

IN THE MATTER OF MISCONDUCT PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE POLICE  
(CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020

CM/607/25

BETWEEN:

**THE COMISIONER OF POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS**

The Appropriate Authority

-and-

**PC TAMSIN ARCHER**

The Officer Concerned

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**NOTICE OF OUTCOME ACCELERATED POLICE MISCONDUCT HEARING  
(REGULATION 63 POLICE (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020)**

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Officer concerned: Police Constable (PC) Tamsin Archer

Date of hearing: 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2027

Name of person chairing: Commander Stephen Clayman

[References in this decision to the Regulations are to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, as amended by the Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 and the Police (Conduct, Performance and Complaints and Misconduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2025. The Appropriate Authority is referred to as AA].

**The Decisions of the Accelerated Misconduct Hearing**

**Summary**

1. The Allegations were found proved. It was determined that PC Archer's conduct had fallen below the standards expected of a serving police officer such as to contravene the Standards of Professional Behaviour and to amount to gross misconduct. It was determined that PC Archer should be dismissed and her name added to the barring list.

### **Attendees**

2. The following individuals were in attendance:
  - i. PC Archer attended the hearing and was represented by Jim Southgate.
  - ii. The AA's case was presented by Carl Binas.
  - iii. The Chair was assisted by a legally qualified adviser, Miss Elisabeth Acker.

### **Evidence and documentation**

3. The Chair had been provided with the following evidence and documentation:
  - (a) Special Case Certificate signed and dated 11/02/2026
  - (b) Form 3355D – Allegations
  - (c) MG11 – Statement of PC Amanda GOODSON RE: Special Conditions Met – signed and dated 04/12/2025
  - (d) Investigating Officer's Report 10-20
  - (e) Regulation 17 Notice – Form 163 dated
  - (f) Second Regulation 17 Notice – Form 163 signed and dated
  - (g) Request for Clare's Law made by PC ARCHER dated 15/05/2025
  - (h) Connect 01/7494138/25 Clare's Law
  - (i) MG11 of PC **X** signed and dated 11/06/2025 RE: detailing the Clare's Law disclosure
  - (j) Declarable association form completed by PC ARCHER dated 27/05/2025
  - (k) PNC usage of PC ARCHER from 18th March 2024 to 25th April 2025
  - (l) MG14 – Prepared Statement of PC ARCHER signed and dated 04/09/2025
  - (m) Misconduct interview PC Archer Part 1
  - (n) Misconduct interview PC Archer Part 2
  - (o) Transcript of Misconduct Interview of PC ARCHER
  - (p) Tamsin Archer Reg 51 Response
  - (q) 3355D Form 2024

## **Allegations**

4. The allegations against PC Archer were as follows:

### *Allegation 1*

*It is alleged that you failed to disclose your partner to the Vetting Unit, who is a high-risk Declarable Association, despite having suspicions of criminal activity, and that you did not make this disclosure until prompted to do so by you Professional Standards Unit.*

### *Allegation 2*

*It is alleged that you failed to report to the police intelligence that had been provided to you by your partner regarding a murder and a stabbing.*

### *Allegation 3*

*It is alleged that you allowed your partner to view confidential policing information contained within a MetBats briefing via your laptop at home. You failed to report or flag this data breach.*

### *Allegation 4*

*It is alleged that on 9<sup>th</sup> January 2025, whilst on duty, you conducted an unauthorised PNC search on your partner. You did not have any policing purpose to do so thereby breaching the ICT policy and the Computer Misuse Act.*

### *Professional Standards of Behaviour*

*In the circumstances, the Appropriate Authority contends that your actions breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour as set out in the Regulation 5 and Schedule 2 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (as amended by the Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2024, namely:*

- i. Confidentiality*
- ii. Duties and Responsibilities*
- iii. Discreditable Conduct*

*In that your conduct may bring the police service into disrepute and damage the relationship of trust and confidence between the police and the public.*

*As a result of that stated herein, if proven, your conduct individually or cumulatively amounts to gross misconduct, and your dismissal may be justified.*

## **Preliminary matters**

*Public proceedings:*

5. The Chair confirmed that in advance of the proceedings, he had been supplied with the hearing documents in accordance with Regulation 56 of the Police Conduct Regulations 2020 (as amended) and had determined that the hearing ought to be held in Public.

*Notice and service requirements:*

6. The Chair was satisfied that the requirements at Regulations 51 to 53 of the Conduct Regulations as to service had been complied with. PC Archer was in attendance and represented. She had provided a Regulation 54 response.

## **Background**

7. On 15<sup>th</sup> May 2025 PC Archer submitted a Clare's Law "Right to Ask" Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (DVDS) application online to the MPS relating to her then partner. In the request she detailed that she had been with him for just over a year and was concerned he was involved in criminality, namely drug dealing.
8. She wrote, *"I've become increasingly concerned for my safety and wellbeing due to his secretive behaviour. He has multiple phones, carries large amounts of cash (often £2,000-£3,000), and frequently goes out late at night without explaining where he's going. I now suspect he may be involved in illegal activity, possibly drug dealing. I feel unsure about who he really is and whether I'm safe continuing any contact with him."*
9. A meeting took place between PC Archer and **PC X** on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2025 in relation to the DVDS application. During this meeting PC Archer informed **PC X** that her partner had said he knew an individual captured in a Metbats briefing, which he had seen on her computer. Further, she said her partner had told her he knew who was responsible for a murder. PC Archer told **PC X** she had not done anything with this information. However, she had recently reported his potential drug dealing to Crimestoppers.
10. On 27<sup>th</sup> May 2025, when requested by PSU, PC Archer raised a Declarable Association. When this was reviewed, PC Archer's partner was graded as high risk with intelligence links to drug dealing and criminal associates.
11. At this point PC Archer's was still in a relationship with the high-risk individual. (As of the date of today's hearing, they were no longer together and, in the documentation, PC Archer communicated that she did not see herself getting back with him for at least 5 years.)

12. On 4<sup>th</sup> July 2025 an audit of MPS intelligence systems demonstrated that PC Archer had on 9<sup>th</sup> January 2025 (so roughly 4 months before the Clare’s Law request) conducted a PNC search in her partner’s name and date of birth.

### **Findings on the facts**

13. The Legal Adviser advised that the standard of proof within the proceedings was the civil standard. The Chair was advised that no finding could be made that the alleged conduct amounted to gross misconduct unless the Chair was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this was the case (Regulation 61(16)). The Chair was advised that the burden of proof rested with the AA.

14. The Chair received legal advice from the Legal Adviser in respect of *Kuzmin v GMC [2019] WLR 6660* and in particular that no adverse inference should be drawn in respect of the late Regulation 54 response (the lateness of which had been raised by the AA).

15. The Chair received legal advice that Allegations 1 through 3 particularise “failures” and was reminded that a failure imports a duty to do something, which was not done. The Legal Advisor referred the chair to Regulations Schedule 2: Standards of Professional Behaviour “*Orders and Instructions: Police officers abide by police regulations, force policies and lawful orders*” and the Declarable Associations and ICT policies.

16. Advice was further provided in relation to the statutory definition of ‘gross misconduct’ by reference to Regulation 2(1).

### **The Chair’s Findings on the facts alleged, any breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour and on Misconduct or Gross Misconduct**

17. Careful consideration was given to all of the documentary material together with the submissions made by the AA and the advice provided by the Legal Adviser. No adverse inference has been drawn from PC Archer’s late Regulation 54 response.

#### **Allegation 1:**

**It is alleged that you failed to disclose your partner to the Vetting Unit, who is a high-risk Declarable Association, despite having suspicions of criminal activity, and that you did not make this disclosure until prompted to do so by your Professional Standards Unit.**

18. The Chair concluded that this allegation was proven on the balance of probabilities for the reasons set out below.
19. The Declarable Associations Policy requires police officers to declare associations in the circumstances they “*know, believe or suspect*” that association is the “*subject of criminal intelligence or an interest marker*”. Associations “*having its everyday meaning*”, including “*friendship, relationship, intimacy or connection with a person*”.
20. In the circumstances PC Archer denied knowledge or understanding of the Declarable Associations policy, the Chair bore in mind the requirement upon police officers regarding adherence to policies per Schedule 2 (Standards of professional behaviour) “*Orders and Instructions: Police officers abide by police regulations, force policies and lawful orders.*”
21. The Chair concluded PC Archer had strong suspicions about her ex-partner’s criminal activity as stated in her Clare’s Law request and demonstrated by the fact she referred her ex-partner to Crime Stoppers. She accepted as much as the basis for her PNC check in her written and oral representations. In answering questions during the hearing, PC Archer stated she was not scared her ex-partner would harm her but she was suspicious he was involved in criminality (because of things she was observing) and wanted answers. “*I’ve been to so many calls I’ve seen where money and phones, I was concerned it could be that...if he brings drugs into the flat and coerced me into keeping them, it could end up in a bad situation*”.
22. In her Clare’s Law Disclosure Request PC Archer recorded she had been with her ex-partner for over a year. Therefore, if she was (as intimated) using the Clare’s Law process as a method of declaring an association, it was done too late.
23. In any event the Clare’s Law Disclosure process is not the mechanism for declaring an association to the police rather it is a confidential and protected process designed to provide information to the requester in circumstances of domestic violence and abuse concerns.
24. The Chair found PC Archer had reason to believe or suspect the person she had been seeing for a year was involved in criminality and/or had information about the criminality of others such that she was required to declare it according to the policy, which she did not do.

Allegation 2:

**It is alleged that you failed to report to the police intelligence that had been provided to you by your partner regarding a murder and a stabbing.**

25. The Chair concluded this allegation was proven on the balance of probabilities for the reasons set out below.
26. Metbats (stabbing): In answering questions during the hearing, PC Archer said her ex-partner saw an image on a MetBats briefing on her laptop and commented that he knew the individual. She said she quickly shut her laptop and did not ask him anything in relation to his comment. In her statement **PC X** (who dealt with the Clare's Law request meeting) stated PC Archer told her that her ex-partner saw an image on a MetBats briefing on her laptop and commented that he knew the individual and that the individual was involved in a stabbing. The Chair did not resolve whether PC Archer or **PC X** account was to be preferred. He found that PC Archer became aware of potential information about the identity of the person in the Metbats briefing and ultimately did nothing about that.
27. Murder: In answering questions during the hearing, PC Archer said her ex-partner told her he knew the man who shot [REDACTED], but she did not explore with him the possibility of speaking to police. Nor did she take steps herself to provide the information that a named individual may know the identity of the perpetrator to investigating officers, either directly or via an intelligence report. Notwithstanding she may be correct her ex-partner would not choose to engage with police (she said he had a mistrust of police), having obtained information of this nature and connected with such a serious offence she did not take any steps herself in relation to this information.
28. PC Archer discussed this [REDACTED] information with **PC X** in her Clare's Law meeting. In answering questions during the hearing, PC Archer said she was told the information days before her meeting with **PC X**. The Chair noted the murder occurred in early March 2025 and her meeting was on 20 May 2025.
29. In any event, the Clare's Law disclosure process is not a mechanism for declaring intelligence about an ongoing murder investigation. It is quite clearly a mechanism for obtaining not providing information. When asked in that meeting what she'd done about that information, it did not prompt any further action from PC Archer post the meeting.

**Allegation 3:**

**It is alleged that you allowed your partner to view confidential policing information contained within a MetBats briefing via your laptop at home. You failed to report or flag this data breach.**

30. The Chair concluded that this allegation was proven on the balance of probabilities for the reasons set out below.
31. There was no dispute between PC Archer and **PC X** as to the fact PC Archer informed her that her ex-partner was able to view her laptop, albeit briefly, when she opened it. Nor was there dispute between them as to the fact he commented upon an image he saw there. (PC Archer says he commented that he knew someone who was in a photograph on the MetBats briefing on her computer. **PC X** says PC Archer told her he said he knew the individual photographed was involved in a stabbing. The Chair considered he did not need to resolve this conflict.)
32. In answering questions during the hearing, PC Archer explained she opened her laptop to prepare for university the following day and it was still open on a Metbats briefing. At the time her ex-partner was in her periphery vision, therefore, he was in sight and able to view the contents. The Chair found that PC Archer's ex-partner did in fact see the contents, because he was able to comment on what he saw there. Further, he found that PC Archer knew this had happened because she heard and recalled the comment her ex-partner made about knowing the individual pictured there.
33. The Chair was satisfied PC Archer's ex-partner saw confidential policing information on her laptop and she did not report or flag this in any way with anyone in the police, despite her overriding concerns about her partner at the time.

#### **Allegation 4**

**It is alleged that on 9<sup>th</sup> January 2025, whilst on duty, you conducted an unauthorised PNC search on your partner. You did not have any policing purpose to do so thereby breaching the ICT policy and the Computer Misuse Act.**

34. The Chair concluded this allegation was proven on the balance of probabilities for the reasons set out below.
35. In answering questions during the hearing, PC Archer accepted that she carried out the PNC check in relation to her ex-partner. She gave some context as to her personal circumstances and the fact the ex-partner of her then partner (the subject of the PNC check and all preceding charges) was harassing her. She said the purpose of the check

was to give her some “insight”. PC Archer accepted it was “silly” to do the PNC check and she shouldn’t have done it.

36. The Chair bore in mind that while PC Archer accepted the search, it was for the AA to prove their case. Having considered the audit and what was evidenced elsewhere about PC Archer’s suspicions of her ex partner (Clare’s Law application), the Chair was satisfied on the balance of probabilities PC Archer did the PNC check and further that it was not for a policing purpose (but rather PC Archer’s personal interest in her partner’s criminal history), and therefore it was unauthorised.

### **Breach of standards**

37. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the actions of PC Archer breached the following Standards of Professional Behaviour:

*i. Confidentiality*

“Police officers treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the proper course of police duties.” The Chair considered creating/tolerating circumstances in which PC Archer’s ex partner could view confidential police briefings on her laptop clearly breached this. Further, he found searching the PNC database for personal reasons (entirely outside PC Archer’s policing work) clearly breached this.

*ii. Duties and Responsibilities*

Officers are expected to operate within force policies. The Chair considered PC Archer did not adhere to the Declarable Associations or ICT policies.

*iii. Discreditable Conduct*

The Chair considered PC Archer’s conduct in Allegations 1 through 4 was discreditable to the police, liable to affect the reputation of the police, and fundamentally undermine confidence in policing.

### Gross misconduct

38. The Chair reminded himself that gross misconduct is a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour so serious as to justify dismissal. He considered the seriousness of PC Archer’s breach, firstly in relation to her culpability and secondly in relation to the harm caused.

39. Culpability: The PNC check was intentional, and PC Archer cannot have been under any misapprehension that it was for a proper policing purpose. The failure to declare

and the failure to share information provided to her were omissions, but in the circumstances of PC Archer's concerns about her ex-partner's criminality the Chair was satisfied she was culpable. If, as PC Archer said, she was unsure, she should have sought advice, if not from the officers with whom she worked (whose leadership she criticised) from leadership at university or to personal policing contacts. PC Archer could have spoken to members of her own family (who have policing backgrounds) or to two colleagues with whom she stated she had positive relationships.

40. As a serving police officer, having these kinds of concerns about her partner of a year, should have caused PC Archer to act. She was clearly aware the risk his potential criminality brought upon her (of being implicated by circumstance or association) as she referred to it in her evidence as the reason she ultimately made a Clare's Law request.
41. Harm: The actual harm caused was a breach of PC Archer's ex-partner right to privacy and exposure to potential ICO fines. The reputational harm incurred is high. It undermines the public confidence in the police for officers to be seen to fail to adhere to policies in place to uphold the standards of the police, particularly those designed to overt corruption and protect people's private information. The public rightly expect officers to adhere to them.
42. Therefore, the Chair found the breach was at the standard of gross misconduct.

### **Findings on outcome**

43. A copy of PC Archer's service record was provided by the Appropriate Authority.
44. The Chair received the advice of the Legal Adviser and was advised to consider the College of Policing Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings. The Chair was advised to adopt the 'three stage process' as outlined within the College of Policing Guidance, namely, to assess the seriousness of the misconduct; to keep in mind the purpose of imposing sanctions; and to consider the sanction that most appropriately fulfils that purpose for the seriousness of the conduct in question.
45. The Chair was also advised as to the wording of Regulation 62 of the Police Conduct Regulations 2020 (as amended).

### **The Chair's Decision on Outcome**

46. Careful consideration was given to all of the documentary materials together with the submissions made on PC Archer's behalf and by the Appropriate Authority and the advice provided by the Legal Adviser. In making his decision on outcome, the Chair adopted the three-stage process, as outlined in the College of Policing's Guidance on Outcomes.
47. *Seriousness*: The Chair bore in mind that the first stage in determining the appropriate outcome is to assess the seriousness of the conduct. This is assessed by reference to: (i) the officer's culpability; (ii) the harm caused by the misconduct; (iii) the existence of aggravating factors; (iv) The existence of mitigating factors.
48. *The purpose of the police misconduct regime*: The second stage requires the Chair to keep in mind the purpose of the police misconduct regime. He reminded himself that this has three elements: (i) to maintain public confidence in, and the reputation of the police service; (ii) to uphold high standards and to deter misconduct, and (iii) to protect the public. He further reminded himself that the police misconduct regime is not designed to punish police officers. It is about the reputation and standing of the profession as a whole.
49. *Appropriate Sanction*: The third stage is to choose the outcome that most appropriately fulfils that purpose given the seriousness of the conduct in question.

### **Stage 1: the seriousness of the conduct**

50. Culpability: The PNC check was intentional, and PC Archer cannot have been under any misapprehension that it was for a proper policing purpose. The failure to declare and the failure to share information provided to her were omissions, but in the circumstances of PC Archer's concerns about her ex-partner's criminality the Chair was satisfied she was culpable. If, as PC Archer said, she was unsure, she should have sought advice, if not from the officers with whom she worked (whose leadership she criticised) from leaders at university or to personal policing contacts. PC Archer could have spoken to members of her own family (who have policing backgrounds) or to two colleagues with whom she stated she had positive relationships.
51. As a serving police officer, having these kinds of concerns about her partner of a year, should have caused PC Archer to act. She was clearly aware the risk his potential criminality brought upon her (of being implicated by circumstance or association) as she referred to it in her evidence as the reason she ultimately made a Clare's Law request.

52. Harm: The actual harm caused was a breach of PC Archer's ex-partner right to privacy and exposure to potential ICO fines. The reputational harm incurred is high. It undermines the public confidence in the police for officers to be seen to fail to adhere to policies in place to uphold the standards of the police, particularly those designed to overt corruption and protect people's private information. The public rightly expect officers to adhere to them.
53. "4.36 - *Accessing confidential police information without a legitimate policing purpose is an abuse of an officer's position and may merit dismissal in serious cases. Accidental access to information without a legitimate policing purpose will not attract such an outcome.*" The Chair considered **PC Archer** accessing her ex-partner's PNC out of personal curiosity to be captured by the first sentence and amount to an abuse.
54. Aggravating Factors: The Chair noted there are multiple proven allegations. However, he bore in mind they relate to the same factual matrix and are in effect separate aspects of the same flawed thinking and failings around PC Archer's personal circumstances and duties. He did not identify any other aggravating factors.
55. Mitigating Factors: The Chair found very significant personal mitigation in PC Archer's case. Clearly her circumstances were very difficult at the time of the proven conduct - a period of homelessness, [REDACTED], ceasing to speak to her stepmother, and a lack of support at work with these issues and more generally. [REDACTED]. It was clear to the Chair PC Archer has endured some incredibly difficult periods in her life both before, during and after this proven misconduct.
56. [REDACTED]. Therefore, while it provides significant mitigation as to PC Archer's personal circumstances since the proven misconduct occurred and to this day, it does not bare on what was operating on her mind at the time of the proven allegations (for example by this event impacting on her being able to communicate with police colleagues) and reduce the seriousness in that way.
57. PC Archer said she was not aware of the Declarable Associations policy and did not know what to do in the circumstances. The Chair found firstly, there was a duty upon PC Archer as a serving police officer to abide by the policies applicable to her and designed to uphold policing standards. In the circumstances of PC Archer's concerns (that her ex-partner was dealing drugs, which she based on the number of phones and amounts of cash she was seeing) and her fear he would bring drugs to her property, it was incumbent upon her to take steps.

58. It is common sense that if PC Archer (a police officer) was concerned, her partner was engaged in criminal behaviour and would implicate her, it was incumbent upon her to take steps. However, she did not research her duties or turn to anyone. The only steps she took, after over a year of being with her ex-partner, was to try to obtain information for herself (through the Clare's Law request and the unauthorised PNC request), rather than to declare her association or flag the data breach or information of which she's become aware from him. Therefore, the Chair considered PC Archer's lack of awareness of the policy provided limited (if any) mitigation in the circumstances.
59. Conclusion on Seriousness: Taking all these matters into consideration, the Chair assessed the seriousness of the misconduct as high. While PC Archer's personal mitigation is high ([REDACTED]), and mitigates PC Archer's culpability to some extent, it cannot negate the seriousness of the misconduct.

### **Stage 2: the purpose of the misconduct regime**

60. The Chair considered the threefold purpose of the police misconduct regime carefully in considering the appropriate outcome in this case. The police misconduct regime is not designed to punish police officers, it is about the reputation and standing of the profession as a whole. It is to uphold standards and to ensure that the public is protected.
61. Protecting the public: PC Archer shared confidential police information, and then failed to flag this breach had occurred, notwithstanding she had serious concerns about the individual with whom it had been shared.
62. Maintaining public confidence: She failed to flag her association per the policy or in any way until over a year into the relationship and she did not pass on the information she received (including about a murder) even after the Clare's Law meeting. Such conduct requires a response that will uphold trust and confidence in the MPS.
63. Upholding standards of behaviour: PC Archer's actions represent a serious and sustained departure from the expected standards of a serving police officer. A departure from the requisite standards of conduct requires an appropriate response to uphold standards of behaviour.

### **Stage 3: the appropriate outcome**

64. The Chair considered the officer's record of service and read the provided character statement and background material ([REDACTED]).

65. He considered the wording of Regulation 62 (as amended), which makes clear that in a case where gross misconduct has already been established, unless the decision maker is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify a different outcome, a sanction of dismissal without notice is required.
66. The Chair considered this case very carefully and had well in mind PC Archer's significant personal mitigation.
67. Firstly, the Chair acknowledged what PC Archer said about her lack of knowledge or understanding of the Declarable Associations policy. This may provide some mitigation, but it does not provide exceptional circumstances. She was a serving police officer 18 months into service. Her Hendon training was very much within living memory and in any event, she was required to abide by the policies that applied to her as a serving police officer. Not knowing or seeking to equip herself with the knowledge to act in accordance with policy does not provide her with exceptional circumstances. In the circumstances here (PC Archer's high suspicion her partner was involved in criminal conduct as a drug dealer, and she risked being implicated), her failure to act in any way to vitiate that risk (per the policy or otherwise) for over a year or take steps to find out her duties in the circumstances are especially concerning.
68. The Chair considered PC Archer's experiences in childhood and the difficulties she has endured at the time of the misconduct events and since. These are truly to be regretted, and the Chair expresses his sympathy. However, he did not consider these circumstances provide exceptional circumstances in this case.
69. The regime is not designed to be punitive and that is not the purpose of this sanction. Rather it is to declare and uphold standards, to protect the public and maintain public confidence. As a police officer with enduring and specific concerns about the criminality of her intimate partner (such that she feared being implicated by him keeping drugs at her home) PC Archer failed to raise anything with the police until over a year of being with him. When she did, she did so by a mechanism designed to provide her with information rather than provide the police with information. Most concerning she used her access to confidential records to address her own curiosity (entirely outside any authorised policing purpose) but did not take any steps to pass on the information that came into her knowledge.
70. In any event, having considered the nature and seriousness of PC Archer's conduct together with the severity of the breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour, the Chair was satisfied that no lesser sanction than dismissal would be appropriate.

71. The Chair decision therefore is that the only viable option is that PC Archer be **dismissed without notice** and placed on the College of Policing barred list.

### **Decision on Publication**

72. Having further considered the submissions on publication from the AA, it is further directed that this decision shall be published in accordance with Regulation 63(5) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (as amended).

73. However, it is directed that the following aspects should not be reported or published: the name of PC Archer's ex-partner, anything related to her health, or the specified matters of personal mitigation ([REDACTED]).

**Chairperson's signature: Cmdr Stephen Clayman**

**Date: 23 March 2026**

### **Right of Appeal**

A police officer has a right of appeal against any disciplinary finding and/or disciplinary outcome imposed at an Accelerated Misconduct Hearing held under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (as amended). Notification of this right of appeal is provided in accordance with Regulation 63(2) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (as amended).