

IN THE MATTER OF A MISCONDUCT HEARING UNDER THE POLICE (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS
2020 AS AMENDED BY THE POLICE (CONDUCT) (AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS 2024

CM/426/24 AND CM/806/24

BETWEEN:

THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS

AND

OFFICER A

FINAL DECISION

Chair: Commander Andy Brittain

Independent Panel Members: Rachel Ellis

Placida Ojinnaka

Legally Qualified Advisor: Kenneth Hamer

Counsel for Appropriate Authority: Jennie Osborne

Counsel for Officer A: Michael Levy

Dates of hearing: 3 April 2025

4 July 2025

5 January 2026

26-27 March 2026

27 May 2026 – 3 June 2026

Venue: Palestra House, 197 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NJ

The Allegations against the Officer and the Decisions of the Panel

Allegation CM/426/24, as amended

Allegation 1

On the 13th March 2024, Officer A claimed to have completed the tasks and checks assigned to her by a senior officer when knowingly she had not completed them.

If proved, allegation 1 amounts to gross misconduct for the following reasons;

- (a) The conduct amounts to a breach of her duty to act with honesty and integrity.

Allegation 2

On the 13th March 2024, Officer A did not make efficient and effective use of policing resources to complete basic checks, record and retain details in relation to a reported crime.

Officer A thereby undermined an effective primary investigation.

If proved, allegation 2 amounts to gross misconduct for the following reasons:

- (a) The conduct amounts to a failure to be diligent in the exercise of her duties and responsibilities.

Decision of Panel:

Allegation 1: Proved

Allegation 2: Proved

Allegation CM/806/24, as amended

Allegation 1

On the 17th March 2024, Officer A signed a witness statement in the name of AP using her own signature.

If proved, allegation 1 amounts to gross misconduct for the following reasons;

- (a) The conduct amounts to a breach of her duty to act with honesty and integrity.

Decision of Panel:

Allegation 1: Proved

Outcome: Dismissal Without Notice

Preliminary matters

1. At the outset of the hearing, Mr Levy applied for Officer A's name to be anonymised and for the hearing to be held in private. Ms Osborne did not object to Officer A being anonymised as "Officer A" and for the hearing to be held in private, with the matter to be reviewed at the end of the hearing.
2. The Panel bore in mind regulation 39 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 ("the Conduct Regulations") and Home Office Guidance, paragraph 11.84, and determined that in light of Officer A's [REDACTED] it would be appropriate for her to be anonymised and for the hearing to be held in private, with the matter to be reviewed at the end of the hearing.

Background

3. Officer A – joined the Metropolitan Police Service on 6 January 2020. In March 2024, Officer A was based at Islington Police Station.
4. In relation to CM/426/24, on Wednesday 13 March 2024, Officer A was on an early shift and was posted to assist to the front desk at Islington Police Station. When Officer A arrived at the front desk, there was a male sitting, waiting to report a crime. It is accepted that during the day, Officer A approached PS Abrahams and made her aware of the allegation and sought guidance as to whether this amounted to a public order matter of threats to kill. PS Abrahams gave Officer A a list of tasks which she would need to undertake prior to approaching the duty officer, Inspector Clarke, to carry out a risk assessment. The tasks included doing intelligence checks on all the parties.

5. Shortly after speaking to PS Abrahams, Officer A approached Inspector Clarke, to make him aware of the allegation. It is alleged that Inspector Clarke asked Officer A if she had carried out IIP and PNC checks on the parties, which Officer A confirmed she had. Officer A told Inspector Clarke that her Connect file had failed and that she could not re-key the details as she had shredded the information, which she had written on paper instead of in her pocket note book. Officer A is alleged to have confirmed that she had done all the actions set by PS Abrahams, including PNC and IIP checks, later telling Inspector Clarke that she was “99.9% certain” she had carried out these checks. It is accepted that no such checks were carried out after speaking to PS Abrahams.
6. Officer A says that at the time she spoke to Inspector Clarke she believed that she had undertaken these checks. Officer A denies that she breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour to act with honesty and integrity and/or to be diligent in the exercise of her duties and responsibilities.
7. In relation to CM/806/24, on Sunday 17 March 2024, Officer A was on duty in marked police vehicle CN71 and attended a call to a domestic incident. Officer A obtained a witness statement from AP, the victim of the domestic related incident, and gave her a stylus to digitally sign the statement but which it is alleged she failed to sign. It is alleged that once back at Islington Police Station, Officer A signed the witness statement in the name of AP using her own signature.
8. Officer A denies that she signed the witness statement in the name of AP using her own signature, and that she acted in breach of the standards of honesty and integrity.

Evidence

9. The Panel was provided with a combined Final Hearing Bundle of both CM/426/24 and CM/806/24 comprising over 160 pages.
10. CM/426/24 includes (but is not limited to) the following documentary evidence:

- The Investigating Officer's Report;
- The Regulation 30 Notice;
- Witness statements of Officer A dated 13 March 2024;
- Witness statement of PS Abrahams dated 14 March 2024;
- Witness statement of Inspector Clarke dated 15 March 2024
- Witness statements of PS Williams dated 21 June 2024, and 10 July 2025;
- MG14 reply of Officer A undated;
- IIP audit, Connect audit and PNC audit;
- Officer A Regulation 31 Response dated 11 March 2025;
- Medical Records of Officer A;
- [REDACTED];
- Bundle of character evidence on behalf of Officer A.

11. CM/806/24 includes (but is not limited to) the following documentary evidence:

- The Investigating Officer's report;
- The Regulation 30 Notice;
- Witness statement of AP dated 14 June 2024;
- Witness statement of PC Glorney dated 28 May 2024;
- Witness statements of PS Williams dated 2 July 2024 and 4 December 2024;
- Witness statement of PC Swaine dated 12 August 2024;
- Witness statement of APS McDermott dated 25 August 2024;
- Witness statement of PC Palmer dated 3 September 2024;
- Witness statement of PC Rimmer dated 4 September 2024;
- Witness statements of PC Coll dated 3 December 2024, and 21 January 2025;
- MG14 responses of Officer A dated 27 November 2024, and 29 August 2025;
- Officer A 31 Regulation Response dated 27 November 2025.

The Panel's approach to the evidence

12. The Legal Advisor gave written legal advice, repeated orally, covering four broad areas, namely the burden and standard of proof, the need for separate treatment of each of the allegations, the wording of the allegations and the Panel's approach to the evidence.

13. The Panel accepted the advice of the Legal Advisor and that the burden of proof lies on the Appropriate Authority throughout. The Appropriate Authority must prove the allegations on the balance of probabilities. There is no obligation on Officer A to prove anything. Further, the inherent probability or improbability of an event is a matter which can be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and in deciding whether the event occurred.

14. Throughout its consideration of the case, the Panel took into consideration the good character direction/advice given by the Legal Advisor.

15. After reviewing the evidence presented, listening to the submissions made on behalf of the Appropriate Authority and Officer A, and the advice of the Legal Advisor, the Panel has approached its fact-finding role in 3 stages:
 - To ascertain the facts;

 - To determine on the basis of those facts whether Officer A breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour (SoPB) alleged in the Allegations; and

 - Whether any breaches amounted to misconduct, gross misconduct or neither.

Findings of fact

CM/426/24 – Allegation 1

16. In support of Allegation 1 of CM/426/24, the Appropriate Authority called Former PS Abrahams (now Senior Constable Abrahams) and Inspector Clarke, both of whom gave live evidence by video link.
17. Both officers confirmed that the contents of their respective witness statements were true to the best of their knowledge and belief. The thrust of PS Abrahams's evidence is that when she saw Officer A at around 2:30 pm on 13 March 2024, she asked what risk assessment measures had been taken, and she told Officer A to carry out IIP and PNC checks of the individuals involved in the potential threats to kill allegation that had been made earlier that day to Officer A by one of the males. In her witness statement, PS Abrahams says that Officer A said that she hadn't carried out these enquiries.
18. Officer A herself made a witness statement later on 13 March 2024 about the events of that day. In her witness statement, Officer A states that she spoke to PS Abrahams and was "advised to get all intel with regards to both MALE 1 and MALE 2" before asking advice from an inspector. The Panel noted that in her MG 11 statement, Officer A does not say that she told PS Abrahams that she had already done these checks.
19. The Appropriate Authority does not dispute that prior to seeing PS Abrahams, Officer A may well have carried some PNC checks during her shift on other cases, but does not accept that Officer A carried out any checks in relation to the potential threats to kill allegation.
20. The critical issue is what she told Inspector Clarke about carrying out the checks set by PS Abrahams when she saw him at 15:26 hours. Inspector Clarke says that at 15:00 he had a teams meeting for an unrelated matter but he could see a PC (i.e. Officer A) waiting to speak to him outside the supervisor's door. Officer A accepts

that she did not carry out any IPP or PNC checks on anyone during the period between speaking to PS Abrahams at 2:30 pm and speaking to Inspector Clarke at 3:26 pm.

21. The Panel was satisfied that Inspector Clarke asked Officer A specifically whether she had carried out the checks requested by PS Abrahams. In his witness statement, Inspector Clarke says that having been told by Officer A that she had shredded her manuscript notes after she had put the crime report on Connect, he said: "OK but you did all the actions you had been set by PS Abrahams, including PNC, and IIP checks?"
22. This question was very clearly directed towards the checks requested of Officer A by PS Abrahams. In answer to Inspector Clarke's question, Officer A replied "Yes".
23. Inspector Clarke's evidence is that he spoke again to Officer A later on 13 March 2024, when she repeated to him that she had done the checks directed to her by PS Abrahams and that Officer A replied "I am 99.9% certain I did them".
24. The Panel was satisfied that no IIP or PNC checks were done in relation to the two males involved in the potential threats to kill allegation. In her witness statement, Officer A says that she used her warrant card number when doing a TE check, as this would potentially show all PNC checks which she had performed that morning, but no details showed up for Male 1 or Male 2 on TE. In her MG 14 reply, when asked whether she recalled any of the names for IIP and PNC checks carried out on 13 March 2024 as being related to the threats to kill report, Officer A said "I think it could (be) the last name on this list, I can't be certain". In her Regulation 31 Response, Officer A accepts that she must have failed to complete intelligence and PNC checks as requested by PS Abrahams.
25. The last language line request shows that a Bulgarian interpreter was requested for Male 1 at 9:27 am (GMT) on 13 March 2024. There is no record of any further calls to language line following Officer A's conversation with PS Abrahams.

26. The Panel carefully considered whether there was possibly some misunderstanding between PS Abrahams and Inspector Clarke on the one hand and Officer A on the other hand, and whether they might have been at cross-purposes in the sense that Inspector Clarke asked Officer A whether she had done the checks requested by PS Abrahams, and in answering “Yes” Officer A may have misinterpreted or misheard the question as being whether she had done any IIP or PNC checks on Male 1 and Male 2 that day. The Legal Advisor quite properly advised the Panel that the mere fact that a person misleads another is not in itself evidence of guilt.
27. The Panel had borne in mind also that Officer A is of good character, that the 13 March 2024 was a very busy day, that Officer A was without assistance on the front desk, and that she may well herself have been feeling unsupported generally [REDACTED]. She also, using her own word, “panicked” when she saw that Connect had failed earlier in the day.
28. However, the time difference between Officer A speaking to PS Abrahams at 14:30 hours and waiting outside Inspector Clarke’s office to speak to him at 15:00 hours, and then speaking to him at 15:26 hours, was less than one hour in all. The Panel did not consider it feasible that within such a short space of time Officer A was under any misunderstanding that PS Abrahams asked her to carry out checks on Male 1 and Male 2. She did not do them after speaking to PS Abrahams, and when Inspector Clarke specifically asked her whether she had performed the tasks set by PS Abrahams, she replied “Yes”, later bolstering this by saying that she was “99.9% certain” she had done them.
29. In considering whether in her response to Inspector Clarke, the Appropriate Authority had satisfied the Panel to the requisite standard of proof that Officer A was dishonest, the Panel applied the two-stage subjective and objective test in *Ivey v. Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd v. Crockfords* [2018] AC 391, at paragraph 74, namely:

“When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding Tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual's knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.”

30. Integrity connotes adherence to the ethical standards of one's profession; per Jackson LJ in *Wingate and Evans v. Solicitors Regulation Authority* [2018] EWCA Civ 366, at paragraph 100.
31. The Panel was satisfied Officer A could not have been confused during such a short time-frame. Officer A knew she had not done IIP or PNC checks on Male 1 and Male 2 that day at all, and therefore she was dishonest and lacked integrity in claiming to Inspector Clarke to having completed the tasks and checks assigned to her by PS Abrahams. A reasonable member of the public would also regard her conduct as dishonest.
32. The Panel considered what reason Officer A may have had for knowingly misleading Inspector Clarke, although to prove allegation 1 the Appropriate Authority does not have to establish a reason. The Panel noted that earlier in the day at 13:55 hours Officer A asked PS Abraham whether she could go. PS Abrahams replied “No” and that she had not dismissed the early turn who were on duty until 16:00 hours.
33. It may be that Officer A request to leave early having been denied may have prompted her to short circuit matters when she was later asked to complete checks on Male 1 and Male 2, but the Panel does not rest its decision on this and to some degree it is speculation. Whatever the reason for her response to Inspector Clarke,

repeated on more than one occasion, the Panel was satisfied that allegation 1 was proved for the reasons stated above.

CM/426/24 – Allegation 2

34. In view of the allegation reported to Officer A on the morning of 13 March 2024, it was important for her to complete basic checks, and record and retain details in relation to the reported crime. At the time of these events, Officer A was a serving officer with four years' experience in the Met. She should have been able to recognise the potential harm to a member of the public of a threat to kill, and the need to address it diligently.
35. In cross-examination, Officer A accepted that when dealing with an allegation of crime, and the need for safeguarding and a risk of assessment, and in carrying out a primary investigation, it was important to record details of the crime and carry out intelligence checks and PNC checks.
36. Officer A was aware that the Connect system that had recently been introduced at Islington Police Station was unreliable. Despite this she chose to shred her manuscript notes of the alleged crime before satisfying herself that matters had been recorded on Connect. This meant there was no audit trail on any system. Also, she could not go back to Male 1 as she no longer had his name and contact details. It meant that no risk assessment was capable of being carried out, and that Officer A was not able to assist any officer clearly about what level of risk there was.
37. In these circumstances, the Panel was in no doubt that Officer A did not make efficient and effective use of policing resources, which thereby undermined an effective primary investigation. In short, she was not diligent in the exercise of her duties and responsibilities.
38. Accordingly, the Panel found Allegation 2 of CM/426/24 proved.

CM/806/24 – Allegation 1

39. In support of Allegation 1 of CM/806/24, the Appropriate Authority called the following witnesses:

- PC Glorney in person
- PC Swaine in person
- PC Williams in person
- PC Rimmer by video link
- PC Palmer by video link
- PC Coll in person

40. Each of the witnesses confirmed that the contents of their respective witness statements were true to the best of their knowledge and ability.

41. It was not in dispute that on the evening of 17 March 2024, Officer A accompanied by PC Glorney went to the home of AP, the victim of an alleged breach of a non-molestation order by her ex-partner. Officer A went into the home first alone and proceeded to take AP's witness statement using Officer A's police computer.

42. The statement was quite short and comprised a single page. It required a signature by AP at the top of the front page to confirm that she understood she would be liable to prosecution if she wilfully stated anything that she knew to be false, or did not believe to be true, and a signature at the foot of the statement. It also required a signature on the back page confirming witness contact details and matters relating to witness care and so forth.

43. When the statement was complete, Officer A handed the computer to AP. PC Glorney, who by this time had entered the property, said that she recalls Officer A asking AP for a signature and turning her laptop around to AP, and seeing Officer A

hand to AP the stylus for AP to sign the statement. Neither PC Glorney nor, it seems, Officer A witnessed seeing AP sign the statement. In her evidence Officer A said that she did not explain to AP the declaration at the top of the statement or check to see that the statement had actually been signed by AP at all. Both officers left the property assuming that AP had signed the statement. However, it was Officer A's responsibility as the person taking AP's witness statement to check to see that it had been correctly signed.

44. The record at the foot of the statement says that it was taken by Officer A between 20:04:14 on 17 March 2024 – 21:46:33 on 17 March 2024. PC Coll, attached to the Digital Data and Technology command of the MPS, explained that 20:04:14 refers to the time when the statement was started, and that 21:46:33 is the time the statement was signed and submitted to the Connect system. The IP addresses for these respective times are at different locations but it is not possible to identify the geographical locations.
45. On 14 June 2024, PS Williams and A/PS McDermott attended AP's home address and showed AP her witness statement dated 17 March 2024 about her complaint of a breach of the non-molestation order by her ex-partner. In a witness statement dated 14 June 2024, AP says "There is a signature on the front and back page. I have looked at these signatures, and these are not mine, and I do not recognise them." AP provided a handwritten signature of her name to the police.
46. It is fair to record that when PS Williams gave his oral evidence to the Panel, he initially thought that AP had recognised one or more of the signatures on her witness statement of 17 March 2024, and that in his witness statement dated 2 July 2024 he said that the victim signatures on the front and the rear pages appeared to be different. However, on looking again at AP's witness statement of 14 June 2024, he confirmed that the statement he took from AP was her correct evidence that she had not signed any of the signatures on her witness statement dated 17 March 2024.

47. The Panel therefore proceeded on the basis that none of the signatures on AP's witness statement were signed by AP.
48. On returning to Islington Police Station, Officer A and PC Glorney went into the writing room. It had been discussed between them that PC Glorney would complete the crime report on Connect, which would require AP's witness statement, then on Officer A's laptop, to be put on Connect.
49. However, it could not be submitted by Officer A because it was not showing as green.
50. PC Glorney says in her witness statement: "I'm not fully certain of the exact wording used however Officer A made a comment about her signature pad. ... I checked the side bar of the e-statement to see if it was green and it was not. Officer A then stated that she thought he (sic) signature pad was broken as she had got a signature."
51. PC Swaine, PC Palmer and PC Rimmer were in the writing room at the time. PC Swaine says that he went round to where Officer A was sitting and noticed there was no signature from the victim; and that after a short while he looked back at the statement and "realised there was now a signature on the statement". PC Palmer says that he heard Officer A say that she had "lost" a signature and later "cheerfully say: "I have fixed it"", adding "I remember what the signature looked like". PC Rimmer says she heard Officer A say words to the effect of "the signature hasn't worked". PC Rimmer says that the signature box was empty.
52. The Panel recognises that there were some inconsistencies between the evidence of PC Swaine, PC Palmer and PC Rimmer. However, the panel notes that the statements were made some time after the event, that each of the officers would have been concentrating on completing their own tasks before the end of the shift, and that this was a brief passing situation.
53. Overall, the evidence is consistent in showing that three officers in the writing room with no involvement in the case all observed or were a party to hearing of a problem

with Officer A being able to submit AP's witness statement, which then was remedied.

54. In his oral evidence, PC Coll explained that Connect works on a traffic light system, with red, yellow and green. To submit a witness statement all the mandatory areas have to be completed before the side-bar turns green. The victim's signature would have to be completed to submit a witness statement. Once the statement is signed, one can manually press SUBMIT for it to be sent. Until then it cannot be submitted. PC Coll said that if a statement has no signature, it can be added later. However, once it has been signed it cannot be overwritten.

55. Bringing the evidence together, the Panel was satisfied that AP did not sign any part of her witness statement dated 17 March 2024. She has said she did not sign it, and her evidence is unchallenged. It is apparent from the evidence of PC Coll that without a signature AP's witness statement could not be submitted to Connect but a signature can be added if there is no signature already on the statement.

56. The Panel was satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the lack of a signature was delaying AP's witness statement from being uploaded to Connect. The most probable situation is that AP's signature was added when the statement was signed and submitted at 21:46:33 on 17 March 2024. This was at a different IP address from where the statement was taken at 20:04:14.

57. Officer A's case is that she did not add a signature to AP's witness statement. However, in her Regulation 31 Response dated 25 November 2025, paragraph 4, Officer A said:

"If, which is not admitted, Officer A did add a purported signature to the witness statement this could only have been in circumstances in which Ms P had attempted to sign the statement, both she and Officer A thought it had been correctly signed, a technical failing caused the electronically created statement not to be actually signed and it was thought to be better to rectify

this later by adding a signature than further troubling a vulnerable witness by going back to them”.

58. In her oral evidence, Officer A distanced herself from paragraph 4 of her Regulation 31 Response and said that she had been pressured to sign it by her lawyers at the time.
59. The Panel considered that paragraph 4 is inconsistent with Officer A's oral evidence that signing the witness statement was not a thing she would have done.
60. The Panel considered that, taking into account all the evidence called both by the Appropriate Authority and Officer A, it is more probable than not that Officer A signed the witness statement in the name of AP using her own signature.
61. Applying the test in *Ivey v. Genting Casinos*, the Panel is satisfied that Officer A acted dishonestly. As a serving police officer, she would instinctively know that it would be wrong to sign a witness statement in the name of another person. [REDACTED]
62. However, there is no suggestion that Officer A did not know that what she was doing on 17 March 2024 was wrong. There was no [REDACTED] capable of defending, excusing or exonerating what she did. She signed AP's name knowing and understanding that it was false. It follows that the objective test in *Ivey* is also met and that Officer A's conduct lacked integrity.
63. Accordingly, Allegation 1 in CM/806/24 proved.

Breaches of Professional Standards

64. The Panel then went on to consider whether, by reason of the facts found proved, Officer A acted in breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour (“SoPB”) outlined in Schedule 2 of the Conduct Regulations.

65. The SoPB in relation to Honesty and Integrity states:

“Police officers are honest, act with integrity and do not compromise or abuse their position”

66. The SoPB in relation to Duties and Responsibilities states:

“Police officers are diligent in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities”

67. In the Panel’s view, claiming to have told a senior officer that she had completed tasks and checks when knowingly she had not, Officer A was in breach of the SoPB in relation to honesty and integrity. Falsifying a declaration of truth and signing a witness statement in the name of another using her own signature was also a breach of the SoPB in relation to honesty and integrity.

68. The Panel considered that in relation to Allegation 2 of CM/426/24, Officer A undermined an effective primary investigation which fell within the SoPB in relation of Duties and Responsibilities.

Finding on Misconduct or Gross Misconduct

69. Having found the factual allegations proved and a breach of the SoPB as set out in the Allegations, the Panel went on to consider whether Officer A’s conduct amounts to misconduct, gross misconduct or neither. Misconduct is defined in Regulation 2(1) of the Conduct Regulations as a breach of the SoPB that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action. Gross misconduct is defined as a breach of the SoPB that is so serious as to justify dismissal.

70. The Panel had regard to Regulation 41(16) of the Conduct Regulations, which instructs panels that they must not find the conduct of the Officer concerned amounts to misconduct or gross misconduct unless: (a) they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this is the case, or (b) the Officer admits it is the case.
71. In the present case there is no admission of misconduct or gross misconduct by Officer A. In reaching its finding, the Panel has carefully considered all the evidence presented to it and the submissions made by Ms Osborne and Mr Levy.
72. The Panel first considered the culpability of Officer A. It considered that the following paragraphs of the *College of Policing: Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings* (“the Guidance”) were engaged:

4.9 Culpability denotes the officer’s blameworthiness or responsibility for their actions. The more culpable or blameworthy the behaviour in question, the more serious the misconduct and the more severe the likely outcome.

4.10 Conduct that is intentional, deliberate, targeted or planned will generally be more culpable than conduct that has unintended consequences, although the consequences of an officer’s actions will be relevant to the harm caused.

4.11 Where harm is unintentional, culpability will be greater if the officer could reasonably have foreseen the risk of harm.

4.12 Culpability will also be increased if the officer was holding a position of trust or responsibility at the relevant time. All police officers are in a position of trust, but an officer’s level of responsibility may be affected by specific circumstantial factors, such as rank, their particular role and their relationship with any persons affected by the misconduct.

4.26 Honesty and integrity are fundamental requirements for any police officer. Treat any evidence that an officer is dishonest or lacks integrity seriously. In the words of Lord Justice Maurice Kay in *Salter v Chief Constable of Dorset*, police officers:

‘[...] carry out vital public functions in which it is imperative that the public have confidence in them. It is also obvious that the operational dishonesty or impropriety of a single officer tarnishes the reputation of his Force and undermines public confidence in it.’

4.27 Operational dishonesty is dishonesty in connection with a police operation. In *Salter v Chief Constable of Dorset*, the misconduct concerned an instruction to destroy evidence retrieved at the scene of a road traffic accident.

73. In this case, the Panel considered that culpability is high. As an experienced police officer, there is an expectation that Officer A would have diligently followed the clear instructions that were given to her by PS Abrahams and when questioned by Inspector Clarke answer truthfully whether she had or had not followed those instructions. In relation to CM/806/24, deliberately signing the witness statement in the name of AP was fundamentally incapable with the behaviour of a police officer.

74. In examining harm, the Panel considered the following paragraphs of the guidance document were engaged:

4.64 The types of harm caused or risked by different types of police misconduct are diverse. Victims may suffer:

- physical injury
- psychological distress
- reputational harm

4.68 Where no actual harm has resulted, consider the risks attached to the officer’s behaviour, including the likelihood of harm occurring and the gravity of harm that could have resulted.

4.69 How such behaviour would be, or has been, perceived by the public will be relevant, whether or not the behaviour was known about at the time.

75. Overall, the Panel found harm to be high. Officer A's failure to carry out basic checks meant that the police were unable to properly assess any risk to Male 1, potentially putting him at a risk of harm. This was also a significant reputational risk to the MPS. In respect of AP, by signing the witness statement herself Officer A could potentially have put AP in a difficult position had she been required to attend court in relation to her allegation against her ex-partner. That could potentially undermine the integrity of the investigation and consequently the reputation of the MPS.

76. Having come to the conclusion that both culpability and harm were high, the Panel concluded that Officer A's conduct individually and cumulatively amounted to gross misconduct.

Outcome

77. In determining the appropriate and proportionate sanction the Panel has had regard to Officer A's service record, the character references produced by her, the facts found proved, the submissions made on behalf Counsel for AA, Officer A and the legal advice received from the LQA. The Panel applied the three-stage procedure set out in the Guidance. The Panel assessed the seriousness of the misconduct, keeping in mind the purpose of imposing sanctions and chose the sanction which most appropriately fulfils that purpose for the seriousness of the conduct in question.

Seriousness of the Misconduct

78. In assessing the seriousness of the misconduct, the Panel considered:

- i. The officer's culpability for the misconduct.
- ii. The harm caused by the misconduct.
- iii. The existence of any aggravating factors.
- iv. The existence of any mitigating factors.

79. Culpability is defined as the blameworthiness or responsibility of the officer for their actions. The panel determined that Officer A was highly culpable for her behaviour. Her actions were not planned but were deliberate and intentional. The Panel does not seek to add any more to the culpability already referred to in Stage 1.

80. Harm can be caused in several ways, and the Guidance emphasises how the public might perceive such behaviour if it were to become known. This is a case where no actual harm was caused, but there was potential for serious harm. However, the Panel does not seek to add anything further to that already set out in Stage 1.

81. The Panel considered the following to be aggravating factors in this case:

- There was an abuse of trust. Male 1 and AP reported crimes to Officer A and she failed to complete basic tasks in order to complete safeguarding checks and primary investigations actions.
- This case involved two members of the public seeking police assistance on separate occasions.
- There is more than one breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour of Honesty and Integrity.

82. In respect of mitigating factors, the Panel were cognisant of the Outcome Guidance at paragraph 4.79 in respect of mitigating factors and were careful not to conflate mitigation that goes to conduct and personal mitigation.

83. The Panel found the following mitigating factors were relevant to seriousness in this case:

- [REDACTED]
- There have been no further disciplinary matters.
- In respect of personal mitigation, the Panel noted the positive character references submitted on behalf of Officer A. However, in accordance with the Guidance the Panel gave this little weight in all the circumstances of this case.

Purpose of the Sanction

84. The Panel kept in mind at all times the threefold purpose of imposing sanctions, namely:

- (a) maintenance of public confidence in and the reputation of the police service;
- (b) upholding high standards in policing and deterring misconduct;
- (c) protection of the public. Of these, the maintenance of public confidence in and the reputation of the police service is paramount.

Choosing the most appropriate sanction

85. The Panel had careful regard to the purpose of outcomes and that they are not intended primarily to be punitive. The Panel also had regard to the need for outcomes to be proportionate. In line with the Guidance at paragraph 7.4, the Panel considered the least severe outcome first.
86. The Panel determined that Officer A's behaviour constituted a serious departure from the professional standards set by the police service and the standards which the public can rightly expect from the police officers who serve them. The Panel had regard to the mitigating factors in this case. However, the Panel concluded that Officer A's conduct seriously undermined public confidence in the police service.
87. Therefore, in the opinion of the Panel a final written warning would not reflect or be sufficient to address the seriousness of Officer A's conduct nor would such an outcome uphold high standards in policing or deter misconduct.
88. In these circumstances, the Panel determined that the only appropriate and proportionate sanction in this case that would fulfil the threefold purpose of misconduct proceedings was that of dismissal without notice and placed on the College of Policing Barred List.

Publicity and anonymity

89. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Panel reviewed its earlier determination about Officer A's name being anonymised. After hearing submissions on behalf of the AA and Officer A, the Panel decided that, [REDACTED] it would be appropriate for her name to continue to be anonymised as "Officer A" for the purposes of online publication.

Commander Andy Brittain