

PC Jasmine Kaur
Accelerated Misconduct Hearing
Regulation 63(1) Report

1. This matter comes before me as an accelerated misconduct hearing under Part 5 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020.
2. The hearing was conducted by me, Commander Brigid Beehag-Fisher, on 27 July 2026 in person at Palestra House, 197 Blackfriars Road, London, SE1 8NJ.

Hearing in public

3. The hearing was held in public pursuant to regulation 59(1).

Representation

4. The Appropriate Authority ("AA") was represented by Ms Molly Nairn.
5. PC Kaur was not present but was represented by her Federation Representative PC Barry Edwards.
6. I was advised by Mr Jim Olphert who provided his advice on the record. I delegated responsibility for preparing this report to Mr Olphert pursuant to regulation 63(1B). Mr Olphert submitted a draft report to me on 27 July 2026 pursuant to regulation 63(1C)(a). Having considered that draft, I have satisfied myself, as required by regulation 63(1C)(b)(ii), that I am content with the draft report prepared by Mr Olphert.

Preliminary issues

7. As PC Kaur did not attend as required under Regulation Rule 57(1), I went on to consider whether notice had been properly served and whether I ought to proceed in the absence of the officer.
8. The AA confirmed that the notice had been served on 6 July 2026. Having received legal advice from Mr Olphert, I was satisfied that the requirements regarding notice had been complied with and that the matter had been listed in compliance with Regulation 52.

9. Following submissions from the AA and PC Kaur's Federation Representative, I considered whether or not to proceed in the absence of the officer consistent with Regulation 57(3)(b). I received legal advice from Mr Olphert regarding exercising my discretion to proceed in absence and was taken by him to the relevant points from *R v Hayward [2001] EWCA Crim 168* and *R v Jones [2002] UKHL 5* and *GMC v Adeogba; GMC v Visvardis [2016] EWCA Civ 162*.
10. Consistent with the principles from the above cases, and mindful of the criteria from *Jones*, I concluded that a delay was in the interest of the public and the expeditious resolution of proceedings, that an adjournment would be unlikely to result in the attendance of PC Kaur, and that PC Kaur had voluntarily waived her right to attend. Additionally she had also failed to meaningfully engage with the misconduct process despite being provided with and aware of all material in the case. In the interests of fairness, I also considered whether or not there would be any impact on the proper presentation of PC Kaur's case. Having heard from PC Kaur's Federation Representative, I have concluded that there was not any such impact.

Allegations

11. The regulation 51 notice served on PC Kaur provided as follows:

"Allegation 1 – Unauthorised Access to Police Systems

1. Between 20 July 2025 and 23 July 2025, whilst off duty and on sick leave, you accessed and misused Metropolitan Police computer systems, including CONNECT, to view records relating to Person A and his co-defendants following their arrest for an affray on 19 July 2025.

2. You carried out these enquiries without any lawful authority, legitimate policing purpose, or operational necessity.

Allegation 2 – Retention of Police Information

1. Between 20 July 2025 and 23 July 2025, you took and retained 14 images on your personal mobile phone depicting information contained within CONNECT records relating to Person A and his co-defendants.

2. You retained this information without a legitimate policing purpose and contrary to your responsibilities regarding the handling of police information.

Allegation 3 – Improper Disclosure of Police Information

1. Following the affray on 19 July 2025, you improperly disclosed policing information via the messaging platform “HOTSPOT”, including:

a) advising others not to return to the crime scene because suspects were outstanding; and

b) sharing an image of CCTV footage relating to the incident.

2. You disclosed this information without lawful authority or a legitimate policing purpose.

Allegation 4 – Attendance at Hammersmith Police Station

1. On 21 July 2025, whilst off duty and on sick leave, you attended Hammersmith Police Station between 17:03 hours and 20:19 hours, as evidenced by EBACS records.

2. During this period, Person A was detained in custody at Hammersmith Police Station.

3. You had no legitimate policing purpose or operational requirement to attend the police station.

Allegation 5 – Failure to Declare a Declarable Association

1. You failed to declare your association with Person A in accordance with the Metropolitan Police Service Declarable Associations Policy.
2. In particular, you failed to report that association during the period between Person A's arrest on 20 July 2025 and your arrest on 8 August 2025, despite your duty and responsibility to do so.

Professional Standards of Behaviour

In the circumstances, the Appropriate Authority contends that your actions breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour as set out in the Regulation 5 and Schedule 2 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (as amended by the Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2024, namely:

- Confidentiality
- Discreditable Conduct
- Duties and Responsibilities

In that you behaved in a manner likely to bring discredit upon the police service and undermine public confidence. As a result of that stated herein, if proven, your conduct amounts to gross misconduct and your dismissal may be justified.”

Response

12. PC Kaur has not served a regulation 54, and made no comment when interviewed in respect of these matters.

Evidence

13. I have been provided with a 627-page hearing bundle by the AA which, most importantly, includes:
 - a. The investigator's report of DC Hannah Thomas, dated 16 June 2026;
 - b. The Connect System Audit Workbooks;

- c. The EBACS Access Log for Hammersmith Police Station relating to PC Kaur's access on 21 July 2025;
 - d. Letters which appear to be between PC Kaur and Person A;
 - e. Images of the Connect Records; and
 - f. Screenshots from the download of PC Kaur's mobile telephone including messages relating to Person A and his arrest and time in custody.
14. I have considered all of this material.
15. As I have already said, PC Kaur has not provided any response, nor did PC Kaur attend the hearing and so there is no further evidence from the officer to consider. I received submissions on behalf of the officer from her Federation Representative and have taken account of those in my findings.

Factual findings

16. I am required by regulation 61(15) to review the facts of the case and decide whether or not the conduct of PC Kaur amounts to gross misconduct. Regulation 61(16) states that I must not find that the conduct of PC Kaur amounts to gross misconduct unless (a) I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this is the case, or (b) PC Kaur admits it is the case.
17. There are no admissions in the present case and so I must assess whether I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the conduct is proved. I have reminded myself that it is the Appropriate Authority who bear the burden of proving the case to that standard.
18. I have listened carefully to the case presented by the Appropriate Authority and considered in some detail the documentary evidence presented on behalf of the Appropriate Authority. I have also considered the media evidence in the form of CCTV clips from the Hammersmith Police Station Front Desk and PC Kaur's PACE no comment (silent) interview under caution.
19. I am satisfied that the Officer had no role operational reason for accessing the information, retention or onward sharing of it. She had no role in the investigation nor did she have a reason to attend Hammersmith Police Station on the day

Person A was in custody. Furthermore, she failed to declare the relationship with him.

20. As such, I find all of the factual particulars **proven** on the balance of probabilities.

Breach of Standards of Professional Behaviour findings

21. I then have to consider whether the facts proved amount to a breach of standards. It is for the AA to prove breach of standards on the balance of probabilities.

22. I was advised by Mr Olphert that:

- a. The definition of Discreditable Conduct, per Schedule 2 of the Conduct Regulations, is as follows: *"Police officers behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty."*
- b. The definition of Confidentiality, per Schedule 2 of the Conduct Regulations, is as follows: *"Police officers treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the proper course of police duties."*
- c. The definition of Duties and Responsibilities, per Schedule 2 of the Conduct Regulations, is as follows: *"Police officers are diligent in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities. Police officers have a responsibility to give appropriate cooperation during investigations, inquiries and formal proceedings, participating openly and professionally in line with the expectations of a police officer when identified as a witness."*

23. In respect of Discreditable Conduct, I am satisfied that the proven conduct is capable of bringing discredit to the police service and capable of undermining public confidence in the police service. The proven conduct demonstrates that – whilst not on duty and on sick leave, PC Kaur accessed confidential material relating to a live, ongoing and dynamic police investigation which she had no operational reason to have accessed. She did so because she wished to find out what was happening in respect of the arrest of her then boyfriend Person A, and others who he was with at the time of an alleged public order incident. PC Kaur

did not disclose her relationship with Person A at any time, including after his arrest. PC Kaur also shared details relating to the ongoing investigation, including – notably – that there was a remand application to be made in respect of Person A with others.

24. PC Kaur also appears to have warned people not to attend, and also shared evidence in the form of CCTV stills with others. Again, without any operational justification and to assist Person A and those associated with him.
25. Whilst Person A was in police custody at Hammersmith Police Station, PC Kaur – whilst off sick and not on duty – attended Hammersmith Police Station and accessed the police station with her police identification.
26. It is clear from the surrounding evidence, including message communication with others, and the letters between PC Kaur and Person A whilst in custody that PC Kaur sought to do all she could to try and protect Person A and insulate him from the consequences of the criminal investigation, including accessing documents relating to him and to others.
27. I am satisfied that the above conduct is capable of bring discredit on the police service, and that a member of the public fully aware of all of the material and information in this case would – rightly – be caused to lose confidence in the police service.
28. I am satisfied for the above reasons that PC Kaur's actions in accessing and sharing data from Connect amounts to a breach of Confidentiality.
29. For those same reasons I am also satisfied that such conduct amounts to a breach of Duties and Responsibilities, given the absence of an operational and policing purpose to her disclosures, and as a result of PC Kaur's attendance at and access of Hammersmith Police Station whilst she was off work on sick leave.
30. I am satisfied that the AA has discharged that burden and that the actions of PC Kaur as described above did breach the standards of Professional Behaviour as to Discreditable Conduct, Confidentiality and Duties and Responsibilities.

Severity Assessment

31. Regulation 2 defines:

- a. Misconduct as a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action;
- b. Gross misconduct as a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify dismissal.

32. In assessing severity, I have considered PC Kaur's culpability and harm.

33. Culpability: PC Kaur is wholly responsible for her actions. The proven conduct and breaches of the standards whilst off-duty by misusing police systems for her own personal ends, and her failure to declare the relationship in spite of those actions and indeed Person A's arrest demonstrate a willingness to misuse confidential police data risking the integrity of an ongoing investigation. There is no evidence that she was coerced or encouraged into this, but that she did so willingly. Culpability is therefore assessed as high.

34. Harm: There has been no proven direct harm. However, there is plainly harm to the public confidence should the circumstances be known, and the risk of harm in PC Kaur's misuse of police systems is significant. The public expect police officers to uphold the law rather than undermine the law and the legal process. Her encouragement that others ought not to return to the crime scene, and sharing not only of process information but also screenshots of CCTV risked the integrity of this investigation. Risk is therefore assessed as high.

35. For these reasons I consider that the allegation has been proved at the level of gross misconduct.

Disciplinary action

36. As I have made a finding of gross misconduct, pursuant to regulation 62(1) I must impose disciplinary action.

37. Because this is a case where the allegation came to the attention of the AA after 28 May 2025, pursuant to regulation 64 of the Police (Conduct, Performance and Complaints and Misconduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2025, regulation 62(1) of the Conduct Regulation applies in its amended form. The only disciplinary action available following a finding of gross misconduct in this case is:
- a. dismissal without notice, or
 - b. if I am satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which justify it, a final written warning.
38. In considering the question of action disciplinary action, regulation 62(10) provides that:
- a. I must have regard to PC Kaur's record of police service as shown on the officer's personal record. I confirm that I have done so.
 - b. I may consider such documentary evidence as would, in my opinion, assist me in determining the question of disciplinary action.
 - c. I must give PC Kaur, her lawyer or Police Friend and the AA the opportunity to make oral or written representations. I confirm that I have done so.
39. Ms Nairn's submission was that dismissal was the only appropriate sanction. She submitted that a lesser sanction would require me to be satisfied that exceptional circumstances justified it, and there were no exceptional circumstances in this case.
40. There were no submissions advanced at this stage from PC Kaur's Federation Representative.
41. I have had regard to the College of Policing's *Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings* (2022), which has not been updated to reflect the recent amendment to the Conduct Regulations.
42. On page 15 of the *Guidance* the College of Policing sets out the approach that I must take in reaching a decision as to disciplinary action, which is to:
- a. assess the seriousness of the misconduct by reference to:
 - (1) the officer's culpability for the misconduct;

- (2) the harm caused by the misconduct;
- (3) the existence of any aggravating factors;
- (4) the existence of any mitigating factors;
- b. keep in mind the purpose of imposing disciplinary action, which the *Guidance* explains on p.4 are (i) to maintain public confidence in, and the reputation of, the police service; (ii) to uphold high standards in policing and deter misconduct; and (iii) to protect the public.
- c. choose the disciplinary action which most appropriately fulfils that purpose for the seriousness of the conduct in question.

Stage 1

Culpability

43. On page 16 of the *Guidance* the College of Policing states that “*Culpability denotes the officer’s blameworthiness or responsibility for their actions. The more culpable or blameworthy the behaviour in question, the more serious the misconduct and the more severe the likely outcome.*”

44. I have addressed culpability above, which I do not repeat. I assess PC Kaur’s culpability as high.

45. The AA drew my attention to the Data Protection and Misuse section of the *Guidance* – particularly Paragraphs 4.35 – 4.37. I have had regard to those sections and note particularly that the guidance states: “*Accessing confidential police information without a legitimate policing purpose is an abuse of an officer’s position and may merit dismissal in serious cases.*”

46. I have also had regard to Paragraph 4.37 where the *Guidance* states:

“*Factors that support a more serious outcome include:*

- *accessing information of a secret nature or high classification*
- *onward disclosure of the information*
- *malicious motive for accessing or disclosing the information*
- *personal gain*
- *actual or potential compromise to a police investigation*

- *breaches of personal privacy where the data is very sensitive*
- *attempts to cover up improper accessing of data*
- *altering information held by the police*

47. I am satisfied that the above sections of the guidance are relevant to my determination as to culpability in the present case, and that from the above list “*onward disclosure of the information*”, “*personal gain*” and “*potential compromise to a police investigation*” are applicable to the facts of the present case.

Harm

48. On page 27 of the *Guidance* the College of Policing explains that “*Harm does not need to be suffered by a defined individual or group to undermine public confidence. Where an officer commits an act that would harm public confidence if the circumstances were known to the public, take this into account. Always take misconduct seriously that undermines discipline and good order within the police service, even if it does not result in harm to individual victims.*”

49. I have addressed harm above, which I do not repeat. I assess the harm caused by PC Kaur’s conduct as high.

Aggravating factors

50. I have considered the non-exhaustive list of aggravating factors in the *Guidance* at p.29.

51. I have reminded myself not to ‘double count’ matters that I have already considered with the respect to culpability or harm.

52. I have concluded that the following aggravating features are present in this case:

- a. multiple proven allegations and/or breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour;

- b. malign intent, such as sexual gratification, financial gain or personal advantage – in this case personal advantage;
- c. abuse of trust, position, powers or authority

53. As set out above, there is some overlap between 'b' and 'c' above, and the factors which I have assessed as being relevant when assessing culpability, and so have not 'double counted' those features.

Mitigating factors

54. I have considered the non-exhaustive list of mitigating factors in the *Guidance* at p.30 - 31.

55. I do not find any mitigating factors in this case.

Overall

56. Overall, I assess the seriousness of PC Kaur's conduct as high.

Stage 2

57. I have born in mind the purposes of imposing disciplinary action.

58. I find that all following purposes for imposing disciplinary action are engaged in this case:

- a. **to maintain public confidence in, and the reputation of, the police service.** For the reasons already set out above, an officer accessing and sharing police information, attending the police station in which Person A was in custody, and failing to declare her close personal links to that individual when he had been arrested and remanded undermines public confidence in the police service.
- b. **to uphold high standards in policing and deter misconduct.** In order to do so, findings made by misconduct panels and by me as a Commander conducting accelerated misconduct hearings must be such as to mark the seriousness of the misconduct and show to other officers that misconduct of the type considered in this hearing will result in disciplinary action of a certain severity.

Stage 3

59. I have had regard to PC Kaur's record of service. There was no other mitigation material nor any further submissions advanced. PC Kaur's record of service only attracts limited weight given that she has only been a police officer for some 5 years. Further, I consider that her misconduct significantly impinges on public confidence.
60. To determine an outcome short of dismissal, I would have to be satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances that justify it. I have not identified anything that could be described as an exceptional circumstance in this case. For all these reasons, the only appropriate outcome is dismissal without notice.

Publication

61. I received brief submissions on publication. I require the AA to publish this report pursuant to regulation 63(5), with the names Person A and others appropriately cyphered, given there remains ongoing proceedings.

Conclusion

62. In conclusion:
- a. I find the allegation proved;
 - b. I find that PC Kaur's conduct breaches the Standards of Professional Behaviour of Discreditable Conduct, Confidentiality and Duties and Responsibilities;
 - c. I find that PC Kaur's conduct amount to gross misconduct.
 - d. The disciplinary action I impose is that PC Kaur is dismissed without notice and she is added to the College of Policing barred list.

Brigid Beehag-Fisher

T/Commander

27th June 2026