

**IN THE POLICE MISCONDUCT HEARING
PURSUANT TO THE POLICE (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020 (AS AMENDED
BY THE POLICE (CONDUCT) (AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS 2024**

BETWEEN:

THE COMMISSION OF POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS

Appropriate Authority

-and-

FORMER DS GARY WAITE

Officer concerned

PANEL FINDINGS

Introduction

1. The misconduct hearing for former DS Gary Waite ('the Officer') was held in public from 15th June to 16th June 2026 at Palestra House. A notice of hearing was published in accordance with the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 ("the 2020 Regulations").
2. The Panel comprised Commander Peter Stevens (Chair), Iain Christie and Margie Leong (Independent Panel Members). The Legally Qualified Advisor was Christine Nwaokolo.

The proceedings

3. A pre-hearing took place on 11th March 2026. Throughout the hearing, the Appropriate Authority (AA) was represented by Mr Antony Bartholomeusz of Counsel. Although initially represented in the proceedings, the Panel was informed just prior to the final hearing that the Officer would not be attending and would not be represented.

Proceeding in absence of the Officer

4. An application was made by the AA to proceed in the absence of the Officer. Mr Bartholomeusz invited the Panel to continue in the absence of the Officer, as he had voluntarily absented himself. An email was received from the Federation Representative:

“FDS Waite will no longer be attending the GMH on Monday and, consequently, will not be legally represented. The Former Officer has been made aware of this position. Notwithstanding this, I intend to attend in a purely supportive capacity and to provide assistance where appropriate. However, I do not anticipate having any additional information to contribute.”

On the morning of the hearing the federation representative decided that his attendance was no longer required and therefore did not stay for the hearing.

5. The Panel accepted the advice of the legal adviser. The starting point for the Panel was that Regulation 37 makes it clear that the Officer concerned must attend misconduct proceedings. Further, where the Officer does not attend the misconduct proceedings, the hearing may be proceeded with and concluded in the absence of the officer, whether the officer is represented or not.
6. In considering whether to proceed in the Officer’s absence, the Panel applied the principles set out in *GMC v Adeogba* [2016] EWCA Civ 162 and considered the overall interests of justice and fairness to all parties, it noted that:
 - No application for an adjournment has been made by the Officer;
 - The Officer had received notice of the hearing and was represented at the pre-hearing meeting, when the dates and venue for the hearing were confirmed;
 - There is no reason to suppose that adjourning would secure his attendance at some future date;
 - The Officer has voluntarily absented himself from attending the hearing as per the email from his federation representative;
 - There is a public interest in the expeditious conclusion of this case given the allegations stem from 2022;
 - A witness has attended the hearing to give evidence.
7. Taking into account all the above factors, the Panel decided that it was fair to proceed in the absence of the Officer. The Panel was mindful that, given its decision to proceed with the hearing, there was no general obligation for the Panel to consider adjourning or

providing a further opportunity for the Officer to make submissions if the case progresses to later stages, such as misconduct and outcome. (Sanusi v GMC [2019] EWCA Civ 1172)

Amendment to the Regulation 30 notice

8. The AA made an application to amend the Regulation 30 notice in respect of allegation paragraph 3 to read:

It is further alleged that between 9 December 2022 and 10 January 2023, you:

- (a) asked [REDACTED] to supply you with Viagra; and
- (b) received a supply of Viagra from [REDACTED].

And allegation paragraph 4 to read:

The conduct alleged in the previous paragraph was inappropriate because you were [REDACTED]'s supervisor at the time.

9. The Panel considered that the amendment clarified the AA's case in respect of the Viagra allegation and therefore found the amendment helpful. The Panel considered that the amendment did not prejudice the Officer because the Officer was notified of it and therefore had an opportunity to respond. Further, the Officer's statement dated 1st April 2024, and Regulation 31 response addressed all points covered by the amendment. The Panel accepted the AA's amendments to the Regulation 30 notice.

The proceedings

10. The Panel was referred to the amended Regulation 30 notice. It is alleged that the Officer's conduct breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour (SPB) as follows:

1. It is alleged that between 18 June 2022 and 20 July 2023 and on no fewer than nine occasions, you dishonestly represented that [REDACTED] was on duty when, in fact, [REDACTED] was not on duty, and you knew this to be the case.

2. The conduct alleged in the previous paragraph caused a loss to the Metropolitan Police Service.

3. It is further alleged that between 9 December 2022 and 10 January 2023, you:

- (a) asked [REDACTED] to supply you with Viagra; and
- (b) received a supply of Viagra from [REDACTED].

4. The conduct alleged in the previous paragraph was inappropriate because you were [REDACTED]'s supervisor at the time.

5. The conduct alleged constitutes a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour, namely:

- (a) Honesty and Integrity;
- (b) Discreditable Conduct; and
- (c) Duties and Responsibilities.

6. If proved, [points 1 to 5 above] amounts to Gross Misconduct.

11. The panel approached its task in the following stages:

- i) Are any of the facts admitted?
- ii) What facts have been proved by the AA on the balance of probabilities?
- iii) Of the admitted or proved facts, has the AA satisfied the panel on the balance of probabilities that the relevant SPB has been breached?
- iv) If so, has the AA satisfied the Panel on the balance of probabilities that the conduct admitted or proved amounts to Gross Misconduct, namely the breach is so serious as to justify dismissal?

The admitted facts

12. The Officer's Regulation 31 response makes the following admissions:

- That he used CARMS to book [REDACTED] on duty between 18th July 2022 and 20th July 2023 when he was not at work.
- This conduct breached SPB in respect of honesty and integrity, and discreditable conduct.
- The Officer accepts that his conduct in relation to allegation 1 amounts to misconduct.

These admissions go to Allegations 1, and 5(a) and (b).

Disputed facts

- The Officer denies requesting Viagra from [REDACTED] and receiving it from him. The Officer denies having an inappropriate relationship with [REDACTED]; he describes the relationship as professional and supportive.
- The Officer disputes his use of the CARMS caused loss to the Metropolitan Police Service.
- The officer disputes that this conduct amounts to Gross misconduct
- The Officer does not formally respond to the allegation of breach of Duties and Responsibilities.

Relevant issues to determine

- Whether allegations 2, 3, 4, 5(c) and 6 are found proved.
- Whether the disputed allegations found proven and admitted facts amount to breaches of the SPB in respect of:
 - Honesty and integrity
 - Discreditable conduct
 - Duties and responsibilities
- Whether the Officer's conduct, namely those matters admitted and/or any findings made, amounts to Misconduct or Gross Misconduct.

Stage 1: Finding of Facts

13. The panel accepted the advice of the legal advisor that the burden of proof is on the AA to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the Officer behaved in the manner alleged and, in doing so, breached the relevant SPB. It is not for the Officer to disprove the allegations. Further, the AA must satisfy the panel to the same standard that the nature or degree of the breach is such that it amounts to misconduct or gross misconduct.
14. The Panel reminded itself that it does not need to make a finding on every issue and need only make findings on those issues which it believes to be relevant and material to the allegations. The panel has, however, resolved enough to reach a clear judgment in this case.

15. In considering the disputed facts, the panel carefully considered, among other evidence, the oral evidence and written accounts of the witnesses, investigation reports and interview transcripts. The panel heard live evidence from DI Langton.

Allegation 1

16. This allegation is admitted by the Officer and is therefore proven.

Allegation 2

17. In respect of allegation 2 the AA clarified that the loss alleged was financial.

18. The panel notes that the Officer admits to booking [REDACTED] as being on duty on days when he was not working (as per allegation 1). It therefore follows that [REDACTED] was getting paid for days he had not worked which would result in a loss to the Metropolitan Police Service. This allegation is therefore proven.

Allegation 3(a)

19. The panel considered the text messages exchanged between the Officer and [REDACTED].
On 10th December 2022 the Officer asks [REDACTED]:
“Did you get any Viagra”
[REDACTED] replies “Got a few at home remind me G will bring you 2 packets”
The Officer says “Haha you my dealer x”

20. In another text exchange on 4th January 2023 [REDACTED] says
“Big G, can I pls have leave during this month, pretty pls.”
The Officer replies “Whatever you need brother xx”
[REDACTED] responds “January 10th, One day. January 21st to 25th Plus 4 blue”. He then sends a further message saying “It’s the weekend G, sorry”
The Officer states “Damn you!!!! Xx no problem brother xx”
[REDACTED] replies “4 for you”
The Officer responds “That’s the spirit. Need it xx”
[REDACTED] then asks “When you back in?”
The Officer says “Next Monday cocker xx”
[REDACTED] replies “Cool will bring them in for you”
The Officer states “Great stuff. You the man x”.

21. As the Officer did not attend the hearing the panel did not have the opportunity to explore the content of the messages with him. The panel accepts the AA's submission that as Viagra pills are blue the reference to 4 blue meant 4 Viagra pills.
22. The Panel determined that the text messages clearly show the Officer requesting Viagra pills from [REDACTED] on 2 occasions, on 10th December 2022 and on 4th January 2023. On the balance of probabilities, the panel finds this allegation proven.

3(b)

23. In the Regulation 31 response the Officer states he does not accept he ever received Viagra from [REDACTED]. He goes on to say that [REDACTED] teased the officer *"about needing Viagra and that is why there are jokes about it within the text messages"*. Further the Officer states that as *"Viagra can be purchased at pharmacies and online he does not accept that it was breach of SPB for one officer to receive it from another"*.
24. In the Officer's statement dated 1st April 2024 he says:
- "I understand that there is a suggestion that I was booking [REDACTED] on and off work for shifts that he had not worked, in return for Viagra. This is completely incorrect. I know that these are also available over the counter at a chemist. I have never tried these before, but I thought it would improve my intimacy with my wife. There was no money involved and no gratuity."*
25. The text messages considered above suggest that arrangements were made between the Officer and [REDACTED] for the Officer to collect Viagra, in that on both occasions [REDACTED] told the Officer that he would bring the pills with him to work. There is nothing to suggest that the Officer did not receive the Viagra. Further, the panel noted that the Regulation 31 response and statement are contradictory: on the one hand, in the Regulation 31 response, the Officer denies ever receiving Viagra from [REDACTED]; on the other hand, in his statement dated earlier than the Regulation 31 response, he states that there was no money involved and no gratuity, which implies that he did receive Viagra.
26. Based on the text messages and the contradictory remarks made by the Officer in relation to this allegation, the panel determines that, on the balance of probabilities, it is more likely

than not that the Officer did receive Viagra from [REDACTED]; therefore, this allegation is proven.

Allegation 4

27. The panel has carefully considered all the text messages including those set out above. The panel accepts the AA's submission that the "x's" within messages sent by the Officer denote kisses. The Panel noted that every message sent by the Officer had an at least 1 "x" in it. The panel noted that the Officer referred to [REDACTED] as "bro" and was called "G" by [REDACTED]. The Panel further noted that Viagra is used for sexual purposes and therefore the use of it is private and personal. The panel does not accept the Officer's position that they were speaking about Viagra in a jokey way, as the panel could not identify any jokes within the messages exchanged relating to the Officer's supposed need for Viagra. The panel notes that the Officer uses frequent 'x's' in all his messages to [REDACTED] although this is not reciprocated. This, along with nicknames, shows over familiarity between the two of them.

28. The panel considered other messages to look at the general nature of the Officer and [REDACTED]'s relationship. It noted that:

On 21st October 2021 the Officer sends a message to [REDACTED] saying "don't be silly bro. I love you to bits. All good, get some sleep, and if you need anything let me know xx".

On 20th July 2023 the officer sends a message to [REDACTED] saying "You look like a model in your picture x".

On 31st October 2022 the Officer sends a message to [REDACTED] saying "You are late x" to which [REDACTED] replies "Another fine. The officer then responds "3 fines equal sucky sucky x".

In response to [REDACTED]'s request for leave the officer replied on 4th January 2023 "whatever you need brother xx".

29. The tone of these messages is over familiar and at times crude. The totality of these messages suggests their relationship was inappropriate, particularly as between a supervisor and supervisee. The Officer and [REDACTED] were comfortable enough to share private information about using Viagra which was supplied by [REDACTED] to the Officer. Also, the Officer's language suggested he cared deeply for [REDACTED] in a

personal capacity and that whatever [REDACTED] requested would be granted. It is the panel's view, that the Officer and [REDACTED] had a close relationship beyond what would be considered professional.

30. The panel determines that, on the balance of probabilities, allegation 4 is proven.
31. Allegations 5 and 6 relate to breaches of the SPB and whether the conduct amounts to gross misconduct or misconduct; they are therefore addressed below.

Standards of professional behaviour (SPB)

Stage 2: Do the facts as determined by the panel constitute a breach of the standards of professional behaviour?

32. The Officer having admitted allegation 1 and the panel finding 2, 3 and 4 proven, it then went on to consider whether, by his conduct, the Officer had breached the SPB in respect of 'Honesty and Integrity', 'Discreditable Conduct' and 'Duties and Responsibilities'.
33. The panel reminded itself that Schedule 2 of the 2020 Regulations stipulates that, with regards to:

Honesty and Integrity: Police officers are honest, act with integrity and do not compromise or abuse their position

Discreditable Conduct: Police officers will behave in a manner, which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty.

Duties and Responsibilities: Police officers are diligent in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities.

34. In relation to the conduct under 1 and 2 the panel finds that the Officer breached SPB Honesty and Integrity, and Discreditable Conduct. It noted that when addressing the issue of loss in the Regulation 31 he states "*that he should not have used the CARMs system in a way that represented that [REDACTED] was on duty when he was not. He further accepts that although he was trying to do the right thing, it would be viewed as dishonest by ordinary members of the public.*" This shows that the Officer recognised that his actions

fell below the standard expected of him. Further the Officer's action of making false entries on the CARMS had the consequence of causing financial loss to the metropolitan police.

35. In relation to allegations 3 and 4, requesting and receiving Viagra from a colleague, especially given the Officer's higher rank, was inappropriate. The Officer's relationship with [REDACTED] was unprofessional and went beyond that of a manager who was simply supportive. Intimate, personal information was clearly shared between them, given the Officer's apparent comfort in asking for Viagra. Further, the content and tone of the text messages suggests overfamiliarity between them. The Officer did not manage [REDACTED]'s requests for annual leave professionally and saying that he could have anything he needed created an environment suggesting that [REDACTED] could make any request that would be granted. The panel therefore considers that the conduct under 3 and 4 breached the SPB in relation to Discreditable Conduct.

5(c) Breach of Duties and Responsibilities

36. The panel heard evidence from DI Langton, who was the Officer's line manager at the time of the incidents. The evidence given by DI Langton assisted the panel in relation to determining whether the Officer's conduct breached SPB Duties and Responsibilities.
37. In response to questions posed by the panel, DI Langton told the panel that, although he could not recall any training provided in respect of the CARMS system, he was sure it would have been provided as it was something that Officers would use daily. He was aware there was guidance on the MET Intranet. DI Langton told the panel that he expected every police officer to be responsible for booking themselves on and off duty.
38. DI Langton explained that it is vital for supervisors to be able to see which officers are on duty to deploy work. It is also important that the information in the system is correct, as it directly links to pay and annual leave, as well as for welfare reasons for supervisors to know who is on duty. DI Langton informed the panel that booking someone else on and off duty does happen, but that it is normal practice for officers to book themselves. DI Langton told the panel that managers can book for their team in a supervisory capacity as well as use the system to book annual leave and rest days.

39. DI Langton informed the panel that he did not have any discussions with the Officer about his use of CARMS, save for the email exchange he had about [REDACTED]. DI Langton told the panel that he was alerted to the fact that [REDACTED] had been booked as being on duty while he was abroad, following a stabbing incident the night before for which he needed to deploy officers. DI Langton went to Team 2, which was [REDACTED]'s team, and asked staff where he was. He was shocked when he was told that [REDACTED] was in Pakistan. DI Langton explained that the staff member who told him looked embarrassed about the situation. DI Langton told the panel that, as the Officer (DS Waite) was absent, he could not discuss it with him, so he emailed him. This email is exhibited to his statement.
40. DI Langton told the panel that he had never experienced someone being booked as being on duty when in a foreign country. DI Langton took the Officer's response to his email that he was booked on because he had time owing to him, but he could not show this logistically on the system. DI Langton said that he could not remember what happened after the email exchange.
41. DI Langton informed the panel that the correct process for booking time off is either requesting rest days or annual leave, which is authorised by the supervisor and recorded on CARMS. He also informed the panel that compassionate leave can be requested and authorised by a supervisor. This would be a circumstance in which such leave may be booked on the system retrospectively, but he was clear that he did not think this incident (trip to Pakistan) related to compassionate leave.
42. DI Langton was taken to retired officer [REDACTED] statement, where he refers to it being common practice for officers to use CARMS in the way the Officer had (booking [REDACTED] as being on duty when he was not working) and to DI Langton having told the Officer that it was fine for him to use his discretion when booking officers on the system when they were not on duty to address overworked hours. DI Langton told the panel that he did not recall the conversation, and that it was not common practice to book officers as on duty when they were not.
43. In respect of the impact of booking officers on duty when they are not working, DI Langton informed the panel that, if there is a serious or major incident and there are fewer officers

available than the system shows, it could result in an offender not being arrested or the public having less police protection.

Analysis

44. The Panel found DI Langton's evidence clear and consistent. The panel found DI Langton's evidence helpful in understanding the expectations for how CARMS should be used responsibly and the implications that inappropriate use could have on the force's ability to carry out its duties, such as keeping the public safe and responding to serious and major incidents. DI Langton expressed shock on learning that [REDACTED] was in Pakistan when he had been booked as being on duty. He told the Panel that he had not come across this situation before. The fact that DI Langton raised the issue with the Officer by email further corroborates and supports his concern about how the Officer was using CARMS.
45. The panel found DI Langton's evidence credible and therefore attached much weight to it.
46. As [REDACTED] did not attend the hearing, the Panel did not have the opportunity to explore his evidence further. Where his written evidence was contradicted by DI Langton's oral evidence the panel preferred DI Langton's version.
47. The panel determines that the Officer's use of CARMS was improper by recording [REDACTED] as being on duty when he was not. The panel does not accept the Officer's reasons for doing so, namely that it was to make up for the extra hours [REDACTED] had worked and not claimed overtime. [REDACTED] had accumulated sufficient rest days that he could have used instead. By recording [REDACTED] as being on duty when he was not, he was being paid for days he had not worked.
48. The Officer was in a supervisory role; there was an expectation on him to use the system appropriately and to be a role model given his position. By the Officer breaking the rules, it gave the impression to those he supervised that it was acceptable. Therefore, the panel finds the Officer's breached the SPB Duties and Responsibilities.
49. The panel finds the totality of the Officer's conduct breached the SPB in respect of all three standards.

Misconduct or Gross Misconduct

Stage 3: Findings on gross misconduct/ misconduct

50. The Panel then went on to consider whether the Officer's behaviour amounted to Misconduct or Gross Misconduct.
51. The Panel reminded itself that Regulation 2(1) of the 2020 Regulations defines Misconduct as being 'a breach of the SPB behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action' whilst Gross Misconduct is defined as 'a breach of the SPB that is so serious as to justify dismissal'.
52. Further, the purpose of the police misconduct regime is to:
- maintain public confidence in and the reputation of the police service;
 - uphold high standards in policing and deter misconduct;
 - and to protect the public.
53. The Panel is mindful that assessing the seriousness of the conduct lies at the heart of the decision on outcome under Parts 4 and 5 of the Conduct Regulations. Whether conduct would, if proved, amount to misconduct or gross misconduct for the purposes of Regulation 14 of the Conduct Regulations is also a question of degree (ie, seriousness).
54. Although the College of Policing – Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings is aimed at informing decisions at the outcome stage, the Panel drew assistance from some of the principles contained within the guidance when assessing the overall seriousness of the breach in determining the level of misconduct.
55. The Officer's conduct meets the threshold for Gross Misconduct for the following reasons. The conduct was intentional and deliberate in that he booked [REDACTED] as being on duty when he knew he was not, in some instances when he was out of the country. The Officer was holding a position of trust and responsibility at higher level given his rank and had a supervisory role. It is clear from the evidence that the nature of the relationship between the Officer and his supervisee was inappropriate. It was the Officer's duty to supervise [REDACTED] however given the inappropriate messages about Viagra and the whole tenor of messages showed an inappropriate and over familiar relationship which the public would not expect a supervisor in the police to have with a junior member of staff.

56. The Officer's conduct represented a conscious departure from the professional standards expected of a police officer. It involved operational dishonesty in that the Officer used CARMS inappropriately. Further the conduct was criminal in nature in that it was fraudulent. The CARM system linked to pay, so by recording [REDACTED] as on duty when he was not meant he was paid for shifts he did not work out of public funds.
57. The panel considers the level of culpability to be **high**.
58. The conduct carried a clear potential to undermine public confidence in the police service, as police officers are expected to be honest. Further, receiving pay for shifts that were not worked would have caused a financial loss to the police force at a time when budgets are already tight. [REDACTED]'s absence from work would also have placed more pressure on the colleagues who covered for him. Further, appearing as being on duty while he was abroad impacted the resources supervisors had available to deploy officers and respond to serious and/or major incidents. This had the potential to place the public at an unnecessary increased risk of harm. The public perception of a junior officer providing their supervisor with Viagra would damage public confidence in policing especially given the current concerns around trust and confidence on the police in recent high profile police misconduct cases. The panel considers the level of harm to be **high**.
59. Taken together, these factors demonstrate conduct of such seriousness that dismissal would be justified. Accordingly, the Panel is satisfied that the conduct found proven amounts to Gross Misconduct.

Outcome

60. Having made a finding of gross misconduct, the Panel went on to consider sanction. The Panel approached this by applying the three stages for determining the appropriate sanction:
1. Assess the seriousness of the misconduct by considering factors such as harm, culpability, and aggravating and mitigating factors.
 2. Keep in mind the purpose of imposing sanctions by considering the threefold purpose of imposing outcomes in police misconduct proceedings, as set out in paragraph 2.3 of the College of Policing guidance:

- a) to maintain public confidence in, and the reputation of, the police service
- b) to uphold high standards in policing and to deter misconduct
- c) to protect the public

3. Choose the sanction that most appropriately fulfils that purpose, having regard to the seriousness of the conduct in question. When considering the third stage, the Panel was mindful that, as this case relates to a former officer, there are limited outcomes available.

Submissions

61. Mr Bartholomeusz made the following submissions:

- The harm and culpability in this case are high due to the operational dishonesty committed by the Officer in recording [REDACTED] as being on duty when he was not.
- Whilst no individual had been harmed, damage to public confidence and financial loss to the Metropolitan Police were caused by the Officer's conduct.
- The Officer failed to seek assistance or advice in respect of using CARMS (booking someone as on duty to balance out unclaimed overtime) when he should have done.
- The conduct of not using the system appropriately affected the operational delivery given that it showed [REDACTED] being on duty when he was not at work.
- The Officer's conduct was intentional and deliberate.
- The Officer's conduct was repeated and happened over a period of time.
- There are no mitigating factors.
- The personal mitigation is reflected in the character statements provided, namely that he was a decorated officer who had been commended for his work.

Findings

62. In determining the appropriate and proportionate sanction, the panel had regard to the Officer's service record, the facts found proved, the submissions made by Mr Bartholomeusz, and the legal advice received from the LQA.

63. The Panel adopted the analysis and assessment it undertook on seriousness in relation to its decision on gross misconduct, namely that culpability and harm were assessed as high.

64. The panel determined that the Officer's conduct in using CARMS to falsely record that [REDACTED] was on duty when he was not, including when he was out of the country, amounted to operational dishonesty. The Officer had access to CARMS with supervisory duties and used it in a way that allowed [REDACTED] to be paid for shifts that he did not work. Further, the impact of using the system in this way placed the public at unnecessary risk of harm, given that the system did not accurately reflect which officers were on duty and therefore available to be deployed to serious or major incidents.

65. The panel took into consideration the following aggravating factors:

- The conduct was planned and deliberate.
- There was an abuse of position, in that the Officer was a supervisor who misused the CARMS system.
- Repeated behaviour over a period of time
- Significant deviation from instructions
- Failure to raise concerns or seek advice
- He was in a leadership position and was therefore expected to be a role model.
- There were multiple breaches of SPB
- There was a lack of insight into his actions.

66. The panel took into consideration the following mitigating factors

- Limited admissions were made, but not at the earliest opportunity.

Personal mitigation

67. The panel noted that the Officer was commended for his work as the first officer on the scene during the terror attack on Westminster Bridge. He has won awards and has been commended for his work. Further, the Panel recognised that the character references and statements speak highly of the Officer.

68. However, the panel could attach only limited weight to the Officer's personal mitigation, given its finding of operational dishonesty and the seriousness of the misconduct. Maintenance of public confidence in the police and the reputation of the police service is paramount. The public expect police officers to comply with the SPB and to be role models in society. The public would expect standards to be high and upheld, and for action to be

taken to recognise misconduct as well as deter others from committing breaches of the SPB. The Panel determined that the Officer's conduct constituted a serious departure from the professional standards set by the police service and the standards which the public can rightly expect from the police officers who serve them.

Decision

69. Based on the panel's assessment of seriousness, and taking into account the threefold purpose of sanctions, the only appropriate and proportionate sanction is dismissal without notice had the Officer still been serving and placement on the College of Policing's barred list.

Publication of Outcome Report

70. The Chair directed publication of the outcome decision, subject to the harm test, pursuant to Regulation 43(6) of the 2020 Regulations.

Dated 17th June 2026