

Police Constable PC Jonathan Vieites-Stephenson Warrant No: P267357

Accelerated Misconduct Hearing Finding and Outcome

Regulation 63(1) Report

1. This matter comes before me as an accelerated misconduct hearing under Part 5 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020.
2. The hearing was conducted by me, Commander Colin Wingrove, on 16 September 2026 in person at Patrick Dunne House, Chalk Way Pit, Sutton, SM1 4RD.
3. I have had the benefit of the papers in advance of today and read them carefully before the hearing started, along with the documentary evidence contained within the hearing bundle. I am satisfied that the required notices under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (as amended) have been served. These are matters which have not, in any case, been disputed before me.
4. I am satisfied, on the papers, that the officer has been properly served and that Regulations 51 to 53 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 have been complied with. PC Vieites-Stephenson provided a Regulation 54 response and a supplementary statement.

Hearing in Public

5. The hearing was held in private pursuant to Regulation 59(1) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, as amended.

Representation

6. PC Vieites-Stephenson attended the hearing and was represented by Counsel, Ms Rina Hill.
7. The Appropriate Authority was represented by Counsel, Mr Jannick Fielding and Case Manager, Mr Aaryan Sattani.
8. I was advised by a Legally Qualified Person, Ms Nasreen Shah who provided her advice on the record.

The Allegation

9. On or about 16th June 2024, whilst off duty, you attended a private address and used a Metropolitan Police-issued laptop to access, view and display MPS Body Worn Video ("BWV") footage and other operational policing material to members of the public who had no policing role, lawful authority or legitimate operational reason to access or view that material.
10. The material included operational policing recordings and information, including custody interview footage, stop and search footage, arrest footage and other police-generated recordings obtained in the course of policing duties. The material contained personal data, private information, confidential policing information and information acquired through the exercise of your duties as a police officer.
11. The material was shown for personal, social and/or entertainment purposes and not for any legitimate policing, investigative or operational purpose.
12. It is alleged that, by doing so, you improperly disclosed police information to unauthorised persons, failed to protect personal data and confidential policing information, and failed to handle police information in accordance with the standards expected of a police officer.
13. It is further alleged that your actions were contrary to the Metropolitan Police Service BWV Policy, which provides that:
 - i. "Users need to be aware that the use of BWV cameras or footage for a personal (or non-policing purpose) is not permitted, and that it could subject them and other staff who are involved to disciplinary action."
14. Accordingly, it is alleged that you conduct breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour relating to Confidentiality and Discreditable Conduct.

Professional Standards of Behaviour

15. In the circumstances, the Appropriate Authority contends that your actions breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour as set out in Regulation 5 and

Schedule 2 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, as amended by the Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2024, namely:

- i) **Discreditable Conduct**
- ii) **Confidentiality**

16. In that you conduct may bring the police service into disrepute and damage the relationship of trust and confidence between the police and the public.
17. As a result of that stated herein, if proven, individually or cumulatively, the conduct amounts to gross misconduct and dismissal may be justified.

Application to Adjourn

18. [REDACTED].
19. [REDACTED].
20. [REDACTED].
21. Having carefully weighed the submissions before me and having regards to Regulation 61, I am not satisfied that an adjournment would be necessary in the circumstances nor is it expedient to do so.
22. PC Vieites-Stephenson is not disadvantaged by proceeding today. There is no suggestion that the [REDACTED] evidence would materially impact the factual matrix of the case. The Officer can address me in evidence and set out the circumstances surrounding the incident.
23. Accordingly, I refuse the application.

The Hearing

24. The accelerated misconduct hearing was initially listed for 7 September 2026 and re-listed for 16 September 2026. I have listened to the case presented on behalf of the Appropriate Authority by Mr Fielding, and I have had regard to the representations made on behalf of PC Vieites-Stephenson, by Counsel Ms Rina Hill and the evidence given by PC Vieites-Stephenson.

Facts

25. The matter came to the attention of the DPS on the 1 January 2026, following a disclosure by Learning and Development staff. A Metropolitan Police recruit, who at the material time in June 2024 was a member of the public in the recruitment process, disclosed that a serving officer had shown her police operational Body Worn Video (BWV) footage during off-duty social interactions. There was no public complaint, and the matter was not referred to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC).
26. There were two off-duty interactions at the private address in June 2024. On the 1 June 2024, PC Vieites-Stephenson attended the address of two women to help them move in. On or around the 16 June 2024, he attended again for a casual social visit.
27. The central factual issue is whether, whilst off duty on or about the 16 June 2024, the officer used a Metropolitan Police-issued laptop to access, view and display BWV footage and other operational policing material to civilians for personal, social or entertainment purposes rather than for a legitimate policing purpose.
28. One of the women's evidence is that on the 1 June 2024, she and the other woman had just moved into their address and asked the officer for help. She states that the officer showed her his handcuffs, which she believed were his work-issue ones because he mentioned a serial number, although she did not see the number herself and cannot be fully sure.
29. On or around the 16 June 2024, the officer brought his work laptop, which used its own mobile data rather than the home network, connected it via HDMI to her television, and showed them BWV footage. She recalls a foot chase of a car in which the officer missed a hit to the window and said it was funny, and an interview in which the person questioned "passed gas" and blamed the food. She believes he showed more videos but cannot be sure because she may be confusing some with content later seen on social media.
30. She recalls an underground-station stop and search where an officer was pushed but cannot confirm whether that was shown by the officer or seen on social media.

31. The CARMS duty-status material (SM6) records that on the 1 June 2024, the officer worked a 1200–2100 shift and on the 16 June 2024, he was on a rest day and was not performing policing duties.
32. The BWV User Audit Trail (SM4) from Evidence.com records access, buffering and streaming events under the officer's credentials (p267357) on the 16 June 2024. The Evidence.com URLs and clip metadata for the BWV clips accessed are at (SM5).
33. The BWV governance and system warning (SM7) records that users of Evidence.com receive on-screen warnings that footage may be accessed only for legitimate policing purposes and that every viewing is audited.
34. The CARMS duty-status material (SM6) records that on 1 June 2024, the officer worked a 1200–2100 shift on Operation Nightingale; on 16 June 2024, the date of the principal incident, he was on a rest day and was not performing policing duties.
35. The clip summary (SM8) records the content of the clips streamed, which I have viewed.
36. It includes the Stop and Search clip, approximately 37m45s, in which an officer detains and searches a passenger and later takes him for a strip search, with the civilian's name, date of birth and address disclosed.
37. Further, a civilian's custody interview, approximately 20m50s, with a solicitor present and relating to a no-comment interview about a neighbour altercation with racial remarks, with the civilian's name and date of birth disclosed.
38. Moreover, the "Points and Blades" arrest, approximately 24m23s, in which a male is stopped at a train station, attempts to run, is detained and has a knife found; BWV showing an alternative angle of the arrest; CCTV "Curtain Road", showing a marked minibus, an altercation and officers assisting; and "Custody Van Transport", approximately 8m14s, depicting a detainee in a cage who bangs his body against the cage door, with indications of self-harm or distress.

39. It records streaming at 8pm, 8.03pm, a further file at 8.09pm, and further files at 8.38pm and 8.41pm, from IP address ending 138. There were said to be nine streaming events in total.
40. The MPS Body Worn Video Guidance v6.0 and the Evidence.com sign-in agreement state: *"You must not view any BWV footage unless you have a policing purpose to do so... Every viewing is audited... Unauthorised access or misuse of this system may constitute an offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and/or the Data Protection Act 2018."* Section 9c states that use of BWV footage for a personal or non-policing purpose is not permitted and could subject staff to disciplinary action.
41. The training record shows that the officer completed mandatory training in information handling and data management on the 1 to the 3 March 2025, and a "Managing Information: Operational Programme" was completed on the 10 February 2026. Both courses post-date the 16 June 2024 incident.
42. The officer's response to the allegation contains substantial admissions, set out below under Officer's position.

Officer's position

43. The officer accepts that he attended the address of the two women on 1 June 2024, to help them move in, and on 16 June 2024, for a casual social visit. He denies showing one of them handcuffs on 1 June: *"I did not show ... handcuffs during that visit."*
44. He states that he used his Metropolitan Police-issued laptop, connected it via HDMI to the television at the address, and showed BWV clips which he found funny, having been drinking, *"to impress"* one of the women. He accepts that both women were not police staff and had no policing purpose or lawful authority to view the material, that he had no authorisation to display BWV outside a policing purpose, and that his actions were inappropriate and fell below the standards expected. PC Vieites-Stephen could not 'confidently' say that he displayed any personal data.

45. The officer describes in his written response the clips he showed as a foot chase of a fast white vehicle where he swung his baton at the rear window and missed, which he found comical; the start of a PACE interview where the subject loudly passed wind and blamed a curry, although he asserts that no personal or sensitive information was disclosed during that clip; and a drugs-dog operation in an underground station where a subject rugby-tackled him to the floor.
46. In his written response, PC Vieites-Stephenson outlined that he did not believe full clips were shown, did not believe nine different videos were shown, and cannot account for why the audit shows nine clips. In evidence, PC Vieites-Stephenson could not recall all the footage he may have shown but now having had sight of the audit, fully accepts the findings of the audit trail. In cross-examination, PC Vieites-Stephenson accepted that at the time, he would have selected the parts of the clips which he showed the women, and he accepted that he intentionally took his MPS-issued laptop with him to show the women those clips.
47. In his MG14, PC Vieites-Stephenson attributed some of his conduct to the 1 June visit rather than solely the 16 June. In evidence, he has refuted this, stating it is a mistake.
48. Further, PC Vieites-Stephenson relies on inexperience, a lapse in judgment, [REDACTED] in support.
49. [REDACTED]. However, PC Vieites-Stephenson accepted that none of those records are before the chair and accepted that the material would have only been background.
50. He expresses remorse, accepts full responsibility, and he also stated in writing that he now ensures BWV viewing is justified in the notes field. In evidence, PC Vieites-Stephenson confirmed that he would like to remain a serving constable.

Decision on Finding

51. I have applied Regulation 61(15) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 and have carefully considered the documentary evidence provided to me, including

viewing the video evidence, the MG14, the Regulation 54 response of PC Vieites-Stephenson and his supplementary statement.

52. On the balance of probabilities, I am satisfied that the officer displayed multiple BWV clips to civilians, in a private residential address, whilst off duty, having taken his MPS issues work laptop to do so.
53. The footage contained personal data of members of the public, depicting sensitive operational policing activity, and situations where those members of the public in potentially vulnerable situations.
54. The officer's admissions establish that several clips were shown, and the audit trail establishes that he streamed seven unique files during the relevant period.
55. Accordingly, I find the allegation proven.

Breach of Professional Standards

56. In line with Regulation 61(16), I bear in mind that the burden of proving a breach of standards rests upon the Appropriate Authority, which must satisfy me on the balance of probabilities.
57. I am satisfied that the Appropriate Authority has discharged that burden and that the conduct did breach the Standards of Professional Behaviour as to Confidentiality and Discreditable Conduct.
58. The officer accessed BWV footage, containing police information, personal data (names, dates of birth and addresses) and confidential operational policing material, and disclosed it to civilians with no policing role, lawful authority or legitimate operational reason to view it.
59. The disclosure was made for personal and social purposes, not in the proper course of police duties. The officer accepts that his conduct was inappropriate and not in accordance with his training.

60. He further accepts that he had no authorisation, legitimate policing purpose or other permission. Therefore, I am satisfied that this constitutes a clear breach of Confidentiality.
61. The off-duty display of operational policing footage, including footage of searches, a custody interview, arrests and a detainee in apparent distress, to members of the public for entertainment and amusement purposes is conduct capable of discrediting the police service and undermining public confidence.
62. The public are entitled to expect that sensitive policing material will be handled with the utmost care and will not be treated as entertainment. Therefore, I am satisfied that this constitutes a breach amounting to Discreditable Conduct.

Assessment of Seriousness

63. I go on to make a provisional assessment of seriousness by reference to Culpability and Harm, mitigating and aggravating factors.
64. Culpability —high – The officer's conduct was intentional and deliberate. He abused his position of trust and responsibility as a police officer when he made a conscious decision, while off duty and having been drinking to access police BWV footage on his Metropolitan Police-issued laptop, connect the laptop to a civilian's television, and display operational policing material to impress a member of the public.
65. I am satisfied that the officer knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that BWV footage and police information were confidential and should only be accessed, used and disclosed for a legitimate policing purpose. The proper handling of police information is a fundamental aspect of policing and is reinforced through officer training and the warnings displayed when accessing police systems, including Evidence.com.
66. Harm —high – The footage was displayed to a limited audience of two civilians in a private setting. There is no evidence of any onward dissemination, publication or use of the material.

67. However, the footage contained the personal data, including names, dates of birth and addresses, of identifiable members of the public, including individuals subject to stop and search, a custody interview and an arrest. One clip depicted a detainee in apparent distress. The material therefore related to individuals who were interacting with police in circumstances where they were particularly entitled to expect that their personal information and image would be treated confidentially.
68. The disclosure of such material, even to a limited audience, represents a real and not merely theoretical risk to the data subjects and to public confidence in the handling of police information.
69. Members of the public in these BWV clips would have had an expectation of privacy, with no expectation that the BWV footage of them would be shown in anything other than a legitimate setting and not shown in the manner and circumstances it was.
70. The use of police data and technology is a matter of significant public interest. For example not only to improve police accountability through the protective benefits BWV provides the public and officers, including the better scrutiny and supervision of the police use of powers, but also to secure evidence to support criminal investigations.
71. The harm the officers' actions can have therefore to the reputation of the police service is significant: the public must be able to trust that sensitive material captured through the exercise of policing powers will not be used as entertainment.
72. Aggravating features – I am mindful not to double-count factors already reflected in my assessment of culpability and harm.
73. However, I have considered the following aggravating features; there were multiple files streamed over a period of approximately 41 minutes, further suggesting a sustained course of conduct rather than a momentary lapse.

74. The conduct involved the use of a police-issued device, namely a laptop, and a police system, Evidence.com, for an entirely non-policing purpose.
75. Mitigating features – I have considered the following mitigating features;
76. The officer has made substantial and early admissions. He accepts attending the address, using the laptop, connecting it to the television, displaying BWV footage to civilians, and having no authorisation or legitimate purpose for doing so. He accepts that his actions were inappropriate and fell below the standards expected.
77. The officer has expressed remorse and states that he accepts full responsibility.
78. The officer was a relatively inexperienced probationary constable, and a relatively young adult at the time of the incident. However, he demonstrated a serious absence of judgement and disregard for his training, instructions, and MPS values.

Gross Misconduct

79. I have reminded myself, applying Regulation 2 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, that gross misconduct is a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour so serious as to justify dismissal.
80. Applying that definition, and having undertaken an assessment of seriousness, I am satisfied that the breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour amount to gross misconduct. For the reasons set out above, I reject the submission that the conduct should properly be characterised as misconduct only.
81. Following my findings, I have gone on to carry out another full assessment of seriousness (as per the provisional assessment above).

Personal mitigation

82. [REDACTED]. Further, I have had regard to the two character references provided, which describe PC Vieites-Stephenson as kind, considerate, selfless individual. They set out that PC Vieites-Stephenson had great pride at being a

police officer. He is referred to as a professional, hard-working and trustworthy individual, willing to stand up for others.

83. In any event, I am mindful of the limits to the weight I should attach to personal mitigation as identified in the College of Policing's Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings, and that the interests of the police service, and the protection of the public, are more important than those of the individual officer.

Outcome Decision

84. In making my decision on outcome I bear in mind that the Police (Conduct, Performance and Complaints and Misconduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 ("the 2025 Regulations") came into effect on 28 May 2025.
85. The 2025 Regulations amend Regulation 62 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 ("the PCR") so that, where gross misconduct is proven against a serving officer, the panel must dismiss the officer unless there are exceptional circumstances.
86. I have considered the officer's record of service.
87. I have considered whether there are exceptional circumstances that might justify a lesser outcome, such as a final written warning.
88. The officer's admissions, remorse, inexperience and the limited audience are noted. However, the deliberate disclosure of operational policing footage, including material depicting individuals in vulnerable or sensitive circumstances, for personal entertainment is conduct that fundamentally undermines public trust in police information governance.
89. Furthermore, the conduct involved the misuse of privileged police access and therefore damaged the trust that the MPS, and the public it serves, must be able to place in the Officer who was entrusted with access to sensitive information.
90. Therefore, I do not find any exceptional circumstances. The only available sanction is dismissal without notice, and I am satisfied that it is the only appropriate sanction in this case.

Outcome

91. Having considered the matter fully and having regard to the nature and severity of the breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour, the sanction I impose is dismissal without notice and the officer should be placed on the College of Policing's barred list.

Commander Colin Wingrove

Metropolitan Police Service

16th September 2026