear that further public order officers were needed.

PERSONAL ACCOUNT - CHIEF INSPECTOR ADE ADELEKAN

“I watched my local officers, who I had deployed to a traffic point in order to facilitate peaceful protest, chased down a side street by a baying mob who I believe would have done them some serious harm had they caught them. I then deployed these same officers to an initial cordon outside the police station when waves of bottles, petrol bombs, wheelie bins set alight and a host of street furniture were being thrown at us. These officers went on to complete, at the minimum, a fourteen hour tour of duty outside the police station. They were completely fatigued by the time I dismissed them.

“To put this in context, we faced unprecedented levels of violence that developed without warning in beat duty uniform. Some of my officers expressed the fact that, although they were extremely frightened, they knew the consequences of not standing firm would have been far more detrimental and some even stated they feared for their lives.

At around 2110hrs a second TSG PSU arrived in full public order protective clothing. They joined with the existing officers and attempted to form a line to protect the safe operating area from compromise via a side road. The two TSG units attempted to hold police lines and make whatever interventions they could to prevent crime and violence for nearly two hours before any further assistance arrived. Violence rapidly escalated which challenged the numbers of officers attempting to control the situation.

“I stood between what can only be described as the north and south front lines deploying officers throughout the night until the early hours of the morning. I only became aware of the fact that looting was taking place around 6am in the morning when I was asked if I had any resources to deploy to the Wood Green shopping centre and the Tottenham Hale retail park. This was because the disorder to the north was relentless and ongoing and never seemed to cease. Officers deployed to the north continually asked for more officers as they pushed further up the High Road. The disorder to the south also required constant attention.

“At one point to the south there was a cry over the radio that an officer was down in a burning police car. I led the line south in beat duty uniform to the car in question only to discover that one of the rioters had got hold of a police radio. This was a particularly stressful moment for us all thinking that a colleague was trapped in a burning car.

“I cannot begin to describe the enormity of what we faced on the night. I have always accepted responsibility for my actions regardless of the consequences. I feel very saddened almost to the point of resignation that some reports suggest that we stood by and did nothing whilst Tottenham burnt, this is certainly not the case. I stood shoulder to shoulder with my officers throughout the night whilst they risked their lives in an attempt to quell the disorder that was not instigated by them. I could most certainly not think of a plan on the night or now as I write that would have preserved life and property at the same time with the resources I had available at the initial stages coupled with the explosive nature of the disorder breakout.”
PERSONAL ACCOUNT -
INSPECTOR CHRIS BETHEL IN CHARGE OF SECOND ASSIGNED TSG UNIT

“Things had started to get nasty. My instructions were to hold my line. However the aggressive crowd was growing with large numbers of missiles being thrown at police. I ordered several short shield advances to distance the attackers who were throwing missiles at police and to prevent them from ‘settling’ in their positions.

“During this time I saw a large group of the crowd entering an all night grocers and emerging with large numbers of bottles which were then being thrown at police. I ordered a short shield advance to attempt to prevent this theft and the subsequent disorder. I then saw that members of the crowd were attacking a male at a junction ahead. Again I ordered short shield advances to rescue this male, which was achieved.

“At about 2210hrs the attacks were so sustained and violent that after consultation both PSUs’ officers were withdrawn to form a single line cordon. The crowd continued to focus their attention on the police lines. Other shops were being looted for missiles and at least one petrol bomb was thrown. I could see at least one building on the east side of Tottenham High Road ablaze.

“This was a life threatening situation with constant heavy missile attack, including petrol bombs. There were reports of a shop being looted for knives. Knives were seen in the crowd. These officers were not only the front line, they were the last line. There was no-one to rescue them if they had been overwhelmed - and they knew that.”

Inspector knew that the units were exhausted and asked for replacements. However he recognised the reality that he had to advance forward to take the ground and to enable the fire brigade to negotiate the fire and reduce the threat to life and these were the only units available to him. Throughout this deployment, these officers came under sustained violent attacks from the rioters. Several officers were injured as they made their way up the High Road.

PERSONAL ACCOUNT -
CHIEF INSPECTOR GRAHAM DEAN, GROUND COMMANDER

“It was an incredibly warm night meaning that the working environment got warmer and warmer as house and vehicle fires raged nearby. During this time I was asking them to complete short shield advance after short shield advance to distance the rioters. Officers negotiated barricades of vehicles, trolleys and other street furniture. They faced missiles of masonry, petrol bombs, fireworks, bottles, street furniture and other instruments that had been set on fire. In close quarter work they faced homemade cudgels, wood, steel scaffolding poles, knives, other knives mounted on larger handles, machetes and numerous offensive weapons.

“For those on the front line it was clearly a pressure cooker of violence, knowing they had to push forward (in the end much further than was safe), whilst watching colleagues being carried away injured, in one instance one of the officers was carried away fitting.”

By about midnight another two PSUs had arrived, and although this enabled him to take the original two units off the front line they still could not be released entirely due to the limited resources available to address the escalating situation.

By now the mobilisation plan was in full operation, however specific deployments are difficult to establish due to the fact that urgent assistance calls from officers were becoming commonplace over the police radio which led mobilised carriers of officers to self deploy to the area, driven by the need to assist their colleagues who were clearly facing extreme violence. This was true of other specialist resources, for example the MPS mounted branch.
A serial of ten horses had been deployed to the Tottenham Hotspur Football Club match earlier in the day and had been dismissed to return to their stables. However, the officer in charge was listening to the police radio and therefore called in to the central command to offer their assistance. They were directed to a stand by location and took the opportunity to refresh the horses and to ensure that both officers and horses were wearing protective equipment. They then deployed to Tottenham in answer to a call for all available resources to come urgently to the location.

PERSONAL ACCOUNT - SERGEANT JOEL GRAY, MOUNTED BRANCH

"En route the radio messages described an unmistakable rapid escalation of violence. The mounted contribution at Tottenham was effectively a self-deployment. On our arrival buildings and vehicles were already burning fiercely. We were directed to support the officers who were critically engaged with the most concentrated rioters north in the High Road."

"Arriving behind the foot serials that were battling with the rioters, I was dismayed to witness the impunity with which the rioters were attacking the police. I saw some of them walk up and literally drop burning debris on the officers at the front. The sudden presence of the horses caused a very visible backing off by the rioters who clearly anticipated an advance. It also had the added benefit of bolstering the morale of the hard pressed foot duty. However the presence of a barricade of shopping trolleys, coils of heavy duty cable stretched across the road together with a further barricade of material burning across the width of the road necessitated some rapid assessment of what the horses were capable of in such extreme circumstances. In any event, the foot serials were not ready to sustain any substantial taking of ground."

"In order to overcome the barriers, the plan was formulated to canter single file with half the serial each side of the road before reforming the line for a fast effective advance. This was not a conventional tactic, specifically to canter towards a large fire and to pass so close to burning buildings, and one falter could have deterred the others and caused disarray to blunt the advance. The horses performed and a substantial advance was made. The rioters fled without exception, running for tens of metres. Only when the advance was halted and the line re-established did they regroup."

"We continued to support cordons and made several active advances to relieve the pressure on the officers on foot amid burning buildings. At Lansdowne Road we were asked to push through the junction to provide space for the fire brigade to fight the fire at the landmark Allied Carpets building. At this time the road was full of missile throwing rioters and the building was totally engulfed in flames. The roar of the fire was interspersed with the loud cracks of the reinforced beams as they buckled and blooms of flame spreading into the carriageway under collapses within the building. The advance was accomplished but by this time we had been directly engaged with the rioters for almost six hours with only a twenty minute water break off the line."
Silver’s tactical plan had been to try and isolate the rioters. In order to achieve this, gathering resources were directed to the north of Tottenham High Road in order to advance south towards the existing police resources. This plan would have enabled the police to seize control of the situation but the scale and intensity of the disorder prevented the available resources to achieve success.

PERSONAL ACCOUNT - CHIEF INSPECTOR JOHN DALE, GROUND COMMANDER

“I had three PSUs to travel in convoy to the north of Tottenham High Road. The convoy was split en route, when one PSU was attacked and therefore lost into the disorder. The remaining PSUs made their own way to the RVP. On my arrival I found one PSU deployed with shields. I joined them but after only a few minutes faced a large hostile crowd of 100 plus. We were subject to a barrage of missiles followed by the rioters running at the thin line of officers. I only just managed to get myself and nine officers crammed into the back of a carrier and depart at speed with missiles hitting the rear of the carrier like a ferocious drum beat. I was forced to abandon the carrier I had arrived in and this was promptly set alight by the rioters. I have no doubt that my officers would have suffered serious injuries, if not worse, if we had not have taken prompt action.

“I took about an hour to regroup and head back with eight carriers of officers and to deploy on foot past my burning carrier. We turned from Lansdowne Road, past many burning buildings including Allied Carpets and faced the crowd attacking the officers moving north in the High Road. The scene surrounding us was like a war zone. As we moved towards the rioters they melted into the many surrounding side streets and we came up to and relieved the officers moving north.

“However the crowd regrouped and we spent 4 hours slowly moving north in the High Road fighting through burning barricades with missiles being constantly thrown to enable the fire brigade access to the burning buildings trying to minimise the risk to life. The violence was relentless throughout that time and at one stage I saw an officer fall after a short shield charge. The mob ran towards the officer and I had no doubt that the officer would have suffered serious injury, but for the prompt action from the police line who charged the crowd forcing them back.”

The accounts that have been included offer some insight into the realities that officers faced on the ground. The battle to take control of Tottenham High Road required all available resources and even then was not achieved until early Sunday morning. This is the reason why the MPS was unable immediately to deploy officers to Tottenham Hale Retail Park and Wood Green. By 0300hrs on Sunday 7th August 2011 deployments were made to both locations and by 0500hrs multiple arrests had taken place. The MPS does accept that an earlier intervention would have prevented the impression that looting was being ignored but the review has clearly found that the intense situation in Tottenham High Road initially left no resource to be deployed elsewhere.

In addition to the response from on duty and on call public order cadre officers, the senior leaders of the MPS were quick to take charge of the situation. On the Saturday evening Commander Simon Pountain assumed the role of Gold. He notified Assistant Commissioner Lynne Owens, who retained Management Board lead and was also in attendance. Recognising the critical nature of the event, both Temporary Commissioner Tim Godwin and Temporary Deputy Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe also attended SOR where they were briefed on the events and remained for a significant period of the night.
PERSONAL ACCOUNT - COMMANDER SIMON POUNTAIN, GOLD (STRATEGIC) LONDON

“I arrived at SOR to assume the role of Gold in what was to be the most challenging period of my career. On that first night in Tottenham, I had real concerns for the safety of the public and the officers who were being stretched beyond what could normally be expected. The situation we were facing was one of extreme violence on the streets and fires ablaze. My clear priority was to ensure that we were doing everything possible to protect life - it was unclear whether there were people trapped in burning buildings and it was essential that we provided support to the fire service to enable them to tackle the fires. Alongside this, it was clear that the numbers of officers on the ground was quite simply not enough. The priority was to maximise the number of officers available to deal with the incidents - we directed all available Met resources to be sent to Tottenham and asked our surrounding forces to provide support.

“This night and the following two days saw the most extreme disorder, the extent of which I hope we never see again. It is at times like this that we expect our officers to step up to the plate, and they did. They performed extensive tours of duty, often over twenty four hours under the most intense pressure they can ever have faced.”

Night 1 | Key Statistics (as of 24th February 2012)

- A total of 413 offences (10% of all offences) were recorded.
- 6% of all arrests were for offences that took place on this night. Over 200 people have been arrested for offences committed on night 1.
- 70% had a previous sanction (with an average of 7.7 previous sanctions).
- 3,480 officers were deployed.
- London Fire Brigade received 264 emergency calls from the public and attended 49 fires. London Ambulance Service treated 11 people, taking 10 to hospital.

Time summary chart for incidents in Tottenham and Wood Green - 6th & 7th August 2011
Location of disorder related offences in Haringey Borough

Key Locations

- Carpetright (‘Allied Carpets’)
- Tottenham Police Station
- Tottenham Hale Retail Park
- Tottenham Hotspur FC Stadium
- Wood Green
The review has thoroughly examined police actions as the disorder escalated from the confines of Haringey Borough to spread across the capital. It is however impossible to detail all events and the police response to them in each specific area of London. The report will therefore provide an overview of the key areas of the MPS response on each successive day and then take specific locations as case studies to provide insight into detailed police mobilisation and activity.

Day two will case study Enfield Borough. Enfield saw some of the earliest disorder on the second night in Enfield town centre, later spreading along Southbury Road to Enfield Retail Park. It is an example of disorder taking place on a smaller scale when compared to other London boroughs but it also stood out as an area which attracted younger males, including many known to be linked to gangs. The nature of the crime, numbering more criminal damage rather than burglary offences, tended to suggest that the disorder at this stage remained expressive rather than purely acquisitive although shops were primarily targeted and subsequently looted as the night progressed.

Day three will case study Croydon and Wandsworth Boroughs. Croydon suffered sustained disorder on a considerable scale. It was also the scene of one of the disorder’s two murder offences and some of the most iconic images coming out of August’s events. Croydon recorded more crime than any other borough with the disorder centred on shopping areas spreading north and south through the borough.

Wandsworth Borough in comparison saw a concentration of offences within a relatively confined area, namely Lavender Hill and St John’s Road. It also featured a period of intense activity around 1930hrs rather than the sustained and prolonged criminality experienced in Croydon.
During the second day the disorder extended to other parts of North London and also erupted in Lambeth. At 1649hrs officers were called to Enfield where shop windows were being broken. At 1830hrs police were injured in an altercation with youths in Brixton. Disorder escalated in these and other areas and continued into the early hours of the following morning.

The disorder became more destructive with arson featuring heavily alongside looting, putting increased strain on police and the London Fire Brigade (LFB). In the early hours of the morning of the 8th August three officers were hit by a vehicle at Chingford Mount, Waltham Forest.

MOBILISATION

A full public order command team reported for duty at 0600hrs to relieve the on-call public order command team who had been called in to take command on the previous night. Commander Bob Broadhurst was nominated as the Gold Commander for this Operational Command Team.

At 0700hrs Temporary Commissioner Godwin chaired an emergency Management Board meeting. These were subsequently held early each morning of the disorder period [prior to the government’s Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)20 meetings] and late in each evening. At these meetings the Temporary Commissioner and his Deputy were updated on the operational plans allowing them to set appropriate strategic direction. They ensured that a Management Board member was available for both nights and days. Likewise they ensured command resilience at Gold level.

A key topic of discussion at this inaugural meeting and all subsequent meetings was the resources planned and available to respond to any intelligence and to mitigate any threats. Following the events of the previous night, the MPS mobilised an additional 33 PSUs throughout Sunday 7th August to be used to complement on duty borough officers according to need. This comprises approximately 825 additional officers, which is equivalent to the total complement of police officers in a large London borough. In addition, 24 hour command teams were put in place to operate out of SOR.

The PSUs were supplemented by a significant amount of further public order asset, such as the MPS Mounted Branch, Dog Section and firearms trained officers. In addition, the MPS informally sought mutual aid support from neighbouring forces. Accordingly four PSUs (approximately 100 officers) were supplied from Kent, Surrey, Thames Valley and Essex Police.

This significant increase was planned to reduce the potential for the reoccurrence of disorder. It made specialist trained public order officers available to take immediate control of Tottenham should trouble flare again. The MPS was certainly aware of the potential for unrest in Tottenham given the level of violence directed at police the previous night. Comparable disorder elsewhere in London was not however expected although the numbers of officers did provide for a contingency for dealing with some localised protest against police in areas other than Tottenham itself.

In addition, in recognition of the potential for localised disorder in other locations around the MPS, boroughs reviewed and uplifted their local policing plans as necessary, based on the events in Tottenham and intelligence.

Throughout the period of disorder, the Temporary Commissioner kept the Mayor and MPA Chair fully briefed.

The extra specialist resource was brigaded and briefed centrally. To ensure the coordination and control of any deployment, the resource was divided
into four sections, each led by a public order ground commander. As disorder began in Enfield and then Lambeth, resources were committed accordingly. By the time the situation in Waltham Forest had escalated resources were stretched. Day two had been prepared for with the previous day’s disorder in mind. The resources committed by the MPS to police any similar occurrence were not to be sufficient to deal with the spread of events on this second day.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT WIDENING TO PAN LONDON

The MPS Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team (CTSET) is based within the MPS’s Specialist Operations Command. Since its inception following the events of July 7th 2005, CTSET have developed an expertise in engaging with key community networks and partners at a strategic level. They are also responsible for monitoring tension across London communities. They produce a weekly tension assessment based on information provided to them by boroughs in order to gauge feeling and to help understand local community dynamics across London.

The senior management team for CTSET was alerted late in the evening of Saturday 6th August 2011 that disturbances were happening in Tottenham. They made themselves available at the MPS SOR, from where the policing operation was being controlled, and mobilised staff who worked through the night assisting Haringey Borough in preparing reassurance messages and leaflets for their business community.

By Sunday the 7th August 2011 community engagement was a pan London operation. In recognition of this Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stephen Kavanagh was designated as ‘Bronze Engagement’ for London. This was a relatively new role in MPS command structures. He put in place a larger engagement team and a greater number of staff to cope with the demands of two way community engagement across London. Whilst the majority of local community engagement was going to be required at a borough level, it was coordinated by specialists who were brought together from across the organisation. Predominantly these specialists were gleaned from CTSET who had already become involved in the operation and parts of the Safer Neighbourhoods Command21 based within the MPS’s Territorial Policing (TP) Command.

Very early in the day CTSET began contacting MPS central IAG members to invite them to attend SOR. Members were provided with a briefing on their arrival and were encouraged to engage in a process of offering advice to the command team present. The presence of the IAG members in the SOR was designed to build the trust of the community and to foster confidence in the police decision making process.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Kavanagh instructed boroughs which were deemed to be the most likely impacted by the events on Haringey Borough (Lambeth, Hackney, Croydon, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Lewisham, Waltham Forest and Newham Boroughs) to review their own community engagement as well as their local policing plans in light of the disorder.

Other immediate work was the setting up of a social media monitoring function to feed into MIB and work on a London wide community tension assessment was instigated, which would also feed into the national community tension assessment. A system of communicating twice daily with all boroughs to pass key messages out and to gather in community feedback to inform the overall assessment was established.

Work also began to prepare messages to be disseminated to the London wide business community and CTSET also developed a business engagement strategy on behalf of DAC Kavanagh.

DAC Kavanagh chaired a community IAG meeting at 1500hrs that afternoon. As well as corporate MPS IAG members, the Commander for North London (including Haringey), Commander Mak Chishty, and MPS staff association members were also present. This meeting discussed the main issues affecting London communities.

The first business reassurance messages and leaflets which had been prepared by CTSET for Haringey Borough’s business community were distributed on Sunday evening. The review has had feedback from within some sections of the business community that messages were either not received or were too vague to be helpful.

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21 The Safer Neighbourhood Command lead and co-ordinate safer neighbourhood teams across the MPS who provide community-based policing through increased engagement, visibility, accessibility and familiarity.
INTELLIGENCE

An intelligence structure was developed within MIB on Sunday 7th August 2011. The purpose of the structure was to receive and develop relevant intelligence which could indicate further locations where disorder and other criminality would take place. This intelligence was then passed to the Operational Command Team in order that they could deploy police resources accordingly. In order to make this transfer of information as effective as possible, an Intelligence Officer was sited in SOR with the Operational Command Team, who acted as a portal for delivering intelligence products and feeding back intelligence requirements.

MIB sought to identify all relevant intelligence received through the following means; tasking of covert intelligence collection, searches of MPS intelligence indices, monitoring publicly available information, monitoring Crimestoppers information and information from partner agencies. 102 relevant intelligence reports were recorded on the police intelligence system on this day.

Assessment of the intelligence then led to one of three activities; immediate dissemination to the Operational Command Team, further work by MIB to research, develop or analyse the intelligence, or simply the recording of the intelligence for routine dissemination. In this way, intelligence that needed an immediate response was fast-tracked and the greater intelligence picture was created in regular briefing documents which gave a prioritised list of the geographic areas where disorder was assessed to take place, together with a summary of the expected future activity.

Police were able to take preventative steps when intelligence was available that indicated disorder. For example, the Hackney Carnival which was due to take place at noon on Sunday 7th August was cancelled due to the intelligence that was received. A number of information reports regarding impending disorder were identified and disseminated to Hackney Borough between 1115 and 1130hrs. The majority of the information received indicated that street gangs were intending to attend the carnival and cause disruption. There was also information regarding unsubstantiated threats with officer safety implications. The Tactical Commander for London (Silver) at this time discussed the situation with the organisers who cancelled the event.

INVESTIGATION

Local police boroughs took responsibility for investigations into offences taking place in their own area. Many created their own dedicated units. In cases where the borough capacity was reached, the MPS mobilised specialist investigators. The public order investigative asset was mobilised in the first instance followed by some specialist crime investigators from the MPS Homicide and Serious Crime Command. Haringey Borough in particular benefited from such assistance. In all, investigators had to continue to deal with the 54 individuals arrested the previous night and a further 221 arrested on this second day.

The map below shows the volume of offences committed between 12:00 August 7th and 12:00 August 8th.

Key:
- 21 or more offences in ward, in 24 hour period
- 11 to 20 offences
- 6 to 11 offences
- 1 to 6 offences
### Night 2 | Key Statistics
(as of 24th February 2012)

- A total of 809 offences were recorded for this night (20%).
- 17% of all arrests were for offences that took place on this night.
- 7% of arrestees were female.
- Gang members formed a greater proportion of those arrested for an offence committed in night two in certain areas. To illustrate, arrests for offences committed in Lambeth on Night 2 (39%) and Enfield on Night 2 (31%) were of gang members (up until November 2011).
- Those arrested for offences in Enfield on Night 2 were younger than average (mean age 21) and included very few females (5.7%).
- 4,275 police officers were deployed.
- The London Fire Brigade received 445 emergency calls from the public.
- London Ambulance Service treated 22 people at the major scenes of disorder.
ENFIELD

case study
18:15

7th August

MPs are deployed to support the borough.

18:32

7th August

Public order commander arrives.

18:34

7th August

Police vehicles continue to be attacked.

18:35

7th August

Approx 200 youths are found in Fore Street.

18:50

7th August

Police continue to deal with youths committing violent offences in Enfield Town Centre.

19:45

7th August

Information that Tottenham is just the tip of the iceberg and that more were continuing to arrive. Police lines are in place.

20:10

7th August

City of London Police officers deployed to assist local officers report that the crowd is attempting to good police and that more are continuing to arrive. Police lines are in place.

20:50

7th August

Disorder moves towards Edmonton.

21:15

7th August

City of London Police officers deployed to assist local officers report that the crowd is attempting to good police and that more are continuing to arrive. Police lines are in place.

22:00

7th August

Group of youths attacking shops in Fore Street.

22:40

7th August

CCTV catches youths attacking shops in Fore Street.

23:13

7th August

Police and fire brigade respond to a car on fire in Colyton Way.

23:48

7th August

Police resources redeployed, including 2 PSUs of public order trained officers.

00:38

7th August

Order restored. Some officers recalled to Edmonton Police Station on stand by and remaining officers controlling crime scenes and cordon.

01:38

8th August

Police attend Hertford Road where 20 youths are attacking the shop front of a jeweller. Some are detained and arrested.

02:46

8th August

Order restored. Some officers recalled to Edmonton Police Station on stand by and remaining officers controlling crime scenes and cordon.

03:00

8th August

Enfield Town Centre at 4pm for ‘a repeat of what happened last night’.

03:40

8th August

Sporadic calls to disorder which are each responded to and dealt with by police.

01:38

8th August

Police attend Hertford Road where 20 youths are attacking the shop front of a jeweller. Some are detained and arrested.

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8th August

Sporadic calls to disorder which are each responded to and dealt with by police.
Enfield is the northernmost outer London borough, situated 12 miles from central London. It is one of London’s largest boroughs with approximately two-thirds of the area being designated green belt. The borough is served by five train lines, including the Piccadilly underground line connecting to Heathrow airport. There are also good road links to the City and the M25. Enfield Town and Edmonton Green are the two main hubs separated by a distance of around 2.5 miles. Enfield is a diverse area, with a population estimated at about 294,000. Levels of deprivation and unemployment are relatively high on the borough, the worst of which is concentrated towards the east. It borders the London Boroughs of Barnet, Haringey and Waltham Forest.

The 6th August 2011 saw the outbreak of extreme violence, disorder and criminality on Enfield’s neighbouring borough of Haringey that escalated at a rate and to a level that stunned observers. Although the disorder presented a serious threat it was at this time confined to Haringey. This was not to remain the case.

At around 1300hrs on Sunday 7th August a caller reported that several messages were being broadcast and sent via BBM inviting groups to meet in Enfield Town Centre at 1600hrs for ‘a repeat of what happened last night’ and advising them to dress with their faces covered. This was followed up at 1415hrs with a report from a member of the public that groups from Tottenham Green and Edmonton would be meeting in Enfield at 1600hrs. Safer Neighbourhoods officers were sent to the location to try and verify the accuracy of the information. At 1530hrs a group of youths arrived at Enfield train station tending to confirm that the social networking messages had been accurate.

The first reports of disorder came at 1649hrs from an individual who called to advise police that she had received photographs on her mobile phone of people breaking into shops in Enfield Town. A few minutes later CCTV monitoring revealed approximately 50-100 youths in Fore Street smashing shop windows. The local borough provided the response to these incidents with its complement of officers on duty. One officer reported that a missile had been thrown at a police vehicle. This was quickly followed by another report of a brick being thrown through the rear window of a police vehicle. The MPS central control was aware of developments and brigaded reserves were mobilised to assist the local borough.

An hour later a member of the public reported to a patrolling officer that known gang members were discussing moving onto Edmonton to cause disorder. This coincided with the arrival in Enfield Town Centre at 1745hrs of a police support unit of Level 1 public order trained officers.

CCTV monitoring in Edmonton had picked up a large crowd at Joyce Avenue. The group were seen to go into Fore Street and smash the window of the Ipek store and damage the shutters of a nearby pawn shop. The public order trained officers attended and quickly came under attack from bottles being thrown by the group. They dispersed the group whereby perpetrators ran from police. An inspector directed officers to stop chasing individual suspects due to concerns that the police serails would get split up and isolated officers could get injured.

A gang of 20 youths was then seen gathering between McDonalds and Sainsbury’s in Enfield Retail Park at around 1815hrs and at 1826hrs a CCTV operator reported that approximately 30 youths were damaging shops and obstructing the road with barriers in Enfield. This was followed by calls to Starbucks being attacked. This marked an escalation in the level of disorder and it was also significant that the actions of the crowd tended to suggest aggression towards authority rather than a focus on looting. Two PSUs of public order trained officers were sent in response to this escalation and a chief inspector attended to assess the situation. In the meantime all SNT officers were withdrawn for their own safety.

The situation continued to become serious and by 1834hrs police vehicles were being damaged. All but public order trained officers were now told to leave the location due to severe safety risks in the absence of protective equipment. A few minutes later Chief Inspector Graham Dean arrived at the scene.
At 1945hrs a disturbing call was received reporting that an individual had been heard to say ‘Tottenham is just the tip of the iceberg and there are two grenades in circulation for attacking a police station.’ Further information from a different source added corroboration to this intelligence stating that ‘Holloway and Enfield police stations are going to be targeted’.

Shortly before 2000hrs a CCTV operator who had been monitoring a crowd reported that the numbers concerned had gradually been increasing and were now congregating near Enfield Town Station and Genotin Road.

The threat of the crowd was underlined at around 2010hrs when City of London officers, who were deployed in support of local units, reported that more than 100 people were trying to goad police and that more were continuing to arrive. By 2050hrs shops were being attacked in London Road and officers reported that police lines were equally being attacked by more than 150 people who had moved into Cecil Road where they were using bricks to smash into the Argos store.

By 2115hrs the seriousness of the situation had escalated still further with a patrolling officer radioing in to report a car being set alight and petrol bombs being thrown. The scale of violence being experienced deemed the situation unsafe for the LFB to approach at that time.

The next 30 minutes saw multiple calls to youths trying to break into Argos and Morrison’s, arming themselves with bricks, and a crowd of youths moving down Southbury Road towards the A10 near Cineworld. At 2150hrs information was passed to police that BBMs were in circulation calling for people to go to the UCI Cinema, Tesco in Southbury Road, HMV in Enfield Town and Toys R Us. The intention was to draw police to these multiple locations in order to take them away from Tottenham, where a plan was afoot to set fire to the police station.

By 2210hrs the disorder had started to move to Edmonton. Police cordons in Enfield Town Centre were maintained but violence levels lowered considerably in that area so that officer numbers could be reduced and they were able to remove their full face protective helmets.

In Ponders End youths were seen on CCTV with goods believed to have been taken from the local Tesco’s store. Resources were deployed to police the large group responsible for the looting and occasional attacks on officers. They were directed to encourage youths not involved in direct disorder and criminality to go home and arrest offenders where necessary.

Between 2240hrs and midnight numerous calls were made to police reporting incidences of violence, disorder and criminality; youths in Fore Street were seen to set light to a post van before pushing it into oncoming traffic in Leeds Road, CCTV monitoring witnessed another car set alight in Colyton Way, responded to by police and LFB.

At 2350hrs the Sony Distribution Centre in Solar Way was set on fire. This fire took ten days to be put out and became one of the largest arsons in Europe, causing the employment of 160 people to be displaced. Significant resource was deployed to this incident.

The situation appeared to become relatively stable post midnight. However officers attending Hertford Road just before 0140hrs found a group of 20 youths attacking a jewellers shop. They arrested two males from the fleeing group. Further calls were received to renewed disorder involving shops being

PERSONAL ACCOUNT - POLICE CONSTABLE PAUL SHEPHERD - ASSISTANT TO CHIEF INSPECTOR DEAN

“Having returned to duty on Sunday from a tour of duty dealing with the disturbances in Tottenham the previous night, we were dispatched to reports of acts of criminal damage and theft from the shops in Enfield town centre. Upon arrival and working with fellow ground commanders we began the task of clearing the Town Centre of the large groups that had gathered. As the groups of youths were split up and moved away we continued to receive reports of sporadic acts of vandalism and theft. At one stage in Southbury Road we found ourselves alone confronting a large group (approximately 150) of youths. Luckily this group ran away. This very much typified the night with the youth groups stealing and damaging property indiscriminately wherever they could.”
looted, incidences which were quickly dealt with by swift police response.

Control had been regained by 0300hrs which enabled some officers to be recalled to Edmonton Police Station and to remain on standby. Significant numbers of officers were however retained on the ground protecting crime scenes and maintaining cordonss. There was no further disorder reported until lunchtime the following day.

Enfield Borough saw some of the earliest disorder after the initial outbreak in Haringey. This was mainly in Enfield Town Centre later spreading along Southbury Road to Enfield Retail Park. In all more than 160 disorder-related offences were recorded in Enfield and unlike other boroughs there was more criminal damage than burglary offences, suggesting that the disorder was perhaps ‘expressive’ rather than acquisitive.

94% of those arrested were male with a mean age of 21 years. 31% were associated with gangs, Enfield thus recording the highest concentration of gang-related arrestees in London.

202 people have been arrested for offences related to the disorder, 162 of whom have been charged, 5 bailed pending further enquiries and 53 have had no further action taken against them.

PERSONAL ACCOUNT -
SIMON LAURENCE, SUPERINTENDENT OPERATIONS, ENFIELD BOROUGH

“The speed and escalation of the crowd was too much for the local officers to deal with. The tactics were to contain and preserve life, there were too few resources to make arrests even when public trained officers arrived. However the officers did their utmost to limit the damage and injuries to the community. We thank the local authority and businesses for their support.”
Rasheed Sadegh-Zadeh - Chairperson of Enfield IAG;
“Initially the thoughts of the community were that they felt isolated and therefore vulnerable. It was also noted how quickly events unfolded and indeed got worse in such a short space of time. Whether wrongly or rightly, the community felt that they needed to take action themselves in various ways. The authorities eventually managed to take charge of events although it was quite apparent that the police were caught off guard at the start.”
Enfield | Key Statistics

- Those involved were predominantly male (94%).
- Arrestees were younger than average, with a mean age of 21 - compared to 23 for all arrestees.
- 57% of those arrested were aged 20 or under.

Time spread of all incidents in Enfield - 7th and 8th August 2011
Location of disorder related offences in Enfield Borough

Key Locations

1. Enfield Retail Park
2. Enfield Town Centre
On day three disorder spread through pockets of London. 22 of the 32 boroughs recorded serious incidents of disorder. Disorder started in Hackney at 1719hrs and by 1845hrs fires were reported in both Lewisham and Peckham. Widespread looting was experienced whilst in some areas there were skirmishes with police.

Significantly people travelled across London to take part in the disorder on this day. Croydon in particular suffered from an influx of individuals. Hackney was an exception to this travelling trend with localised disorder happening on the Pembury Estate and Mare Street.

The disorder of Monday 8th August 2011 carried on into the morning of Tuesday 9th August 2011. The MPS was overwhelmed by the spread and scale of disorder. Officers conducted extended tours of duty to maintain a level of response which nevertheless proved insufficient to suppress the crime and violence that was experienced on London’s streets.

**MOBILISATION**

The MPS Management Board had convened its meeting the previous evening and the morning of Monday 8th August. As a result the MPS near doubled its central asset by mobilising 61 PSUs, comprising approximately 1,525 officers. Again significant additional public order asset complemented these numbers.

This level of resource was reflective of the fact that disorder had spread to five other boroughs and numbers of officers that would be required to successfully quell a similar level of multi-location disorder were assigned. There was no indication that disorder would again spread on the scale that was actually experienced. Although the copycat trend has become an obvious phenomenon of the August disorder in hindsight, it was not obvious prior to the events of day three.

At 0930hrs the MPS formally requested mutual aid from other forces via ACPO PNICC (Police National Information Coordination Centre) in order to increase resources for the ongoing policing operation. This took the form of a request for an additional eight PSUs (approximately 200 officers). The MPS dealt with the influx of visiting officers by dedicating its marine support unit to co-ordinating their briefing, accommodation, feeding and deployment requirements.

All resource was divided into five sectors each led by a public order command team. In this way, response to boroughs, which became overwhelmed by the level and seriousness of disorder taking place, was coordinated and controlled. In a similar way, the MPS was initially able to retain officers in reserve to respond to the evolving intelligence picture. The MPS deployed bolder tactics to make maximum use of its resources and equipment. For example, armoured vehicles were used to drive through and clear the streets surrounding Clapham Junction. However it became clear that again the MPS had insufficient resources to respond in any way effectively to the widespread and serious disorder.

*PERSONAL ACCOUNT - CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT ADRIAN ROBERTS, SILVER (TACTICAL) LONDON*

"Despite the significant number of officers on duty at the start of each day, they quickly became consumed as disorder broke out in many different locations. Once officers had been deployed to locations across London re-deployment to other boroughs became very difficult as they were maintaining police lines for many hours, or were involved in arrests. This became an increasing challenge as the requests for help came flooding in from many locations at the same time."

"An extract from my log at 2224hrs on Monday 8th August illustrates the situation;"
‘Sitrep: I’m currently dealing with multi seated sites of disorder, extensive damage to property some violence to persons. I have exhausted all my resources (and some) it is proving extremely difficult to juggle resources to meet demand and there are many scenes I am unable to respond to. I’m currently in the situation where I am having to spend most of my time prioritising resources to meet the needs of the BOCUs (Borough Operational Command Units). I am witnessing outstanding bravery and resilience of BOCU staff all over London and brazen and blatant criminality in all areas that have come to notice, where possible I am advising bronze commanders around tactics but I’m having to rely on them and the BOCU’s staff to make assessments and act accordingly.’

“On a personal level, not having enough officers at certain times and in certain places is a frustration I’ll never forget. I feel very strongly that my job as a police officer is to protect Londoners; and the sense of personal responsibility for the safety of communities across London (including the emergency services) remained at the forefront of my mind over those four days. That said, I am immensely proud to have been part of a team across all the emergency services that demonstrated outstanding levels of resilience, professionalism and in many cases bravery, in the most unprecedented of circumstances.”

**INTELLIGENCE**

On Monday 8th August huge volumes of intelligence material rapidly overwhelmed the capacity of decision makers in the Operational Command Team. The number of information reports created on the MPS intelligence system rose to 484. To put this into context, a report was being entered onto the intelligence system at a rate of one every minute during the peak time of 1500-1700hrs. Each needed to be processed and taken into account.

The intelligence structure was further adapted therefore to triage intelligence material. This was a more effective way of rapidly evaluating material and benefited from an inherent flexibility to alter the triage criteria in response to both the volume of intelligence received and the changing intelligence requirement from the Operational Command Team.

While the triage system allowed more intelligence reports to be processed and acted upon, the MPS accepts that some intelligence could not be reacted to due to insufficient resource being available to process the speed and volume of reports being received. In addition, disorder spread to areas that the MPS had not been able to predict through its intelligence gathering efforts.
By Monday pan-London community engagement had been divided into two strands each led by a commander to recognise the differing needs of the business community and wider public more generally. Commander Adrian Hanstock was appointed by DAC Kavanagh to lead on Community Engagement and Commander Steve Rodhouse on Business Engagement.

On appointment Commander Rodhouse built a new business engagement structure with a range of engagement experts from the Safer Neighbourhoods Command and CTSET. On that Monday business engagement was extended to include the West End of London. They have their own specific messaging service, CommSafe, which reaches out to all retail and commercial businesses in the City of Westminster. In the afternoon Commander Rodhouse chaired a meeting of key business leaders. The MPS did not have a comprehensive database of key stakeholders available and therefore identified representatives from all the major companies affected by the disorder (including Boots, Comet, Dixons, Carpet Right, JD Sports and Foot Locker) and all the major business associations (including The Federation of Small Businesses, The British Retail Consortium, The Association of British Insurers and The British Bankers Association) in order to achieve representation from nearly all sectors of London’s commerce.

The initial mood of this meeting was challenging, but a number of positive steps were agreed. These included the MPS agreeing to provide regular updates to business, extra updates around significant developments and a single point of contact for hearing and addressing business concerns. In return, the major business associations and represented companies agreed to disseminate the updates and the MPS point of contact in turn agreed to maximise the engagement achieved.

The MPS’s corporate messaging system Neighbourhood Link, which reaches out to both the general community and local and commercial businesses was promoted to all boroughs as a means for transmitting messages. They were directed to send out the reassurance messages that had already been sent to parts of the Haringey community via Neighbourhood Link. CTSET directed five affected boroughs (Haringey, Craydon, Enfield, Ealing and Hackney) to specifically encourage business registration on Neighbourhood Link.

The scale of engagement necessary to reflect the size of London, its numbers of businesses and individuals, required a significant effort and management structure. One of the consequences of the introduction of additional management layers to reflect the scale of events was that it considerably slowed the system of signing off and sending out business messages, which ultimately slowed effective business engagement.

The MPS also shared their engagement products and strategies with the City of London Police who began to use them on their own business messaging system. The Communities Together mailbox was activated to receive incoming emails from communities. This is an email address known by the wider community, having been in use for some time.

The system to communicate twice daily with boroughs was fully functional. Boroughs were asked to submit community tension assessments with information regarding events overnight and local engagement activity that had been undertaken. This was not a new process for boroughs who ordinarily submit a version of these weekly to CTSET. Each submission was fed into the overall London wide community tension assessment. Tension levels are explained in section 4 of this report. From an initial tension level scoring of tension evidenced - 5, tension experienced - 5, tension potential - 5 the London wide assessment did not change other than tension potential raising to level 4, where it remained until 21st September 2011. The ineffectiveness of this assessment again calls into question MPS processes for gauging accurate community tension levels.

There were inconsistent reporting levels in respect of community tension from boroughs. This was partially resolved by the introduction of a standardised template and central recommendations for minimum standards of engagement. However it was clear that there was a dislocation in the corporate and local needs being addressed. On the one hand, boroughs became frustrated that they could not conduct their own bespoke communication with communities and centrally there was a frustration regarding the lack of understanding of the national tension monitoring system which the MPS was obliged to contribute to and which therefore shaped reporting requirements of boroughs.
INVESTIGATION

Day three saw the arrest of 609 individuals, bringing the overall number of arrestees to 884. Suspects were being dealt with on a borough by borough basis with additional support from specialist investigators. As the numbers of individuals entering the criminal justice system rose to these levels arrangements were put in place to dedicate more investigative asset to dealing with those already arrested and to further arrest those known to police to be involved in the criminality. The MPS was clear that swift justice would be required as a crucial tactic to bring an end to the unprecedented violence and levels of crime.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESSES

As a further method of ensuring swift and visible justice the MPS, Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) agreed special court arrangements to manage the exceptional demand and staff were mobilised across all agencies to scale up court capacity. Three court centres, Highbury, Camberwell and Thames magistrates’ courts were chosen to sit extended hour courts to deal with cases arising from disorder investigations.

The map below shows the volume of offences committed between 12:00 August 8th and 12:00 August 9th.

Key:
- 21 or more offences in ward, in 24 hour period
- 11 to 20 offences
- 6 to 11 offences
- 1 to 6 offences

Night 3 | Key Statistics
(as of 24th February 2012)

- A total of 3,350 (67%) offences were recorded.
- 12% of arrestees were female.
- Greenwich recorded the highest percentage of white offenders (47%). Those arrested in Greenwich also had the highest average number of previous sanctions.
- 6,000 officers were deployed on Monday 8th August and 16,000 were deployed on Tuesday 9th August.
- 22 boroughs recorded serious disorder.
- London Fire Brigade attended 7 Four Pump Fires, 2 Six Pump Fires, 1 Eight Pump Fire, 1 Ten Pump Fire and 1 Eleven Pump Fire.
- Brixton, Ealing Broadway, Camden Town, Woolwich Arsenal, Barking, Harrow on the Hill and Peckham Rye Underground stations were closed; Hackney Central and West Croydon overground stations were also closed. However, most of London transport was still moving.
CROYDON

case study
8th August: A group of at least ten people smashing a shop in London Road and there are 30-40 near West Croydon.

8th August: Officers deployed along the high street and to comfort hostile crowd of 200 in West Croydon.

8th August: Number of fires started. London Road and Tamworth Road.

8th August: Officers are sent to London Road to assist London Fire Brigade with access.

8th August: The first incident of arson after looting occurred at Somerfield, London Road.

8th August: Police vehicle set alight in Mint Walk and a second police vehicle is severely damaged.

8th August: PCSOs are injured and vehicles are driving at police lines in West Croydon. Further 25 TSG officers sent. Crowd dispersed.

8th August: The fire at New Addington was to be targeted. Vehicle patrol increased. Foot patrols maintained in town centre.

8th August: Officers are redeployed to London Road.

8th August: Foot patrols increased.

8th August: 100 public order officers and commander deployed to Croydon.

8th August: Shop in Reeves Cornet is looted and set on fire. Persons believed trapped.

8th August: Officers sent to repel crowd and facilitate access for London Fire Brigade.

8th August: Fire Brigade request police escort but no units are available.

8th August: London Fire Brigade request police escort but no units are available.

8th August: Group pulling on malleable, minibuses of youths arrive at Surrey Street Market.

8th August: Large groups of youths are reported to be in North End. Police provide advice to numerous retail outlets.

8th August: Second Gold Group meeting with partners held. All officers returned on duty. They conduct high visibility patrolling in the town centre and contact patrol stations and retail outlets in Purley Way.

8th August: Petty intelligence received; to gather at JSU points asking for 500 people to “*** be fed.”

8th August: PSUs relieved.

8th August: A group of at least ten people smashing a shop in London Road and there are 30-40 near West Croydon.

8th August: A police vehicle set alight in Mint Walk and a second police vehicle is severely damaged.

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8th August: Officers deployed along the high street and to comfort hostile crowd of 200 in West Croydon.

8th August: Number of fires started. London Road and Tamworth Road.

8th August: Officers are sent to London Road to assist London Fire Brigade with access.

8th August: The fire at New Addington was to be targeted. Vehicle patrol increased. Foot patrols maintained in town centre.

8th August: Police vehicle set alight in Mint Walk and a second police vehicle is severely damaged.

8th August: PCSOs are injured and vehicles are driving at police lines in West Croydon. Further 25 TSG officers sent. Crowd dispersed.

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Croydon is one of the largest boroughs in London with a population of over 339,000 people. It has a thriving town centre including a large shopping area and a bustling night time economy. It is the southernmost outer borough of London and is split into a number of different areas comprising of 24 electoral wards. The expansion of the East London Line and the introduction of the Tram Network have vastly improved its transport links. The town is home to Croydon College, with over 13,000 students.

Croydon has five police stations across the borough, Croydon being the main 24 hour police station with others at South Norwood, Addington, Kenley, and Norbury. SNTs are also situated in various parts of the borough to provide additional support and accessibility to the local communities. About 1,000 staff make up the policing team of police officers, police support staff and PCSOs, as well as Special Constables.

Sunday 7th August 2011

Many areas of North London had seen significant disorder throughout 7th August as it began to spread across the north and southwards specifically to Lambeth Borough, the first south London borough to experience violent disorder. Intelligence and information was received by police that BBMs were circulating to the effect that there would be ‘riots in Croydon tonight’ and at 2013hrs there was a specific message for a ‘call to arms’ in Croydon. This was to be the start of an extraordinary 24 hours.

At 2018hrs it was reported that a female had been robbed of her phone by individuals amongst a group of 50 youths and a few minutes later a group of youths stormed a wine shop in London Road. Shortly after officers had stones thrown at them in The Retreat, Thornton Heath and at 2030hrs a further message was circulating via social networking stating ‘meeting Croydon 10pm; let’s burn it down’.

At 2200hrs the Duty Inspector conducted a local assessment of the situation and, mindful of the backdrop of events across London, nevertheless reported the current situation to be more or less ‘business as usual’ for a busy borough such as Croydon.

At 2221hrs a call was received to inform police that riots were planned for Brixton and Croydon for 0400hrs. By 2300hrs three calls had been taken stating that 50-60 people were heading towards the town centre. Police attended and their vehicle was kicked and damaged and some arrests were made. As a consequence the Duty Inspector authorised the use of Section 60 CJPOA search powers\(^{22}\) for Croydon Borough.

The next hour saw multiple requests for additional resources to assist Croydon’s neighbouring borough, Lambeth, who were by now experiencing a significant amount of disorder.

Renewed information was circulating at 0203hrs ‘everyone out to Croydon for looting’. This was quickly followed by reports of ten armed males wearing masks in London Road, cars turning up with groups of people and an attempted car-jacking.

A group of around 200 youths also gathered in Croydon that resulted in the decision being taken at 0303hrs that all officers were to be retained on duty. By 0339hrs looting was reported in London Road, Purley Way and Norbury. Dog units and two Police Support Units were deployed to deal with the disorder.

Croydon Borough thus largely controlled the threats of serious disorder taking place on the Sunday night.

Monday 8th August

0900hrs on the morning of 8th August saw a local Senior Manager chair a Gold Group meeting with partners at Croydon Police Station. Plans to reassure the community and inform local shop keepers were made. At 0905hrs instruction had been received from TP’s central command that local boroughs were to take ownership of a police response to events in London over the past two days. An eight day local operational plan was therefore formulated.

Intelligence was continually monitored and the common theme was that disorder was being planned in Croydon around the town centre from 1600hrs that day. The suggested meeting points were JD Sports, North End and later Valley Park at 2100hrs to target the trading estates on Purley Way.

At around 0930hrs officers on patrol recovered cans of petrol hidden in bushes, which CCTV had showed two youths secreting.

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\(^{22}\) Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 allows senior police officers to authorise constables to stop and search persons in a specific area, either where a serious public order problem is likely to arise or has taken place, or for offensive weapons or dangerous instruments.

72 / METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE | STRATEGIC REVIEW INTO THE DISORDER OF AUGUST 2011 - FINAL REPORT
Nothing of too great a significance happened until 1205hrs when reports came in that large groups of youths were gathering in Croydon followed at 1220hrs by calls that messages were circulating for 500 people to ‘gather at JD Sports’ to ‘F**k the Feds’. Shortly after this reports were received of looting and disorder at the Foot Locker store in the Whitgift Centre.

A second Gold Group meeting was convened at 1300hrs and representatives from other emergency services and Surrey Police were additionally invited. A decision was taken to retain all officers on duty and for high visibility patrols to be undertaken in the town centre. Contact was to be made with petrol stations and retail outlets in Purley Way. SNT officers were deployed to key locations and spent the day visiting local retailers.

From around 1630hrs the picture quickly changed and the disorder and violence was to escalate at an alarming rate.

1637hrs saw the first reference to Reeves Corner when a call was received to a ‘male with a petrol bomb’. Officers attended but no suspect was found. The furniture store was to become a victim of arson later that night and the image of the building ablaze was to become an iconic representation of the riots that left a trail of destruction in its wake.

By 1651hrs there were several reports of large groups gathering in North End and numerous calls had been taken from retailers asking for advice on how to protect their premises and staff. 1718hrs had members of the public reporting a group of 40 youths putting on masks in nearby Handcroft Road, West Croydon and minibuses containing groups of youths in Surrey Street Market. Meanwhile information was received that New Addington would also be targeted and vehicle patrols were therefore directed to the vicinity whilst foot patrols were maintained in the town centre.

From this point numerous reports began coming in of shops being smashed up and multiple groups forming. Officers themselves were reporting stopping groups of youths wearing face coverings. By 1825hrs the numbers of groups had swelled and officers reported large scale disorder in progress. All local police stations were contacted in a bid to obtain further officers to assist in Croydon and public order serials (approximately 90 officers) were deployed from Central London resources, the first batch of many that were sent during the course of the night. By 1900hrs, more than 100 youths wearing masks were engaging in significant disorder and the situation continued to escalate.
At 1945hrs officers were deployed to North End and the High Street. Near West Croydon rail station officers were confronted by a hostile crowd of over 200 with a further 30-50 in Station Road.

This already unparalleled situation was soon to take a more sinister turn when at 1957hrs the first instance of arson was reported at Somerfields in London Road. Officers were sent to assist the LFB to gain access and to ensure their safety while they fought the blaze. Meanwhile the officers at West Croydon had come under attack from missiles, bricks and petrol bombs. At 2010hrs PCSOs were injured at West Croydon and officers reported vehicles deliberately driving at police lines.

At this time further Level 1 public order trained officers were deployed from Central London to establish cordons at Mead Place/London Road and West Green. Using their tactical experience and expertise they successfully cleared the crowd by using short shield advances and moved them out of West Croydon Bus Station and into Wellesley Road.

From around 2030hrs a number of fires were deliberately started and within 9 minutes two premises in London Road were set ablaze along with a bus and a house in Tamworth Road. At 2034hrs, an advanced public order trained senior commander was resourced from Central London to attend Croydon and a further 4 public order serials (approximately 100 officers) were re-deployed from Lewisham to Croydon. At 2049hrs a shop at Reeves Corner was looted and then set on fire. This culminated in a 10 pump fire response. There were reports of persons trapped and a female resident of a neighbouring burning flat was forced to jump from a first floor window in fear of her life. Resources were deployed further along London Road to repel the crowd and facilitate access to the LFB but there were insufficient resources to successfully achieve this.

By this time darkness was falling and there were reports of large scale and serious disorder right across Croydon and Addington including Centrale Centre, Purley Way and Surrey Street with hundreds of calls being received via the 999 system. Assistance was still being requested but such was the scale of disorder that the officers on the ground were simply overwhelmed. Numerous officers were being sent to Croydon from other parts of London but the time taken to arrive at Croydon varied, depending on distance of travel and ability to extract from other disorders across London. This proved a common challenge across many boroughs throughout the night and has led to changes in the way the MPS mobilise resources in the future.

This critical situation was to get worse still when at 2115hrs there was a report of a shooting in Duppas Hill. Officers were sent to the scene and found a male with what later proved to be a fatal gunshot wound to the head. Regardless of the events unfolding and the scene around them officers still managed to recover crucial evidence.

At around 2150hrs the police helicopter was deployed to Croydon. By this time resources on the ground were becoming rapidly depleted through officers having made arrests, sustaining injuries and maintaining cordons to ensure crime scene management. At 2154hrs an instruction was issued that addressing fires was to take priority over looting and a Level 1 PSU was sent to assist at London Road and a local ground commander to Reeves Corner in this respect.

At around 2200hrs a group of youths were seen on CCTV en route to Croydon police station armed with petrol bombs. Level 1 officers who had just arrived on the borough were deployed and quickly intercepted the suspects. These 20 or so officers had paraded for duty having had only two hours sleep following a 26 hour tour of duty at Brixton the previous day where they fought running battles with violent crowds. None of the officers had come out of that incident unscathed but, despite their injuries, every single officer had reported for duty.

The next hour saw a relentless display of violence, deliberate fire setting and pre-planned and opportunist burglary and theft. Incidents included vehicles being intercepted filled with petrol bombs, police vehicles set alight and damaged in Mint Walk, looting at Argos and reports of firearms being seen.

At 2247hrs public order trained officers responded to reports of large scale looting at the Comet store in Purley Way. They successfully cleared the premises and managed to detain 12 individuals for burglary as well as recovering countless electrical items.

Officers also responded to reports of petrol bombs in the Staples store in Thornton Heath at 2306hrs. Within 15 minutes officers had been dispatched to two further calls to separate fires in London Road. Reports of further looting at Comet, Carphone Warehouse and John Lewis were also being received at this same time.
At 2334hrs the LFB requested a police escort but there were no units available to assist them. Reports were now being received of looting in Tesco’s, London Road and Barclays Bank in Norbury on the other side of the borough. There was no sign that the disorder was abating and shortly after midnight officers in Greenside Road came under attack from petrol bombs. Around the same time information was coming in that fires were spreading and, when available, officers were redeployed to the scene of concentrated arson attacks at London Road.

Calls were still being received by the minute to large scale looting and, following a deployment to Halfords, numerous arrests were made. The next hour heard reports of burglary and looting in Brighton Road, Sumner Road, Thornton Heath and Gloucester Road where there were also reports of a firearm. The Next store in Purley Way came under specific attack as did the Tesco store in Windmill Road. The numbers in each group varied but up to 50 were reported as looting Next. Where possible and if safe units were consistently deployed.

As the night wore on the scenes of carnage witnessed by so many through live media continued. At 0225hrs on the 9th August the residents of Sumner Road had to be evacuated due to the spread of fire and still the calls came thick and fast to disorder by gangs of youths, looting in Sainsbury’s Church.
Road and a nearby jewellers shop, a phone shop in Acacia Road and renewed incidents at Comet and Sainsbury’s to which a dog unit was dispatched.

Between 0300hrs and 0400hrs additional public order trained officers from Sussex and South Wales Police arrived in the borough and were tasked to relieve local officers. During this time there were still reports of over 200 people in the area and a large group congregating in Oakfield Road. These were eventually dispersed with the help of fresh police resources and control was finally regained.

During this period countless members of the public became victims of the disorder. They lost their homes and livelihoods and bore witness to life threatening scenes that will stay with them forever. Over 66 arrests were made through the course of the night. Many officers worked for more than 20 hours without a break under tremendous pressure and provocation in the most extreme conditions many of them would have ever encountered, and showed immense courage and resilience in doing so.

Although the worst of the disorder centred on shopping areas spreading north up London Road and south into Brighton Road and surrounding streets, there were varying degrees of disorder reported across the breadth of this large borough. The borough recorded more crime than any other in the capital. This amounted to more than 510 recorded crimes that included 232 burglaries, 18 arsons and 62 robberies.

To date there have been 477 arrests that have resulted in 305 charges for a variety of offences. 15 individuals have been bailed pending further enquiries and 207 have had no further action taken. Due to the sheer scale of the events in Croydon there is still around 1,000 hours of CCTV to be viewed. However officers continue to work hard to identify and bring to justice those responsible.

PERSONAL ACCOUNT -
SHUAIB YUSEF, IAG CHAIR AT CROYDON

“During the riots and in the immediate aftermath, there was a palpable sense of shock and disbelief by the communities at the extent of the disorder and crucially at the failure of the police to take charge and protect businesses and personal properties. That this was allowed to continue over an unacceptably long period with impunity simply heightened the sense of shock. Although the communities accepted that the pace and organised scale of the disorder may have been difficult to police at the best of times, the willingness to work with the police to reassure the public at large was testament to the good relations which the police in Croydon had laboriously engineered with the communities over a considerable period of time.”

PERSONAL ACCOUNT -
CHIEF INSPECTOR MARK NANJI - CROYDON

“As I arrived on scene outside West Croydon train station I noticed that officers were coming under sustained attack from three sides. The mob were confronting the police and were throwing a variety of missiles including bricks and petrol bombs. Windows of shops had been smashed and several buildings and vehicles (including a double decker bus) had been set on fire. My initial resources were a mixture of local response team and SNT officers with varying levels of experience, and pretty much anyone else we could round up including CID officers, volunteer constables (MSC) along with a handful of colleagues from British Transport Police. Only a very small proportion of these officers were public order trained, most were wearing regular uniform and for the CID officers it was a question of grabbing whatever was available. I decided that our priority was to hold the police lines in London Road. I recall hearing radio transmissions relating to further serious disorder in other parts of Croydon. I felt frustration because I knew that at the time we simply had no one else left to send. I experienced a number of emotions and feelings during the night of August the 8th. These ranged from anger, when I witnessed the mindless violence and criminality from those responsible, to immense pride at the bravery and professionalism of all our officers whom it was an honour to work alongside. I also have a vivid recollection of two brave members of the public who were risking their own safety by supplying our officers with bottles of water during the worst of the violence. I also recall experiencing a feeling of extreme sadness following conversations with the owners of local businesses whose properties and livelihoods had been destroyed by the rioters.”
Amish Somaila, who is the manager of Argos Church Street said:

“I was affected operationally by the riots because I lost half my stock and suffered severe damage to the store. But business has improved and morale amongst the staff is positive.”
Croydon | Key Statistics

- 477 people were arrested
- 305 people charged
- 15 people bailed to return
- No further action taken against 207 people
- 1,000 hours of CCTV still to be viewed

Time spread of all incidents in Croydon - 8th and 9th August 2011
Disorder related offences in Croydon borough and town centre

Key Locations

1. West Croydon Train Station
2. Reeves Furniture Store
3. Duppas Hill
4. Croydon Retail Park
5. New Addington

1.6km
WANDSWORTH

case study
The London Borough of Wandsworth is situated to the south-west of the city and is the largest inner London suburb. It has a population of over 280,000 and comprises a number of different areas including Battersea, which was the seat of disorder within the borough. It is the location of Clapham Junction, one of the busiest railway stations in Europe servicing routes from all over the south-east of England into Central London. The surrounding streets are a vibrant area comprising a large number of shops, bars, cafes, restaurants and leisure facilities.

During the course of Sunday 7th August the disorder had spread southwards across London with outbreaks of violence and disturbances reported in Croydon and Wandsworth’s neighbouring borough of Lambeth.

In the early hours of the morning of 8th August there were ten venues damaged within Wandsworth Borough in the Battersea, Tooting and Balham areas. Against the backdrop of what was occurring elsewhere in London and coupled with information that police stations were to be attacked with hand grenades, an authorisation for the use of Section 60 CJPOA was given at 0320hrs by the local superintendent. This proved a justifiable tactic when two large bladed knives were found in Tooting at 0345hrs and seven arrests were made from an incident at Blockbusters also in the early hours.

It was not until around midday on Monday 8th August that information relating to the potential for pre-planned violence and criminality occurring in Wandsworth began to gather momentum. During the next five hours members of the public and local shop owners phoned 999 to report that they had either received or seen messages circulated via BBM or posted onto social media websites such as Twitter and Facebook that there was to be ‘rioting’ that night. Others reported content including a call to ‘raid JD Sports’ and a rally that Wandsworth riots could ‘outdo Tottenham and Brixton.’ Specific locations were named as targets including Clapham Junction, Tooting Broadway and Southside Shopping Centre.

On this day Wandsworth, like most other boroughs, had been required to send officers to support additional patrols in the worst affected areas, judged as such in terms of serious and ongoing disorder and violence. In addition to this there were other events going on in London that were subject to a pre-planned police response, one such being a demonstration at the Libyan Embassy. To this end Wandsworth provided a total of two inspectors, seven sergeants and 44 constables to be deployed centrally by the MPS. Of these officers, 32 were level two public order trained.

The early shift response team officers worked a staggered shift system, starting at either 0700hrs or 0900hrs. Taking into account officer roles requiring presence inside the police station, for example gaoler or station reception officer, between 23 and 30 officers were left available to conduct crime patrols and provide the emergency response to any incidents that occurred during their tour of duty.

At 1400hrs the first of the late shift teams paraded for duty with an additional 20 officers available to patrol and respond. Throughout the day local Safer Neighbourhood Teams and the borough’s Town Centre Team also patrolled the areas of the Southside Shopping Centre and Tooting.

The day remained relatively uneventful and therefore the first of the early shift teams was dismissed at 1500hrs. However with intelligence still being received a decision was taken to retain on duty any available officers, numbering seven.

As a result of the growing intelligence picture at 1700hrs a local Gold Group meeting with multi-agency membership was held at Battersea Police Station, chaired by a member of Wandsworth Police Senior Management Team. The timing of this meeting was such that police could have the fullest picture available and to afford other professionals the due warning time to enable them to come to the meeting. A police command team meeting had been conducted much earlier in the day. The purpose was to share information, identify any areas of risk and concern from communities and businesses and develop a policing and communication strategy to respond.

An update from partners present was that, at that time, there were no issues being raised from the local community in Battersea and specifically Clapham Junction. In Tooting it was reported that individuals were worried about the potential for further attacks.

At 1800hrs a further ten officers paraded for duty, bolstering the number of officers available for deployment in Wandsworth to around 51. This was the number available during what would later be established as the peak time for disorder, roughly between 1930hrs and 2200hrs.
Although there was a steady flow of information it was largely uncorroborated and the local policing plan to post officers to key locations where there was a suggestion that disorder would occur coupled with the response teams was deemed sufficient up until the early evening when the picture quickly changed.

At around 1925hrs a local officer reported that small groups were gathering around Clapham Junction. One sergeant and seven constables were deployed to the railway station. A few minutes later a member of the public reported 12 youths with a petrol can and their faces covered at nearby Grant Road.

Within a couple of minutes officers responded to this call and reported via radio that there were 50-60 youths present. At 1945hrs officers on scene updated the control room that the group were now arming themselves with bricks and bottles and were moving down Grant Road onto the Winstanley Estate. They reported seeing fireworks and smoke and at 1947hrs a police vehicle came under attack, being struck with a plank of wood.

The local duty inspector deployed level two public order trained officers towards the estate and established a rendezvous point (RVP) at Grant Road/Falcon Road for officers without protective equipment due to the safety risk. At this stage only one serial of level two trained officers (one sergeant and seven constables) were available to the borough. These officers, in their public order protective uniform, successfully deployed and dispersed some of the hostile crowd despite coming under continuous attack.

Meanwhile the local duties office back at the station began to respond to the need to provide resilience and additional resources by contacting all level two trained officers and recalling them to duty. Some were on a rest day and called in from home, others were retained on duty from their previous shift and others were called back to work having already completed one entire shift that day.

The situation was escalating at an alarming rate and at 1950hrs officers at the scene reported smoke grenades being thrown and coming under attack from youths hurling bottles and glass. At 1951hrs a member of the public called to say that they believed the youths were trying to ‘bait officers onto the estate’. CCTV witnessed the youths in Winstanley Road self-arming and using bins to create road blocks.

In neighbouring Grant Road CCTV monitoring reported youths attacking members of the public and passing vehicles at 1954hrs. The local buses were put on diversion to prevent injury or damage to passersby and vehicles. There were now around 100 youths in Plough Road and the police were under severe attack.

Members of the public were calling in to provide witness accounts of events unfolding in the area; 30 youths in that vicinity were throwing stones at vehicles, 60-70 youths in Plough Road had robbed a shop, 20 youths outside a shop on the Winstanley Estate were smashing it up.

The outbreaks of violent disorder were not limited to one location or venue and were in large pockets around the Winstanley Estate and the environs of Clapham Junction Station thereby stretching the limited police resources further still.

At 2000hrs officers reported that another group of youths with a large quantity of bricks had gathered. By now, eight additional officers had been identified to return to duty at Earlsfield Police Station to form a serial. By 2002hrs the group from Winstanley Road had moved off to Battersea Park Road. Meanwhile BTP reported 35 youths putting on masks on the other side of Clapham Junction Station outside a local pub.

At 2003hrs 30-40 youths broke into Halfords in Lombard Way. The store was looted and while two youths were arrested at the scene the remainder made off on the arrival of police. At 2006hrs callers reported youths with their faces covered, some on bikes heading towards Clapham Junction and another stated that youths had climbed over locked gates and a fence towards Scholey House.

It was now apparent that there were multiple groups, varying in numbers, who were able to mobilise quickly and that local officers were wholly outnumbered. It is not clear if the efforts of the youths were concerted or if they were independent groups with the common purpose of mindless violence, criminality and thievery.

The public order trained officers who had been deployed onto the Winstanley Estate had been continuing to tackle the disorder, however they had come under such sustained attack that it reached the point where it was so dangerous they had to retreat at 2010hrs.
The borough were still in the process of directing the further level two trained officers who had been called back to work to Earlsfield Police Station in order that the second serial could be formed.

At the same time officers who had been at the rendezvous point were directed to deploy out onto the streets. At 2020hrs officers were flagged down by a victim of robbery. The officers pursued the suspects into Badric Court and came under attack by 30 youths. At 2027hrs BTP radioed in to report 50 hooded youths - one with a machete - were on the Peabody Estate.

As dusk descended, pockets of disorder were appearing at a number of locations with information being received simultaneously relating to the same or separate incidents from a variety of sources including CCTV, 999 calls, officers being flagged down in the street or encountering incidents directly. This made co-ordination almost impossible.

At 2034hrs youths were reported as present at JD Sports and at 2039hrs T-Mobile had been attacked. By 2045hrs groups of youths armed with bricks were seen surging towards Lavender Hill. Moments later two police units approached Debenhams. Staff inside the store were reporting approximately 200 males, some armed with metal bars and possibly a sword, at the location. The police reported looting in progress but immediately came under attack and their police vehicle was damaged.

Reports came in of youths entering the O2 store and of a member of the public having been hit by a brick trying to fight them off.

At just before 2100hrs officers at the scene reported that the youths were armed with knives and they were coming under severe attack with one officer injured. By this time the crowd had swelled to around 300. A mere 13 public order trained officers and two dog units nevertheless deployed against the mob and undertook a series of active advances and withdrawals to distance the crowd and attempt to protect businesses and residents.

Despite their valiant efforts to try and clear St John’s Road whilst being attacked by missiles thrown by the hostile crowd, they could not repel the barrage of violence and requested urgent assistance. A supervisor at the scene radioed in “We cannot get out. Large group at junction of Falcon Road. Unable to withdraw. We are under attack….we can’t withdraw…it’s not safe to withdraw”. At this point the local superintendent requested assistance from the Territorial Support Group (TSG) - level one public order trained officers. The officers present eventually managed to withdraw to the RVP at Lavender Hill Police Station where they re-grouped before redeploying.

PERSONAL ACCOUNT - INSPECTOR KEITH GARDNER - WANDSWORTH BOROUGH

“At about this time information was received that NO additional central resources were available to assist local officers and that borough officers would have to deal. In view of the size of the crowd (approximately 300 people) and the significant risk to officers (13 level two officers and two dog units) in St John’s Road becoming isolated they were instructed to withdraw to the RVP at Lavender Hill police station. While held at the RVP the instruction from Gold was received that the boroughs working strategy aim was the ‘preservation of life’.”

Information had been received that a petrol bomb had been thrown and others were being prepared at Altenburg Gardens, a short distance from the RVP. Level three officers were moved to a second RVP of Elspeth Road/Clapham Common Northside awaiting directions when further information came in that vehicles were being readied to drive at them. The units were therefore withdrawn under instruction of an inspector to Earlsfield Police Station for safety.

The next hour saw numerous premises looted and damaged including Currys and the Jamie Oliver Shop. At 2116hrs a group began smashing windows at Pizza Express. Staff and customers had been forced to lock themselves in a back office and staff room and could hear the premises being attacked. A police operator phoned them and was forced to explain they had no unit to send to assist. They contacted the store again at 2130hrs and informed them that from the monitoring of CCTV they could see that there were no youths outside and advised them to leave the area.

A local town centre worker said “…businesses felt unprotected….They called 999 for help, they were told that police couldn’t attend”. A local businessman later said “… there was a significant absence of officers…there should’ve been more of a presence” but went on to say he was “full of admiration for the local officers on the street”. 
At 2119hrs a request was made to BTP to try and move passengers on trains away from the area rather than expose them to danger by allowing them out on to the main road.

By 2200hrs 75 additional level one and two officers and a bronze commander had arrived at Lavender Hill. Local night duty officers had also reported for duty. They all joined the local level two officers who had been redeployed to St John’s Road/Lavender Hill. The crowd, now numbering around 450, was still on the rampage and attacking police with missiles. However, with the assistance of the newly arrived resources, several shield advances were undertaken and the officers quickly established control. Arrests were made outside Currys and crowds were dispersed along St John’s Road with cordon put in place outside Debenhams. By this time it was nearly 2300hrs and the original public order trained officers had been on duty on the front line for nearly 16 hours.

Officers maintained patrols of the areas, responding to incidents they encountered. At just before midnight one of the inspectors on duty noticed a fire at the Party Shop on Lavender Hill. He called the Fire Brigade and took four officers with him to the location with the intention of trying to put it out. However it quickly escalated with flames and smoke billowing from the shop. It was too dangerous to enter but he realised there were occupied flats above and helium canisters inside the shop. They managed to push back the crowd that was gathering and instigated a successful evacuation of the premises that involved forcing entry to the flats and searching to ensure nobody was trapped. They then held the large group back at the junction to enable the Fire Service to control the blaze in safety, once again facing hostile and violent individuals. When the officers were joined by an Essex Constabulary PSU that had been deployed to assist, they were eventually able to clear the area using tactical advances.

The arrival and subsequent deployment of armoured vehicles, known as Jenkels, proved to be a successful tactic in clearing the remaining groups from the streets and by 0020hrs on the 9th August the streets were relatively clear. Level three officers could now be safely deployed to manage crime scenes, road closures and cordon and at 0130hrs calm was fully restored.

The following day saw an extraordinary call to arms of a different sort when the local community brigaded together to clear the mess that had been left behind. Their action sent a clear message out to those
who had shown such disrespect to Wandsworth Borough’s decent and hardworking local people.

In the period between 1900hrs on the 8th August and 0800hrs on the 9th August there were over 600 incidents recorded on the Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) system for Wandsworth. In addition to this there were 1000 plus ‘linked’ calls (incidents of which police were already aware).

As a result of the disorder more than 60 non-residential burglaries and 40 criminal damage offences were recorded in Wandsworth. Unsurprisingly, the highest concentration of offences was along Lavender Hill and St John’s Road where a few brave officers had encountered the large and violent crowds that attacked them relentlessly through the evening of 8th August and where the public witnessed scenes of violence and lawlessness that will never be forgotten.

Post-event there have been 208 arrests for a variety of offences specific to Wandsworth. Of those 129 individuals have been charged, five bailed pending enquiries and 74 had no further action taken. All CCTV has been viewed and enquiries are still ongoing to bring those involved to justice. Local officers continue to work with local businesses and communities to strengthen, rebuild and develop relationships in the wake of the events in Wandsworth.

PERSONAL ACCOUNT -
GERRY CAMPBELL, ACTING BOROUGH COMMANDER WANDSWORTH BOROUGH

“It was clear that the speed with which the groups formed and how their numbers swelled (up to 450+ at the height of the disorder), caught us by surprise and overwhelmed the police units deployed on the ground in Clapham Junction. There were sustained attacks against property and police officers. Some of the crowd were armed with knives and used lumps of concrete and street furniture as weapons or missiles. Given the now developing picture we made the difficult decision that the policing priority at that time was the preservation of life. I want to pay tribute to the professionalism, bravery, fortitude and commitment of the front line officers deployed on the borough that night.”

PERSONAL ACCOUNT -
SUPERINTENDENT STEVE DEEHAN - WANDSWORTH BOROUGH

“Having been called out from home on the Monday evening of the disturbances I got to Clapham Junction at around 10pm expecting at least one public order unit to be in the area. When I arrived we ended up driving straight through a large frenzied mob of around 450 that were actively looting Debenhams and the whole of St John’s Street. I found seven officers from the British Transport Police and secured their support. There were no other public order resources in the area, but I felt we needed to make our presence known, so we kitted up and started walking down St John’s Hill. We were then joined by one TSG public order unit and started to clear St John’s Street to stop the looting, but with only one unit the rioters simply looped around us and back into the street. The TSG held the Northcote Road end of St John’s Street with a large crowd of onlookers making our lives slightly more difficult. We were then joined by 15 or so officers from Wandsworth Borough who were cobbled together in station vans. As a result we were able to clear St John’s Street and prevent any further looting and damage. Unfortunately we could not protect everything in that area and we then had to hold our ground and wait for further resources, which were coming from Essex. I gave instructions to move forward from our position only if life was at risk because there were armed individuals in the junctions ahead of us. I am immensely proud of the officers who worked with me that night and whatever else is said or whatever else we learn, I know this organisation and the BTP have brave men and women who will rise to a challenge and protect others.”
Speaking after the events of 8th August the Wandsworth Independent Advisory Group Chairperson, Larry Davis said;

“From talking to the public about the evening of the disorder the community was shaken and scared as to the lack of police dealing with the disorder itself. They found themselves helpless only to watch mindless individuals who went about causing carnage in their local area and those that wanted to get involved were persuaded not to because of the large numbers of youths and adults that took part. The question as to why such a thing had taken place and what could have been done to prevent it is what I have heard time and time again. But the real question is not why it took place but why something like this must never happen again. The community felt isolated without the proper support and protection. As a member of the public and an individual with a role advising the police who was present at the disorder, I personally felt it would have been unrealistic at such short notice to be able to deal with the vast amount of people directly. What is enlightening is to know how effectively the police are pursuing those who have been involved in the disorder to date.”
Wandsworth | Key Statistics

- The borough saw a concentration of offences on Lavender Hill and St John’s Road with the most intense activity around 1930hrs.
- Those arrested in Wandsworth on Night 3 included more females than elsewhere (19% compared with 11% overall).
- Only 22% of those arrested had no previous sanctions (compared to 29% overall).

Time spread of all incidents in Wandsworth - 8th and 9th August 2011
Location of disorder related offences in Wandsworth Borough

Key Locations

- Clapham Junction Train Station
- Debenhams Store
- Winstanley Estate
- Lavender Hill Police Station
Day four saw the dissipation of disorder in London as the MPS restored order. It is the view of the MPS that this was achieved through a combination of significant numbers of officers flooding the streets, the recognition that they were able to use more assertive tactics and the success of the criminal justice system in full action. The MPS fully recognises the effect that London’s communities themselves had in preventing further disorder. The powerful image of local residents and businesses coming together to clear up after those who had so wilfully disrespected their neighbourhoods undoubtedly contributed to a large degree to the overall effect of putting a stop to the disorder.

MOBILISATION

On Monday evening Management Board had decided to further substantially increase the number of officers deployed. A plan had been developed overnight and presented early on Tuesday morning. Following discussion that working on the previous day’s experience was no longer a relevant benchmark when deciding resource allocation, Temporary Commissioner Godwin decided to further increase the proposed figure of 13,000 officers to 16,000. This included 50 PSUs (1,250 officers) provided through PNICC at the request of the MPS.

The Temporary Commissioner briefed the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Home Secretary on this decision prior to the Tuesday morning COBR meeting.

The operational plan differed on this day due to the numbers of officers at the command team’s disposal. The MPS was able to allocate the officers and their command teams to individual boroughs to provide high visibility patrolling and an effective mobile response to any incidents. This had the effect of reassuring the community as well as acting as a strong deterrent to criminal activity. Officers were specifically briefed to disperse any forming groups of youths and to engage with the local communities.

INTELLIGENCE

From Tuesday 9th August onwards, information was coming in at the rate of one every 30 seconds from 1100 - 1400hrs, at which point it increased to one every 15 seconds. 245 intelligence reports were received at MIB for assessment between 1400 and 1500hrs and 1,751 reports related to the disorder were received in total during the course of day four. This represented the peak level of intelligence reports coming into the MPS and levels remained high with 1,168 reports coming in on Wednesday 10th August, 880 on Thursday 11th August and 1,095 on Friday 12th August.

As one example of the provenance of intelligence coming in, by Thursday 11th August there was a backlog of 600 Crimestoppers reports to be dealt with.

Largely the intelligence was of a reactive nature, detailing individuals who had been involved in the disorder and criminality over the preceding three days. Intelligence professionals worked through the vast quantity of reports as quickly as possible in order to disseminate the information to investigators and thus accelerate the criminal justice aspect of the MPS’s tactical response.

INVESTIGATION

Following the worst of the trouble on Monday 8th August it became clear that dealing with investigations arising from the disorder on a borough by borough basis was no longer appropriate and Operation Withern was launched to coordinate the investigation of all crimes relating to the disturbances. The plans that had been prepared the previous day were put into action and over 200 specialist
investigators were mobilised to bolster the borough response that had to date taken precedence.

This was a reactive investigation unlike any other and focused on bringing offenders to justice as swiftly as possible. The investigative response was rapid, with continued arrests taking place and the multiple suspects already in police custody being dealt with. Within 24 hours an Investigative Oversight Group (IOG) was established to initiate a corporate response to the disorder and ensure that appropriate and sustained resources were applied to the investigative teams.

**CRIMINAL JUSTICE**

On Tuesday 9th August Criminal Justice (CJ) partners agreed to extend the number of magistrates’ court centres to nine, sitting extended hours from 17:00 to 21:00. All Crown Court Operation Withern cases would go to Wood Green and Inner London Crown Court.

The National Offender Management System (NOMS) agreed prison receiving times would be extended to avoid defendants who were remanded into custody or sentenced to custody needing to be taken back to police cells.

Later in the afternoon, as demand on police custody centres increased, CJ partners agreed to sit night courts at two court centres, Westminster and Highbury magistrates’ courts, to deal with the escalating numbers.

**COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT**

As an evolving strategy, the command team responsible for delivering community engagement was streamlined to bring residential and business engagement back together under one senior lead. This was in recognition that a single co-ordinator would be better placed to oversee a consistency of messaging. Similarly it allowed for the better use of specialist staff as the team was reshaped to denote specific roles and responsibilities under the new structure.

To deliver on the agreements reached at the meeting for key business leaders the previous day, an ‘Engagement POD’ was created within the SOR at Lambeth. From this inaugural day the POD remained in place for the following four weeks, proactively delivering daily business digest updates and several additional development circulations on behalf of the MPS. These were circulated externally via DPA, Neighbourhood link, the MPS website, Twitter and external business associations reaching tens of thousands of London and UK businesses. This communication allowed ‘Gold’ and ‘Bronze Community’ to disseminate key messages on an unprecedented scale and through attendance of the POD supervisors at all ‘Gold’ and ‘Silver’ strategy meetings (initially every two hours) to obtain considerable feedback on issues and concerns to help form the overall strategy. These updates were also disseminated to all London MPs, Local Authority Chief Executives, IAG members and GLA and MPA members to increase their understanding of what was being done and to inform their public comments.

Borough engagement continued to be the primary source of local engagement, supported and underpinned by the Engagement POD. In the first week after the disorder the POD circulated MPS instructions and guidance to all boroughs to ensure that effective engagement and reassurance was being provided to local and business communities. Key messages were disseminated to the boroughs to ensure that the post disorder reassurance response across London was accurate and the best it could be. Over the next three weeks, the POD continued to co-ordinate, refresh and evaluate the entire MPS engagement response and deliver its outcomes to the command team.
Reeves Corner in Croydon - The day after.
7 THE FINDINGS
7.1 INDEPENDENT ADVICE

HARINGEY INDEPENDENT ADVICE

The local engagement that took place on Haringey Borough prior to the disorder breaking out has been explored in great detail in section 4. From the comprehensive examination that the review has undertaken it is possible to arrive at a finding.

If it was the case that a level of tension existed within the Broadwater Farm Estate or wider community that predicated imminent disorder on Saturday the 6th August 2011 the MPS was not aware of it. If it was the case that the disorder was totally spontaneous then the fact that there existed within the community large numbers of individuals prepared to engage with or take advantage of that disorder was also unknown to the police. It is therefore a conclusion of this report that the community engagement model that was used extensively by Haringey Borough (and which is commonly in use across the MPS) to obtain independent advice and community intelligence did not achieve its purpose.

As has already been described, the IAG structure at Haringey Borough is unique. There is both an IAG and a BIAG. Some members of the IAG understand the current need for a BIAG whilst others see its existence as divisive and further state that discussions of issues raised by the BIAG in isolation do not assist a borough wide perspective.

It is difficult to objectively audit the efficacy of the advice that the BIAG have offered in the past due to the lack of consistent records of meetings and other ad hoc contact that police have had with its members. The members themselves feel very strongly that its existence has contributed positively towards community relations in Haringey. Several members of the Haringey BIAG are also members of the Trident IAG and are highly valued in that capacity.

The BIAG was the recipient of a joint award from Haringey Council and Police in 2009 for their work within the criminal justice system in reducing violent crime in Haringey.

The MPS, and specifically Haringey Borough, recognise the standing of BIAG members within the community and continue to value working in partnership with them to the benefit of the borough and the wider MPS as a whole. The police and BIAG members met on Tuesday 14th February 2012 and at that meeting agreed to meet on a monthly basis, discussions to include addressing specific issues such as stop and search and gangs. The MPS welcomes this.

Haringey BIAG is not exceptional in its lack of formal terms of reference. Across the MPS there is no universal standard that clearly defines the working relationship between an IAG, the individuals who operate as part of the group and the MPS. The review identifies this lack of clarity and the impact that had on community liaison as one of the key factors in both the inaccurate assessment of community tension that was formed and the subsequent community reaction.

The question specific to the events of August 2011 in Haringey is whether an IAG member just has responsibility for advising on police action or whether the role includes a wider responsibility directed at improving community relations with police by mitigating concerns and proactively advising on community issues as they arise. Haringey Police believed that the overall aim of obtaining critical independent advice was to improve community relations. They also believed that independent advisers would assist police in working towards that aim in all circumstances. It has become clear however that some independent advisers believe that their role in critically advising or monitoring police activity has defined boundaries, outside of which they have no responsibility. The review acknowledges that the
The police remain accountable for the decisions that they make and that the responsibility for actions to manage community impact also remains theirs regardless of the quality or nature of the input from IAG members.

The MPS remains committed to seeking independent advice and recognises that it is of paramount importance that as many different voices as possible are heard from its communities by the local police. It is equally important that those same communities have the opportunity to hear from the police via channels that they trust. This is particularly important in Haringey which is one of the London boroughs that has seen significant change in its community profile within the last twenty years.

The review recommends that Haringey Borough continues to work with independent members and that they also strive to broaden the representation of independent advisors from within the black community, including those under the age of thirty to ensure younger voices are heard.

**PAN LONDON INDEPENDENT ADVICE**

The issues regarding the role of IAG members are not unique to Haringey. Therefore it is critical that these differing views are resolved not just in Haringey but across London. There is a danger in extrapolating too widely individual lessons learnt during a time of extraordinary organisational crisis. However, the events of August 2011 have raised important questions regarding the efficacy of MPS community engagement and the need to use these events as an opportunity to review existing arrangements is fully recognised.

The report recommends that the method for gaining independent advice is reviewed. The MPS are clear that the need for independent advice is an absolute necessity to preserve its privileged position of policing by consent. This wider review will seek to determine whether the current structure and processes relating to IAGs remain appropriate as part of the way in which the MPS engages with communities. The value that such groups have provided over the years has been enormous. However if the lessons learnt from August 2011 are to be built on and the groups are to have credibility and add to police understanding, a renewing and refreshing process is now crucial.

The report recommends:

- That an audit be carried out by TP involving the MPS Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate (DCFD) on the current position of IAGs, whether they be independent, specialist or community advisory groups. The audit will include membership and diversity profile, arrangements for deployment, collation and sharing of advice and a method of monitoring the value of advice.

- To determine whether the current structure and processes of IAGs continue to be the most effective method of obtaining independent advice.

- To ensure that advisors consist of a cross-representation of their local communities and reach key groups that are appropriate to the borough, business group or corporate position. It is the responsibility of the MPS to ensure that boroughs proactively invite individuals who can represent influential groups within their communities.

- That a memorandum of understanding (MoU) is re-developed in consultation with advisors clarifying the relationship and expectation between the MPS and an advisor. This should include a clear description of the responsibilities of any advisor who goes on to participate in an ongoing issue having offered advice on, and therefore shared in, the policing plan for that issue.

- That a method of recording, in a manner that is retrievable at a later date, advice and police action resulting from specific advice is agreed between the MPS and its advisors.
The Haringey BIAG members were not the only community representatives who were contacted and relied upon by Haringey Police. Other KINs were contacted over the course of the two days following the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan. No community intelligence was provided to police regarding the possibility of imminent disorder arising out of levels of tension reaching a critical state. This leads to the recognition that the reach of the MPS into Haringey’s communities was neither as far reaching or current as it needed to be. The MPS concludes that the engagement in the period between the shooting of Mark Duggan and disorder on Saturday night involved too narrow a representation of the community.

The MPS recognises that it holds the responsibility for KIN membership and the use of the networks. The review recommends that Haringey Borough should review its KINs to deliver the widest possible engagement across all communities, and particularly from within black ethnic minority communities and those under thirty years of age.

Beyond Haringey, all MPS boroughs carried out local community engagement in tandem with the MPS corporate process that was taking place. To better understand the nature of MPS community engagement at a local level the review took an in depth look at some individual boroughs. In particular, the range of practices that took place was explored, including the quality of their messaging and their target audiences.

As expected some commonality in practice was found, for example all boroughs engaged with their KINs. This activity met with mixed success at best in acquiring an accurate reflection of community tension and intelligence. Overall it is clear that the MPS did not gain an accurate picture of the mood within London’s communities through the use of this part of the MPS engagement model. As a result, the observation and recommendation pertinent to Haringey Borough is valid for all MPS boroughs. Recognising the importance of effective community engagement, the MPS will explore its use of KINs and, if they continue to be part of the mechanism for achieving effective community engagement, will look to refresh their membership to ensure penetration into all communities and in particular the youth community.

There were however marked differences in some of the engagement practices used by boroughs. For example, the number and type of community meetings that were held by boroughs: Some held public meetings whilst others held invitational closed meetings. Boroughs further differed on the targeting of their engagement, with some prioritising communities defined by their ethnicity and some by their age. The nature and frequency of the communication to these communities was also varied. There are examples of specific youth-targeted engagement on some boroughs which appears to have had a positive effect on the level of disorder experienced, for example Hammersmith and Fulham Borough.

Diversity in community engagement approach is to be expected, each London borough being different in its make up and character. However the MPS recognises the need for greater consistency whilst respecting the individuality of each borough and has commissioned an improvement project, led by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Territorial Policing, on community engagement across the MPS in order to make improvements to the existing arrangements and to build upon developed best practice. The crucial element of this work will seek to ensure the MPS penetrates its communities, reaching key groups such as young people.

The review further recommends that, in circumstances such as those of August 2011, police should
consider a public undertaking to hold a community meeting to which the following would be invited to come together to engage with the wider community: local authority partners, the IPCC, community representatives, faith groups and elected politicians.

The MPS has recognised the unique position Haringey Borough is in post the riots. It has invested in 50 additional police officers to the borough to improve the visibility and accessibility of front line policing. The Borough Commander has listened to the views of the local community and responded by focusing the extra uniformed officers on delivering enhanced neighbourhood policing. This means additional officers on the street, on foot and highly visible to the local community.

On 14th February 2011 the Borough Operational Command Unit (BOCU) made 11 key promises to local people to demonstrate their commitment to reducing youth violence, making Haringey safer and building upon work already underway to develop better police and community relations. In support of the new front line officers and community promises, the MPS has further invested in a strong leadership team for the borough, to provide additional resilience and ensure that the new policing approach is delivered effectively.

**PAN LONDON ENGAGEMENT**

The review has examined the MPS’s corporate approach to community engagement in the early stages of the disorder in August. Community engagement as a practice is embedded within the ethos of the MPS and is practiced both locally and strategically across the organisation. The MPS response was founded on existing resources and processes.

The scale of the disorder drove an unprecedented London wide community engagement operation. The size of the operation and the enormity of its task led the MPS to set up a large command structure which included the relatively new role of Bronze Engagement. The unfamiliarity of officers with this role and structure led to some initial delays in the engagement process. Thereafter the command structure was streamlined and messaging protocols were established through the creation of the Engagement POD within SOR.

The MPS accepts that some borough commanders felt frustrated by the MPS strategy of centrally controlling the content and timing of information flow out. Whilst this was a safeguard to avoiding misinformation into the public domain, it also provided for an unnatural relationship for some boroughs with their communities and some mixed messaging being received.

The two MPS departments who have the responsibility for driving day to day community engagement across London are CTSET and the Safer Neighbourhoods Command. These departments currently sit in two different business groups within the MPS and, whilst they have some interaction, do not work closely together on a daily basis. The events of August, a time of critical need, has highlighted that the two departments’ working practices were not as complementary as they could have been. If this is true during critical incidents when the need is greatest it is very unlikely to be different during day to day business.

This consideration will form part of the wider review and improvement project on community engagement across London. Part of this work will specifically consider the better integration of the MPS’s London wide engagement functions, Specialist Operations’ CTSET and TP’s Safer Neighbourhoods Command, in order to bring operational benefits and efficiencies both in their day to day business and at times of critical organisational need.

**COMMUNITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

The MPS monitors tension in the community by way of a Community Impact Assessment (the template form is attached at Appendix B). It is a system which is used by both individual boroughs and the MPS corporately and is thus the standard mechanism for the collation of information and intelligence with which to form an assessment of tension monitoring on both a local and pan-London level. It is a critical area for the MPS as it is used as a basis to inform resource allocation and community engagement activity.

The Community Impact Assessment in Haringey has been discussed in section 4 of this report but to summarise, it suggested tension before the first night of violence was at a relatively low level. This was clearly an inaccurate assessment and raises questions about the effectiveness of this model of tension monitoring.
Similarly, the pan-London picture of tension did not provide an assessment reflective of the events which unfolded. Two separate issues arose. In the first instance, individual boroughs provided inconsistent levels of reporting into the central MPS community engagement team. This was partially resolved as the days went on by the introduction of a standardised template and central recommendations for minimum standards of engagement. Secondly, and more seriously, the MPS’s systems of gathering intelligence and information did not appear to provide accurate or sufficient quantities of such intelligence and information to inform a genuine picture. During the whole of August 2011 only one of the three tension monitoring categories - experienced, evidenced and potential - ever rose above level 5 to level 4. This calls into question the whole assessment aspect of this mechanism.

In order to address these issues, the review recommends a detailed examination of the current Community Impact Assessment process. This forms part of the work allocated to Deputy Assistant Commissioner TP and is due to be completed by April 2012.

### WORKING WITH PARTNERS

The review has considered how the MPS worked with the London Local Resilience Partnership. The Partnership comprises such agencies as the LFB, the LAS, the faith sector, the voluntary sector, the National Health Service, Transport for London, the City of London Police, British Transport Police and the Environment Agency, among others, who all work together to deliver plans to manage the consequences of large scale emergencies.

Traditionally the Partnership has been used to help in the consequence management of major incidents such as terrorist incidents. There is a very close working relationship between the two organisations and the MPS have two officers seconded to work within the London Resilience Team.

The events of August were being treated and managed as an on-going public order incident and therefore the London Resilience Team was not activated. The MPS accepts that it should assess large scale public order incidents at an initial stage to assess whether the earlier utilisation of the London Local Resilience Partnership would be of benefit. To this end the MPS has already introduced this approach within its public order training courses.

In furtherance of this, an MPS senior officer was present in SOR to consider the interests of partnership working during the various public order events of November 2011. This provided improved intelligence and was demonstrated on 30th November by the issues raised as a result of the strike impact on the capacity of the LAS. These issues were quickly resolved due to the fact that a gold group was convened with all appropriate partners in a very short period of time. This has now been adopted as good practice.

Given the nature of the events, two other specific partner agencies that the MPS worked very closely with were the LFB and the LAS. To build further on what is already a close working relationship the three agencies have already conducted joint training in order to capture the lessons learned during the August disorder and further increase understanding and inter-operability in complex events. The success of this training will now be promulgated to a wider audience in the form of a structured training package.

### SOCIAL MEDIA

In terms of social media the MPS is clear that its capability for using social media networks as engagement is in its infancy. During August 2011, an opportunity to engage with its communities more effectively was lost by the MPS. It is recognised that the facility to communicate instantly and in a far-reaching way could have been used to great effect, specifically to counter incorrect information and to improve public safety and confidence.

The MPS has two corporate Twitter sites carrying one-way information only, @CO11 and @metpoliceuk. Victim Facebook sites and YouTube have been used successfully but sporadically for MPS appeals and campaigns, such as witness appeals or raising awareness around youth violence. However, like the MPS Twitter accounts, these are very much operated as a broadcast, creating a ‘one way’ dialogue.

Like many other forces, the innovative and widespread use of social media for engagement with the online community in London has very much been restricted either through fear of staff misuse attracting negative publicity or a lack of skilled staff to operate its use. The MPS accepts that it has been too risk averse in its use of social media and that this is not a viable state of affairs to sustain. Its focus on issues relating to security controls and the prevention of its misuse must now shift.
The option of communicating via social media presents a way of facilitating two-way communication with sections of the community who the MPS does not currently reach - those that use such sites as their primary communication. With over 200 million users of Twitter, 800 million active users of Facebook and 3 billion views of YouTube a day, the MPS fully recognises the pivotal role played by social media in shaping public opinion of the police response and handling of a situation. The MPS must no longer respond retrospectively to the opportunities and risks presented by social media but must face both the challenge and opportunity of ensuring this rapidly evolving medium is managed effectively to enable it to engage with the public.

The MPS is not alone in its sluggishness to engage with social media. There is currently no national strategy, policy or tradecraft in respect of the police use of social media and individual forces conduct activity according to their own priorities and interpretation.

The review has led to significant work being undertaken to develop an effective response to social media and digital communications, which is being conducted by the MPS Digital Communications Steering Group and led by Commander Mark Streater, the MPS Head of Intelligence and Covert Policing. The overall project has as its focus to ensure that systems and structures are put in place to monitor, engage and respond in a pro-active manner via social media. Expert technical support to the project is provided by the MPS’s Directorate of Information who have brought both in-house and external resources to this work.

Engagement forms a specific strand of the project and is viewed as being the most significant strand, providing the foundation for how the MPS interfaces on a day to day basis with its communities and wider public. The strand will work on the ability of the MPS to inform the public on what is happening, to actively listen to online community concerns, to appeal for assistance and crucially to provide reassurance in the way that it is conducting its business.

The group has already started to develop a governance structure to bring control and standards over the existing initiatives and to launch new ideas for innovative engagement methods. It will develop the MPS’s presence across social media in respect of neighbourhood policing, corporate campaigns and the response to particular events or incidents.

There has already been some notable successes in this area. The MPS have continued to develop the @metpoliceuk Twitter feed and it is now followed by around 53,000 people. The tweets are more varied including links to stories on the MPS website, comments from the Commissioner and invitations to MPS events. On 24th November 2011, the MPS sent more than 80 updates via Twitter during Operation Hawk (the MPS’s day of action against criminal suspects), including live tweeting of arrests made and the use of Twitpic to show what items had been seized by police.

The MPS has planned for all 32 boroughs to have an official MPS Twitter account. Eight boroughs are already online and others will follow. The accounts are managed locally and as well as being used to broadcast to communities, the boroughs also respond to questions.

The MPS has also developed a new corporate Twitter account called @mpsonthestreet. This is a feed taken over for a day by an officer or unit. It has a conversational approach and the officer will reply to people who tweet the address. It is still relatively new and has to date been used for the 30th November demonstration (N30) and New Years Eve 2011 celebrations. It was a successful first outing with 800 followers in one day and a good reaction from the public.

Also during N30 the MPS made use of ‘Bambuser’, a live streaming website, to give a live commentary from an MPS commander in SOR. It was Bambuser’s highest ranked video from the UK on the day and each broadcast had around 500 viewers.

The MPS has also launched a new Facebook page which promotes key campaigns and the Commissioner’s community road shows. It makes use of video footage and photographs.

Further work in progress includes the development of ‘personalities’ within the MPS which the public will be able to follow via blogs and Twitter accounts. This will provide the ability for followers to converse over topical issues of interest or concern. The MPS is aware that certain aspects of its work have the potential to attract considerable public interest and the air support unit, being one, already has a feed, ‘MPS in the air.’ Similarly other units, for example the Olympic Command, mounted branch, dog section and marine units potentially provide a capability for the MPS to engage a large following on social media.
The MPS has launched and continues to build on a new model to tackle gang and youth violence. The use of social media will be incorporated within this work and it is recognised that a prominent opportunity exists to trial this in the MPS’s Connect Boroughs.

The significant work already undertaken and that planned for the future has demonstrated a compelling need for more designated MPS staff to be trained in social media engagement, specifically at borough level. There is no current trained cadre of individuals to undertake this critical role. Similarly an investment in technology has also been identified and both these aspects also form part of the overall digital communications project work.

STOP AND SEARCH

The Riots, Communities and Victim Panel work (2011) outlines perceptions towards stop and search as being a major source of discontent with the police. This concern was widely felt by young black and Asian men who felt it was not always carried out with appropriate respect.

A bespoke public survey was commissioned by the MPS in 2009 to capture youth BME (black and minority ethnic) views of and experiences towards policing (the BME survey). The survey findings allow us to explore issues of respect within the stop and search experience in more detail.

Across all survey respondents from the BME survey or Public Attitude Survey (PAS) those who reported being stopped in the last twelve months had a more negative view about policing. However, of those stopped, the BME group tended to have a more negative view than the white group and perceive the stop encounter differently. Significantly only a quarter of the BME males (25%) felt fully treated with respect compared with over a half of the white males (54%).

More detailed analysis was conducted upon wave two of the BME survey conducted in the summer of 2011. Interestingly, three quarters (75%) of respondents supported the stop and search tactic as something that the police should be able to use. There was no difference between males and females here.

The MPS continues to work closely with its communities to ensure their continuing support for its tactics. The use of stop and search is a powerful tool to combat violence and to deter those who are thinking about carrying weapons. Stop and search is part of a range of tactics being deployed daily in order to keep Londoners safe. Its use is intelligence led, targeted and monitored internally and externally to ensure that the MPS uses its powers smartly and consistently.

The MPS recognises that the most significant issue being raised is not the use of the power itself but the nature of the encounter and accepts that its quality of interaction can improve. Furthermore there is recognition that officer interactions with the public on all levels is central to delivering the MPS commitment to Commissioner Hogan-Howe’s Total Policing vision.

To this end, it is important that the MPS reviews not only its stop and search strategy, but also the wider engagement of its officers, particularly those in the front line and who engage regularly with young people. The Deputy Commissioner has already set out the central aims of the MPS’s new approach to stop and search - to make it a more effective tactic with a greater focus on tackling violence and to increase trust and confidence among communities.

In furtherance of these aims, the use of S.60 CJPOA as an operational tactic has been reviewed; the threshold for its authorisation has risen and its overall use in London will be reduced. Furthermore the proactive use of Section 1 PACE searches will now be used primarily to combat violent crime and keep London’s streets safe. This entails a firm focus on intelligence based tasking and leadership to ensure that the use of this legitimate and effective policing power continues to have community support.

The MPS will ensure that communities will have a transparent view of the use of stop and search and have confidence that it is being used responsibly to keep them safe. The recording of stop and account will remain in force within the MPS and the public accountability and scrutiny of the police use of search powers will be strengthened at a local and strategic level.

Commander Tony Eastaugh is leading changes to the way the MPS uses stop and search within London. Ongoing engagement with communities, interest groups and young people in particular is an important part of this work that is being developed.

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23 A survey first conducted in 2010/2011 focused on the experience of over 1,000 young (16-30) BME males across 4 boroughs (Newham, Hounslow, Southwark and Tower Hamlets). The second year expands to young females (n=501), in addition to the males (n=504).
24 The Public Attitude Survey consists of 12,800 face-to-face interviews representative of all Londoners per year.
through the Stop and Search Community Monitoring Network, work with a variety of youth groups and in development with the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime.

**PUBLIC SUPPORT**

The MPS would like to take the opportunity to recognise and extend its thanks for the overwhelming public support that was offered both during the disturbances and in their aftermath. There are many instances of individual officers receiving specific praise and demonstrable public support on the streets of London and the MPS received in excess of 2,000 messages of support and thanks.

The views of Londoners are important for the MPS and are routinely captured through the PAS. Public confidence in the police is a key outcome measure for the MPS and it knows that when the public have confidence in the police they are more willing to cooperate, obey the law and come forward with information to assist the police.

The PAS was ‘in the field’ capturing Londoners’ views both before and after the disorder. This provided an opportunity to test whether confidence in the police changed in the immediate aftermath of the disorder. The MPS found no evidence that the disorder had affected Londoners’ confidence in the police, either at a local or London wide level.\(^{25}\)

The MPS understands that it can only police London effectively with the consent of the people. It is therefore vital that the MPS listens to the views of the people it protects, and responds appropriately to improve the quality of service it provides.

To support better communication between police and communities the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police has launched a series of road shows across boroughs. Here members of the public are able to hear first hand from the Commissioner about his vision and priorities for policing in London and are able to raise concerns and put questions directly to him and other senior officers. These road shows will offer every borough in London the opportunity to hear and question the Commissioner, with the opportunity to submit questions to him after the event made available to all.

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\(^{25}\) We have found no statistically significant difference in levels of confidence in local policing (63%-63%) and policing in London as a whole (59%-60%) before and after the Disorder. MPS Public Attitude Survey data: 5th June-30th September 2011 sample = 2234.
Prior to August 2011, the MPS dealt with public order intelligence by way of a specialised unit that would prepare for and support public order events as they happened, ordinarily with notice having already been provided to police for such an event to take place. The events of August did not fit this pattern both in spontaneity and scale. Thus the police were forced to adapt as it became clear that the disorder was gaining momentum.

Up until serious disorder broke out in Tottenham on the evening of Saturday 6th August, Haringey Borough had maintained responsibility for intelligence gathering to inform the need for an operational response. This was primarily gained by making contact with community members and is discussed in detail above. Following the change from peaceful protest to violent disorder it became clear that more MPS intelligence resources were needed to inform the developing policing plan.

MIB provides a corporate intelligence service in support of pan London activity. However, public order policing had been hitherto outside its remit due to the nature of public order events being largely pre-planned and therefore dealt with by the dedicated public order intelligence team. The MIB’s ability to implement quickly an intelligence structure to assess large volumes of information and to respond to what was needed by the organisation was significantly challenged by the scale and nature of these events.

Limited success was achieved in predicting and preventing disorder. The example of Hackney Carnival being cancelled due to intelligence is included above. There are also numerous examples across the boroughs of specific intelligence being acted upon by police who were able to disrupt and prevent planned attacks and looting. By way of example, Brent Borough had some notable examples of reacting to intelligence that was coming in. Key to the success of this borough in preventing major disorder and looting was the fast time dissemination of this intelligence to the Senior Management Team who in turn ensured the rapid deployment of resources to key areas identified.

For example, on Monday 8th August 2011 intelligence of planned disorder at the Currys store in Staples Corner was received. Resources were deployed and on their attendance numerous arrests were made for public order. This swift action prevented mass looting at the location.

Similarly intelligence was provided regarding a stolen vehicle that was to be used in later organised looting together with details of many of those involved and potential target areas. By acting on this intelligence, the groups were successfully intercepted en route to the identified areas and 23 of about 40 suspects were detained and arrested in possession of numerous items to facilitate their looting.

However, the MPS recognises that successes were limited and that the majority of the widespread disorder and looting was not disrupted or prevented. Police numbers are a critical factor, but the inability to deal with such vast volumes of intelligence also played its part.

A serious challenge was the evaluation of these quantities of intelligence. The majority of information received through the Sunday and Monday related to further possible areas of disorder, but much of this information was graded as material whose source was previously unknown and could not therefore be relied on. Due to the volumes of information reports generated it was not possible with any degree of accuracy to differentiate between that which was current and relevant and that which was historic. Similarly information that was subject of multiple reporting was very difficult to distinguish.

From the Monday through to the Tuesday, the information received continued to identify further areas where disorder was rumoured to take place but became predominantly of an historic nature, naming individuals and areas affected by the events.
of the disorder. Thus intelligence reports continued to grow in number following the dissipation of disorder.

As a result of the challenges of relevance and currency of information reports, MIB focussed on the triage and assessment of information which indicated where disorder was either in progress or likely to happen. Briefing documents informed the Tactical Commander for London of the changing intelligence picture by providing locations of note categorised into tiers:

- Tier 1: Disorder very likely in the near future
- Tier 2: Disorder likely in near future
- Tier 3: Limited intelligence suggesting disorder

Briefings were provided hourly at peak times to the Tactical Commander in SOR. This priority was in order that the best possible decisions for the deployment of resources could be made, and did not prioritise any specific location in London. 1,554 reports in total were assessed and disseminated to SOR in this way between the 7th and 14th August 2011.

**SOCIAL MEDIA**

Numerous reports related to social media being a primary source of information. From the 1,554 reports assessed and disseminated by MIB the use of social networking sites equated to 337 (19%) of the total assessed reports, with BBM information included in a further 249 (14%).

The events of August demonstrated how social media is now widely used as a planning and communication medium by people intent on causing disruption. The ability of gangs to co-ordinate widespread crime during the riots by using the internet and other means of digital communication was a new phenomenon.

It is clear therefore that social media provided significant opportunities for the collection of publicly available intelligence. However the MPS had not encountered an incident with such fast-moving coverage and its system to coordinate and prioritise the collection of relevant intelligence was tested to the limit. The MPS could not comprehensively monitor social media in real-time and was therefore not in a position to be moving ahead of events.

Specifically, there was insufficient resilience in both trained staff and technology, to review, capture and download the vast volume of open source data which needed to be processed. There were no automated search tools to enable accurate and fast time directional searching across the internet on trigger issues.

The MPS’s embryonic social media capability was further complicated by the concurrent need for the evidential capture of material before it was deleted from the public arena.

The MPS is committed to developing its ability to use social media as a tool to understand and know what is going on in the community, as well as to measure the pulse and temperature of public attitude and concern on police related issues.

There is significant work underway to obtain the appropriate technology for use in the police intelligence arena. The products that analyse social media are specifically in the business intelligence field. Most are used by the commercial world to understand product trends, data mining and indications of customer characteristics. The MPS is in the process of working with providers to adapt software to fit a law enforcement model.

The Home Office have agreed to fund an MPS project to develop the use of social media intelligence technology ahead of the Olympic Games, including relevant training. Consideration will then be given to extending this work after the games to developing a wider national system. In addition the Digital Communications and Internet Service Providers have indicated to the Home Office and ACPO groups that they are willing to help provide training and advice to the police service in the development of a more effective use and understanding of social media.

**ENHANCING PUBLIC ORDER INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY**

At the time of the disorder, the MPS had a specialised public order intelligence team which had been honed around the policing of pre-planned peaceful protest events and did not form part of MIB. The team was headed by one officer who would perform the role of Intelligence Officer within SOR for public order events. This existing capability could not support the large scale disorder experienced in August 2011 and the MPS was forced into creating a system...
using the greater resources of MIB to enhance its intelligence capability.

In recognition of this, the MPS has now begun its work to create a cadre of trained, accredited officers who specialise in the role of Bronze Intelligence within the Operational Command Team for public order events. Training for these identified officers is being devised with specific regard to being prepared for the forthcoming Olympic Games.

In addition, a member of the cadre shadowed the existing public order intelligence team officer performing the role of Intelligence Officer as part of the police response to the 9th November 2011 student demonstrations. This was further developed for the 30th November 2011 public sector demonstration when the shadowing officer undertook the role of Bronze Intelligence and thereby trialled the use of a developed intelligence system for providing a more professionalised public order intelligence capability.

The work around professionalising the intelligence aspect of public order policing continues and the MPS are committed to the full development of a public order intelligence cadre and the preparation of trained individuals to perform the Intelligence Officer role for the Olympic Games period.

In extension of this, work is also underway to develop closer working practices between current public order intelligence structures and MIB. The two have been working in partnership to develop the intelligence support structures for large public order events which will enable a refined intelligence structure to be in place immediately at times of unrest or during large scale public order events.

One example to illustrate this work was the shortfall in public order intelligence structures for social media research capabilities. Additional capacity has been developed through MIB resources to provide further coverage on a 24/7 basis to public order policing.

MIB provided staff and skills to enhance the intelligence service provided to the policing response to the 9th November students’ demonstration. For the Remembrance Day and weekend ceremonies MIB provided the additional intelligence support required to police the events. This included additional social media monitoring capability being provided.

In this way the learning from the August disorder has already turned into intelligence procedures and products for the delivery of a more effective public order operational delivery.

The MPS is also working very closely with the Strategic Oversight Board for the ACPO response to the HMIC Review into August 2011 disorders. Assistant Commissioner Rowley is leading on the intelligence workstream which is looking to develop a national ‘all source’ hub. The purpose of the hub will be to collect, manage and disseminate public order intelligence and will be linked to national mobilisation to ensure prioritised coordination.
POLICING THE MARCH - SATURDAY 6TH AUGUST 2011

The community engagement activity undertaken by Haringey Police over the three days did not identify critical levels of tension that may have suggested the extreme levels of disorder that were to follow. Based on the information that was available and the advice of independent advisors the facilitative plan was appropriately resourced. It included officers present at Tottenham Police Station sufficient to facilitate a peaceful protest and extra resources in close proximity to be called on at Tottenham Hotspur football ground and Commissioner’s Reserve resources.

The contingencies of that plan accounted for why police resources were still available some hours after the march was meant to have taken place. Post-event analysis of police planning on the 6th August has concluded that deployments and requests for further resources were made based on the available intelligence and in the context of many years of low community tension. It had been nearly fifteen years since serious disorder had taken place in inner London boroughs.

SERVICE MOBILISATION

It became clear that further MPS resources were needed when the situation in Haringey changed from peaceful protest to violent disorder on the evening of Saturday 6 August. The rapid escalation of violence also made it clear that yet further MPS resources were urgently required. The SMP was activated at 2133hrs on 6th August 2011.

The SMP operated by the MPS provides the corporate mechanism for providing additional Level 1, 2 and 3 public order trained police officers for deployment to spontaneous public disorder, terrorism or civil emergency incidents. It is reliant on an ‘on call’ system of senior police officers to provide command, coordination and control.

The activation process is instigated by the on call senior public order command officer. This took place at 2030hrs on Saturday 6th August 2011. This decision was communicated to the Chief Inspector on duty within the MPS Central Communications Command (CCC), whose role it is to send messages to all BOCUs to seek resources.

The SMP has two levels of message available to be sent:

- The AMBER message - indicating that the SMP has been activated and requesting an assessment of specific resources available.
- The RED message - indicating which BOCUs are to mobilise resources.

As has already been noted, Superintendent Gomm instigated the RED phase but the AMBER message was sent.

The method of mobilising officers is predetermined and necessarily comprises significant time delays. Each borough takes responsibility for assembling a set number of officers, including the vehicles and equipment that they will need for deployment. A central coordination point is then informed when this has been achieved and the resources are brigaded to form Police Support Units (PSUs), which comprise 1 inspector, 3 sergeants and 21 constables. These PSUs become the deployable public order asset.

It is the finding of the review that despite the fact that the RED phase of the SMP was not immediately activated, the activation of the existing SMP in whichever phase would have had little impact on the disorder which escalated so rapidly in Tottenham. Furthermore it is acknowledged that the numbers of officers that were mobilised were not entirely as a result of the SMP. Rather, self-mobilisation took place as officers became aware that colleagues were becoming in urgent need of assistance.
At the time of the disorder the SMP operated a phased response to deliver a full mobilisation within three hours of activation, comprising 380 public order trained officers. However the situation that took hold in Tottenham so rapidly on the evening of Saturday 6th August 2011 would not have been quelled by this phased response. Post event a professional assessment has been undertaken by public order professionals to determine the levels of resource which would have been required to contain the disorder and clear Tottenham High Road. It is assessed to be in excess of 25 PSUs, in other words in excess of 750 public order trained officers.

The SMP resource levels have been revised during the course of this review to reflect the learning from Operation Kirkin. Any activation of the SMP now ascertains the number of public order trained officers on duty and, dependant on emerging threats and intelligence, resources are mobilised to forward mustering points rather than held on boroughs. They are then formed into PSUs at these points and sent directly to the required location. A recent exercise, taking place at 1500hrs on a weekday, showed that the MPS could have mobilised 32 PSUs under this method. In addition, the number of senior officers on call has been increased in order to enhance the efficiency of the mobilisation of these officers.

There is a limitation around how quickly significant numbers of officers can be made available and mobilised to a particular location however. Clearly there are times in a 24 hour period where available resources are leaner in number. This is a direct result of borough policing working to a shift pattern that matches resources to territorial policing demand. The MPS is currently committed through its mobilisation plan to have available at any given time a minimum number of public order trained officers on duty to mobilise nine PSUs. This meets its national commitment for mobilisation, as well providing resources within the MPS in times of spontaneous disorder.

The minimum levels of public order trained officers available to be called upon by the MPS should the SMP be triggered in the future remains under consideration. This forms part of a wider piece of mobilisation work being undertaken by the MPS under the direction of Commander Public Order Branch; specifically with regard to uplift in the number of public order trained officers and its relationship with the ongoing TP Development Programme, which is reshaping the way London borough policing is delivered, and includes a fundamental review of shift patterns across the MPS. It is recognised that the necessity to swiftly assemble trained, equipped and fully briefed officers requires an agile Service Mobilisation Plan that delivers the resource in the shortest time possible.

The events of August 2011 brought into focus the fact that the existing service mobilisation system did not mobilise any additional support to deal with the incident triggering the SMP. Specifically, if the trigger was a public disorder situation as in this case, the public order command team were not automatically supported by any bespoke intelligence unit or criminal investigation capability. The MPS has already addressed this issue in the short term by developing a cadre of officers who can perform the roles of ‘bronze investigation’ and ‘bronze intelligence.’ Should the SMP be triggered, officers in each of these roles will be in place from the start.

In development of this, the MPS is undertaking work to extend the scope of the SMP to include the activation of other MPS assets, including specialist assets for deployment direct to the incident such as mounted branch and dog teams. In addition the mobilisation of a support infrastructure in the form of logistics staff, the use of police staff to backfill relevant officer roles (and thus release greater officer asset) and the use of officers from the Special Constabulary in spontaneous public disorder incidents is being developed.

The MPS Public Order Command has also planned and successfully trialled a new system for resourcing planned public order events. All events are graded to attract a specific response depending on the assessment of the likelihood of disorder occurring. This includes the ability to have available a strategic reserve of officers who remain on their boroughs but are deployable anywhere in the MPS at short notice.

CONTINUED MOBILISATION

The following gives clarity around resource levels deployed across the MPS during the disorder period, and illustrates the escalation of the police response, as determined by ‘Gold London;’

- Saturday 6 August: Approximately 3,000 officers across London + 380 MPS public order officers deployed to Haringey + 100 mutual aid
- Sunday 7 August: Approximately 4,275 across London includes 1,275 public order trained, of which 124 were mutual aid
On each successive day further numbers were mobilised based on an assessment of what had taken place the preceding day coupled with available intelligence for what might happen the next day. In this regard, the numbers recorded above provide their own narrative.

The MPS did not predict that disorder in Tottenham would be replicated in four further boroughs the next day and then on to in excess of twenty two boroughs the following day. By Tuesday the phenomenon of copycat disorder had become apparent to inform a successful assessment of sufficient numbers needing to be deployed to finally suppress further spread in London.

**ACPO POLICE NATIONAL INFORMATION COORDINATION CENTRE (PNICC)**

The MPS made use of mutual aid arrangements whereby other police forces supply numbers of public order trained officers according to need. This is ordinarily arranged via PNICC. PNICC is a national unit which exists to quickly put in place an effective mechanism for deploying resources when the demand exceeds the capability or normal procedures within a force or region. PNICC will only be activated for a spontaneous mobilisation on the authority of a chief police officer.

In fact, MPS links with surrounding forces led to mutual aid being provided in the first instance without the support of PNICC. However as events escalated and indeed became a national issue, PNICC assumed control of inter-force arrangements and the MPS benefited from the formal deployment of mutual aid resource.

In order to manage the needs of the officers from other forces the MPS Marine Support Unit’s management team were assigned to coordinate the logistical challenges associated with the large numbers of officers involved. They liaised with PNICC, individual forces and the PSUs directly. They arranged accommodation, feeding and briefing for all mutual aid serials.

Whilst arrangements for briefing and deploying those officers appeared to work well, providing sufficient suitable accommodation was an issue for the MPS. Following initial short-notice utilisation of some MPS and Army accommodation, university accommodation was eventually sourced utilising arrangements which will be in place for policing the Olympics in 2012.

The MPS contacted all forces that had provided mutual aid to Operation Kirkin throughout August and September with a view to de-briefing them. The aim of the debriefing exercise was to identify any learning to be taken forward and to seek feedback from their experiences. The following forces were de-briefed: Staffordshire, Warwickshire, Derbyshire, West Midlands, Nottinghamshire, Thames Valley and South Wales Police. The debriefs were split into four distinct areas: Standards and Leadership, Intelligence and Briefings, Community Engagement and Other.

As expected a mixture of experiences were reported. Of note, visiting officers expressed the need for local knowledge to be available to them in the form of experienced local officers. There is some evidence that this worked well in some areas and not in others.

The perception of visiting officers was that too little emphasis was placed on positive engagement or reassurance patrolling by MPS officers. This was an observation of both visiting officers and some London community members and will feature as part of the community engagement recommendation discussed in section 1 of this report.

**DEPLOYMENT OF OFFICERS**

The review has found no evidence to support the suggestion that the MPS, in distributing its resources, prioritised certain areas of London. As more public order trained officers were made available over the Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, they were deployed across London to support local borough policing plans, as determined by information and intelligence, or in response to escalated disorder beyond the capacity of local police. To ensure that this response was as balanced and speedy as possible, London was divided into four sectors on Monday 8th August and five sectors on Tuesday 9th August. Public order officers and commanders were allocated proportionately to each sector. The delay
Mutual Aid officers made a huge contribution to supporting MPS resources.

in getting public order resources to some boroughs was because there simply were not enough.

The MPS Police Federation has conducted an extensive survey among members to seek their views following the August disorder. Prior to this survey, the MPS review team provided officers from Enfield, Haringey, Hackney and Croydon who were involved in the policing of the disorder the opportunity to give their views on what they felt went well, not so well and what the MPS could do better. Camaraderie was flagged as a positive within the service and the allocation of resources as something that could be improved. Officers cited instances of officers being sent long distances across London to be given a meal, and then having to drive back across town for their deployment. This finding of non-effective deployment was apparent amongst mutual aid serials also who cited instances of being deployed to a borough who had not been given forewarning of their attendance. The MPS has sought to address this issue by the additional senior officer resource to deal specifically with deployment issues.

It was also noted that some officers were deployed to fill requirements on neighbouring boroughs rather than their own and the MPS accepts that as far as possible local officers should police local areas.
PUBLIC ORDER TRAINED OFFICERS

The MPS has acknowledged that the number of public order trained officers available on the first three nights of the operation was not sufficient to deal with the levels of criminality and disorder which were faced. The MPS understands that, should such events happen again, a significant increase in trained officers would be required to successfully quell disorder and sustain a police response.

Options have been put forward to increase the number of Level 1 trained officers by 25% (200 staff) and Level 2 officers by 50% (1,750 staff equal to an additional 70 PSUs). These additional numbers could be achieved within existing training capacity although it is recognised that additional cost would be incurred in the issue of individual personal protective equipment and a commensurate amount of shields.

Similarly, in order for this increased number of officers to be operationally viable an increase in the number of protected vehicles would be required. In the current climate the MPS is fully aware of the cost implications of any proposed recommendations however there would be cost benefits in the long run.

A 25% increase in Level 1 trained officers would increase this specialist capability to nearly 1,000 officers. This would give each of the existing five bases an additional unit. This number would be manageable in terms of accommodation and management levels and would provide an increase of 15 Level 1 trained PSUs. The feedback provided to the MPS through the de-briefing of mutual aid serials underlined the benefit of specialist officers - the mentality, professionalism and standards shown by the Level 1 officers were described as ‘commendable’.

Enhancing specialist resources would also increase the range of tactics available to command teams, for example the supporting of baton gun teams, static protection, arrest teams and their Level I public order function. If each area increased by one unit, reserves to support boroughs would be increased as would the availability of Level 1 officers for the SMP.

An increase in Level 2 officers would further increase the numbers of shield trained officers available to boroughs. The demand for Level 2 officers is extremely high due to the number of events requiring this level of training. The benefits of increasing the number of Level 2 officers would provide essential resilience to the boroughs. The SMP would also be further supported by an increase in Level 2 officers on duty to respond to its second wave. The MPS’s own uplift in numbers would also cut mutual aid cost on the basis that it would rarely be needed due to the ability to deploy in excess of 200 PSUs if the proposed increase was realised.

Alternate models are being provided to MPS Management Board for discussion and decision. The MPS is mindful of the financial constraints facing the service and the impact of such investment on other service priorities.

Recognising the pivotal role that local officers themselves played in both preventing and responding to disorder, the MPS will also consider further training and equipping level three officers to enable broader deployment in a public order environment. In response to the events of August and as preparation for the Olympic Games delivery the MPS has added a public order element to every officer’s mandatory training program.

The MPS will also consider issuing these officers with basic protection equipment. Head protection and public order boots would allow a certain level of public order policing to be undertaken by a general police officer which would release specialist trained...
An MPS police dog, Zack, was injured during the disorder. Photograph courtesy of Press Association

officers for more relevant deployments. For example, such an enhanced level of protection would enable officers to remain deployed in more confrontational situations than is presently possible when wearing normal police uniform.

PUBLIC ORDER COMMANDERS AND INSPECTORS

The numbers and diversity of its public order commanders cadre is something that the MPS has been pursuing for some time. Sufficient resilience was maintained throughout the events of August 2011, however there is recognition that this was largely due to prolonged tours of duty being undertaken. With the coming Olympic Games the MPS is undertaking significant efforts to ensure its officers are fully prepared and efforts are also being made to enhance the existing cadre.

The public order strategic training unit are coordinating the following activity:

- Running a series of public order cadre seminars to update its officers
- Cadre weekends under the refresher programme are arranged throughout 2012. The content has been reviewed to ensure its relevance and currency
- A cadre individual plan (CIP) has been developed to identify and develop individuals longer term in the role of Gold to ensure resilience and experience in the future
- Cadre insight days are being conducted to recruit potential cadre officers from across the MPS

The events of August have also brought into focus the role of the Level 2 trained inspector. These are individuals who volunteer to be trained in public order policing on top of their usual role and who are then called upon to lead a PSU on the ground at times of deployment. The MPS conducted a debriefing seminar with its Level 2 inspectors following the disorder.

The main issue highlighted was one of resilience. Currently there are only 115 trained inspectors available and virtually all are based within territorial policing. This causes pressure on borough policing when large scale disorder happens and the MPS
are exploring training inspectors, and other ranks, from business groups other than TP to relieve this pressure.

The MPS recognises that it must enhance and professionalise the role of the Level 2 inspector with a view to ensuring such staff are better equipped to perform the role that the organisation demands of them. To this end, a development programme for all Level 1 and 2 trained inspectors will be implemented. This programme will include:

- A continual personal development programme for all Level 1 and 2 inspectors
- The appointment of a member of the public order commanders cadre to mentor each Level 1 and 2 inspector
- Their attendance at cadre development seminars
- Their attendance with their cadre mentor to the public order commanders’ refresher training to better understand the role of the public order commander
- Appraisals to include feedback from the cadre mentor on the inspector’s performance and competence in their public order role
- The MPS promotion process to include a weighting to reflect the experience and willingness to become trained in public order policing

**PERSONNEL CARRIERS**

Feedback from staff was that the effectiveness of the MPS mobilisation and deployment of officers was in some instances adversely affected by some vehicle fleet issues. There were insufficient numbers of suitably equipped vehicles that necessitated the use of mini buses that were not compatible with the role. The MPS public order planning office is addressing this issue.

The MPS minibus fleet is leased, and currently due replacement. It comprises 73 9-seater vehicles, 71 spread across the 32 boroughs and two held by the public order planning command, and an additional 40 15-seater vehicles. These have police markings but do not have blue lights or sirens nor do they have protective grills.

During 2011 the MPS has found it necessary to use this fleet on many occasions to transport Level 2 officers engaged on public order events. Their use has proved problematic due to limited space within and the weight restrictions applicable to the 9-seater minibuses. Without the blue light and siren response capability deployment of officers has also been too slow at times.

The use of minibuses was a necessity during the August disorder period because of the number of officers that were needed to be deployed. The numbers of officers deployed necessitated the hiring of additional minibuses from a variety of sources in order to support the policing during the disorder. The additional numbers were in excess of 100 at the peak deployment times.

The MPS is seeking to use the opportunity of the current replacement programme to change its make up to 78 15-seater and 35 9-seater minibuses and to equip each one with a blue light and siren capability. This would enhance the MPS’s self-sufficient ability to mobilise correctly equipped officers in a safe and timely way.

Police ‘carriers’ are the preferred choice of vehicle. They enable ‘carrier tactics’ to be used, namely using the vehicle itself as a resource, and can enter a disorder situation due to their extra protection whereas minibuses cannot. However the MPS understands that the extra funding required to purchase and maintain a comprehensive fleet of such vehicles would be significant. It is however taking the opportunity of scoping other vehicle models which could be used to support public order trained officers in the most cost effective way.

**LOGISTICS**

The logistical support required to support an operation such as that undertaken during August 2011 can not be understated. It is an area that went well for the MPS.

Examples of the kind of support that was supplied by the MPS’s Resource Directorate are:

- Catering Services provided feeding facilities around the clock and supplied 77,000 meals and 72,500 snacks to MPS and Mutual Aid officers
• Criminal Exhibit Services assisted at various crime scenes and provided warehouse facilities to store five lorry-loads of exhibits recovered by police. The remainder of recovered goods and exhibits were housed in existing borough criminal exhibit stores.

• Information, Communications and Technology maintained personal issue equipment such as Airwave radios and additional batteries and provided other specialist equipment in support of front line policing.

• Property Services co-ordinated requests for resources on a 24/7 basis, carried out security works and repairs following riot damage to MPS buildings, surveyed various crime scenes and delivered in excess of 700 personal issue fire extinguishers.

• Transport Services managed the lease/hire vehicle supply and through their workshop facilities maintained the MPS vehicle fleet, including carrying out all necessary repairs to protective carriers and other vehicles caused by riot damage.

• Travel Services assisted with accommodating in excess of 1,000 Mutual Aid officers within section houses, hotels and student accommodation around the capital.

• Uniform Services provided additional public order clothing to meet the huge increase in demand.

• Vehicle Recovery Examination Services recovered and stored vehicles damaged in the riots utilising the MPS ‘Special Operations Removal’ teams and contractors.

The SHRMT also addressed the important question of whether the MPS would have been able to maintain the tempo of the operation should the disorder have continued longer. The MPS recognises the importance of this work in order to be better prepared in the future and specifically in its preparation towards the delivery of the Olympic Games.

The MPS public order capability was not only deployed to the events of the August disorder but continued to be deployed throughout the whole of August up to and including the policing of the Notting Hill Carnival over the August bank holiday weekend. Significant demands were placed on individual public order officers and commanders at every level, ranging from very lengthy individual tours of duty lasting many hours and in excess of normal demands, to the cancellation of pre-planned holidays and rest days resulting in long series of days working in highly pressurised roles without a break.

The issues, such as those described above, which arose from a prolonged operation such as policing the events of August and beyond, and the ability of the MPS to successfully and safely maintain such an operation in the future are being considered by the public order command team. Senior public order officers are assessing the findings and judging how they can be best adopted in the operational arena. The Olympic Plan is also being considered against important implications that prolonged policing commitments introduce.

**TECHNOLOGY - AIRWAVE**

Despite unprecedented demand during the disorder, the review has identified no concerns with regard to Airwave radio coverage. By utilising additional equipment in place for the Olympics, officers supplied from other forces working in support of the MPS were able to communicate using their own radios on shared MPS talk groups without configuration issues.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES**

**(SPECIAL OPERATIONS ROOM)**

The Special Operations Room (SOR) is the central control room (situated within the MPS Central Communications Command) providing communications support to the command of all pre-planned or spontaneous major incidents and events happening throughout the Metropolitan Police.
District. The SOR deals with over 500 events and operations annually and will be where the MPS coordinates the command and communications of its policing operations at the 2012 Olympic Games. These range from small scale operations or regular events such as the policing operation surrounding Prime Ministers Questions, up to the policing of large scale public events like the Notting Hill Carnival or the London Marathon. The policing of state visits, sporting events and spontaneous disorder or demonstrations are all handled within this purpose built facility.

The software used within SOR is termed MetOps and was introduced in the 1980s. The age of the system means that it is not linked directly to the software used in the MPS Central Communications Centre (CCC), known as the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. This can result in CCC being unaware of what is being dealt with within SOR and conversely SOR being unaware of what is being dealt with through the CAD system. The MetOps system is a messaging and recording system not designed for dynamic incident management. This limitation means that Gold and Silver commanders have no simple way to view the latest situation in an evolving incident. Situation reports are created manually within the system but the software itself does not extract any information itself.

The events of August and in particular the size and scale of the policing operation brought into focus some principal issues for the command team.

- The inability to ascertain which sector had the highest work load and demands, for example by extracting the number of arrests taking place or the number and nature of officer injuries being experienced
- The inability to establish where reserves were specifically deployed, how long they had been active and how this in turn related to the MPS’s reserve capability.
- The inability to monitor key incidents
- Slow communication with commanders on the ground.
- The lack of capability to hand over command to the oncoming command team
- The inability to log key decisions and rationales for future review.

These significant limitations coupled with the sheer scale of task around the flow of information, communication and co-ordination of resources posed an immense challenge for those within SOR, particularly on Monday 8th August. With respect to communication, the MPS is evaluating new technology as part of the future of its command centres.

The MPS was in the process of replacing its Command and Control systems before August 2011. The shortcomings of the incident planning and management support to these events will be fed into the requirements for these systems and those that interface with them. In the meantime some temporary solutions are proposed; a new GIS system is being trialled in order to assist with the co-ordination of resources and the availability of existing MPS software (currently used in live crime investigations) is being considered for use within SOR.
7.6 PUBLIC ORDER TACTICS

The MPS is aware that the way in which the serious disorder was policed has been the subject of much debate and recognises the importance of the public having as full an understanding of policing decisions and actions as possible.

The events of August 2011, and in particular the first three nights, saw MPS tactics tested to the extreme. The review has established that when officers were able to deploy those tactics that they had trained and tested on a regular basis, they largely worked in the way that they were intended. Of note however was a need in many cases to adapt those tactics to meet the challenges that the disorder presented.

When confronted with a scene of serious disorder, public order officers are faced with four basic options; to isolate, contain, arrest or disperse the crowd. At all stages officers will attempt to use communication as a means of reducing the threats faced. However, should this approach fail or not be viable, officers can resort to a range of tactical options and resources to affect their desired outcome. Options include the use of officers in protective clothing with shields, arrest teams, dogs, mounted branch, vehicle tactics and ultimately baton rounds. Each of these present different risks to the safety of the public and police officers. Importantly any tactical deployment must be a proportionate and necessary response to the incident and officers need to be able to account for their decisions and subsequent actions.

Under the direction of an experienced public order Gold commander, a small working group of experienced public order leaders, firearms specialists, public order trainers and practitioners was established post August. The remit of this group was to review current public order tactics and explore opportunities around making them more flexible and adaptable to the evolving picture of public order in this country, specifically in order to better address the speed and agility of criminality experienced in August. Furthermore, the MPS recognises the opportunities that exist through this group to seek to develop tactics around the issue of the criminal use of firearms in public order.

The work of this group continues under Assistant Commissioner Rowley. A continued structure of meetings to develop tactics for spontaneous violence in particular, but also for standard tactics, has been put in place. New approaches to public order tactics will be tested and implemented as appropriate. Arrest tactics have already been tested, for example, and are discussed below. Another outcome of this work is the development of a revised public order training package, which includes more advanced training in the use of vehicle tactics and arrest teams together with a more flexible use of the current PSU. This package will be rolled out in 2012.

The MPS welcomes the review of tactics nationally by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). The MPS has been central in this work by seconding staff to the HMIC review and is also engaged on the national level in identifying and ratifying tactics through the ACPO Public Order and Public Safety working group.

ARREST TACTICS

The MPS understands the frustration of some members of the public that police officers did not make arrests or that they stood by as offences were being committed. The MPS acknowledges that there are examples of where the public felt let down by the police because police did not immediately come to their aid or prevent the destruction of property. The MPS has acknowledged and reiterates in this review that there were just not enough police resources available to deal with the unprecedented scale and geographical distribution of serious disorder across London.
It has not been possible to examine the actions of every officer or what happened at every specific location affected by the disorder due to the thousands of officers involved across the multiple locations in London but the review has identified examples where decisions were made not to arrest due to the prioritisation of competing demands. Specifically, the need to protect emergency services such as the LFB to prevent loss of life, the need to protect an area in an attempt to prevent the spread of further disorder and the need to hold ground until the arrival of more police resources in order to then take action. Examples of such decisions are included within the personal accounts of officers in section 5 and 6 above.

If it is deemed possible to arrest a suspect at the time that criminal offences are committed in a public disorder situation, the inspector in command of each PSU must first balance the considerations discussed above before action is taken. In the case of the August disturbances the review has found that police resources were clearly stretched. As a result inspectors were often left with the situation that should they send officers forward into a dangerous situation to try to make an arrest, they would then no longer be able to maintain a police cordon which was critical to holding a junction or protecting a location to prevent the spread of disorder or to protect life.

There was the added consideration of losing arresting officers from the frontline whilst the prisoner is processed in accordance with the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. This would have an impact on the PSU’s capability.

Furthermore, acknowledging the perception of some that an apparent lack of police intervention in some areas might have been the subject of specific orders from senior commanders, this review has found nothing to support this. The review notes that whilst there were instances of arrests not being affected at the time offences were taking place, 884 arrests were made over the first three days.

When a decision to arrest is taken, a number of established arrest tactics are available (as outlined in the ACPO Manual of Guidance ‘Keeping the Peace’). These are the tactics commonly used in public order events and were used during August 2011. The MPS recognises however a need to refresh its training in arrest tactics and crowd intervention in order to respond to the changing nature of recent disorders.

The MPS has already tested and implemented the development of a tactic that deploys specialist officers in plain clothes, with uniform support, into a public order situation in order to effect an arrest. This tactic has been successfully tested in recent public
order events and continues to develop as a result of lessons learned from its deployment.

**USE OF FORCE**

It is important to understand the evolving nature of public order policing. In recent times the emphasis of public order policing has been on facilitating peaceful protest. There have been a number of pivotal events that have influenced this approach to policing within the capital. By example, the protests at the G20 summit in April 2009, the student demonstrations in November 2010 and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) day of action in March 2011 all attracted scrutiny with regard to the style of policing adopted. In particular this scrutiny led to concerns over police tactics and the perception of a heavy handed approach by police.

In response the MPS addressed these concerns by making a number of changes to the way it deals with public order events; in particular it addressed concerns over the tactic of containment, improved our dialogue with protest groups before and during the event and made facilitating peaceful protest the foundation of both police planning and subsequent action. Public order training advocated this approach to public order policing.

Whilst the review has not specifically explored this commonly debated issue of past events and their impact on the mindset of police officers, it accepts the finding of the HMIC report ‘The Rules of Engagement’ around the confidence of some officers engaged in public order scenarios.

Taken in a wider context, it can be argued that mindsets can also be affected by a lack of experience and confidence in dealing with disorder on such an intense scale. The MPS would need to look back many years to a period predating the service of many serving officers to find a period of serious disorder that mirrors the past 12 months.

It is important therefore that the MPS recognises the need to properly equip and train its staff and empower them where necessary to carry out their duties with the confidence that they will be supported, provided that their actions are proportionate and within the law.

The MPS seeks to address this issue through the new development programme for public order inspectors; whereby training with public order commanders will lead to a greater understanding of each others role and improved leadership throughout the command chain.

**ATTENUATING ENERGY PROJECTILES (AEPs)**

The use of AEPs (commonly referred to as baton rounds) in disorder has been discussed at length. Despite not having been used in a public order scenario to date on the UK mainland, the MPS recognises AEP as a viable tactic, that offers a less lethal option if absolutely necessary to protect life, prevent serious injury or prevent serious damage to property (in circumstances likely to lead to loss of life/serious injury).

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Commander Pountain considered its use in order to relieve unrelenting pressure of extreme violence on officers which would likely lead to a life threatening situation. However the use of AEP was balanced against the concern that it would significantly raise the police reaction, which could in turn raise the level of retaliation of the crowd thus increasing the likelihood of individuals, with the capacity to do so, arming themselves with firearms. An urgent review of available resources to assist the police serial was conducted and the availability of resources and other tactical options led to the decision not to deploy AEP.

There were instances on the night of Monday 10th August where public order commanders again considered the use of AEP. However the speed and agility of the disorder over this night hindered its deployment. The MPS had at its disposal only one team trained to deploy with baton rounds. In an effort to make this resource as flexible as possible, the team had been divided into two and was centrally deployed according to priority. At the time that the Silver Commander considered its use in Croydon, the resource had been deployed to Tottenham (following the discovery the previous night of damage to a police carrier consistent with projectiles having been

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27 Attenuating energy projectiles are also known as baton rounds and are effective up to 40m. When the nose of the round strikes a person the potential energy contained within it is converted to kinetic energy. Upon striking the body, the nose deforms due to the void, thereby increasing the surface area over which the kinetic energy is spread. This deformability ensures that even if the round were to strike the head, the likelihood of a serious injury is reduced.
fired at it) and Clapham Junction (where armoured vehicles had been deployed to clear the streets). It did not prove possible to mobilise the resource quickly enough to the south to deploy at a time where its use would have been proportionate.

In answer to the review’s findings that a more localised availability of this resource might have enabled commanders to deploy baton rounds as an effective tactic, the MPS is currently considering the establishment of this tactic as a more readily available option across London at short notice. In doing so, the MPS recognises the need to consult widely and the importance of public debate in support of the British Policing Model.

In the interim, the MPS has already responded with an increase in trained officers to work with Kestrel Teams (teams deployed with baton rounds). This increase in capacity has already enabled the MPS to make more agile use of this tactic.

**WATER CANNON**

Water cannon is widely recognised as an effective tactic to disperse and distance aggressors. It requires a precise environment and works most effectively against large static crowds that are, for example, throwing missiles at police, or other communities. It does have tactical limitations, such as manoeuvrability in an urban environment.

Currently the MPS has no water cannon capability but relies on an agreement with the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) to have the resource available for use at 24 hours notice.

It is the opinion of this review that had it been available for use, it would have been considered as a tactical option during this disorder. However it is unlikely to have been an appropriate and practical option owing to the speed and agility of the disorder.

Examples in recent history where the use of this tactic might have been a consideration for commanders had it been available include the Countryside Alliance demonstrations in Parliament Square (2004), the ‘Gaza’ demonstrations against The Israeli Embassy (2008/9) and potentially the student protests of 2010 where specific locations were targeted. In all these cases police had to face significant levels of violence in order to protect key locations and buildings and the staff within them.

The events of August and subsequent interest in this option have opened the public debate as to whether it is appropriate to have this option more readily available on the UK mainland. As such the MPS is contributing to the national discussion and has concluded that water cannons would be valuable in a few rare situations.

The MPS looks forward to the Home Office resolving its position on licensing and the funding of water cannon as a national asset. It is estimated that ACPO will be in a position to issue guidelines to forces in May 2012. The MPS continues to be involved in discussions regarding the potential purchase of water cannon vehicles to be based regionally in England and Wales.

**TASER IN PUBLIC ORDER**

Taser is not currently approved by ACPO for use in public order situations. Its future use is being looked at as part of Deputy Chief Constable Simon Chesterman’s national ‘ACPO Firearms and Less Lethal Working Group’, working to Chief Constable Ian Learmonth as head of ACPO’s national public order portfolio. The MPS are represented on this group.

**ARMoured VEHICLES**

The use of armoured vehicles as a non-armed tactic proved invaluable during the August disorders to remove barricades, distance crowds and clear offenders from an area. Another adoption of their use was also to provide the basis for high profile policing in a number of areas across London, for which the MPS received significant praise from local communities. To this end the MPS will continue to explore the appropriateness of this tactic as a viable contingency looking forward, mindful however of the potential impact on community tension in every event.

**ALTERNATIVE TACTICS**

The MPS is reviewing those tactics that are currently recognised within the ACPO Manual of Guidance ‘Keeping the Peace’ but are not currently within its scope of options. Such tactics are being considered as part of the ongoing work of the tactics strand of this review, under the direction of Commander (Public Order).
An example is the use of CS smoke, which is a recognised tactic to disperse groups during incidents of serious public disorder, as a last resort, where loss of life, serious injury and widespread damage are likely. As with other tactics not yet used on the UK mainland it has limitations. These include the risk to innocent parties and of an adverse impact on crowd dynamics and community confidence.

Furthermore the MPS is committed to keeping up to date with technology in its attempt to address the evolving nature of disorder and the unprecedented scenes of August 2011. As such the MPS has been working with the Home Office Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST) to examine new options that could be considered within the public order tactical arena.

The expediting of testing and licensing by the Home Office could provide valuable new tactical options to effectively counter threats such as those seen last year.
Operation Withern was the MPS’s response to the investigation of the 3,931 offences (recorded during 06/08/2011 to 27/02/2012) recorded as a direct result of the August disorder. During the first few days of the disorder crime was investigated on a borough by borough basis with central support being provided in the form of specialist investigators to those boroughs who could not cope with the sheer volume of offences. The operation remains a significant investigation for the MPS with 522 police officers and staff still dedicated to it in a range of roles. The investment of staff reflects the importance attached to holding those responsible for the disorder.

The review into the investigatory aspect of the August disorder has specifically looked at the systems that were in place within the MPS at the time of the disorder and whether they were appropriate to effectively investigate the widespread offences which took place during this time. It has specifically examined the mobilisation of investigative assets and how the MPS coped with widespread offending and the prisoner handling demands arising from the arrest of significant numbers of suspects in spontaneous circumstances. In addition the review has recognised that CCTV was a central issue for the investigative arm and has identified learning from the handling of the vast amounts of footage that was seized.

The MPS had good systems in place to instigate the investigation of public order offences. The public order branch of the MPS has considerable experience in this sphere and as such are regarded as the service experts. However the existing focus was on responding to spontaneous disorder in limited locations. What was obviously different here was the sheer scale of offending that took place across the capital.

During the first few days of the disorder local boroughs took responsibility for investigations taking place in their area. Many created their own dedicated units to investigate these offences and coped well, but in cases where the borough capacity was reached, the MPS took the approach of mobilising specialist investigators. This was the situation in Haringey Borough for example. It has already been noted that certain assets are not included within the formal MPS Service Mobilisation Plan; this is the case for investigative asset.

The MPS deployed the public order investigative asset in the first instance, but it quickly became clear that another approach was required to deal with the rapidly escalating volume of offences. The investigative response clearly required significant...
numbers of trained staff to be mobilised at short notice to carry out the key roles of prisoner processing and CCTV recovery.

Although the MPS was successful in re-deploying staff from specialist teams into these roles the initial response was characterised by a lack of clarity of responsibilities and direction. The original ethos of the post disorder investigative strategy was to absorb all borough investigative capacity to deal with local need, identify and mobilise other detective asset from elsewhere than borough policing and then deploy the resources to boroughs. Logistically this was not easy.

Available specialist officers were identified and they reported to the central operations command centre. The success in providing the requisite numbers was due to established systems being in place which could be built upon. For example the Homicide Command was well placed to quickly mobilise asset through its existing call-out procedure. However the review has found that this ad hoc approach had an element of disjoint due to its lack of planning and frustrated the most effective use of resources.

The officers, being specialists, were those generally involved in lengthy ongoing serious enquiries and were often de-skilled in regard to borough policing processes such as IT systems and custody requirements. Similarly many did not have up to date CCTV recovery or viewing skills. It is accepted that there needed to be greater clarity in the ‘call to action’ of specialist officers regarding the skills required to be of assistance to borough colleagues.

The report has already dealt with the fact that service mobilisation plans are in the process of revision. Going forward, the plan will trigger the formation of a criminal investigation capability which will deliver appropriate support for the command team dealing with the incident that triggers the SMP. The proposals under discussion will seek to formalise the deployment of specialist officers and investigative asset for use in the large scale investigation of public disorder incidents. The work is being led by the MPS Public Order Command.

Recognising that deployments did not make the most effective use of skills as an issue, it is clear that this was largely due to a lack of deployment oversight and coordination being present at an early stage. For example efforts to quickly analyse CCTV footage were hampered by contradictory decisions over who, how and where footage was to be viewed. The MPS simply did not have sufficient crime managers with the appropriate public order skills and experience.

The review recommends that this is addressed through the professionalising of the crime management role in order to address this shortfall. The MPS has already initiated the formation of a public order crime cadre of suitable officers identified and trained to perform the lead role of investigating incidents of large scale public disorder. This will both provide resilience and ensure that public order professionals can maintain the investigatory lead role should a similar situation arise in the future.

To date 20 Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) have been provided with additional training on the implications of coordinating an investigation into large scale public disorder. This training will now become a key element within initial SIO training. In addition the role of Bronze Investigation, the strategic lead in relation to coordinating the investigative response into public disorder, has now been embedded within the SOR structure. This structure has been tested within the command team for the student protests on 9th November 2011 and the TUC demonstration in central London on 30th November 2011.

Crucially the Bronze Investigation now holds the lead responsibility for activating the MPS Investigation Mobilisation Plan through the joint borough policing, public order and specialist crime co-ordinating and tasking offices. This officer will then retain sole responsibility for providing support from the available resources where most needed.

NATURE OF INVESTIGATIONS

The instigation of Operation Withern on Tuesday 9th August 2011 coordinated the investigation of all crimes committed during the disturbances and focussed on bringing offenders to justice as swiftly as possible. The nature of the Operation Withern response evolved over time into the creation of 11 investigative ‘hubs’ - each responsible for the investigation of offences within a specified geographical area. They are staffed from across the MPS, including the use of volunteers, according to the volume of reported incidents. To date over 411 officers remain amongst those staff who have been dedicated to this investigatory strategy at a cost of £33.5million and this reflects the continuing efforts to identify offenders for all reported crimes.

Operation Withern captured a range of offences, from two murders through to multiple minor
disorders. Despite the huge volume of offences, specialist investigators have been able to ensure an appropriately high quality of investigation to each offence. This approach has ensured significant successes in bringing offenders to justice. Notably, charges were brought quickly for the murder of Richard Mannington-Bowes in Ealing and Croydon Borough similarly brought charges against an arsonist responsible for the destruction of the 150 year old Reeves furniture store. Both of these offenders were arrested within the first week of investigation.

On 20th February 2012 Andrew Burls was sentenced to eight years in prison after pleading guilty to arson and burglary committed during the summer disorder. Burls caused nearly £1.2m worth of damage by destroying two shops in Southwark. His was the longest sentence for anyone convicted in relation to the summer disorder so far.

Since August 3,931 crimes have been reported, 3,994 arrests have been made and 2,472 people have been charged for a number of offences. The MPS has been extremely well supported by its criminal justice partners in this process. Below is a summary of court cases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUMMARY OF CASES AT COURT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases Completed at Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>Custodial Sentence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Custodial Sentence - Suspended</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional Discharge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detention &amp; Training Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community order/ sentence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
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<tr>
<td>One Day Detention Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Referred to Youth Offending Panel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervisory Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFA/ Found Not Guilty</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figures accurate as of 21/02/2012

The MPS is proud of both the speed and quality of investigations that have taken place and the results they have achieved. Officers continue to actively investigate all offences committed during the August disorder. Currently over 150 suspects are still being arrested across London every month and it is clear that the majority of these have a history of serious offending prior to their involvement in the disorder. The Operation Withern investigators are prioritising these arrests to ensure that the most serious offences are investigated first.

As the case studies testify, during the disorder police faced people wielding dangerous weapons, expressing high levels of aggression, and causing serious damage to London’s streets. The MPS conducted a detailed analysis of the previous known contact with police, including any criminality, of those individuals arrested during and immediately after the disorder. The results in looking at over 2,500 individuals show high levels of previous criminal histories of those arrested and complement government and other reports in the public domain.

The analysis confirms that 7 out of 10 arrestees had some criminal history resulting in a conviction (similar to the figure reported by the Ministry of Justice), considerably more than the ‘average’ adult or youth population as a whole. These arrestees began their criminal career at a young age and were generally known to the police in one way or another, such as through previous offending, gang involvement or a history of being stopped and searched.

The scale of the Operation Withern investigation will be regularly reviewed to ensure that the investment of resources remains appropriate and whether the structure of the investigative teams remains the best use of the staff.

FORENSIC

Operation Withern has utilised a number of techniques to drive forward the arrest of offenders. Forensic recovery methods were used from the outset. This resulted in the retrieval from crime scenes of fingerprints, clothing fibres, and other DNA related items, such as blood. To date, 1,173 items of forensic data have been recovered from crime scenes, of which 768 have been matched to an individual leading to 480 charges.

CCTV

CCTV proved to be a critical issue in the investigation of offences committed during the August disturbances. The imagery seized by police has been central in identifying offenders and evidencing their part in offences committed. However, there were significant challenges presented due to the sheer scale of the task, in total an estimated 200,000 hours’ worth of footage.
As discussed in the wider issue of investigative asset mobilisation, CCTV was an area for which there was no existing blueprint that could be put into action. As such the MPS had to adapt a strategy as events unfolded and a review of this strategy has provided valuable learning.

The MPS’s first consideration was the collection of all available and relevant CCTV. Prior to the August disorder each of the 32 borough policing teams had discretion on what level of resources were deployed to gather and view CCTV footage for high volume crimes dealt with at borough level. Those boroughs who had established resilient Visual Identification Image Detection Offices (VIIDOs) with trained staff were able to quickly secure CCTV evidence and make early arrests. Conversely, other boroughs found great difficulty in establishing proper systems to view footage and prepare evidence.

In order to ensure that CCTV recovery took place consistently across the affected boroughs, a central collection system was established. In hindsight this would have been more effective remaining as a borough based system. By collating CCTV products centrally local officers, who were most likely to know and therefore identify offenders, did not have immediate access to the imagery.

As events developed, the MPS reverted to a borough based system of collecting, viewing and preparing images from CCTV footage. This localised approach was further developed to ensure that each borough officer was allocated dedicated viewing time for outstanding images to ensure maximum success in this identification process. To date over 75% of the estimated 200,000 hours of footage has been viewed, with some boroughs having now completed this task.

CCTV viewing has produced a significant number of images of offenders. Each image is accompanied by a package of evidence that shows the offences committed by each offender and this painstaking work is essential to ensure that successful prosecutions can follow. At present over 5,000 such packages have been prepared and over 1,100 have been fully confirmed as identified.

**Example of CCTV evidence package** - Junior Saunders who was convicted of six charges including violent disorder and burglary and sentenced to a total of five years imprisonment for his part in the Hackney disorder.

1. CCTV image showing the subject smashing the window of a police vehicle with a bike lock on the 8/8/2011 at 16:42
2. Further CCTV image revealing the subject’s face next to marked police vehicles with a bike lock
3. CCTV showing the subject walking along the road on the 8/8/2011 at 16:57 holding a piece of wood
4. Picture taken from a mobile phone image showing Junior Saunders wearing the same t-shirt worn during the disorder.
Efforts continue to use the knowledge of MPS staff and the wider public to identify the individual offenders. Wanted images are being circulated through a range of traditional and social media outlets by the MPS Circulation Unit (MetCU) and staff within the wider criminal justice system are regularly being shown series of images.

In the early days of the investigation there was an understandable desire to publish images of suspected offenders. This was vital in informing the public of the measures police were taking to bring offenders to justice and to send the message out that offenders would be tracked down. However the review has recognised that the balance between these concerns and maintaining the evidential integrity and value of the images is better served by a single portal, the MetCU.

In response to the challenges of managing such quantities of images of offenders, the MPS has procured a bespoke system to allow the efficient cataloguing and searching of wanted images. This system was installed in February 2012 and will significantly streamline the process of circulating pictures of wanted offenders. Until now the MPS has had no technical solution other than the manual cutting and pasting of images into posters, and most crucially, has now been able to collate all images of wanted offenders in one location.

Viewing equipment also posed some challenges. There were issues of equipment availability and compatibility to the seized data, both of which were inconsistent across borough and specialist units. The MPS began by viewing imagery to the best of their ability at borough level and also by making use of its Counter Terrorism viewing suite. Many measures were immediately instigated to continually increase viewing capacity; a number of specialist viewing PCs and laptops were built and training provided to operational teams across the MPS and additional viewing facilities from existing resources were made available from other specialist units across the MPS.

The investigation into Operation Withern has highlighted the extent and value of CCTV evidence available across London but has also demonstrated that the MPS needs to do more to harness the value of this tactic. This experience has led to two clear actions. Firstly the MPS is already taking steps to ensure that every borough will be supported by an effective VIIDO facility. This will comprise dedicated supervision, trained staff and sufficient IT. The MPS has prepared a fully costed business case to achieve this.

Secondly, the MPS has now secured 149 additional CCTV viewing stations. These are currently deployed on Operation Withern but at the conclusion of the investigation will form the basis of a CCTV mobilisation facility. An additional 83 MPS staff have now been trained as CCTV viewers and training for an additional 100 volunteers is also currently being delivered. It will be the role of Bronze Investigation to ensure that the viewing of CCTV for widespread crime and disorder will be conducted through borough VIIDO units in the first instance. This will ensure clarity of roles and responsibilities in the early stages of an enquiry.

The MPS Digital Imagery Strategy

In order to incorporate the learning from Operation Withern and to ensure a comprehensive strategy is in place which will cater for any future London wide incident the MPS has commissioned a specific piece of work under the heading, the ‘MPS Digital Imagery Strategy.’ It deals with the use of CCTV and other private or public images which would comprise part of the response to any future large scale public disorder in London. Specifically;

- the investigative support required in the immediate aftermath of any future public disturbances,
- practical steps necessary to ensure that images from CCTV and other sources are gathered and made available as evidence of any criminal offences and
- a method to ensure that images gathered by the public and media outlets generally are able to be received and processed by the MPS.

The digital imagery strategy work is not confined to public disorder work but is inextricably linked to the MPS management of imagery generally. To this end substantial projects have been allocated to ensure that the MPS has an overarching governance of all matters concerned with imagery. Examples of such projects include the development and exploitation of automatic facial recognition systems, the replacement of the current custody imagery network with a digital system and the upgrade of the integration of local authority CCTV systems into Central Communication Command (CCC) centres.

The cost implication for such substantial ventures are significant. The capital cost alone necessary to
Support the suggested upgrades or replacements is estimated to be in the region of £43m. Staffing costs to enable the overall imagery strategy to develop would present further expenditure. If resources are to be found to fund these developments from within existing MPS budgets, this work will need to take priority over other projected expenditure.

Some of the specific work in relation to large scale public disorder investigation has been discussed above. It has been divided into short, medium and long term work and is summarised below.

### MPS Imagery Strategy - Public Order Investigation

#### Short term
- Identify a cadre of officers to specifically recover CCTV imagery.
- Establish a number of viewing locations to allow the viewing of material to commence in a controlled and prescribed way.
- Issue clear guidance to allow local viewing capability to be developed and integrated into a central strategy.
- Commission the procurement of a central image handling system capable of being integrated onto the MPS core system.
- Publicise the routes that the MPS is able to receive images from the media and the public.

#### Medium term
- Publicise a communication plan to make the public aware of the significance of CCTV and other images. This will seek to influence the need to maintain systems, offer advice about the capability and capacity of different systems and explain what to do with images at the time of public disorder.

#### Long term
- To convert the CCTV image viewing system in the MPS SOR from an analogue to a digital system.
- To upgrade the custody CCTV infrastructure to a digital system.
- To replace the system to allow digital provision of local authority CCTV footage to the MPS via Central Communication Command (CCC) centres.

### SOCIAL MEDIA

Investigation has its part in the developing work around the police use of social media. An MPS appeal for public support in identifying suspects using Flickr and You Tube after the riots was successful but was retrospective and needed to form part of the engagement strategy during the riots. Again the MPS capacity in the use of social media was found lacking.

The MPS has a need to increase its ability to use social media as a law enforcement tool, conducting pro-active investigative enquiries and gathering evidential material. Invariably this activity will be reactive, following trigger events or the development of intelligence gleaned through internet use and cyber crime. The wider digital communications work being developed by the MPS incorporates an investigation strand to address this need. It will also include the preparation of social media material for judicial proceedings.
The Criminal Justice (CJ) partnership response to the August disturbances is seen as an overriding success from police preparation of case papers through to the speedy appearance of offenders before the court. Demonstrating in fast time that crime has consequences was instrumental in reducing the spread of copycat disorder. In addition the speed at which justice was delivered resulted in a higher early guilty plea rate. Not only was justice seen to be done, but criminal justice agencies made a saving because cases were dealt with swiftly.

The review has found that the MPS’s contribution to the criminal justice efforts follows the pattern that has emerged. In the early hours and days of the unprecedented events the police command structure did not have criminal justice processes at the forefront of their considerations. However police representatives were working with NOMS from the start and by Monday 8th August were liaising with NOMS, HMCTS and CPS representatives in a newly formed criminal justice command structure.

The MPS is now preparing a formal contingency plan to set out roles and responsibilities in a variety of situations. It will also include a clear trigger for special arrangements to be brought into operation to integrate CJ expertise at the earliest opportunity and effectively manage a criminal justice response. Work on the contingency plan is at an advanced stage and, subject to the agreement of CJ partners, will be in place by the end of March 2012.

The immediate challenges posed by mass arrests was the impact on custody centres. As disorder spread across London, local custody provision was quickly put under strain and in some instances suspects were held outside the MPS in other forces. Critical to freeing up police cells was the ability of the criminal justice agencies to take and deal with the surge of defendants in police custody. The MPS had an existing custody management model for centralised cell allocation which was used and proved successful at managing demand.

The MPS has now developed this model through a written strategy with neighbouring forces to extend cell capacity at times of exceptional demand. Use of the model was considered for the public order events held in London on the 9th and 30th November 2011 but the decision was made that its use was not required to deal with those events. However the cell allocation model is already successfully operating at one of the MPS’s three Communications Command Centres. Plans are in place to extend the model to provide coverage for the whole of London by May 2012.

A notable success of the criminal justice response was the speed with which suspects were brought before courts and sentenced. This was a direct result of a decision early on Monday 8th August by the Judiciary and HMCTS in consultation with MPS and the CPS to extend hours at three designated court centres to deal with the surge in custody cases. NOMS and SERCO played a vital role in supporting the efficiency of extended court hours by ensuring the secure movement of suspects between custody centres, courts and prisons outside of normal hours.

The MPS was slow to establish reliable information about demand which could have better informed court scheduling. No single system is currently used by the MPS that captures all the relevant data required to provide an accurate picture of suspect and defendant status. The MPS has since established a single point of contact for the MPS to share demand information with CJ partners and other stakeholders. The methodology to provide as accurate data as possible comprises a process of data collection and tracking from the very outset. Each offender is then flagged on the MPS custody database and accurate and timely updating of the MPS crime reporting system is ensured through supervision.

In the first week of the disorder period 1,836 Withern suspects were arrested and 1,009 of them charged. Of those charged 82% (830) had their first appearance in court in that same first week. Of

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28 Highbury, Camberwell and Thames magistrates’ courts
those attending court 71 defendants pleaded guilty to offences and were therefore also sentenced in that same first week, including two defendants who appeared at the Crown Court.

### SUMMARY OF ARRESTS DURING THE FIRST WEEK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suspects Arrested</th>
<th>1,836</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charged</td>
<td>1,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeared in Court</td>
<td>830 (82%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleased Guilty and Sentenced</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeared at Crown Court</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sight of suspects being brought before courts and justice being seen to be done so quickly attracted national and international media attention and it is strongly believed that the visibility of the criminal justice system in action reduced copycat disorder and attrition rates29.

On Tuesday 9th August 2011 CJ partners agreed to extend the number of magistrates’ court centres sitting extended hours (from 1700 to 2100hrs) to nine. They also designated two Crown Court centres to receive all Withern cases30. As disorder spread later that day it was further decided to run courts through the night at two court centres, Westminster and Highbury Magistrates’ Courts, enabling more Withern cases to be promptly dealt with.

Night courts are commonplace in some jurisdictions but had not been used in England and Wales previously, other than a pilot scheme which was conducted in 2002. The speed with which CJ partners responded and set up night courts, putting in place administrative and support arrangements to enable these courts to run effectively was impressive. A practical example of this was the agreement of NOMS on Tuesday 9th August 2011 to extend prison receiving times. This avoided the need for defendants who were remanded or sentenced to custody at the night court to be taken back to police cells.

Westminster and Highbury Magistrates’ Courts continued to sit through the night throughout the week ensuring that cases continued to be processed in a timely fashion. Furthermore Westminster Magistrates’ Court sat during the day of Sunday 14th August 2011.

The MPS worked in a successful partnership with the CPS to ensure that court papers were ready on time and to the right quality. This having been said, the criminal justice system was still a paper-based one and dealing with post charge issues would have been simpler and more efficient with a digital file. This would have avoided some of the file building challenges that were encountered through the disparate geography of the investigative teams, CPS prosecutors and the courts.

The MPS has already moved towards a digital criminal justice system, with 24 boroughs already using this process. It is anticipated that all boroughs will have the digital system by the end of March 2012, improving the exchange of case information with CPS and other CJ partners on a routine basis.

The report has already spoken of its central investigation and criminal justice unit comprising eleven investigation hubs to deal with the investigation of offences and the preparation of prosecution case files for those individuals charged. The serious nature of many of the offences required an additional criminal justice coordination and Crown Court support team consisting of a further 22 staff, including 17 police officers.

The disorder attracted media attention from around the world and journalists were tweeting from inside courtrooms as cases were being dealt with. The review notes that communicating early, clear and practical messages that those rioting and looting will be caught on camera and arrested was just as important as the signal sent by setting up 24hr courts. Police and CPS briefed media very effectively about the criminal justice response to the disorder although it is accepted that a single point of information amongst criminal justice partners can ensure that conflicting information about the number of defendants going through court can be avoided.

### STREAMLINED FORENSIC REPORTING

The MPS made use of a model for streamlined forensic reporting (SFR), which resulted in an increased early guilty plea rate. SFR involves better assessment of the evidential value of forensic evidence at the start of a case, thus allowing defendants to make an earlier informed plea, saving resources and reducing delays.

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29 The attrition rate measure reflects which proportion of cases entering the criminal justice system are duly resolved, closed or dispensed with by criminal justice agencies.

30 Wood Green and Inner London Crown Courts.
To date 278 cases which have made use of SFR have been completed at court and a further 93 are currently in the criminal justice system. The performance data shows a high success rate of 72% early guilty pleas compared to 61% in comparative forensic evidential cases. This contributes to the overall 91% guilty rate for Operation Withern cases using either fingerprint or DNA forensic evidence. The review recommends an accelerated use of this model across London to realise these benefits further.

**LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK**

The MPS has considered supporting legislation when undertaking a thorough review of this kind and as such has given consideration as to whether additional powers in respect of public order policing and the criminal law would be of practical use.

As a result, the MPS has formed the view that it would not want to raise expectations that any proposed changes to the law regarding face coverings or curfews would enable the police to become more effective in tackling the unprecedented widespread disorder, such as that experienced in August 2011. One area in which the MPS would welcome further debate is in the public order use of the common law power, Breach of the Peace. Mindful that legal challenges are currently testing the use of this power in relation to allegations of conducting mass arrests in anticipation of a breach of the peace occurring, the MPS would welcome consultation specifically around the benefits of translating this common law power into statute law, with appropriate guidance.

It is important to note that the views expressed above are those of the MPS and as such, they were presented to the ACPO Public Order and Public Safety Meeting, chaired by Chief Constable Sue Sim, on 5th December 2011 for wider consideration. The MPS continues its ongoing active participation in the wider consultation around police powers through this group.

In addition it will consider whether the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) codes and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) would benefit from further review.

Many of the Operation Withern cases involved serious offences that required them to be dealt with at the Crown Court. Criminal Justice procedure still requires a hearing in the Magistrates’ Court to formally commit defendants to the Crown Court where offences are capable of being tried either way (at the Magistrates’ or the Crown Court). The serious nature of most Operation Withern cases meant that they ended up in the Crown Court and the requirement to hold a committal in these cases highlighted these hearings as an unnecessary procedural step.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 already provides for the abolition of committal proceedings and replacing them with a simple sending procedure but needs to be brought into effect by a commencement order. In a speech to the Magistrates’ Association on 8th December 2011, Nick Herbert, the Policing and Criminal Justice Minister, announced the Government’s intention to abolish committal hearings as part of the justice reform strategy in 2012. The MPS would strongly support this initiative.

The MPS is already working with HMCTS, the CPS and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) to see how video link technology might enable extended court hours to become part of normal business practice in the future. Camberwell Magistrates’ Court ran such a ‘Virtual Court’ facility on Tuesday 9th August 2011 when it provided one of the extended hour court centres. The future expansion of video links between CJ partners offers significant potential to expand on this work and to undertake other procedural requirements remotely rather than by the current practice of in person.

The MPS is already in dialogue with the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice to seek agreement on areas where the use of video links can be extended. Examples include conducting investigation interviews with suspects in custody by video link (obviating the need for their production in many of the 4,000 cases the MPS handles a year and making applications to magistrates by video link instead of having to attend the magistrates’ court in person (applications such as extending periods of detention during an investigation, swearing an information for a search warrant or to produce a prisoner from prison and for applications to pursue the recovery of proceeds of crime).
The Riot (Damages) Act 1886 requires Police Authorities to deal with claims for loss or damage to property caused by rioters. Following the disorder the MPS handled these claims on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA). On 16th January 2012 these duties transferred to the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC) and the MPS continues to handle the claims on their behalf. Where businesses and households are insured, their insurance companies deal with claims in the first instance, and then seek reimbursement from the MPA/MOPC.

The MPS fully appreciates the catastrophic effects the August disorder has had on individuals within its communities. Businesses, livelihoods and homes were lost and there are individuals who lost all personal possessions through fire. Whilst monetary compensation can only go so far in alleviating the situation of those affected in this way, the MPS is endeavouring to process claims in the most efficient and timely way possible.

Information about the claims process was placed on the MPA, MPS and Home Office websites immediately after the incident, and subsequently updated. The Home Office arranged for a claims bureau to provide information and receive claims from uninsured persons. The time limit for claims was increased from 14 to 42 days and an antiquated claim form was abolished. The Home Office appointed loss adjusters to assist with claims from uninsured persons, and they are, where necessary, visiting the claimants to ensure that claims are properly presented. The MPS has written to all claimants or their representatives outlining the process that is being followed.

The MPS has established internal processes to log, process, make and record decisions on the claims. These have been approved by auditors and are fully operational. The MPS target, which is being achieved, is to consider and make decisions upon claims received from the Home Office loss adjusters within a maximum of five days.

The MPS considered approximately 4,500 claims and in the region of 80,000 supporting documents. Around 1,000 claims have been eliminated as duplicates. The total amount of claims received by the MPS has therefore totalled 3,405. Of the 342 uninsured claims received, 181 have been settled to date.

The MPS has also started reimbursing insurers, and have to date settled 396 claims of the 2,538 received. Some insurers have indicated that they will be unable to provide details of claims until some months into 2012. They are being encouraged to provide the information as soon as they can. Loss adjusters are helping the MPS to assess the size of the claim, especially for larger claims.

Liabilities are currently estimated to be in the region of £250m. It has been agreed with the Home Office that uninsured claims will be considered as a matter of priority.

In some cases it will not be possible to pay claims. That is because they fall outside the terms of the Act, for example claims of personal injury, or because the loss was not caused by a riot (although this has been the reason for rejecting only a small number of uninsured claims). In such cases we will, where possible, advise claimants of other potential sources of compensation. Some insurance companies have sought reimbursement for losses paid under business interruption policies. We cannot accept these claims on the basis that the Act has never been understood to include such losses.
“Summer 2011 saw the MPS experience a wholly unprecedented scale, type and spread of disorder. This report recognises the devastating consequences it had for individuals and communities and reflects the bravery of officers and staff who acted with extraordinary courage in the face of violence.

“Our review has been a determined look at how we can learn and improve. In particular our conclusions centre upon; improving our engagement with communities, better public order intelligence systems, the scale and speed of our mobilisation and the tactics we deploy in such circumstances. Much work has already taken place so we are already better placed, and much is still ongoing.

“Having taken on the final phase of this review from AC Lynne Owens I have been impressed at the progress made so far and I am committed to seeing the work through in order that we are better placed to protect our communities.”

Mark Rowley
Assistant Commissioner
Specialist Crime and Operations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AC</th>
<th>Assistant Commissioner</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airwave</td>
<td>National police radio system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEP</td>
<td>Attenuated energy projectile (also referred to as baton rounds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>Association of Police Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>Air Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>Blackberry Messaging</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIAG</td>
<td>Black Independent Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>BME</td>
<td>Black and Minority Ethnic</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOCU</td>
<td>Borough Operational Command Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze</td>
<td>Public Order ‘Forward’ or ‘Ground’ Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTP</td>
<td>British Transport Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Computer Aided Despatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAST</td>
<td>Centre for Applied Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Central Communications Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed Circuit Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ</td>
<td>Criminal Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJU</td>
<td>Criminal Justice Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Central Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO11</td>
<td>MPS Public Order Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO19</td>
<td>MPS Specialist Firearms Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBR</td>
<td>Cabinet Office Briefing Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTSET</td>
<td>Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team within the MPS. CTSET is responsible for engagement and consultation with key strategic partners, stakeholders and networks, as well as London’s diverse communities, within the context of counter terrorism and security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Detective Constable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCFD</td>
<td>Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Directorate of Public Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>Directorate of Professional Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>Equality Impact Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLM</td>
<td>Family Liaison Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLO</td>
<td>Family Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The levels of public order training for police officers. Level 1 officers carry out training on a five week cycle and are from the TSG. Level 2 officers are drawn from boroughs and some specialist units; they receive the same training as Level 1 officers but only twice a year for two days (or in some forces a 3 day course every 12 months). The MPS has approximately 3,500 Level 2 trained officers. All other police officers are classed as being level 3 trained as they receive this basic level of public order training at training school. Their training includes all foot duty cordons.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIO</td>
<td>Senior Investigating Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>Service Mobilisation Plan. This consists of two states, phases amber and red. Amber details that available resources are identified and red details that resources are to be mobilised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNT</td>
<td>Safer Neighbourhood Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCA</td>
<td>Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOR</td>
<td>Special Operations Room. Dedicated facility within the MPS to manage the policing of any large event or operation in London. It is designed to handle public order events and major incidents. Also known as ‘GT’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Territorial Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSG</td>
<td>Territorial Support Group. This unit provides the MPS Strategic Reserve for public disorder and critical incident response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIIDO</td>
<td>Visual Identification Image Detection Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES
The terms of reference of the Operation Kirkin Strategic Review were to:

- Establish the timeline: To develop a timeline of events which informed strategic decision making and, to detail relevant operational activity between Thursday 4th August and Friday, 19th August 2011. To ensure all relevant documentation is extant, in order to underpin the MPS response to any independent scrutiny or accountability process. To coordinate and receive the product from the varied and necessary Op Kirkin de brief processes.

- Critical incident management - To examine the critical incident management processes used during the relevant period, including liaison between the MPS, Mr Duggan’s family, the community and IPCC during the relevant period.

- Community engagement - To review the community engagement processes used during the relevant period and identify any learning, including the role of key external partners, such as IAGs, PCCGs and statutory partners.

- Causality - To gain an understanding of the criminal and social factors that triggered disorder and identify any future preventative action.

- Public order tactics and response: To review the recommendations of previous incidents of large scale disorder and public protest noting the implications for Op Kirkin. To review and make recommendations to inform the MPS and national response to widespread and sustained public disorder. To assess MPS resource planning, deployment, scalability, public order trained officer mix and interoperability identifying areas of MPS and national learning.

- Contingency and preparedness planning: To review contingency and preparedness arrangements in relation to Op Kirkin and develop any organisational learning, liaising with partners, other forces, and the ACPO Public Order Business Area.

- Intelligence and social media: To develop the intelligence requirement to inform future operational planning for significant public disorder, including the role of social media, within the context of a digitalised environment.

- Investigation: To develop a proactive and reactive investigation strategy across MPS Business Groups to support the policing response to significant public disorder.

- Logistical Support: To review the logistical and support service responses to the sustained and impactive operational policing requirements of Op Kirkin.

- Criminal Justice System - To review the process of engaging with CJ partners to respond to major public disorder.

- Riot Damages Act 1886: To influence the MPS approach to the Riot Damages Act 1886.
APPENDIX B

Community Impact Assessment Form

COMMUNITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT

| Freedom of Information Act Document | |
| Protective Marking                  | |
| Publication (Y/N)                   | |
| Title                               | |
| Summary                             | |
| Branch / OCU                        | |
| Date created                        | |
| Review date:                        | |
| Version                             | |
| Author                              | |

INITIAL/INTERIM/SUPPLEMENTARY COMMUNITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT

(Define what sort of assessment you are writing, initial if it’s the first, interim if it’s a subsequent one, supplementary if it’s one that is separate from but related to the initial and final if it’s the closing assessment)

[Text] (The title of the assessment goes here)

Introduction

This section ‘sets the scene’ for the reader. It should explain what the background to the assessment is. It should also contain any readily available information and intelligence, what’s known about the situation, what the problem is or what’s about to happen (see also page 14 of Understanding and Monitoring Community Tension in Local Communities).

http://www.coventry.ac.uk/researchnet/icoco/toolkits/tension

You should also consider who, particularly in terms of specific communities or groups, might be affected by the proposed action and how

[Enter text here]

Purpose

State whether this is an initial assessment or the first, second etc. interim. State what exactly have you been asked to assess. This needs to be a precise question related to an event or incident (if you are being asked to assess overall tensions then you need a Community Tension Assessment). Ensure that the person who has commissioned the assessment agrees this.

[Enter text here]
Methodology

Suggested wording follows, it explains the Modified Woodland model of assessment for those who are not familiar with it.

This assessment follows the Modified Woodland model of community assessment.

An assessment of intelligence (both open source and closed) and environmental scanning together, where appropriate, with consultation with community members has been carried out (but see caveats for a definitive list).

The results of this process are combined to provide a community impact assessment which is divided into three sections:

Experienced (how do communities feel)
Evidenced (what does our information tell us is happening)
Potential (what might happen)

The results of each of these sections are tabulated to give a numerical assessment of community tension, where 1 is the highest and 6 is assessed as normal. The actual assessment figure is highlighted in each table.

Caveats

This is probably the most important section. State exactly what you have done in terms of consultation, search strings, etc. If there is anything you haven’t done state it here together with the reasons, particularly if any restrictions have been placed because the incident to be assessed is confidential. The person reading this assessment needs to know exactly what your assessment is based on. There is nothing wrong with not having carried out certain sorts of assessment but the person reading the assessment needs to know that they haven’t been done.

This assessment is based on a ‘snapshot in time’, where appropriate the views of those consulted and the experience of those making the assessment. Any significant change in circumstances or events must necessarily trigger a new assessment reflecting those changed circumstances.

Legislation Assessment

If there are any specific implications particularly with regard to the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and/or the Human Rights Act 1998 they need to be considered and recorded here.

I. Experienced (how do communities feel)

Assessment definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imminent</th>
<th>Corroborated evidence of preparation for crime and disorder – e.g. groups gathering, weapons being prepared etc. Or widespread calls at national or international levels for explanation, action or sanction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Substantial evidence of fear of crime and/or disorder along with evidence of preparations to deal with the consequences – e.g. boarding up of shops. Or members of public representative bodies expressing critical concerns or questioning actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate (High)</td>
<td>Evidence of widespread alarm at current tension levels. Local media reporting that tension is raised with local opinion formers and/or significant local people stating their fears. Or local and national media may have sustained coverage of the issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate (Low)</td>
<td>Corroborated evidence that a significant number of people in the community in question or across communities fear crime and/or disorder. They expect crime and disorder to happen if no action is taken to prevent it and/or another event serves to increase tension. Or there is widespread discussion of the issue, some polarisation of views is apparent, media interest is regular and may be at the local and/or national level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Above Normal</td>
<td>Some corroborated evidence of fear of crime or disorder within the community. The crime and disorder feared would be of low intensity and/or experienced by a limited range of people. Or there is some evidence of growing levels of discussion, media interest is increasing, may be sporadic but remains at a local level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Limited community concerns that tension will rise and that, even if it did, the impact will be minor. Or discussion is confined to single interest groups with negligible or no media interest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comment**

What has brought you to the assessment you have made and is there anything that you want to flag up to the person reading this document. You need to make clear the justification for your assessment. You should highlight your overall assessment figure in the boxes above and restate it at the end of your comments.

[Enter text here]

**II. Evidenced (what does our information tell us is happening)**

**Assessment definitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imminent</th>
<th>Tension indicators indicating crime and/or disorder to be expected within hours – e.g. stockpiles of weapons discovered, groups gathering on streets, opposing groups planning to demonstrate. Community and/or criminal intelligence suggests disorder is likely to develop within hours.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Levels of crime and/or disorder raised along with evidence of serious offences having been committed. Tension indicators showing sustained hostility between particular groups or towards police. There may be evidence of activity by extremists groups. Disorder may have happened in the recent past. Community and/or criminal intelligence suggests disorder or crime likely to develop within days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Moderate (High)</td>
<td>Substantial rise in crime and/or disorder combined with substantial corroborative evidence of other tension indicators. Particular communities may be targeted. Community and/or criminal intelligence suggests disorder or crime is likely to develop unless responses are developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate (Low)</td>
<td>Crime and/or disorder levels clearly raised above normal. Other tensions indicators – e.g. assaults on police, racist graffiti etc. – providing corroboramation. Levels may indicate targeting of specific communities. Levels well above normal. Community and/or criminal intelligence suggests disorder or crime may develop but that steps can be taken to prevent such development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Above Normal

Evidence that crime and/or disorder levels are raised when compared to the normal levels. Raised levels may indicate targeting of particular communities. Levels not substantially above the normal. Information sources do not suggest that crime and/or disorder will develop.

Normal

No indication in police crime and disorder reporting that tension is above normal.

Comment

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[Enter text here]

III. Potential

Assessment definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Imminent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Moderate (High)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moderate (Low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Above Normal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 Normal

No issues locally, nationally or internationally that would impact on local communities sufficiently to cause abnormal tension levels.

Or there is no apparent danger of any reputational or other organisational impact

**Comment**

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[Enter text here]

**Identified Risks**

This is the area to comment on specific risks and to plot them on a scoring matrix. The PPPLEM model may be used:

P – Physical
P - Political
P - Police and community
L – Legal
E - Economic
M - Moral

The Likelihood of the risk occurring should be multiplied by its potential impact to produce an estimate of risk using the information below. Remember to be realistic about both figures

Likelihood (rating) – 1 (Insignificant), 2 (Low), 3 (Medium), 4 (High), 5 (Almost Certain)
Impact (rating) - 1 (Insignificant), 2 (Low), 3 (Medium), 4 (High), 5 (Critical)

Where a risk has an impact rating above 5 or a score greater than 11 (for risk x impact) then an action plan needs to be developed.

[Enter text here]

**Intervention options**

What options are you recommending to mitigate the issues you have identified in any of the sections? These may be community led, inter agency or simply policing options (see also page 46 of Understanding and Monitoring Community Tension in Local Communities)

http://www.coventry.ac.uk/researchnet/icoco/toolkits/tension

[Enter text here]
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