

IN THE POLICE MISCONDUCT HEARING

PUSUANT TO THE POLICE (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020 (AS AMENDED BY THE POLICE (CONDUCT) (AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS 2024

IN THE MATTER OF:

PC TYLER SULLIVAN

DECISION OF THE PANEL

Former Commander Katie Lilburn (Chair), Sarah Chambers (Independent Panel Member) and Pradeep Agrawal (Independent Panel Member).

INTRODUCTION

The misconduct hearing for PC Sullivan was held in public between 15th-18th June 2025 at Palestra House, London. A notice of hearing was published in accordance with the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 ("the 2020 Regulations").

THE ALLEGATIONS

The Panel was referred to a Regulation 30 notice in respect of PC Sullivan ("The Officer") containing the allegations and that his conduct amounted to gross misconduct, namely:

Being a member of the Metropolitan Police Service, you:

1. On 15th May 2023

a. Accessed "Crimint," a police database system;

b. Made a search on Crimint with the search terms '((suspicious) ((Brampton)%+3))' and provided a reason for your search as "own research,"

c. Did not have a proper policing purpose for accessing/using the systems above in the way described at (1)(a) & (b);

d. At the time of accessing the systems set out above, knew that you did not have a proper policing purpose for doing so;

2. On 5th June 2023:

a. Were sent an email by PS Helen Williamson on behalf of Met Intel audit;

b. Were aware of the content of that email;

c. Were aware of the requirements to complete the audit specified within that email;

d. Failed to comply with the instructions within that email by the stated deadline of 28

days;

3. *On, or around, 11th July 2023:*

- a. Had your access to Crimint was suspended;*
- b. Were aware your Crimint access had been suspended.*

4. *Between 2nd October 2023 and 4th October 2023;*

- a. Informed PS James Trundle that you were unaware of the fact you had been audited;*
- b. Informed PS James Trundle you did not know the reason why you did not have access to Crimint;*
- c. Informed PS James Trundle you had not received the email referred to at (2) above.*

5. Your actions described at (4), taken individually or collectively, in whole or in part, were dishonest, in that you knew the information you told PS James Trundle to be factually incorrect and/or misleading.

By reason of the matters set out, either individually or collectively, your behaviour did not meet the standards required by the Standards of Professional Behaviour set out in Schedule 2 to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 as to:

- a. Discreditable Conduct;*
- b. Duties and Responsibilities;*
- c. Honesty and Integrity;*
- d. Confidentiality.*

Your behaviour amounts to gross misconduct.

REPRESENTATION

1. The Appropriate Authority ("the AA") was represented by Lucy Chapman of Counsel. PC Sullivan was represented by Campaspe Lloyd-Jacob of Counsel.
2. The Panel would like to thank the representatives for their assistance throughout the case, including the provision of an opening note.
3. The Panel were assisted by Maurice Cohen, Legally Qualified Advisor.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

4. The defence had sought to adduce in evidence a psychological report from Dr von Brandt in support of PC Sullivan's case. The chair was only made aware of the report on 9 June 2026.
5. The Appropriate Authority initially opposed the inclusion of the report and/or indicated that Dr von Brandt would be required to attend remotely in order to give oral evidence and be cross examined in respect of the content of his report.
6. In the light of the opposing positions of the parties, the Chair directed that a further pre-hearing take place to consider the above issues.
7. By the time of the 2nd pre-hearing, Ms Chapman on behalf of the Appropriate Authority indicated that upon reflection, she wished to revise her position. She indicated that no objection was taken to the inclusion of Dr von Brandt's report in the bundle. She conceded that it was admissible. It was not deemed necessary for this witness to be called to give evidence. It was clear that Dr von Brandt reported upon matters told to him by PC Sullivan (para 3.3.3 of the report). The ultimate questions to be decided in respect of the allegations would rest with the panel.
8. In the light of the above, the Chair directed that the report be included in the bundle.

REGULATION 30 NOTICE

9. On the first morning of the hearing the Regulation 30 Notice, as set out above, was read out.
10. The Officer accepted undertaking the CRIMINT search but did not recall receiving the audit email; referred to the effects of his ADHD and the lack of availability of appropriate medication for the same; denied the allegation regarding dishonesty; admits carelessness and failing to follow correct procedures; admits misconduct but denies gross misconduct. PC Sullivan's response was set out in the Regulation 31 response.

THE PANEL'S APPROACH

11. The Panel reminded itself it was required to: -
 - a. Consider the facts of the case and to make its findings of fact in relation to the allegation;
 - b. Determine whether those findings of fact found constitute a breach of the relevant standard;
 - c. Determine whether the conduct found proven against the officer mounted to misconduct, gross misconduct or neither.
12. The Panel reminded itself that the burden of proof is on the Appropriate Authority throughout and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, namely 'what is more likely than not'.

13. The Panel have approached its decision making by keeping in mind the purpose and character of police misconduct proceedings. The primary purpose being not to punish the officer but to protect public confidence in, and the reputation of, the police service by holding officers accountable and making clear that improper behaviour will not be left unchecked. A secondary purpose is to be declaratory of high professional standards and a final purpose is to protect the public and staff by preventing similar misconduct recurring in the future. The Panel has had regard to *Bolton v Law Society* [1994] 1 WLR 512; *Chief Constable of Dorset v PAT*, *Salter Interested Party* [2011] EWHC 3366 (Admin) and *R (Williams) v PAT* [2016] EWHC 2708 (Admin).
14. The Panel has also had regard to a framework of regulations and guidance, in particular the following:
- a. The Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 (the “Regulations”) including in particular the Standards of Professional Behaviour at schedule 2;
 - b. 2018 Home Office Guidance (the “HOG”), including in particular chapter 1, summarising the Standards;
 - c. The definition of misconduct given at Reg 3(1) of the Regulations: “a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour”;
 - d. The definition of gross misconduct given at reg 3(1) of the Regulations: “a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour so serious that dismissal would be justified”.
15. The Panel listened carefully to all of the oral evidence. They read and carefully considered every item of written evidence before them. They considered the totality of the evidence and submissions made. They do not propose to comment on each and every aspect of the evidence or submissions made, but they state their main conclusions.

EVIDENCE

16. The Panel had been provided with the following documents:
- a. Regulation 30 Hearing bundle comprising a total of 810 pages; which included: the Regulation 31 notice; MG14 of PC Sullivan; the Officer’s medical bundle including psychological report from Dr Von Brandt; GP records and occupational health records.
 - b. AA Opening Note.
 - c. A character bundle and a record of good work.

THE BACKGROUND

17. On 15 May 2023 PC Sullivan undertook a search on Crimint (a police intelligence database) of his mother’s address without a legitimate policing purpose. He stated that he did this search because he was concerned by 2 young women who he had seen acting suspiciously in front of his mother’s house (his family home at the time) through video doorbell footage. He claimed to have attended the local police station to ask about the incident but discovered that the relevant Safer

Neighbourhood Team were not on duty. He subsequently indicated that he had performed a Crimint search in order to see whether there was already any intelligence reports recorded describing similar suspicious behaviour in that area.

18. On 5 June 2023, Met Intelligence conducted a random audit of Crimint and PC Sullivan was sent an email instructing him to provide a rationale for the search he conducted on the 15 May 2023. The email stated that if there was a failure to comply with the instruction, CRIMINT access would be removed after 28 days of the email being sent. On the 5 June 2023, PC Sullivan was off work with back and pelvis injuries and stress problems following a crash during a high-speed police chase on 2 June 2023. He returned briefly to work on two dates in June, but was off sick again until the 12 July 2023. He states that he did not recall seeing the email and did not action it.
19. Met Intelligence did not receive a response to the audit email, so PC Sullivan's access to CRIMINT was removed on the 11 July 2023.
20. During the summer period of 2023, two colleagues on the same proactive unit as PC Sullivan (PC Dolce and PC Villiers) report having conversations with PC Sullivan about his lack of CRIMINT access and the reason for it. Both colleagues urged PC Sullivan to tell his line manager, PS Trundle.
21. PS Trundle said that he became aware of PC Sullivan not having access to CRIMINT in September 2023, but does not recall precisely which officer brought this to his attention.
22. On 2 October 2023, PS Trundle asked PC Sullivan to review a previous intelligence development plan on Crimint; the reason in part was to test whether he did in fact have access. PC Sullivan responded by email and provided reference numbers but said he could not open the referenced reports as "CRIMINT was playing up". This then led to a conversation where PS Trundle enquired into the reason why he could not get on to CRIMINT and PC Sullivan responded saying he did not know why. PS Trundle observed from the front page of PC Sullivan's Crimint account that there were no servers or report options displaying on the left-hand side, which gave rise to his view that his account had been suspended. PS Trundle asked him if he had received an audit email and PC Sullivan replied that he had not.
23. A search of PC Sullivan's inbox was conducted by putting in the search terms of 'Crimint audit' but that did not bring back any emails.
24. PS Trundle states that he then received an email from Chief Inspector Hannah Hayes from south area Professional standards unit on 3 October 2023. This stated that PC Sullivan had been audited on Crimint on 5 June 2023. He had not replied to the audit. As such, and in line with procedure, the officer's Crimint account was suspended on 11 July 2023.
25. On 3 October 2023, PS Trundle spoke to PS Mark Mills of the AS Local Intelligence Team who confirmed that PC Sullivan was one of 20 officers subject to a random audit on 5 June 2023. PS Mills indicated that there were no issues

with the email system and also confirmed that PC Sullivan had made no attempt to try and get his Crimint access restored or to question why it had been suspended.

26. PS Gavin Ring, PC Sullivan's line manager, sat in on the meeting with PS Trundle and PC Sullivan on 4 October 2023. PC Sullivan was challenged in respect of his Crimint access being suspended. PC Sullivan denied knowing anything about the audit. PS Trundle and PS Ring advised PC Sullivan that they had been approached about the issue by another PC who stated that PC Sullivan was worried about an audit. PC Sullivan told the two Sergeants that he was off his ADHD medication and had no memory of speaking about the audit with anyone else. He recalled conducting the original Crimint check on his mother's address but maintained that he did not know about the audit. He did not offer an explanation about not realising that he had not had Crimint access since July 2023.
27. In addition to the above, PC Sullivan indicated that he was diagnosed with ADHD as a child and had been on medication ever since. However, in 2023 there were national supply shortages which affected the availability of his prescription. He maintains he was not able to access his medication.

EVIDENCE

Medical Evidence

28. The panel had sight of a psychological report from Dr von Brandt. He had access to PC Sullivan's occupational health reports and a breakdown of a summary of his GP records (November 2023 to February 2024) from Patient Access. Whilst PC Sullivan's legal representative had requested full medical records from his GP on at least 2 occasions, and therefore were likely to have received the same (there being no contrary indication in the notes) the full medical records covering the relevant dates for the allegations were neither provided to Doctor van Brandt or to the panel.
29. Following his review of the medical evidence and his interview with PC Sullivan, Dr von Brandt confirmed the diagnoses mentioned and the potential cognitive effect of these conditions. He states that 'from a neuropsychological approach the interaction between ADHD, PTSD, and depressive symptoms is particularly significant. ADHD is associated with baseline impairments in working memory, sustained attention and task completion. PTSD is associated with impaired concentration, intrusive cognitive load and disrupted encoding and retrieval of information. Depressive states further reduce processing speed, motivation and cognitive efficiency. When these conditions co-occur their effects are not merely additive but potentially multiplicative, leading to substantial impairment in executive functions.' He also notes that the officer's sleep disturbance would further impair memory. He notes that the constellation of conditions was likely to have had a significant impact on memory, organisation, and ability to complete compliance-based tasks.

30. Dr von Brandt reports on what he has been told by PC Sullivan. He cannot say what was or was not in the officer's mind but gives expert evidence about how the officer's conditions were likely to have affected his cognitive function.

History of work related incidents – relevant to PTSD diagnosis

31. In evidence in chief, PC Sullivan referenced his exposure to a number of traumatic incidents. This included his attendance at the scene of a quadruple murder in 2022, where he witnessed horrifying injuries and he feared for his own safety when he was performing containment at the address with only a taser.
32. Then on 02 June 2023, he was involved in a police pursuit which resulted in the head on repetitive ramming of the police vehicle, again causing him to genuinely fear for his life.
33. On the 03 June 2023, on his way to work he was the victim of a knife point robbery.
34. These events led him to becoming upset and emotional in October 2023 during a meeting with his then line manager (PS Ring) who conducted an OH referral. This resulted in an assessment of PTSD in February 2024, with symptomatic PTSD being present in 2023.

Character Bundle

35. The panel had been provided with extensive bundle of character statements. These emanate from officers who know and have worked with PC Sullivan. They speak of his skills as a highly competent, hard-working and diligent officer who has dealt with a number of challenging situations in a professional, courteous and conscientious manner. He treats people with compassion.

WITNESSES

36. The Panel heard evidence from 4 witnesses, it is not repeated here in full, but a general summary given.

PS Trundle

37. He adopted his witness statement as his evidence in chief.
38. In cross-examination PS Trundle indicated that other than the events comprising the allegations, the only other incident of note arising in respect of PC Sullivan involved him getting upset and speaking disrespectfully to another sergeant in connection to last minute duty changes at the time of the Coronation. PS Trundle explained that there was pressure placed upon him to discipline PC Sullivan, but instead he supported the officer in the matter and did not take it any further. He

stated that PC Sullivan was embarrassed and apologised in respect of the incident.

39. When cross examined, PS Trundle did not agree that PC Sullivan was an “outsider” on the team. He was aware of PC Sullivan being diagnosed with autism and ADHD. He was not aware of issues that PC Sullivan had in accessing medication until October 2023.
40. PS Trundle was asked about PC Sullivan’s becoming de-motivated after the transfer of a high value prolific phone investigation to City of London Police. PS Trundle provided an explanation as to why this was necessary, citing resources and whilst understood there was a level of disappointment, he maintained it had to happen.
41. PS Trundle gave his account of the high-speed pursuit on 2 June 2023 in which he was the driver and PC Sullivan the operator, where their car was repeatedly rammed and they sustained multiple physical injured. PC Sullivan returned to work briefly on 12 June 2023 and then left again on sick leave.
42. PS Trundle indicated that his team was a proactive team that was involved in attempting to disrupt significant crime in areas such as bike theft, mobile phone theft and frequent robberies. The team would receive briefings before their shift. They were expected to undertake their own research utilising Crimint on a near daily basis in order to attempt to glean valuable intelligence concerning perpetrators operating in particular areas and areas where there was a high prevalence of the types of crime which they were investigating.
43. PS Trundle indicated that it was either PC Villiers or PC Dolce who alerted him to the fact that PC Sullivan had undertaken a Crimint search of his mother’s address, been audited and that his Crimint access had been suspended.
44. PS Trundle gave evidence concerning his discussion with PC Sullivan on 2 October 2023 and his request that he search his emails to locate the audit email and he oversaw this search. He denied that the meeting on the 4 October with PC Sullivan was overly confrontational.
45. PS Trundle indicated that as far as he was concerned, he had a good relationship with PC Sullivan.

PS Ring

46. PS Ring adopted his witness statement as his evidence in chief.
47. PS Ring did not give evidence beyond what was contained in his witness statement, stating due to the passage of time and the fact that his memory and recollection of events would have been far more accurate at that time of making the statement than it was now.

48. PS Ring indicated that he was aware of PC Sullivan's mental health conditions. He supported him in an occupational health referral. He was ex-military forces and had experience of colleagues suffering from PTSD.

49. In response to the panel's questions, PS Ring provided details concerning a previous incident in which PC Sullivan had been criticised for not wearing his body worn video.

PC Dolce

50. PC Dolce adopted his witness statement at his evidence in chief.

51. In cross-examination PC Dolce indicated that he was frequently partnered with PC Sullivan. When this occurred, PC Sullivan would drive as he was a non-driver, and he would act as an operator. He was aware of PC Sullivan's neuro-divergent diagnoses. PC Dolce indicated that there was a change in PC Sullivan's demeanour during to 2023 when he became uncharacteristically subdued and withdrawn.

52. PC Dolce indicated that he became aware from PC Sullivan that he had lost access to his Crimint in the summer period of 2023, but cannot be specific on dates. PC Dolce said that the disclosure was initiated by PC Sullivan whilst they were on duty in a car.

53. PC Dolce said that PC Sullivan explained the reasons for conducting the Crimint search was being concerned about a burglary at his mother's address. PC Dolce said that he told PC Sullivan to go to his Sergeant and explain what he had done. PC Dolce said he thought that his line manager would be supportive because there was some reasonableness to the original Crimint check.

54. After the initial disclosure, PC Dolce said that he followed this up with PC Sullivan on several occasions (described as being once every couple of weeks) to see whether he had spoken to PS Trundle. He responded that he had not. PC Dolce stated PC Sullivan's attitude in response was dismissive and blasé. PC Dolce was described as being as frustrated by this response and told PC Sullivan it would only get worse the longer he left it.

55. In response to a question from the panel, PC Dolce was asked if PC Sullivan had mentioned about being subject to a random audit, PC Dolce responded that he thought he had mentioned it.

56. When asked about the impact of PC Sullivan not having Crimint access, he said that professionally there was one less officer who was not contributing to the intelligence search efforts.

PC Villiers

57. PC Villiers adopted her witness statement as her evidence in chief.

58. In cross-examination PC Villiers indicated that she became aware that PC Sullivan had lost access to his Crimint. This resulted in her speaking directly to PC Sullivan on a few occasions in the office, about his lack of access.
59. She had been told by a colleague that he had conducted research on Crimint against his mother's address. She felt that he was placing an added burden on the team since Crimint was an essential tool for their department which they would utilise on a daily basis. PC Sullivan was not able to fully perform his role on the team.
60. PC Villiers stated that she spoke to him on at least two occasions, where she enquired 'have you sorted Crimint?' and he said 'no not yet'. She described that his responses were brief and felt he was delaying it. This frustrated her, as it impacted the team. She said that these conversations took place in the open office (writing room).
61. PC Villiers subsequently spoke to PS Trundle and described her relief that the sergeant now knew about this matter.

PC Sullivan

62. PC Sullivan gave detailed evidence concerning his background, career and significant achievements including those for which he received a commendation. He was a highly motivated and dedicated officer but over time, due to incidents where he felt that his work had not been adequately valued including in respect of a prolific mobile phone theft, which had been transferred to City of London police, he became demoralised.
63. PC Sullivan gave detailed evidence concerning his various medical conditions including when he was diagnosed with ADHD and the resultant medication. He described in general terms about how his ADHD affected his memory, providing an example of how he recently he had forgotten to feed his baby on one occasion. PC Sullivan also cited examples of forgetting things at work, even whilst medicated for ADHD.
64. He indicated that there was a significant and well publicised interruption with the supply of his ADHD medication in 2023 and that he spent a significant period of that time without medication. Later in the year, some supplies were restored and he eventually became aware that he could request a generic rather than name brand medication.
65. PC Sullivan indicated that he had been involved in a number of traumatic incidents at work in 2022 and 2023; this included a particularly distressing quadruple murder in 2022 and the car pursuit/ramming incident with PS Trundle in 2023 and being the victim of a knife point robbery in October 2023.

66. In addition to these events, he also cited how he had a “meltdown” after a late notice change of his rota at the time of the King’s coronation (May 2023) and was verbally discourteous to a sergeant. He stated he was embarrassed about his response. On another occasion, in October 2023 he explained that he had forgotten to put his BWV back on after going to use the bathroom. He received criticism for this by a Sergeant and was embarrassed by his behaviour.
67. PC Sullivan indicated that he undertook the Crimint search of his mother’s address, where he was living at the time, because two young girls had rung the doorbell and in his opinion were acting suspiciously.
68. He explained that at that time, he believed he had been off work on sick leave. One or two days later (being the 15 May 2023), he attended the local police station in order to attempt to speak to the relevant Safer Neighbourhood Team (SNT) covering that area. He was advised by a PCSO that the SNT team were not on duty. He said that he then conducted a Crimint search himself, putting in the name of the Ward where his mother resides. He said he undertook the search in order to see if there was any record of suspicious activity in the neighbourhood.
69. In response to panel questions, he said that there was a negative response to his search term and he did not proceed to enter a new intelligence report about the incident he had observed through the doorbell video. PC Sullivan could not provide any explanation as to why he did not do so.
70. He conceded that this action was wrong but could not provide an explanation as when he formed the judgement that it was wrong. So whilst he expressed regret and embarrassment about doing this search, PC Sullivan said that he did not know it was wrong on the 15 May 2023. He said that this was because his medical state may have affected his perception of whether it was wrong. He maintained that he would have known it was wrong if he was on his regular medication.
71. PC Sullivan indicated that he did not recall having conversations with his colleagues about the original crimint search and the audit email. Maintaining that if they told him to speak to PS Trundle to sort this matter out, he forgot that they had given him that advice due to his mental state.
72. PC Sullivan in cross-examination and in response to the panel’s questions frequently appeared to struggle to provide a coherent response to the question that he had been asked. PC Sullivan was invited throughout his evidence to indicate if he required a break at any stage due to his mental health conditions but declined to request any additional breaks to those provided naturally in the evidence.

PANEL ANALYSIS

73. The panel considered PS Trundle to be a credible, consistent, open and helpful witness who gave evidence to the best of his recollection and belief. If he could not

recall something, he advised accordingly. It was considered that he had no “axe to grind” against PC Sullivan. He had supported him previously in the face of pressure from colleagues to discipline him. The panel accepted that they had a positive working relationship.

74. Whilst the panel considered that PS Ring was initially reluctant to add any details to his written testimony, it was considered that in the course of his evidence, particularly in response to the panel’s questions, he adopted a more open approach. The panel also found him to be a credible and consistent witness.
75. The panel found PC Dolce to be an open, credible and consistent witness who had a good working relationship with PC Sullivan and appeared to know him well. The panel felt that he gave compelling evidence around PC Sullivan self-initiating the disclosure about the Crimint check and losing access to Crimint.
76. The panel also found PC Villiers to be an open, credible and consistent witness. She added texture to her written evidence, indicating the frustration that she and other members of the team felt with PC Sullivan following his Crimint account being suspended which in turn placed more pressure on other members of the team. She also was certain that she had repeatedly urged PC Sullivan to tell his line manager (PS Trundle) about this matter.
77. The panel determined that the evidence of all four witnesses was corroborative of each other and this in itself was compelling.
78. In contrast the panel found in key areas, particularly in response to their questions, that PC Sullivan struggled to provide a logical, coherent or credible response to questions asked of him. He claimed that despite it being likely that PCs Dolce and Villiers had repeatedly spoken to him about the topic of his Crimint suspension, and giving him advice to speak with his line manager to get the matter sorted, he had simply forgotten almost instantaneously what they had advised him. The panel felt it was not plausible to have a coherent conversation with a colleague and then immediately forget it but then be able to have a later coherent conversation with the same person, on the same topic. If it was forgotten, then it would be more likely that on subsequent mentioning there would be some confusion as to what was being mentioned. There was no evidence of any such confusion.
79. Whilst the panel accepted that PC Sullivan suffered from the various medical health conditions described, it did not accept that these would have affected his memory or cognitive abilities to the extent that he would repeatedly forget the advice being given to him by his colleagues on multiple occasions in different settings including at the police station rather than acting upon them and going to speak to PS Trundle or taking other action as one might expect. The panel noted the significant emotional effect that forgetting to feed his baby had on him (as relayed in oral evidence). The panel considered that if a proud, hardworking officer was advised by his colleagues that he was having a negative impact on the team by not being able to contribute to Crimint searches, it would have been noteworthy and piqued an emotional response.

80. In the light of the above matters and noting the manner in which he gave evidence generally, the panel found that PC Sullivan lacked credibility in several significant aspects of his evidence.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Allegation 1

- (a) This sub-allegation is found proved by way of admission.
 - (b) This sub-allegation is found proved by way of admission.
 - (c) This sub-allegation is found proved by way of admission based on the oral evidence that PC Sullivan gave before the panel.
 - (d) In her submissions to the panel, Ms Lloyd-Jacob indicated that PC Sullivan's motive for performing the Crimint search on 15 May 2023 was almost for a policing purpose, referencing it as "adjacent to a policing purpose". The panel note that PC Sullivan accepted that the search was not for a legitimate policing purpose, though there was ambiguity around whether he appreciated that this was wrong on the day he did it. The panel noted that data misuse and confidentiality of police databases are part of the fundamental training of all police officers; confidentiality reminders frequently appear on police systems to remind officers about information integrity. Police officers are aware that they should not undertake searches on one's own family or for one's own benefit. The panel noted that two colleagues urged him in the weeks afterwards that conducting such own research was not appropriate and urged him to speak to his Sergeant. The panel found PC Sullivan's concern could and should have led him to take alternative action, such as asking a colleague to undertake the search, calling 111 or waiting for members of the SNT team to return to shift and report the matter accordingly.
81. The panel found on the balance of probabilities that PC Sullivan knew at the time that he undertook the Crimint research that he did not have a proper policing purpose for doing so and accordingly find this sub-allegation proved.

Allegation 2

- (a) This sub-allegation is found proved by way of admission.
- (b) The sub-allegation is worded such that on 5 June 2023 PC Sullivan was aware of the content of the email from PS Helen Williamson. The panel have evidence demonstrating that PC Sullivan was off sick on 5 June 2023 and therefore was unlikely to have been aware of the contents of that email on that date. On that basis, the panel find this sub-allegation not proved.
- (c) On the same basis as its findings above, noting the reference to 5 June 2023, the panel similarly find this sub-allegation not proved.
- (d) The panel note that PC Sullivan returned to work briefly for one day on 12 June 2023. He indicated in his evidence before the panel that he would probably have looked at some of his emails on that date. PC Sullivan admits becoming aware of the audit email, at some stage, although he claims that he did not cognitively register the contents or identify the need to respond to it. The panel

find factually that PC Sullivan failed to comply with the instructions within the email sent on the 5 June by the stated deadline of 28 days and thereby find this sub-allegation proved.

Allegation 3

- (a) This sub-allegation is found proved by way of admission.
- (b) The panel noted that whilst PC Sullivan was not in the office on 11 July 2023, he returned on 12 July 2023. The panel noted the evidence of all the witnesses, who remarked that the use of Crimint was a vital and essential tool in the proactive work undertaken by their unit. Given the evidence from witnesses and character references that PC Sullivan was a diligent and thorough researcher, the panel found it unlikely that he would have so completely neglected his intelligence duties as to have been unaware that his Crimint access had been suspended for over two months. He used an alternative method (e-forms) to record stop and searches. However, as this facility did not allow any search function it was not an equivalent system. The panel determined that it was more likely than not that PC Sullivan would have sought to login on to Crimint on occasions in the period since the 11 July 2023, and in doing so would have found that the search capabilities were disabled, alerting him that his access had been suspended. In these circumstances the panel find this sub-allegation proved on the balance of probabilities.

Allegation 4

- (a) This sub-allegation is found proved by way of admission.
- (b) This sub-allegation is found proved by way of admission.
- (c) This sub-allegation is found proved by way of admission.

Allegation 5

82. On the basis of the panel's findings in relation to allegations 1-4 above, the panel found that PC Sullivan had an awareness of the fact that his specific Crimint search on his mother's address conducted on the 15 May 2023 had been subject of an audit and he had sight of an email advising him of such.

83. The panel were persuaded by the evidence of PC Dolce, that it was PC Sullivan himself who initiated the conversation about conducting a Crimint search on his mother's address, referencing an audit and the suspension of his Crimint access which resulted in PC Dolce advising him to tell his Sergeant. PC Dolce later told others, likely to have included PC Villiers, about this matter which led her to have conversations with PC Sullivan further urging him to tell PS Trundle about it in order to resolve the issue. The panel were not persuaded by the proposition that PC Sullivan may have seen the email and instantaneously forgotten its existence. Despite his series of mental health conditions, there is no evidence of PC Sullivan suffering cognitive issues to the extent that he would receive such a significant email and yet forget about its total existence and such a claim is directly contradicted by the evidence of PCs Dolce and Villiers.

84. In addition to the above, the panel noted that, having realised his Crimint account

had been suspended, PC Sullivan did not take appropriate action as one might expect from an officer who had no explanation for why his account was suspended, such as enquiring with Met Intelligence or logging a fault with the IT help desk. The panel found PC Sullivan's actions to be consistent with him having the knowledge that his account had been suspended because of his failure to respond to the audit email.

85. The panel rejected the claim made by PC Sullivan that he did not have a good relationship with PS Trundle and would have been intimidated in approaching him. The panel acknowledged the evidence of PS Trundle that he had supported PC Sullivan in the past, including when he had informally dealt with the issue of PC Sullivan speaking rudely to a duty sergeant around the King's Coronation. The panel found that PC Sullivan had no good reason not to report these matters to PS Trundle as he was repeatedly advised to do by PCs Dolce and Villiers.

86. The panel next considered three separate comments made by PC Sullivan to PS Trundle between the 02 and 04 October 2023:-

- (i) On 02nd October 2023 PC Sullivan wrote in an email to PS Trundle that the reason he was not able to complete a Crimint based task on that day was: "*as his CRIMINT was playing up*"

Subjectively, before this date PC Sullivan had spoken to at least two colleagues about the real reason for the withdrawal of CRIMINT access, on multiple occasions. There had been several triggering conversations about the reason for the Crimint access revocation between 11 July and 02 October 2023. PC Sullivan demonstrated an awareness of the original Crimint search (and audit) when these colleagues spoke to him; so, it is more likely than not that he himself knew that the reason he gave to PS Trundle on 02 October 2023 that 'Crimint was playing up' was an untrue statement when he wrote it. The panel note that this comment was written on an email in response to a routine task. PC Sullivan was not under an undue additional pressure (such as in the meeting on the 4 October) at the time he responded. In the same email response, PC Sullivan references the telephone number for the IT help desk and infers he will call them to make enquiries about Crimint access. However, he admitted in answer to panel questions that he never did make that enquiry. The panel found that this acknowledgement of the IT help desk and the failure to call them immediately even when he wrote that he would, indicated a conscious decision not to.

Objectively, this was not a true statement and a reasonable person would know it to be untrue. CRIMINT was not 'playing up'. PC Sullivan had his access intentionally removed, he had been informed of the reasons in an email and he had retained that knowledge sufficiently long enough to mention it to colleagues.

87. (ii) Later, on the 2 October 2023, PC Sullivan said to PS Trundle that he:-

"did not know why he didn't have CRIMINT access" in response to PS Trundle's query as to why he didn't have access.

Subjectively, PC Sullivan had told PC Dolce about the reason for the lack of

CRIMINT access which was the failure to respond to the audit email. Linked conversations about how to restore said access were then repeated with that officer and PC Villiers. So, there had been several triggering conversations over many weeks before this conversation with PS Trundle occurred in October. PC Sullivan maintained that those conversations with PC Dolce probably did occur as described, but simply that he had no recollection of them. The panel rejected this intermittent but repeated memory lapse and restoration as being unlikely. Significantly, like the initial written comment, this verbal denial was made on the 2 October 2023 within an open plan writing room, so this was not during the heightened stress of the more formal meeting on the 4 October.

Objectively, a reasonable person would know this statement to be untrue, due to the combination of knowledge of the audit email and the resultant lack of access.

88. (iii) On the 4th October 2023, during an in-person meeting with PS Trundle and PS Ring, PS Trundle confirmed to PC Sullivan that an audit email from Met Intelligence had been sent on the 5 June and asked for an explanation. In response, PC Sullivan '*denied any knowledge of an audit or that being the cause of his lack of CRIMINT access*'.

Subjectively, from PC Sullivan's account from the 2 October 2023 he was aware that his Sergeant knew that he did not have CRIMINT access. If he did not know the reason for the withdrawal of access, then he could have made proactive steps to enquire with Met Intel or the IT Service desk about what the issue was and try and resolve this straight away. His lack of taking other reasonable steps, demonstrate that it is probable that he had retained the knowledge of the true reason (the failure to comply with the audit instructions).

Objectively, a reasonable person would know this not to be true. The lack of a response to the audit email was the causal reason for Crimint access being withdrawn. PC Sullivan demonstrated knowledge of this reason during the summer of 2023 by articulating this to his colleague PC Dolce. He also knew that the onus was on him to restore CRIMINT access when he spoke on other occasions with PC Villiers. Objectively, this demonstrates that he knew about the audit and his own lack of a justification rationale being provided as being the reason that he no longer had access to CRIMINT.

89. The panel weighed up the two alternative explanations that PC Sullivan responded as he did to PS Trundle's questions as either (a) he was honest albeit mistaken in his responses because he had not retained knowledge of the unauthorised Crimint check, the audit email and the account suspension; or (b) he was dishonest and intentionally misleading in his responses.
90. The panel found it more likely than not that PC Sullivan was dishonest in his responses due to a demonstrated chain of consciousness over a protracted period starting with the original unauthorised Crimint search, then recalling the key information in conversations with two colleagues on several occasions over a period of weeks demonstrating no signs of memory lapse of the key facts when those conversations were returned to.

91. On this basis, the panel found on the balance of probabilities that PC Sullivan knew the responses he gave to PS Trundle between the 2 and 4 October 2023 to be false and misleading. PC Sullivan knew that he was giving a dishonest account to PS Trundle when he advised him that he was unaware of the fact that he had been audited and did not know the reason that he did not have access to Crimint and that he had not received the audit email. Furthermore, the panel considered that PC Sullivan's actions would be considered dishonest by the standards of ordinary, decent people.
92. In the light of its findings above, the panel find allegation 5 proved on the balance of probabilities and that PC Sullivan's actions were in whole or in part dishonest.

BREACHES OF THE STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOUR

93. PC Sullivan conceded that in respect of the allegations admitted by him that there were breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour set out in Schedule 2 to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. The panel have found that PC Sullivan has acted dishonestly.
94. In the light of the admissions made by PC Sullivan and the panel's own findings they therefore find that through the allegations found proved that PC Sullivan breached the following Standards of Professional Behaviour:
- a. Discreditable conduct.
 - b. Duties and responsibilities.
 - c. Honesty and integrity.
 - d. Confidentiality.

SERIOUSNESS ASSESSMENT

95. The Panel next considered whether the allegations found proved amount to misconduct or gross misconduct.
96. In making this assessment, the Panel had regard to the College of Policing Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings (2023). Thus, the Panel assessed the seriousness of the proven conduct by analysing PC Sullivan's culpability for that conduct and the harm caused by that conduct as well as assessing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Culpability

97. The panel found that PC Sullivan's actions in respect of undertaking the original Crimint search on his mother's address was deliberate and premeditated. He believed he was on sick leave and attended a police station at least a day after viewing the video footage and then logged on to a system to perform this search. The lag reinforces that this was planned. His actions in undertaking a search on a police database which he knew did not have a legitimate policing purpose were reprehensible. PC Sullivan's actions additionally amounted to misuse of a police

database.

98. In respect of lying to PS Trundle the panel found PC Sullivan's responses and comments were more spontaneous and unplanned, as a result of him acting in the moment. Nonetheless these actions were unjustified and inexcusable. Lying in a professional capacity to a senior officer is behaviour of the utmost seriousness. PC Sullivan's actions amounted to 'operational dishonesty' because they arose from an operational tasking from his line manager to complete closure reports on nominals. Dishonesty is always regarded as being serious.
99. In the light of all these factors, the panel considered that PC Sullivan's culpability in this case is high.

Harm

100. In respect of harm, the harm with which the panel is concerned in this case is reputational in nature. The public would be shocked to learn that a serving police officer lied to a senior officer. They would further be disappointed to learn that PC Sullivan used police databases for his personal use. In the light of these factors, the panel find that the harm caused in this case was medium in nature.

Aggravating factors

101. In considering aggravating features, the panel notes that PC Sullivan's actions found proved breached multiple professional standards of conduct and behaviour. The panel considered that PC Sullivan demonstrated limited insight. His behaviour continued after he knew that what he had done was wrong, both having received the audit email and having been advised on multiple occasions by his colleagues that he needed to escalate matters to a senior officer. Despite this, PC Sullivan did not heed the advice which culminated in him lying to a senior officer. PC Sullivan failed to comply with instructions in relation to the proper use of MPS databases and the audit email.

Mitigating factors

102. In respect of mitigating circumstances, the panel acknowledged that PC Sullivan's constellation of mental health conditions had a significant impact on him as did his inability to access ADHD medication although the panel note from the evidence before it that the time period over which this was the case was not clear as it does not have the benefit of sight of full GP and medical records for PC Sullivan. The panel further acknowledged that PC Sullivan suffered a series of traumatic events in 2022 and 2023. Nonetheless, as a police officer he at all times would be expected to know right from wrong. PC Sullivan's mental health conditions were likely to have had some impact on his memory, but not on his ability to tell the truth or to follow instructions. They did not prevent him from telling the truth on the 2nd or 4th of October 2023. PC Sullivan's health conditions may well have had a significant impact on his ability to cope with the circumstances that he faced. PC Sullivan accepted many of the allegations and

breaches of the professional standards of conduct and behaviour and that his actions amounted to misconduct. He demonstrated partial remorse.

103. Taking all of the above into account, the panel concluded that the allegations found proved amount to gross misconduct in that they are of such seriousness that they could justify PC Sullivan's dismissal.

OUTCOME

104. In considering outcome the Panel has taken account of the College of Policing Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings (2023). The Panel has borne in mind that the purpose of police misconduct proceedings is threefold:

- To maintain public confidence in and the reputation of the police service.
- To uphold high standards in policing and deter misconduct.
- To protect the public.

The Panel heard submissions from Ms Chapman and Ms Lloyd Jacob as to the appropriate outcome. The Panel also had sight of the Officer's character bundle and service record.

105. The Panel approached its decision on outcome in three stages to determine the appropriate sanction. It adopted the structured approach as set out in *Fuglers LLP & Ors v Solicitors Regulation Authority* [2014] EWHC 179 (Admin).

Stage 1: Assess the seriousness of the misconduct.

Stage 2: Keep in mind the purpose of disciplinary action

Stage 3: Choose the sanction which most appropriately fulfils that purpose for the seriousness of the conduct in question.

106. The panel has already addressed seriousness including consideration of culpability, harm, aggravating and mitigating factors in paragraphs 95-103 above and adopts its previous findings herein.

107. The panel considered the detailed submissions of both representatives. It considered the advice of the LQA.

108. The panel makes the following additional observations:

109. The panel was satisfied that PC Sullivan's conduct found proved was akin to operational dishonesty. This is because PS Trundle (in a policing context) instructed PC Sullivan to update and close nominal reports on Crimint. This task had an operational backdrop and context. It was inherently linked to policing intelligence which would be relied upon by other officers for their policing duties.

PC Sullivan wrote a dishonest response back to PS Trundle saying that he could not complete this task because “Crimint was playing up”. Whilst the panel acknowledge that he did not enter false information on to Crimint, the act of deceit was in lying to a supervisor with the intent for him to believe that his failure to close the nominal reports was a system fault rather than an issue created by his own conduct. PC Sullivan was trying to mislead his supervisor about the functionality of a police intelligence database.

110. Whilst the panel acknowledge that the acts of operational dishonesty committed by PC Sullivan are on the lower end of a spectrum and are not as serious as other types considered in the case of **Salter**, it nonetheless found that it does amount to operational dishonesty and therefore that dismissal should be expected in all but the most exceptional circumstances.
111. The panel noted that there were significant features in this case which were identified as being particularly serious in the College of Policing’s guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings.
112. The panel were satisfied that PC Sullivan’s Crimint search was undertaken at least in part for personal reasons, linked to the potential risk of his high-performance vehicle and that of his stepfather being stolen from outside their home address. Police officers are continually reminded through training and warnings on police systems that they should not use policing systems for personal benefit. The same message is repeated in the College of Policing guidance (4.35). PC Sullivan’s actions were in blatant disregard to this fundamental requirement. The misuse of police data is another matter which is considered as particularly serious.
113. The panel considered that PC Sullivan attempted to deflect blame for his own actions. He sought to claim that he did not have a good relationship with PS Trundle when the panel found this was not the case. He claimed that PC Villiers had not spoken to him about his lack of access to Crimint and what he should do to resolve the matter and then conceded in oral testimony that she had (but he forgot about the conversations). He additionally attempted to claim that there was a problem with Crimint when this was not the case. The panel find that PC Sullivan’s actions consistently demonstrate a failing to take responsibility for his own actions and that he lacked true insight. By not having this insight, the panel felt there would be the possibility of repetition.
114. The panel acknowledge PC Sullivan’s personal mitigation. It noted that PC Sullivan is an officer of some 11 years standing. He has undertaken police work

of a high standard both prior to the incidents and subsequently. This conduct was out of character. His diagnosed PTSD was caused by incidents occurring during the course of his police duties.

115. Notwithstanding the mitigation in this case, the panel found that the allegations found proved are defined as particular serious categories In the College of Policing's Guidance on Outcomes (namely operational dishonesty and data protection and misuse). The panel first considered the sanction of a final written warning but determined that such a warning of even the maximum duration would not be sufficient to mark the seriousness of the conduct and protect public confidence in and the reputation of policing. The panel found that there are no compelling exceptional circumstances in this case.
116. In these circumstances, the panel found that the only and proportionate outcome was that of **dismissal without notice**.