

Accelerated Misconduct Hearing Finding and Outcome

Officer Name: FDC Mohammed Abdullah

Warrant No: P252120

Date of Hearing: 7th September 2026

Alleged Standards Breached: Confidentiality; Discreditable Conduct

Findings

I have had the benefit of the papers in advance of today and read them carefully before the hearing started. I am satisfied that the required notices under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 have been served. These are matters which have not, in any case, been disputed before me.

The hearing was held in **Private**.

FDC Abdullah did attend the hearing and was represented by DC Attwell. FDC Abdullah provided a written Regulation 54 response dated, the 4th September 2026, which I have considered.

The AA was represented by Case Manager, Molly Nairn.

I am satisfied FDC Abdullah has been properly served with the papers and Regulations 51 to 53 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 have been complied with.

Application to adjourn

An application to adjourn the proceedings is made on behalf of FDC Abdullah on the following grounds;

1. Absence of a PACE interview under caution and the lack of procedural fairness due to the absence of the interview
2. Investigation Insufficiency
3. The College of Policing Guidance on Outcomes requiring individual assessment
4. Limited actual harm or culpability

For the reasons set out below, the application for an adjournment is **refused**.

In the application before me, considerable emphasis is placed on the fact that FDC Abdullah was never interviewed under caution prior to referral to the AMH. It is submitted that this constitutes a significant procedural deficiency and he never had an opportunity to “explain himself”.

The latter statement is not correct, and I do not accept that this justifies an adjournment. The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 do not expressly require that every officer must be interviewed under caution before an AMH can be directed. The Appropriate Authority may certify a case where they deem the special conditions under Regulation 49 are met. The Regulations contain no statutory precondition that a PACE interview must have taken place before such certification.

FDC Abdullah’s right to answer the allegations is not extinguished by the absence of a PACE interview. It is in fact protected by the hearing procedure itself. Under Regulation 54, the Officer has had the opportunity to file a response and he has done so.

At the hearing, FDC Abdullah will have the opportunity to give evidence, make representations, and challenge the case against him. These procedural safeguards are sufficient to ensure that his account is before me.

The absence of a pre-hearing interview under caution does not, of itself, render the proceedings unfair or create any procedural bar to the hearing taking place. This ground does not make an adjournment necessary or expedient.

Moreover, it is submitted that FDC Abdullah is denied procedural fairness because he was not afforded a formal opportunity to answer questions before referral to the AMH.

I have considered this submission with care. Procedural fairness requires that the Officer be given adequate notice of the allegations, an opportunity to respond, and a fair hearing. In this case, the Officer has been given notice, and a Regulation 54 response has been provided. As set out above, FDC Abdullah will have the opportunity to give evidence, make representations, and challenge the case against him during the hearing.

The requirements of natural justice and fairness are met by the hearing procedure provided for in the Regulations. Fairness is served by the hearing proceeding, not by its adjournment.

Further, it is submitted that the investigation was not sufficiently thorough or balanced to justify certification for an AMH and that the available material presents only part of the picture. The question of whether the investigation was sufficient does not provide a ground for adjournment. The Appropriate Authority certified the case under Regulation 49 and maintains its proper certification. It is not the function of this chair to re-examine or review the certification decision. My role at the hearing is to determine, on the evidence, whether the allegation against FDC Abdullah is proved and to what standard.

If the evidence is contested, as outlined, FDC Abdullah may challenge it during the hearing. If he considers that the evidence is incomplete or unbalanced, the proper course is to put forward his own account, explanation, context, and mitigation at the hearing. As chair, I will make my determination on the totality of the evidence before me.

In addition, it is submitted that the College of Policing Guidance on Outcomes requires an individualised assessment of motive, intent, disclosure, personal gain, actual harm, mitigation, and previous service.

I accept that the College of Policing Guidance on Outcomes requires an individualised assessment. However, that Guidance is directed at the relevant stage of the proceedings, it goes to the question of seriousness and what sanction, if any, is appropriate once I have made a determination on the findings. It is not a reason to adjourn.

As to any reference to harm and culpability, again, these are matters of substance going to the merits and, in particular, to the question of outcome. They are not matters which bear upon whether the hearing should be adjourned.

Accordingly, an adjournment in these circumstances would be contrary to the statutory purpose of the accelerated hearing procedure and would not serve the public interest.

The Allegation

An IIP audit identified that, between 30 August 2019 and 1 July 2023, you conducted a number of searches across MPS systems without an identified lawful policing purpose, operational necessity, or other legitimate policing authority.

Particulars

1. On 30 August 2019, you conducted searches relating to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], recording the rationale as “training”. These searches returned numerous CRIS and CAD records associated with addresses on [REDACTED].
2. On 31 August 2020, you conducted a search of [REDACTED], recording the rationale as “location-based officer safety assessment”. The search results included records associated with addresses on [REDACTED].
3. On 23 September 2020, you conducted a search of [REDACTED], recording the rationale as “officer safety”. The search results included records associated with addresses on [REDACTED].
4. On 13 July 2021, you conducted a search of [REDACTED], recording the rationale as “officer safety assessment”. The search results included intelligence reports and CAD records [REDACTED].

5. On 1 July 2023, you conducted a search of [REDACTED], recording the rationale as “intel checks”. The search results included records relating to offences connected with nearby [REDACTED] addresses.
6. The searches were conducted over a period spanning 30 August 2019 to 1 July 2023 and relate to your home address of [REDACTED], and the surrounding area.
7. As a result of the above searches, you accessed and viewed at least 35 records, comprising CRIS, CAD, Merlin and Crimint reports, [REDACTED].

Professional Standards of Behaviour

In the circumstances, the Appropriate Authority contends that your actions breached Standards of Professional Behaviour as set out in the Regulation 5 and Schedule 2 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (as amended by the Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 and 2025, namely:

- i. Discreditable conduct
- ii. Confidentiality

In that you behaved in a manner likely to bring discredit upon the police service and undermine public confidence. As a result of that stated herein, if proven, your conduct amounts to gross misconduct and your dismissal may be justified.

The Hearing

I have listened to the case presented on behalf of the Appropriate Authority by Ms Nairn.

Facts

The main issue of fact which I have to decide is whether the Appropriate Authority has proved on the balance of probabilities the allegation against FDC Abdullah.

The allegation concerns a series of searches conducted by FDC Abdullah on the Metropolitan Police Service’s Integrated Information Platform (“IIP”) between August 2019 and July 2023. IIP is a policing tool that integrates multiple databases, including CRIS, CRIMINT, CAD and Merlin. I set out the relevant facts below.

FDC Abdullah’s home address is [REDACTED]. An IIP audit was conducted by a Research Officer within the Intelligence Bureau of the Metropolitan Police Service’s Anti-Corruption and Abuse Command. The audit identified a series of searches conducted by FDC Abdullah which related to his home address, neighbouring addresses and nearby streets. The relevant searches are as follows:

30 August 2019 – FDC Abdullah searched for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] with the recorded rationale of “Training”. [REDACTED] is located less than a third of a mile from, and approximately a five-minute walk from, his home address. The searches returned numerous CRIS and CAD records linked to [REDACTED] addresses, including reports of domestic incidents, burglaries, vehicle crime, fraud, assaults, criminal damage and child safeguarding concerns.

31 August 2020 – FDC Abdullah searched for [REDACTED] with the recorded rationale of “Location Based Officer Safety Assessment”. The search returned CRIS, Merlin and CAD records associated with [REDACTED].

23 September 2020 – FDC Abdullah searched for [REDACTED] with the recorded rationale of “Officer Safety”. The search returned Merlin and CRIS entries relating to residents of nearby [REDACTED].

4 November 2020 – FDC Abdullah searched using the postcode [REDACTED], which is his home postcode, with the recorded rationale of “Officer Safety”. This search was identified by PC Bishop and had initially been missed in the original audit.

13 July 2021 – FDC Abdullah searched for [REDACTED] with the recorded rationale of “Officer Safety Assessment”. The search returned intelligence and CAD records [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is a neighbouring property to FDC Abdullah’s home address.

11 July 2023 – FDC Abdullah searched for [REDACTED] with the recorded rationale of “Intel Checks”. The search returned offences linked to nearby [REDACTED] addresses. [REDACTED] is a neighbouring property to FDC Abdullah’s home address.

PC Bishop reviewed the IIP audit returns. She noted these searches were recorded under rationales of “Training”, “Officer Safety” and “Intel Checks” and contained minimal rationale compared with FDC Abdullah’s other searches, which usually contained crime reference numbers and more detailed explanations. PC Bishop became concerned there was no legitimate policing purpose for the searches and referred the matter to the DPS Intelligence Bureau.

On completing the IIP audit, it did not appear FDC Abdullah had a legitimate reason or policing purpose for the searches.

The MPS Information Code of Conduct and Use of MPS ICT Systems Policy make clear that officers must only access MPS information on a need-to-know basis for legitimate policing purposes; that searching or using policing data for personal purposes is strictly prohibited; and that unauthorised searches may breach the Data Protection Act 2018, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the common law offence of Misconduct in Public Office. The College of Policing Code of Ethics 2014 (July 2014) similarly requires police-held information to be accessed only for a legitimate or authorised policing purpose and warns that unauthorised access to personal data may

itself be a criminal offence. The Met Data and Technology Management Policy, dated 2 December 2019 and applying with immediate effect, requires all Met personnel to handle Met data and technology appropriately, with due care and diligence, and to comply with data-protection law and associated codes and procedures. All ICT use is subject to lawful business monitoring and audit, and misuse can lead to dismissal.

If this allegation is proven, then I must decide whether it amounts to breach of the following standards of behaviour:

Confidentiality – Police officers treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the proper course of the exercise of police duties.

Discreditable Conduct – Police officers behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty.

Officer's position

FDC Abdullah was served with a Regulation 17 notice on 21 May 2026. He signed the notice on 1 June 2026, recording "No comment". Full disclosure was provided to FDC Abdullah via his Federation Representative on the 8th July 2026.

FDC Abdullah provided a written Regulation 54 response. He accepted that he undertook the searches. However, he avers the searches were for a policing purpose. He did not accept that his conduct amounted to gross misconduct.

He admitted conducting the IIP searches between 2019 and 2023, but said they were area searches around the vicinity of his home address, rather than searches on himself, his address or any specific neighbour. He said the purpose was to assess officer-safety risks, identify developing crime patterns and dangerous individuals or gang members in the vicinity, and that some early searches also served as practice on the system when he first started. He said he genuinely believed there was a proper policing purpose and no conflict of interest and did not appreciate that the searches were improper.

FDC Abdullah disputed in his Regulation 54 response that the two ICT policy documents disclosed to him were in force at the material time, observing that they referred to documents dated October 2023. He said the only policy with which he was familiar in 2019 was the "Conditions of Use of Met ICT Systems". He said he knew that searches required a proper policing purpose but believed that requirement was met.

[REDACTED]

With hindsight, and following advice from more experienced colleagues, he accepted that the searches were an error of judgment and that any such checks should have been carried out by a manager or DPS on his behalf. He accepted that he had not

followed that process. He disputed any suggestion that he had viewed [REDACTED] reports relating to himself or his own address, stating that he had never been involved in [REDACTED]. He said he stopped the searches as soon as he understood they were improper.

He advanced mitigation based on his being a new direct-entry TDC on an experimental scheme, which he said provided inadequate guidance and support; [REDACTED] He expressed remorse, asserted that he had not disclosed any accessed information to third parties and that there was no conflict of interest, and relied on his previous service and record.

Decision on Finding

I have applied Regulation 61(15) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. I have reviewed the facts and carefully considered the documentary evidence provided to me, including the IIP audit evidence, the investigation report and FDC Abdullah's written Regulation 54 response. I have considered that response and submissions both in deciding the facts and in assessing whether the searches had a legitimate policing purpose.

The IIP audit conducted, establishes that FDC Abdullah conducted a series of searches on the IIP between August 2019 and July 2023 relating to his home address at [REDACTED], neighbouring addresses on [REDACTED], and nearby streets.

The searches were recorded under rationales of "Training", "Officer Safety", "Officer Safety Assessment" and "Intel Checks". At least 35 reports were viewed across CRIS, CAD, Merlin and Crimint, including reports of domestic incidents at or near his home address.

I note that these searches contained minimal rationale compared with FDC Abdullah's other searches, which were typically accompanied by crime reference numbers and more detailed explanations.

FDC Abdullah's Regulation 54 response amounts to an admission that he personally conducted the searches, which reinforces the factual finding. I have considered his explanation that he was conducting area searches in the vicinity of his home for officer-safety risk assessment, not searching himself, his address or any specific neighbour, and that some early searches also served as practice on the system. That explanation addresses his motivation, but it does not establish authority or a legitimate policing purpose for the searches.

The essential dispute is whether there was a legitimate policing purpose. Even taking FDC Abdullah's officer-safety account at its highest, the recognised and proper course for a genuine officer-safety check in the vicinity of his home was for it to be authorised and conducted by a manager or the appropriate department, including DPS where appropriate, rather than self-generated by FDC Abdullah. He accepts that he did not

follow that process in his Regulation 54 response. A subjective safety concern does not itself confer authority to search police systems.

I reject FDC Abdullah's contention that the relevant standards and policies were not in force at the material time. The College of Policing Code of Ethics, published in July 2014, was in force throughout the relevant period and required access to police-held information only for a legitimate or authorised policing purpose. The Met Data and Technology Management Policy came into effect on the 2nd December 2019 and applied with immediate effect, covering the overwhelming majority of the searches. It required Met personnel to handle Met data and technology appropriately, with due care and diligence, and to comply with the Data Protection Act 2018, the GDPR and associated codes and procedures. The obligation to access policing systems only for a legitimate policing purpose was therefore clearly established; indeed, on his own account, FDC Abdullah knew that a search required a "proper policing purpose".

FDC Abdullah's recorded rationales, including "Training" and "Officer Safety", and his acceptance that he knew a proper policing purpose was required, are inconsistent with any genuine belief that no justification or authorisation was needed. They show an awareness that a policing rationale was required, but no manager or appropriate department authorised or conducted the checks, and the rationales did not amount to legitimate authority. His contention that he did not intend to view material concerning himself or a particular neighbour does not alter this conclusion: the issue is the unauthorised access to police-held information concerning the area around his home.

Therefore, having considered the explanation advanced in the Regulation 54 response and in the submissions on his behalf, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the facts are proved. FDC Abdullah conducted searches on the IIP relating to his home address, neighbouring addresses and nearby locations between August 2019 and July 2023 without any legitimate policing purpose.

Accordingly, I find the allegation proven.

Breach of Professional Standards

In line with Regulation 61(16), I bear in mind that the burden of proving a Breach of Standards rests upon the Appropriate Authority and that it must satisfy me on the balance of probabilities.

I am satisfied that the Appropriate Authority has discharged that burden and the conduct did breach the standards of professional behaviour as to Confidentiality and Discreditable Conduct.

As to Confidentiality, FDC Abdullah accessed policing databases through the IIP to search for information relating to his home address, neighbouring addresses and nearby locations without any legitimate policing purpose. The College of Policing Code of Ethics 2014 Confidentiality standard required officers to treat information with

respect, access police-held information only for a legitimate or authorised policing purpose, be familiar with and abide by data-protection principles, and understand that unauthorised access to personal data may itself be a criminal offence, regardless of any onward disclosure.

Police officers are entrusted with access to sensitive information and must treat that information with respect, accessing it only in the proper course of the exercise of police duties. The Met Data and Technology Management Policy, dated 2 December 2019 and applying with immediate effect, required all Met personnel to handle Met data and the technology assets that process it appropriately and with due care and diligence, to comply with the Data Protection Act 2018, the GDPR and associated codes and procedures, and placed an expectation of trust on individuals to access and use Met data appropriately.

FDC Abdullah's repeated searches of addresses at and around his home, recorded under vague and unsubstantiated rationales, represent a clear breach of the duty of confidentiality. The MPS Information Code of Conduct and Use of MPS ICT Systems Policy expressly prohibit accessing policing data for personal purposes, and all such access must be on a need-to-know basis for legitimate policing purposes. Those requirements govern access itself and are not limited to any subsequent disclosure of the information.

As to Discreditable Conduct, the Code of Ethics 2014 identifies *Integrity, Honesty, Accountability and Selflessness* as principles that should guide every policing decision: doing the right thing, acting truthfully and trustworthily, being answerable for decisions and actions, and acting in the public interest. Its Conduct standard requires officers to behave in a manner which does not bring discredit on the police service or undermine public confidence in policing. The unauthorised access of policing databases by a then serving officer for what appears to be personal interest in the area around his own home brings the police service into disrepute and damages the relationship of trust and confidence between the police and the public.

Assessment of Seriousness

I go on to make a provisional assessment of seriousness by reference to Culpability and Harm, mitigating and aggravating factors. I have carefully considered the submissions by the Appropriate Authority and the representations advanced in writing by FDC Abdullah in his Regulation 54 response and the submissions on his behalf.

Culpability – high – FDC Abdullah's conduct was deliberate and sustained over a period of approximately four years, from August 2019 to July 2023. I acknowledge his account that he was inexperienced and genuinely believed he had a proper officer-safety purpose, but that belief does not materially reduce culpability. He personally chose to conduct the searches and repeated them over the identified period.

He made multiple searches on the IIP relating to his home address, neighbouring addresses and nearby locations, using rationales that were vague and minimal and which I have found did not reflect any genuine policing purpose. This was not a momentary lapse but a repeated and conscious pattern of access over approximately four years.

FDC Abdullah was a serving detective constable throughout this period. I have considered his account that he was a new direct-entry TDC on an experimental scheme and lacked adequate guidance and support. Those matters are relevant, but do not materially reduce culpability because the College of Policing Code of Ethics 2014 and the Met Data and Technology Management Policy made clear the duty to access police information only for a legitimate or authorised policing purpose and to handle Met data with due care.

The fact that he recorded rationales such as “Training” and “Officer Safety” suggests awareness that the searches required justification. His acceptance that he knew a proper policing purpose was required is consistent with that conclusion, but the rationales were not genuine authorisation, and he did not obtain the independent managerial or departmental check he now accepts was required. The conduct was therefore deliberate and sustained notwithstanding his stated subjective belief.

Harm – high – The misuse of police information systems causes serious harm to the reputation of the police service and to public confidence. The public entrust officers with significant powers to access sensitive personal data, including information relating to domestic incidents, safeguarding concerns and criminal offences. The unauthorised access of such data by a then serving officer undermines the relationship of trust between the police and the communities they serve.

FDC Abdullah’s conduct undermines public confidence in policing at a time when the police and specifically the Metropolitan Police Service are aiming to demonstrate how seriously it is tackling higher standards following highly publicised and damaging incidents.

At least 35 reports were accessed, including records of domestic incidents, burglaries, fraud, assaults, criminal damage and child safeguarding concerns relating to residents in the vicinity of his home. The potential for harm arising from unauthorised access to such sensitive information is significant.

Aggravating features – I have considered the sustained and repeated nature of the conduct over approximately four years and the volume and breadth of the searches, which covered multiple addresses, multiple policing databases and at least 35 reports. However, I am mindful not to double count or take into consideration any factors that have already featured in my determination of culpability and harm.

Mitigating features – I have considered the mitigation advanced in FDC Abdullah’s Regulation 54 response. I give fair but measured weight to his mistaken, subjective

belief that he was acting for officer-safety reasons; [REDACTED]; his remorse and his cessation of the conduct once advised in or around 2023 that it was improper; his assertion that he did not disclose accessed information to third parties. These matters do not materially reduce the assessment of culpability or harm. [REDACTED] and I therefore attach limited weight to those aspects of the mitigation.

Gross Misconduct

I have reminded myself that gross misconduct is a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour so serious as to justify dismissal. Applying that definition and in line with Regulation 61(15), having undertaken an assessment of seriousness and weighed the mitigation advanced in the Regulation 54 response, as well as the representations made during the hearing, I am satisfied that the breaches of the professional standards do amount to gross misconduct.

Following my findings, I have gone on to carry out another full assessment of seriousness (as per the provisional assessment above).

Personal mitigation

I have considered the personal mitigation now advanced, [REDACTED], and the workplace treatment described by FDC Abdullah. I accept that these matters may have placed him under considerable pressure at the time, but the response is not supported [REDACTED]. I also take into account his previous good character and record of service, including his detection record and a borough commander's commendation. I also take into account the officer's educational background. I am mindful of the limits to the weight I should attach to personal mitigation as identified in the College of Policing's Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings. The interests of the police service and the protection of the public are more important than those of the individual officer.

Outcome Decision

In making my decision on outcome I bear in mind that the Police (Conduct, Performance and Complaints and Misconduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 ("The 2025 Regulations") came into effect on the 28th May 2025.

The 2025 Regulations amend Regulation 62 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 ("The PCR") so that, where gross misconduct is proven against a serving officer, the panel must dismiss the officer unless there are exceptional circumstances.

I note that this matter involves a former officer. FDC Abdullah made written representations through his Regulation 54 response, including his asserted officer-safety motivation, personal mitigation, remorse and insight, and I have considered those representations as well as the representations made during the hearing.

I have considered the officer's record of service. This case is based upon what amounts to incontrovertible evidence, namely the IIP audit evidence establishing a sustained pattern of unauthorised database searches over a period of approximately four years.

FDC Abdullah has now offered an explanation for the searches and advanced personal mitigation. I have carefully assessed the seriousness of the conduct and the mitigation advanced. However, I do not find any exceptional circumstances.

The only available sanction is dismissal without notice. I am satisfied that, had the officer still been serving, he would have been dismissed without notice.

OUTCOME:

Having considered the matter fully and having regard to the nature and severity of the breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour, had FDC Abdullah still been a serving police officer, he would have been **dismissed without notice** and is to be placed on the College of Policing's barred list.

T/Commander Brigid Beehag-Fisher

Metropolitan Police Service

7th September 2026